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

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

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

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

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

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# THE GREAT WAR

FIFTH VOLUME
THE TRIUMPH
OF DEMOCRACY

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# THE GREAT WAR

## FIFTH VOLUME
## THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY

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# PREFACE

Adeo varia fortuna belli ancepsque Mars fuit ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt . . . Livy 21, 1.

[*So shifting was the fortune of the struggle and so ambiguous the favor of Mars that those who conquered had been in the greatest peril.*]

The present volume completes the series on the Great War with an account of the general progress of events from the closing days of 1917 to the formal acceptance of the terms of peace by Germany on June 28, 1919, the fifth anniversary of the fatal murder at Sarajevo. It deals with the disappointing outcome of the great hopes of the Allies in 1917; the upheaval which detached Russia from the Western Powers; the economic and political situation and prospects of the Central Empires at a time when unlimited possibilities lay before them; the development of the effective military strength of the United States; Germany's stupendous efforts in the West, which in a few days swept away the laboriously acquired gains of its opponents and created the supreme crisis of the whole war; the sudden turning of the tide of victory; the collapse of the Quadruple Alliance; and the deliberations from which the peace treaty issued.

These tremendous movements present a dramatic spectacle without parallel in history. They are fraught with intensest human interest and significance. Allusion will also be made incidentally to subsidiary issues and events,

such as those involved in the confusion of Eastern Europe after Russia's downfall. But divergent themes will be included only as they bear directly on the principal action and their treatment must in all cases be brief.

The life and experience of humanity are continuous in time and space. No absolute bounds can be set to great historical movements. They rise imperceptibly like the waves of the sea and lose themselves in other movements. The character of incompleteness is especially inherent in the subject matter of the present work. The Great War and its close are a beginning rather than a fulfilment. They have created or given prominence to more and greater problems than they have solved.

After the heroic exaltation of the four years' struggle, after all the splendid hopes, promises, and predictions, peace brought the disillusionment of imperfect reality. The supposed settlement, like so many other diplomatic monuments of history, leaves a sorrowful impression of inadequacy and inconclusiveness. But for this very reason the age upon which we now enter will be momentous for humanity, because it will be filled with strivings for the solution of problems of immeasurable importance. The merit and honor of the nations will be tested by their attitude towards these fundamental tasks.

But the lessons of the Great War offer positive encouragement and guidance in future trials. The war has been as truly a struggle of whole peoples as of armies, a fact so universally recognized that the spirit of the populations has been the constant preoccupation of governments, staffs, and all intelligent observers. The resistance of the armies would have quickly waned without the determination of the peoples behind them. Hence it is a supremely significant indication that the only great power which failed to hold out to the last was the one in which liberty

was least developed and that the nations which faced reverses with the greatest tenacity were those in which democratic principles were most firmly rooted. Democracy as the fundamental rule of life for enlightened nations has thus stood the fiery test, and the close of the Great War may justly be regarded as the Triumph of Democracy.

GEORGE H. ALLEN, PH. D.

# CHAPTER I

## The War in Africa and Asia

Political situation in South Africa at the beginning of the Great War. General Botha's loyalty and the suppression of the rebellion. Campaign of the South African Union against German Southwest Africa: the plan for converging operations; successful advance in the north; coöperation of the three columns in the south and the occupation of Keetmanshoop on April 20, 1915; capitulation of Windhoek, May 12th; final surrender of German forces, July 9th. Penetration of the interior of Kamerun by British and French; completion of conquest of Kamerun in February, 1916. Desultory operations on the borders of German East Africa. Vigorous offensive inaugurated by General Smuts, largely with South African forces, in the spring of 1916. Portugal's intervention in the war. British and Belgian converging operations and the expulsion of the Germans from German East Africa in November, 1917. New campaign against Palestine launched by General Allenby in October, 1917; the Turkish Gaza-Beersheba position overcome, October 27-November 7; rapid British movement northward; operations for isolating Jerusalem, surrender of the city, December 9th. Progress of the war in Arabia. British offensive northward and the conquest of Damascus. British advance in Mesopotamia. Reflections on the significance of the events related.

It was often stated as axiomatic of the strategy of the Great War that the destiny of colonial empires would be decided on the battlefields of Europe. But even if this were true, it would not follow that the conflict in Africa was entirely without significance. On the contrary, the forces in the German protectorates, which the Allies' control of the sea excluded in any case from direct participation in the chief theaters of war, could, by their operations in Africa, retain there Allied troops equal or superior to themselves in numbers which might otherwise have been arrayed against the German armies in France. Operations in Africa, which from the numbers engaged would rank with events in Europe that scarcely deserved more than passing mention,

were rendered memorable by reason of the great distances traversed and the great natural difficulties overcome. A considerable part of the public first learned the identity and names of the German protectorates when they ceased to exist as such.

A brief account was given in Volume III of the early occurrences of the war in Africa; we shall now follow the course of the campaigns in that continent to the point when the last vestige of German rule was swept away.

Impartial minds may differ widely in their judgment of the British government's position in the conflict which extinguished the existence of the two Boer republics (1899-1902); but Great Britain's treatment of the vanquished deserves unqualified admiration. The granting of self-government to the Transvaal in 1906, only four years after the close of the bitter struggle, and to the Orange Free State the next year was an act of magnanimous statesmanship preliminary to the federation of the four autonomous British colonies in the South African Union in May, 1910. The development of a spirit of tolerance and coöperation was thus fostered and the confidence of the British government has been amply justified.

Yet it is not surprising that the resentment of a people distinguished for their tenacity did not entirely disappear at once and that, at the time of the outbreak of the Great War in Europe, there was still a certain number of irreconcilable, intensely anti-British Boers, as well as a larger number who stood for a separate national development of the peoples of South Africa in combination, apart from the British Empire. The Nationalists, as these were called, led by General Hertzog, formerly a Boer commander, were opposed by the Unionists under Louis Botha, once the ablest of the Boer generals, now the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.

Botha's vigorous support of Imperial defense bore striking testimony to the potency of the ideal of a voluntary partnership of free peoples as embodied in the British Empire. His courage, sagacity, and tact were soon to render an indispensable service to the cause which he had espoused. By their loyalty in discharging during a critical period the most responsible duties under the British Crown, prominent Boer leaders and statesmen manifested the verdict of history on the treacherous spirit that had inspired the famous Kruger telegram.

Besides antagonism due to Dutch nationalistic feeling, an important factor in the general South African situation had been the violent labor disturbances in 1913 and the early part of 1914, culminating in the arbitrary deportation of nine of the principal agitators by the Botha government. The labor element and the Nationalists tended to act together in opposition to the government. There was still much latent discontent, and the Germans were doubtless encouraged in the hope that South Africa would be a source of preoccupation rather than of assistance to the mother country, in case of war. It is scarcely necessary to add, in view of the proximity of the German protectorate as a base, that the Germans had been carrying on an active campaign of intrigue throughout the Union.

When the Union Parliament assembled on September 8, 1914, General Botha announced his intention of invading German Southwest Africa. The Nationalists opposed this project, holding that, as long as the Union was unmolested, it should take no active part in the war, but the policy of the government prevailed by a large majority.

On September 19th Brigadier-general Christian F. Beyers resigned the chief command of the Citizen Defense Force of the Union and Premier Botha took the command in

person. The first act of rebellion occurred in the northwestern part of the Cape Province, where Lieutenant-colonel Solomon G. Maritz, who had fought on the Boer side in the South African War, entered into a secret understanding with the enemy and won over most of his commando to make common cause with the Germans, arresting those who refused. Defying Colonel Conrad Brits, who was sent to take over his command early in October, he raised the standard of revolt near Upington, but was driven over the border into German Southwest Africa before the close of the month.

By this time, Beyers was gathering recruits in western Transvaal and Christian de Wet, who had commanded the Orange Free State forces in the Boer War, was fomenting rebellion in the northern part of his home province. On October 26th Botha called for volunteers and there were soon as many as 30,000 under arms. Taking the field in person, he fell on Beyers near Rustenburg, about eighty miles west of Pretoria, on the 27th, dispersing the latter's followers.

Beyers retreated into the Orange River Colony, where De Wet had opened the campaign of rebellion by defeating a detachment of loyalists under General Cronje at Wimburg on November 7th. Botha dealt De Wet a decisive blow near Marquard on the 11th and again defeated Beyers four days later, before the latter could join his fellow insurgent leader. With a few followers, De Wet attempted to escape into German Southwest Africa on horseback, but was overtaken by Union troops in automobiles and compelled to surrender, December 1st, about 100 miles west of Mafeking. Beyers was drowned while attempting to swim across the Vaal. About 1,200 insurgents led by Colonel Maritz and Lieutenant-colonel Kemp made a final rally, attacking Colonel van

Deventer at Upington, but were dispersed, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kemp and his followers surrendered on February 3, 1915.

General De Wet was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a fine of £2,000 on June 21, 1915, but was released in December of the same year with 118 others convicted of treason.

With the suppression of the rebellion the Union government was free to prosecute a vigorous campaign against German Southwest Africa. On January 14, 1915, Union forces, then holding Walfish Bay and its vicinity, seized the neighboring German port of Swakopmund, the starting point of railway lines to Windhoek and Grootfontein. Lüderitz Bay, which was connected by a southern railway line through Keetmanshoop with Windhoek, had been in British hands since September, so that the German protectorate was effectively cut off from the sea.

Botha's plan of operations consisted in a concentric advance of four different columns into German Southwest Africa with Windhoek as the common objective. He took personal command of a northern force which was to move from Swakopmund along the railway eastward. The operations of the remaining forces, in the south, were under the general command of Botha's able lieutenant, General Jan Christian Smuts. One column under Sir Duncan Mackenzie was to follow the railway from Lüderitz Bay inland, the route of a second column under Colonel van Deventer lay from the Orange River fords to Warmbad and thence northward along the railway, while the third under Colonel Berrange was ordered to start from Kimberley and penetrate the German protectorate from the east. After these three columns had united, they would proceed northward under Smuts, and, with the troops of Botha, close in on Windhoek, the capital.

Neither means nor efforts were spared in the execution of this comprehensive plan. It involved the transportation of about 30,000 men (more than one-half being mounted) from 500 to 700 miles by sea, besides the marshalling of the land forces on the frontier of the Union. To facilitate the landing operations in the north, Swakopmund and Walfish Bay were connected by a railway line in January, 1915.

Botha started inland on February 22d and after several successful engagements reached Karibib Junction on May 5th. Van Deventer gained the railway terminus at Warmbad on April 3d, cleared the enemy from the Karas Mountains flanking on the right his line of progress northward, and entered Seeheim, the railway junction, on April 17th. Colonel Berrange crossed the eastern border of the German protectorate on March 19th and after several skirmishes joined van Deventer near Keetmanshoop, which surrendered, April 20th. After following the railway eastward as far as Aus, Mackenzie struck off to the northeast for the purpose of cutting the main line north of Keetmanshoop and defeated a German force near Gibeon on April 28th.

Windhoek, threatened on all sides, surrendered to Botha on May 10th, but the bulk of the German forces had withdrawn to the region of Grootfontein in the northeastern part of the protectorate. The British advance along the northern line towards Grootfontein began in June. After minor engagements at Otavifontein and Gaub, Dr. Seitz, the German governor, opened communications with General Botha and the Germans laid down their arms on July 9th. The number surrendering was reported as 3,497, including 204 officers. The victors had already made about 1,500 prisoners.

Although the Union forces were several times more numerous than their adversaries, the unfailing precision

with which the campaign was carried through to victory in spite of the great distances, the trying climatic conditions, and the difficulties of supply and transportation, reflected great credit on the Union and its leaders.

The general election held throughout the South African Union in October, 1915, was an emphatic popular endorsement of the governmental policy, the Unionists obtaining forty seats in the new parliament; the Nationalists secured twenty-seven; the Independents, five; and the Labor party, four.

As already observed in Volume III, the earliest Allied incursions into Kamerun encountered spirited resistance, although the Germans were comparatively few in number and the defense depended mainly on native troops trained by German officers. Later, the invaders were greatly impeded by the natural difficulties of movement, swamps and forests, the rainy season, and the intense heat, and the campaign was carried on in part as a series of isolated undertakings. The principal Allied force, chiefly French colonial infantry, under Brigadier-general C. M. Dobell, operated in separate columns along the two railway lines running inland from Duala, while Allied contingents invaded the protectorate from Nigeria and the French possessions on the north, east, and south.

By October, 1914, the German forces had fallen back to defensive positions in the interior. Edea on the Sarranga River, about fifty miles from Duala, was occupied on October 26th. The surrender of Garua near the northwestern border of Kamerun to a combined Franco-British force on June 11, 1915, practically completed the conquest of the northern part of the protectorate. The Allied columns in the north, advancing southwards, occupied Ngaundere in central Kamerun on June 29th, the German forces withdrawing to the hilly region north of the sources of the Sanga.

In the meantime, Lome had fallen on June 25th and in the south the French had taken nearly all the territory as far as the former boundary line.

Finally, the British, Belgian, and French expeditions converged on the remaining German positions. Yaunde was taken, January 1, 1916, and early in February, the German commander, General Zimmermann, with his force of 900 Germans and 14,000 natives crossed the boundary into Spanish Guinea for internment and Kamerun was partitioned between the British and the French for the purpose of administration.

The German East African protectorate extended from the Indian Ocean westward to Victoria Nyanza and Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. It was bordered on the north and the south by British East Africa and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique, respectively, and touched on the west the Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. With an estimated area of 384,170 square miles and a population of 7,666,000, it was the largest, most populous, and most valuable of the German overseas possessions. The surface rising in a succession of natural terraces towards the interior presented a considerable range of climate and products, from the hot, low-lying coastal zone, with tropical vegetation, to the temperate pampas of the lofty plateaux. The natural lines of communication were the river valleys descending from the interior eastward to the coast. The Germans had constructed a northern railway line from Tanga to the base of the great volcanic mass of Kilimanjaro with 219 miles of track and a central line traversing the protectorate from the capital, Dar-es-Salaam, to Lake Tanganyika with 777 miles of track.

Allusion was made in Volume III to some of the hostile occurrences on the borders of this German dependency in the earliest period of the war. The German forces in East

Africa were directed throughout a long and bitter struggle with remarkable vigor and dexterity by an able, resolute commander, von Lettow-Vorbeck, until finally they were overwhelmed by superior numbers under leadership which was a match for his.

Von Lettow-Vorbeck had devoted special attention to native troops and his forces probably numbered about 2,000 Germans and 14,000 Arab and negro levies trained by German officers. He had, besides, a formidable equipment of more than 100 Krupp seventy-seven millimeter field pieces and several hundred machine-guns. At first these forces far outnumbered the aggregate strength of the Allies in the conterminous territories. The political leaders in Germany had dreamed of a German dominion stretching across central Africa from sea to sea, of which the East African protectorate would form the principal nucleus. During the war the Kaiser ordered the Germans in East Africa to hold out to the very last and we shall see that von Lettow-Vorbeck complied to the letter with the imperial mandate. He had the advantage of operating on interior lines and at first, at least, with superior communication facilities. His supplies were occasionally replenished by a ship slipping through the British blockade of the coast, and ammunition was manufactured in local establishments.

At the outset the British forces in East Africa and Uganda, numbering less than 1,000 men, received the feeble accession of two small volunteer units raised among the white settlers. Brigadier-general T. M. Stewart, reaching Nairobi with reinforcements from India on September 3, 1914, took command for a time. The advance of a German detachment of 600 along the coast towards Mombasa was arrested by a small British force at Gazi.

A second British Indian expeditionary force under Major-general Aitken arrived off the German East African coast

at the beginning of November, but a landing party attempting to take Tanga was repulsed with 800 casualties. This was followed by desultory encounters. A German column advancing by the coastal route invaded British territory but was repulsed by the land forces with the coöperation of a British squadron, and three Indian companies occupied Jassin as an advanced post twenty miles within the German border. These were overpowered and compelled to surrender, January 19, 1915.

A distinguished Indian officer, Brigadier-general Tighe, was appointed in April commander of the troops in British East Africa with the rank of major-general, but operations continued fitfully throughout the year without definite results for either party. At the beginning of 1916 the East African protectorate, the only colony left to Germany, was still intact.

The systematic invasion of the German territory was finally undertaken in the spring of 1916, after a large South African force had been brought to British East Africa and General Jan Christian Smuts, who had won a brilliant reputation in the Southwest African campaign, received the chief command. General Smuts arrived at Mombasa, February 19, 1916.

A political event of considerable significance occurring at this time had an important bearing on the East African campaign: Portugal, after many months of waiting, entered the war on the side of the Allies. Portugal's precarious financial condition had perhaps delayed this expected step. The Portuguese had had reason to dread German penetration and German designs, particularly in their rich colonial possessions. A suggestion for a partition of the Portuguese dependencies in Africa between Germany and Great Britain had emanated from the former power but had failed to seduce the latter from loyalty to an alliance with Portugal which dated back to 1373.

Formal declaration of solidarity with Great Britain was made in the tribune of the Congress in Lisbon by the Prime Minister, Bernardo Machado, August 7, 1914. But far from translating this sentiment into immediate warlike action, Portugal continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Central Empires. At the same time it favored Great Britain by offering the freedom of its ports to British shipping, while withholding supplies of coal from German vessels. After his ascendancy had suffered a temporary eclipse from the intrigues of political adversaries, Machado, a determined advocate of intervention on the side of the Allies, became President of the Portuguese republic. With the sanction of parliament, the Portuguese government requisitioned thirty-six German and Austro-Hungarian merchantmen moored in the Tagus on February 24, 1916, and eight German steamships at St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, on the next day, claiming that the destruction of shipping by German submarines made this measure a public necessity. Although compensation was offered, Germany demanded the release of the vessels and, upon Portugal's refusal, declared war on Portugal, March 9th, alleging at the same time certain other breaches of neutrality, such as the granting of free passage for British troops through Mozambique. Henceforth the German East African protectorate, bounded by enemy territory throughout its entire land frontier and closely blockaded by sea, was completely encircled by a hostile ring.

Notwithstanding the British command of the sea and the fact that the natural lines of communication ran east and west in the German territory, General Smuts planned his offensive from the north, instead of attacking the coast, utilizing thereby the existing organization for supply and keeping the operations, as far as possible, in the healthier upland regions of the interior. But the difficulties involved

in advancing athwart the natural and developed routes were very great.

The British, now outnumbering the German forces, were organized in two divisions in British East Africa, besides the contingents near Victoria Nyanza and on the borders of Nyasaland and Rhodesia. The First Division under General Stewart was directed to make its way from Longido around the western slope of Kilimanjaro, while the Second Division, under General Tighe, supported by the First South African Mounted Brigade, commanded by General van Deventer, struck southwestward between Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mountains. The First Division set out on March 5, 1916, the Second on the 8th. After some difficult fighting this double maneuver was completely successful, the German forces were driven from the region of Kilimanjaro, and the door to the German protectorate was won. The British descended to the northern railway line.

The invading forces were now reorganized in three divisions, the First under Major-general Hoskins, the Second under Major-general van Deventer, and the Third under Major-general Brits. Van Deventer pushed out boldly towards the southwest to threaten the central railway, taking Kondoa Irangi and repulsing German counter-attacks on May 7-10. A few days after this, the First and Third Divisions began their march down the left bank of the Pangani River, threatening the retreat of German forces from the mountain ranges along the border. On June 19th the British occupied Handeni as a suitable base for a further advance against the central railway. Tanga was occupied on July 7th and became a useful maritime base.

The Belgians on the western border of the protectorate and the British in the region of Victoria Nyanza now

joined in the offensive. On July 14th a part of van Deventer's division reached the central railway line. Advancing in three columns, Smuts's main force cleared the Nguri Hills, a rugged tract of territory, August 6-15, forcing their opponents to retire on Morogoro on the central railway. Smuts recovered touch with van Deventer and the British forces entered Morogoro on August 26th, the enemy retreating southward.

Brigadier-general Edwards, who in the meantime had been advancing along the coast, with the coöperation of a British squadron, compelled Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of the protectorate, to surrender on September 3d. Eventually the eastern section of the central railway was repaired and became a much shorter line of supply starting from Dar-es-Salaam as maritime base. In the west, Tobora was taken by the Belgians, September 19th, but the German garrison escaped towards the southeast.

From this time the progress of the invasion was much slower. The German forces had been almost entirely driven from the healthier parts of the country and the British entered upon a stage of operations in which the attacks of disease would be no less formidable than the resistance of the enemy. About 12,000 men were sent back to South Africa as unfit for service in the pestilential regions and the Third Division was disbanded. In November, the First Division under General Hoskins was transferred to a new base at Kilwa on the coast, whence it could threaten the German forces on the right flank and in the rear. The British effected the crossing of the Rufiji early in January and with the advance from Kilwa closed in on von Lettow-Vorbeck from three sides.

General Smuts did not remain to complete the war in Africa. His services received well-merited recognition by his appointment to the Imperial War Conference in

England and he sailed from Dar-es-Salaam on January 27th. Lieutenant-general Hoskins, who took his place as commander-in-chief, was in turn succeeded by General van Deventer in May.

The German forces now formed two principal groups, one of 4,000-5,000 men under von Lettow-Vorbeck's immediate command in the Matandu valley, the other of 2,000-3,000 men under Tafel in the region of Mahenge. Von Lettow-Vorbeck gradually retired southward. Belgian forces coöperated from the west in the operations against Tafel, who was entrapped and forced to surrender on November 28th. Von Lettow-Vorbeck with a remnant of about 2,000 men had already crossed the Rovuma into Portuguese territory. The German East African protectorate was thus left entirely in the hands of the Allies and the final remnant of Germany's colonial empire was swept away.

Our account of British operations against Palestine closed in Volume IV with the failure of the attack on Gaza, by which the expeditionary force was brought to a stand on the edge of the desert along the southwestern border of the country. The Turkish army was increased to a total of nine divisions of infantry and one of cavalry and its positions were greatly strengthened. Gaza, situated near the point of a spur projecting westward from the main ridge of Palestine, where the coastal plain is narrowest, guards the natural gateway opening from the Sinai desert northward. The town was defended by earthworks among the dunes along the coast and on the eminences eastward. Under German direction, the Turks had created six fortified positions along the front from Gaza to Beersheba, with connecting lines of trenches and an excellent motor road for lateral communications. A light railway from Jaffa to Gaza served as the main artery for supplies. The problem

of transportation, particularly of providing an adequate supply of water, was extremely difficult for the British, except near the railway which they had constructed from Egypt, and an enormous number of pack animals was required for replenishing the right wing stretching out upon the desert.

Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, who had been appointed to succeed Sir Archibald Murray in the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, arrived at the end of June, 1917, and decided to resume the offensive against an enemy superior in numbers and stronger in position. His plan was to create a diversion by assaulting Gaza and then to push through an interval of four and one-half miles between the fortified positions to the northwest of Beersheba and roll up his adversaries' left flank. Three months were spent in preparing for this attack. The base for the main operation was a point ten miles south of Beersheba, from which the mounted forces were to make a detour to the east of Beersheba while the infantry attacked the Turkish line in front.

The bombardment of Gaza began on October 27th and on the same day a Turkish reconnaissance in force was repulsed. On the 30th the naval squadron joined in the bombardment and at the same time the concentration of the main attacking force south of Beersheba was completed. It consisted of two divisions and an additional brigade of infantry, the Imperial Camel Corps, a cavalry regiment, and the mounted column for the turning movement on the right. The British advanced to the battle position before Beersheba by bright moonlight on the night of October 30-31. In the morning, the Turks, taken by surprise, were quickly driven from their advanced position. After a bombardment, the two infantry divisions carried by assault the principal defenses of

Beersheba early in the afternoon. The British cavalry engaged the enemy to the east and north, cutting off retreat by the Hebron road and early in the evening the Australian Light Horse made its way into Beersheba.

To distract the attention of the Turks from their threatened left flank, the British directed a frontal attack at the other extremity of the line, against the western defenses of Gaza, on the night of November 1-2, driving a wedge between this town and the sea. On the other hand, the Turks threatened in vain the right flank of the main British attacking force which was now moving northwestward along the Beersheba-Gaza line.

At dawn on the 6th, the latter attacked the Turkish forces from Tel-el-Khuweilfeh on the east to Kauwukah on the west with such success that Hareira was taken and the cavalry could be sent northward to threaten the enemy's retreat from Gaza. The final attack on Gaza during the following night encountered slight resistance, and by the 7th the Turkish army had completely abandoned the Beersheba-Gaza line and was hastily retreating northwards.

The British occupied Ascalon on the 9th and pressed forward as rapidly as possible so as to gain the junction of the railway to Jerusalem in time to cut off the Turkish forces in the Philistian plain from those retreating by the eastern route along the ridge. In spite of the difficulties of supply, augmenting rapidly as the distance from the British railhead increased, this object was attained on the 14th. Two days later, the occupation of Jaffa afforded the British a new maritime base.

After crumpling up the formidable line of Turkish defenses, the British had executed a brilliant advance of seventy miles in nine days, fighting all the way. Progress now became much slower because of the arduous nature of the ascent from the coastal plain eastward towards Jerusalem.

General Jan Christian Smuts, commander of the British forces in the campaign against German East Africa.

General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby, commander of the Allied forces which operated against Palestine.

Besides the railway from Jaffa to Jerusalem, there was a good highway ascending a valley to the north of the railway. The British infantry advanced eastward by several routes with their right flank resting on this Jaffa-Jerusalem highway with the aim of severing communication between Jerusalem and the north. By November 22d the British had gotten within two miles of the main highway from Jerusalem to Nablus and Damascus, when the Turks began a series of vigorous counter-attacks, checking the progress of their adversaries for about two weeks.

The British on the north and west of Jerusalem prepared for the final operations, while the Welsh division and a cavalry regiment, which had taken Tel-el-Khuweilfeh on November 6th, left their positions north of Beersheba on December 4th and advanced along the Hebron-Jerusalem road so as to close in on the city from the south and east.

Von Falkenhayn had come to Jerusalem but departed when he perceived that the situation was hopeless. In spite of a heavy rain, which set in on December 7th and impeded the movement and installation of the larger pieces of artillery, the British attacked at dawn on the 8th, soon carried their first objectives, and by nightfall had almost reached the Jerusalem-Nablus road. On the morning of the 9th they gained a position astride the road, four miles north of Jerusalem, while the troops from the south cut the Jericho road northeast of the city. At noon on the same day Jerusalem was surrendered.

Even in the present age of realism the imagination of mankind was deeply impressed by the conquest of Jerusalem, the holy city of the Jews, the Mohammedans, and the Christians, the goal of pilgrims and crusaders, the symbol of ecstatic aspiration. The moral effect was very great.

General Allenby made his official entry at noon on the 11th in a manner befitting the solemnity of the event.

Accompanied by the commanders of the French and the Italian detachments which had coöperated with the British expedition, the French, Italian, and American military attachés, a few members of the General Staff, and a guard of honor, the British commander was met outside the walls by the military governor, entered the Jaffa Gate on foot, and was greeted as a deliverer by the joyous multitude of many nationalities that thronged the narrow streets and crowded the balconies and house-tops. When he reached the steps of the citadel, at the base of David's Tower, his proclamation was read to the people, assuring them that the rights of persons and property, and particularly the sanctity of all sacred places, would be scrupulously observed.

"Since your city," declared General Allenby, "is regarded with affection by the adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make known to you that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred."

Thus Jerusalem was liberated after four centuries of Turkish misrule. There had long been an Arab prophecy that a deliverer would come from the West, bearing the name of a Prophet of God, that he would enter Jerusalem on foot, and would appear when the Nile flowed into Palestine. The populace observed that the name of the British commander signified in Arabic the "Prophet" and that his men had brought with them the waters of Egypt.

The British front was pressing northward when the Turks made a determined effort to retake Jerusalem. A

series of fierce attacks, beginning at 2 A.M. on December 27th, continued for twenty-six hours without decisive effect. Finally, General Allenby directed a counter-attack against the western flank of the Turkish forces, paralyzing their offensive. The British made a general attack on the 28th and by the 30th they had reached a line twelve miles north of Jerusalem.

It will be recalled that in June, 1916, an Arabic uprising had been added to the forces defying the grandiose Pan-Islamic projects of the Turks and Germans. With the encouragement of the Allies, the Grand Sherif of Mecca, guardian of the Ka'ba, the most sacred mosque of Islam, a member of the Koreish tribe, to which Mohammed belonged, Hussein Ibu Ali by name, the greatest of the Arabian chiefs, had declared himself independent of Turkey and eventually took the title of King of Hedjaz. He had quickly gained possession of all Hedjaz except Medina, which was held by a strong Turkish garrison supplied by the Hedjaz railway from Damascus.

The Arabian insurgents advanced northwestward, defeated the Turks near Ma'an, southeast of the Dead Sea, and henceforth harassed the railway leading to Medina. In January, 1918, the Arabs occupied the Turkish post of Tafile, eighteen miles southeast of the Dead Sea, and would soon reach a position for active coöperation with the British.

With a view to linking the British front with the Arabic forces, in anticipation of combined operations, the British right flank started a movement northeastward on February 19, 1918, captured Jericho after some sharp fighting on the 21st, and occupied a bridgehead east of the Jordan. Early in February, 1918, continuous service was established over the military railways from Egypt to Jerusalem.

With the critical situation arising on the Western front in March, several of General Allenby's veteran divisions were transferred to France, reinforcements from India eventually taking their places in Palestine, where a cessation of active operations was prolonged throughout the period of greatest heat. Meanwhile, preparations were maturing for a supreme blow to be delivered in unison with the great offensive of the Allies on all the fronts.

In September, 1918, the French and British under General Allenby, stretching from the sea to the desert on a front running through El Ballutah, were confronted by more than 100,000 Turks, forming the Seventh and Eighth Armies west of the Jordan and the Fourth Army east of the river, reinforced by more than 15,000 Germans and Austro-Hungarians.

The overwhelming success of the Allied offensive was largely due to the mastery of the air and the bold use made of the British cavalry under Sir Philip Chetwode. One force of cavalry advanced in the night of September 18-19 between the Jerusalem-Nablus road and the Jordan, thrusting itself between the Turkish armies. The Allies delivered their main attack the next morning on a front of sixteen miles adjoining the coast, crushing all resistance. Another cavalry force advanced along the coast and took Haifa and Acre.

The British cavalry operating north of Nablus turned upon the Turks streaming northward in wild rout, barring them from flight by the fords of the Jordan. The Arabs under the King of Hedjaz captured Ma'an, isolating the Turkish forces holding Medina, and came into action against the Fourth Turkish Army east of the Jordan.

The Allies gave their demoralized opponents no chance to reform. The British entered Nazareth on the 20th and Tiberias on the 25th, and the Australian Mounted Division

Dr. Seitz, governor of German Southwest Africa, signing the surrender to General Botha.
*General Botha is on the right with Dr. Seitz next to him signing the articles of surrender.*

General Allenby accompanied by French, Italian, and American military attachés entering Jerusalem.

and the Arabs appeared before Damascus on the 30th. The army of the King of Hedjaz entered the Syrian metropolis the next day. By October 5th the British had taken 71,000 prisoners and the Arabs 8,000. Beyrout was taken on the 7th, Tripoli on the 13th, and Homs on the 15th, and the campaign culminated with the capture of Aleppo, 180 miles north of Damascus, on the 26th and the cutting of the Constantinople-Bagdad railway.

When the active operations in Mesopotamia were suspended with the advent of summer in 1917, the British had made their immediate position secure, although the outlook was not without eventual elements of danger. The recent Russian revolution was already exercising a demoralizing effect upon the Armenian front and the dissolution of Russian military power might open the way to the penetration of Persia and Central Asia by the Turks and Germans. Early in June, 1917, Baratoff and the Russian force which had occupied positions on the British flank in the region of the Diala abandoned the torrid desert for the cooler highlands in the interior of Persia. The Turks were gathering their strength and General von Falkenhayn had been sent to Aleppo to restore the military situation of the Central Powers in the southeastern theaters. Within a few months the British might be seriously threatened, isolated, nearly 700 miles up the Tigris from the Persian Gulf.

Allusion was made in Volume IV to the defeat inflicted on the Turks by the British at Ramadje. The British position had resembled a spearhead tapering back from the point formed by the center at Samarra to the right and left flanks situated respectively at Beled Ruz, east of the Diala, and at Feludja, on the Euphrates. The advancement of the left flank was an important measure of precaution and an indispensable preliminary to further

progress up the Tigris. In July a British column failed in an attempt to capture a Turkish entrenched position at Ramadje on the right bank of the Euphrates, twenty-five miles above Feludja. The undertaking was repeated in September on a larger scale.

Besides the immediate defenses of Ramadje, the Turks held an advanced position on a ridge about three miles to the east, extending southward from the river. Sir Stanley Maude's plan was to turn the southern end of this outlying position and attack Ramadje on the south, while the cavalry executed a longer detour and cut the Turkish line of communications west of the town. The British column slipped by the ridge in the night and attacked the defenses of Ramadje on the morning of September 28th. By nightfall the garrison was entirely hemmed in and, after an unsuccessful attempt to break through the cordon westward, the Turkish force under Ahmed Bey surrendered on the 29th.

During October the British right wing drove the enemy from the region of the Diala. On November 5th the British center attacked the entrenched position of the Eighteenth Turkish Corps at Tekrit on the Tigris about forty miles above Samarra and forced the abandonment of the position on the next day.

But before the British could reap the full measure of advantage from these successes, they suffered a serious blow in the loss of Sir Stanley Maude, the talented commander, who in little more than a year had so brilliantly transformed the entire aspect of the Mesopotamian operations. He succumbed to a sudden attack of cholera on November 18th.

Nearly all the territorial changes outside of Europe resulting from the Great War have been determined by events narrated in the present chapter. Some of the

operations here described concerned the vital interests of the world's greatest empires. Their consequences baffle the imagination and we should not dismiss the subject without some general indications serving to illustrate their significance. Attention will be directed to two salient features, the extension of European power to western Asia and the territorial consolidation of the British Empire.

In the year preceding the outbreak of the war the Powers were approaching an agreement for the informal division of the Ottoman Empire into different spheres of influence without abolishing its theoretical unity. Germany, as we have seen, had secured predominant influence at Constantinople and was strengthening its position in the territory crossed by the Bagdad railway. The conciliatory attitude of Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, bore fruit in an understanding as to certain questions pending between the two countries, by which Great Britain conceded the extension of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf under German control, but the war broke out before Germany had ratified the agreement. A peaceful evolution was securing for Germany the most advantageous position in the Turkish Empire, but German rapacity overreached itself and impatience ruined the rapidly maturing plans.

By constraining Turkey to intervene in the war, Germany expected to exclude the other participants from the division of the Turkish provinces, to restore Egypt to Turkish suzerainty, or in other words, to bring it under German domination, and thus to cleave the British Empire, and to open the way to Persia and India. Germany ventured her whole interest in the Orient on one enormous stake.

The Allies, confident of ultimate success, proceeded to recast the map of western Asia on the basis of the assumed

elimination of Germany. By 1916 it was generally understood by the Allies that Russia should receive Constantinople and that successive zones from north to south in western Asia would be attributed to Russia, France, and Great Britain. An agreement concluded at Petrograd by an exchange of notes between M. Paléologue and Foreign Minister Sazonoff, April 26, 1916, established the northern limit of the French zone along the Ala and Ak Mountains and past Zara, Egin, and Charput, so as to include the vilayets of Adana and Siwas. An exchange of letters between M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey established the limit between the French zone in Syria and northern Mesopotamia and the British zone in Palestine and southern Mesopotamia, including Bagdad. The line left the Mediterranean coast at a point north of Acre.

The progress of the war brought important changes in the political prospect for the Orient. Interior convulsions eliminated Russia as a prospective participant in the division of the Ottoman Empire, but the problem was complicated by the necessity of compensating Italy and later by the entrance of Greece into the struggle. A provisional understanding between the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy in conference at St. Jean de Maurienne in Savoy, on August 21, 1917, accorded Italy a sphere of domination in Asia Minor, including the region of Smyrna, but was made subject to the consent of Russia. Within three months the Kerensky government in Russia fell without having ratified the convention.

For several generations the safety of communications between Great Britain and India was the most prominent consideration in British foreign policy, anxiety on this subject seeming at times to hold public opinion under a hypnotic spell. British suspicion of Russian designs eventually gave place to solicitude about the maneuvers of Germany,

but the conclusion of an agreement for the extension of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf gave evidence of the fairmindedness of the British Foreign Office as well as of the urbane qualities of the German Ambassador.

We have traced the course of events by which the British established themselves firmly in Palestine and Mesopotamia, winning important strategical and economical centers. But the vast Mohammedan population of India and other parts of the British Empire made British rule particularly susceptible to any commotion in the Mohammedan world. Great Britain and, in a lesser degree, France saw danger in humiliating the Sultan, as the moral importance of the caliphate was still great. This anxiety showed its effect in the tendency in some quarters to preserve the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan. But it was also one of the motives on the part of Great Britain for encouraging the Arabic revolution in Hedjaz, as this movement would give the custody of the holy places of Islam and the spiritual authority over the Mohammedan world to a power dependent on the British Empire for its existence and preservation. Great Britain would domesticate the caliphate.

The Arabic movement was recognized in the Franco-British agreement of May, 1916, which limited the influence of the two powers over the corresponding parts of the Arabian hinterland between Syria and Mesopotamia to the right of advising or assisting the Arabian authorities, with a priority of opportunity for each Power in local enterprises and loans in its respective zone.

The African campaigns described above, by effacing German rule in Africa, upset a far-reaching German scheme for expansion in that continent. Significant for Germany's designs was the fact that, while the German government was willing on the eve of the attack on France to renounce all intention of annexing French territory in

Europe as a means for propitiating Great Britain, it was not willing to extend the same promise to French colonial territory. Germany, in fact, looked forward to establishing at the expense of France and Belgium a compact Central African empire extending across the continent from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, lying across the British Cape to Cairo route. The German Colonial Secretary Solf declared in an address on December 21, 1917, that Belgium, France, and Portugal were incapable of developing their colonial possessions in Africa and ought to be deprived of them, wholly or in part, in the final settlement.

Instead of this the war removed every barrier to the continuous development of British power from the Cape of Good Hope to the Suez Canal. Napoleon predicted that the British Empire would eventually find its grave in South Africa, because Cape Colony was at that time the vital spot on the line to India. With the opening of the Suez Canal this vital spot was shifted to the other extremity of the continent, and there a similar impression led the Germans and Turks to launch their futile blows at British power.

The builders of the British Empire, working according to circumstances and without any fixed plan, built better than they knew. Like an edifice whose façade is still incumbered and incomplete, the fabric of British power reveals but slowly its organic form and outline. In unconscious conformity with a mysterious design, the architects have reared a mighty vault, encompassing the Indian Ocean with Australia and South Africa as bases, the Malay and African possessions, Arabia and the Straits Settlements, as voussoirs, and India as the keystone. The fabric owes much to the element of Boer loyalty. "The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner."

# CHAPTER II

## The Autumn of 1917 in the West

Changing methods of warfare: the tactical problem in the West; the contest between offensive and defensive resources; the original German superiority in artillery superseded by the Allies; various innovations in the engines of war; the evolution of the German defensive system. Disposition of the British armies in the summer of 1917. Continuation of the Battle of Flanders: Allied attacks of August 16th, September 20th and 26th, October 4th, 9th, and 30th, and November 6th; the results. The summer of 1917 on the sector of the Aisne. French offensive in the Verdun region. French autumn offensive on the Heights of the Aisne. The British Cambrai offensive: new tactics applied in the attack, November 20, 1917; initial British successes; powerful German counter-offensive and British retirement. The great Austro-Hungarian attack against Italy, launched October 24th; errors of the Italian High Command; the Caporetto disaster; Italian retreat to the Piave; the amazing reaction of the nation and the army; failure of the renewed Teutonic efforts. Reflections on the campaign.

Attention has been given in preceding volumes of this work to the general methods of warfare prevailing in the earlier stages of the conflict. But these methods underwent fundamental changes in the subsequent course of operations and it would be impossible to grasp the culminating events of the war without an understanding of the transformation gradually evolved from the conflicting efforts of the antagonists.

Although the center of interest shifted for a time from the Western to the Eastern theater, the Western front retained at all times the most elaborate organization. The immense strength of the defensive lines in the West, covering, as they did, the entire zone of conflict from the North Sea to Switzerland, preventing any turning

movements, the keenness with which every possible advantage in this theater was seized upon and utilized, and the lack for so long a time of a decisive superiority on either side created in Belgium and France the most engrossing problems of the whole war. The Western front became the great experimental laboratory where the shrewdest intellects on both sides vied in frenzied competition for the progress of the science and the art of war. The tactical evolution of the Great War must be studied principally in the West, and the opposing aims of the contestants in this theater furnish the logical basis for the investigation.

At the beginning of the war the movements of the Germans were doubtless guided by purely military motives. Believing that the conflict would soon end in a decisive victory which would give them whatever they coveted, the German leaders would scarcely have been influenced by political objectives in devising the actual plan of military operations. The German hosts were first launched with terrible momentum against the most prompt of Germany's antagonists, but, contrary to reasonable conjecture, France threw back the invaders. Germany, loath to risk the doubtful issue of a long struggle, for which it was imperfectly prepared, vainly drew its strength together for renewed efforts in the West. But after the failure in Flanders in November, 1914, the first military power of Europe virtually acknowledged that its original design had been frustrated and turned its main aggressive force against its Eastern assailant. The struggle in the West passed into a warfare of positions lasting down to 1918, in which the chief aim of Germany was to hold the Western Powers in check and thus gain time to beat down the other opponents and win the prizes of victory in eastern and southeastern Europe, while the object of the French and British was to crush the German barrier and expel the invaders

"Pigeons."



"*Crapauds*" toads.

"Ordinaries," general type with club handles. *Three types of German hand grenades captured by the French.*

from Belgium and France. With the single great exception of the German offensive at Verdun we may consider the action of the Allies as the chief impulsive force in the development of the warfare of positions in the West. The Allies' constant preoccupation was to surmount the opposing physical obstacles and overcome their antagonists' resistance, while the Germans were mainly engaged in counteracting the successive efforts of the Allies and in meeting every increase in hostile attacking power with a corresponding augmentation in the effectiveness of their own defensive.

The Great War came at a crucial moment in the development of the applied sciences. Technical achievements were just maturing which would inevitably revolutionize the entire field of military tactics. No one had appreciated in full the nature and extent of the approaching transformation and the first months of the war were a period of uncertainty for all the belligerents. But the Germans, in consequence, partly, of their own discernment, and partly, of a casual combination of circumstances, were better prepared than their adversaries for making the most of the situation. The initial superiority of the Germans was most marked in their artillery, which greatly exceeded the French artillery in numbers and contained a vastly greater proportion of heavy pieces. The Germans had already become convinced of the great importance of long-range field artillery of heavy caliber and they had not only far outdistanced their adversaries in the strength of this class of their artillery, but had developed the theory of fire and become thoroughly proficient in the manipulation of the pieces.

At the beginning of the war the regular German field artillery provided two regiments for each infantry division, namely, three battalions (9 batteries) of the standard

77-millimeter field guns and one battalion (3 batteries) of the 105-millimeter field howitzers, altogether 144 light guns and field howitzers for each army corps. Including the 33 horse batteries (4 guns each) the light field artillery of the active army numbered, therefore, more than 3,700 pieces.

Upon mobilization, the twenty-five regiments of Fuss-artillerie, heavy field, siege, and fortress artillery, each regiment consisting of 2 battalions of 4 batteries each, provided the 25 battalions of 150-millimeter howitzers forming the organic heavy artillery of the active army corps, 9 battalions of 210-millimeter mortars attached to the armies, 12 battalions of siege and fortress artillery, likewise assigned to the armies, and 4 battalions of coast artillery; altogether, 200 heavy batteries (800 pieces).

The lighter field artillery was immediately increased by reserve and Landwehr units, while each active regiment of the Fussartillerie mobilized a reserve regiment bearing the same number, the process providing altogether 16 organic battalions of the reserve army corps, 30 battalions of siege and fortress artillery, and 4 battalions of coast artillery. While the number of German infantry divisions was doubled from the close of mobilization down to December 1, 1917, the ratio of heavy artillery batteries of all kinds to infantry divisions was more than doubled in the same period.

The Germans had already distinguished and studied the two characteristic functions of the heavy artillery, the destruction of the enemy organization before the attack and the suppression of his artillery during action.

With the French the army corps had a complement of 120 75-millimeter field guns. The heavier artillery was all assigned to the armies. In spite of the arguments of a few earnest advocates of heavy field artillery, the French

command had remained comparatively indifferent to this important development in the German army down to the very eve of the Great War. The most influential French authorities placed supreme confidence in the excellence of their standard 75-millimeter field gun, which was superior to the German 77-millimeter piece in precision and rapidity of fire. Prepossessed by the traditional faith in French impetuosity as the dominant military quality, they steadfastly opposed giving an important place in the field to any element that might detract from rapidity of movement. The French army possessed several types of larger field pieces which had to be mounted on platforms, involving at least a day's delay. Howitzers of 120- and 155-millimeters had been designed for firing without such special platforms, but only one modern rapid-fire field piece of heavy caliber had found a place in the regular organization of the French army, namely, the 155-millimeter Rimailho howitzer, invented in 1904. The French had 21 batteries of Rimailhos, or 84 pieces, as compared with the 400 pieces of similar caliber in the heavy field artillery of the German active army (25 battalions of 4 batteries with 4 pieces in each battery). The Rimailho was rather cumbersome and its range of 6,500 meters was distinctly inferior to that of the corresponding German piece, which was of 8,500 meters. Altogether the French had only about 300 heavy field pieces as compared with 800 in the active German army alone.

French artillerists maintained that the effect of long-range fire against unseen targets would not justify the expenditure of ammunition involved. Their doctrine did not recognize the possibility of destroying the enemy artillery when it was under shelter. French field regulations, drawn up as late as 1913, declared: "The infantry conquers and holds the ground . . . . Artillery fire has only a minimum effect against enemy under cover. To

compel the enemy to expose himself, he must be attacked by the infantry." But in 1916 General Petain declared: "In the warfare of the present, the artillery conquers the ground, the infantry occupies it." A revolution in theory and practice intervened between these two statements.

At first the fundamental importance of the heavy field artillery was somewhat obscured. The Germans, as well as the French, had formed no adequate conjecture of the enormous expenditure of ammunition by modern artillery. Lack of ammunition for their heavy pieces was one of the causes for the defeat of the Germans in the Battle of the Marne. The Germans had assumed that 4,000 rounds of ammunition would suffice for each heavy piece throughout the war. Before the close of September, 1914, they faced a veritable ammunition crisis. Nevertheless, their heavy artillery thwarted the efforts of the Allies at the Aisne, and the stabilization of the Western fronts brought the heavy artillery on both sides into a unique position of importance.

The Germans, who dug themselves into the soil of Belgium and France, had to be blasted out by explosives dropped from the sky, projected from artillery, or discharged in mines in the ground below. But for more than two years attention centered on the heavy artillery and the increasing offensive power of the Allies was measured in terms of strength in this class of matériel. The war in the West became a contest between the destructive capacity of fire and the resisting power of the defensive organization.

The situation of France in the face of the vital problem of the offensive was desperate. The Germans boasted that they had deprived the French of 40% of their coal, 90% of their iron-ore, 80% of their steel, and 80% of their industrial equipment suitable for warlike purposes. Undismayed by this appalling handicap, the French set out to

Field-marshal Sir Douglas Haig.
K. T., G. C. B., G. C. V. O., K. C. I. E.

revise their tactics, develop their war industries, and make up for Germany's enormous lead in the matter of artillery. They accomplished a miracle of improvisation. The adaptation and development of French industry for purposes of war was a splendid achievement of intelligence, fortitude, and patience in the face of adverse physical conditions. Skilled labor which had been mobilized was judiciously transferred from the trenches to the factories. The number of women employed in munitions plants increased from 41,000 on June 1, 1915, to 300,000 on January 1, 1917. The Allied command of the sea enabled the French to import coal and iron from England and Spain. The chemical and powder industries, which had long been dependent on Germany, were made self-sustaining. Plants utilizing the water power of the South of France were established for deriving nitrate from the air. The daily output of shells was gradually increased from 5,000 to 250,000, of which 60,000 shells were of heavy caliber, and the earlier ratio of three shrapnels to one shell was reversed to meet the requirements of position warfare.

The conditions of trench warfare not only imposed a complete change in the use of artillery but compelled the French to create the scientific basis for the action of their artillery. They had to win efficiency in all forms of terrestrial and aërial observation, construct battle-maps of all the enemy positions from the sea to the Swiss boundary, develop the technique of fire adjustment on invisible targets by means of balloons and aëroplanes, improve their signalling equipment to the point of installing wireless telegraphy on aëroplanes, and organize their liaison system. The native talent for precise calculation won for them a position of preëminence in the science of ballistics. Most of the natural sciences were ransacked for data bearing on ballistic problems and as far as possible the effects of all

the natural factors that might influence the fire of artillery were reduced to mathematical formulae. The theory and practice of all the Allies in the matter of artillery were largely derived from those of France.

The new French 105-millimeter field batteries made their appearance at the Battle of the Yser. Early in 1915 tractor batteries of 155-millimeter guns and 220- and 270-millimeter mortars were organized.

For the Champagne offensive in the winter of 1915 the French concentrated only 100 pieces of a caliber of 95-millimeters or larger. During the operations in Artois in May and June, 1915, the number was still less than 400. But more than 1,100 of the heavier pieces were engaged in Artois and Champagne during the offensive of the following September. From August, 1914, to June, 1917, the French heavy artillery organized in regiments was increased from 300 to 6,000 pieces.

It was usually reckoned in 1916 and 1917 that the preparation and execution of an attack required the expenditure of 300-400 rounds for each piece of 75, 200-300 for each piece of 155, and 80-100 for each piece of 220 or 270. The enormous expenditure in demolition fire may be appreciated by the estimated need of 300 shells of the 155-millimeter guns for the destruction of every 100 meters of trenches. Sometimes the total daily consumption of projectiles by the batteries of a single army corps with both divisions engaged represented a weight of 1,200 tons.

But heavy artillery was generally unsuited for destroying the first line trenches, because it could only be used at a considerable distance and this involved dispersion of fire and waste of ammunition. To meet this difficulty the Germans invented the Minenwerfer, or trench mortar, soon after the institution of position warfare and the Allies followed their example. Trench mortars are usually

smooth bore muzzle-loaders, of a great variety of calibers, firing, at high angle and short range, projectiles with powerful explosive charges. They are very destructive of trenches and defenses of every sort. The projectiles usually have vanes forming a tail-piece to maintain their direction through the air.

In the period of the fully developed offensive tactics with preliminary bombardment the mission of the various forms of artillery was quite clearly distinguished. The trench mortars, usually in or near the second trench line of the first position, battered the enemy front lines; the light field artillery, behind the first position, demolished trenches, supported the assaulting waves of infantry with barrages, and repulsed counter-attacks of the enemy; and the heavy artillery, further to the rear and at various distances, according to its size and range, executed the demolition fire for the destruction of the enemy works, the deep shelters, redoubts, and communications. Eventually the French had in the field thirty different types of heavy artillery ranging up to 520-millimeters in caliber.

The British, like the French, had to be forced to the conviction that victory was impossible without supremacy in artillery. The War Office was slow to comprehend the vastness and the real nature of the demands of the new warfare and the censor left the public in complacent ignorance of the perilous situation at the front. A courageous journalist, Viscount Northcliffe (Alfred Harmsworth), owner of the *London Times* and *Daily Mail*, defied popular resentment and the rigors of the law in revealing the true condition of affairs without the sanction of the censor, reflecting upon the sagacity of Lord Kitchener, an idol of the British people, and showing how thousands of troops were being sacrificed through the obtuseness of the War Office in sending largely shrapnel, which was almost useless

in trench warfare, instead of the indispensable high power shells.

The government was driven to far-reaching measures. The preceding volume described the creation of the Ministry of Munitions in May, 1915, to be animated by the quickening genius of Mr. Lloyd George, followed by the Munitions Bill and the mobilization of British engineering resources through the system of "controlled industries." Towards the end of 1916 the weekly British output of 155-millimeter shells was three times, that of 200-millimeter shells five times, and that of 230-millimeter shells three times as great as during the whole first year of the war.

The chief tactical innovation of the British was the tank, conceived and built by Sir William Tritton and first used, as we have seen, on September 15, 1916, in the Battle of the Somme. The chief motive for its invention was the impossibility of destroying all obstacles to the advance of the infantry in attack, such as machine-gun nests and barbed wire, by even the most thorough artillery preparation. The tanks, waddling across the contested terrain, rooted out the enemy machine-gun nests with the remorseless imperturbability of swine devouring rattlesnakes. The French made use of tanks for the first time in the fighting on the Aisne, April 17, 1917. Their chief success was later with quite small tanks carrying only two men.

It must not be supposed that during the period of position warfare in the West the Germans merely responded to the efforts of their opponents or were content with simply keeping their original advantages. On the contrary, their action in defense was characterized at all times by remarkable originality, initiative, and boldness, and, while winning their most sensational victories elsewhere, they matched the ingenuity of the Allies in France and Flanders.

British tank unable to climb out of a German trench near Cambrai.

Tankdrome and supplies.

Allusion has already been made to some of the German innovations, such as the gas cloud. The Germans themselves improved on this device in their gas shells, bombs, and hand grenades. The use of gas in projectiles was generally more satisfactory than in the cloud, because so used it could be applied with greater flexibility and precision and independently of the weather. The Allies followed the Germans in the various uses of gas and in some respects improved upon their methods. Gases of many kinds were eventually produced, classified, according to their effect, as lachrymatory, suffocating, and asphyxiating.

The effects of the Allied efforts and the adaptability of the Germans were reflected in the evolution of the defensive organization of the German front during the period of position warfare in the West. The necessity of absorbing the ever more violent shocks of the Allied offensives brought about a gradual transformation from the earlier, comparatively thin, hard-crusted front, described in preceding volumes of this work, to the later deep defensive system with its chief resisting strength drawn back towards the rear.

In a general way this evolution may be divided into the following four stages:

I. The period down to October, 1915. The first position with two or more lines of trenches and shelters was backed by the reserve or supporting position, and about a mile or more behind the latter there was usually a third position. The excavated shelters were supported by wooden beams and roofed with two or three layers of logs, the space above being filled with earth. The greatest stress was laid upon holding the first position and recovering it at all costs if it were taken by the enemy.

II. October, 1915, to October, 1916. The Allied offensive in September, 1915, had shown that the breaching of

the German front was a physical possibility, and in fact at one point a British unit had actually penetrated all three positions. The events on the Somme in 1916 were a still more cogent argument for increasing the power of resistance of the front. A general reorganization was carried out with much greater depth. The heavy artillery and trench mortars compelled the defenders to bury themselves deeper. Shelters and casemates were now rebuilt in reinforced concrete. Narrow-gauge tracks were extensively laid for the replenishment of the front lines with ammunition. Six hundred German position batteries were organized from the autumn of 1915 to that of 1916. One of the results of stationary warfare was the loosening of the organic connection of the artillery battalions with the army corps. The artillery unit performed its function at a given point on the front rather than with a particular army corps. The batteries usually remained in the same positions when the army corps to which they had originally been attached were shifted. The Fussartillerie became exclusively an organ of the army. The infantry division received an amount of heavy artillery proportionate to the activity on its sector. Batteries were assigned to active sectors in the ratio of from four to six for each kilometer of front, and to quiet stretches in the ratio of six to eight for each divisional sector. Machine-gun nests became increasingly numerous.

III. October, 1916, to June, 1917. The lessons of the Battle of the Somme were now fully manifested in the defensive organization. The fronts were deepened into broad fortified zones in which the defensive was becoming more and more elastic, the first position being only slightly held. The cohesion of the hostile attacks was broken by machine-gun nests in checkerboard formation before reaching the really vital defensive positions.

These machine-gun nests were known as pill-boxes by the British.

IV. After June, 1917. The buffer system of absorbing the force of the attack by echelonnement in great depth now reached its fullest development. The continuous first line was replaced by a series of detached positions in shell-craters or small redoubts. Following these in succession were the pill-box belt, a strong system of wire entanglements, and usually three organized combat zones usually two miles or more apart, so that artillery preparation could not be executed simultaneously against two zones. Defensive operations, comparatively mobile in character, were no longer conducted on fixed lines, but within certain zones of combat. The evolution of the front seemed to foreshadow a return to the warfare of movement.

The Allied offensive of the summer of 1917 in Flanders was preceded by important alterations in the disposition of the forces, particularly the transfer of the British Fourth and Fifth Armies from the British right wing in Picardy to the left wing in the north. After these changes had been made the Allied front was held: from the North Sea to St. Georges, by the Fourth British Army under General Rawlinson; from St. Georges to Noordschoote, by the Belgian Army; from Noordschoote to Boesinghe, by the First French Army, consisting of three army corps under General Antoine; from Boesinghe to the Zillebeke-Zandvoorde road, by the Fifth British Army under General Gough; from this road to the River Lys, by the Second British Army under General Plumer; from the Lys to Arras, by the First British Army under General Horne; and, finally, from Arras to the junction with the main line of the French armies near St. Quentin, by the Third British Army under General Byng.

The main purpose of the offensive in the north was to drive the Germans from western Flanders and thus deprive them of their chief submarine bases on the Belgian coast. The immediate objective was the higher ground east and northeast of Ypres, where, from a central elevation crossed by the Ypres-Menin road, a series of ridges run northward, gradually falling away into the plain. The possession of this slightly higher ground would enable the Allies to command the flat country for a considerable distance and threaten the German communications with Ostend and Zeebrugge. The Fifth British and First French Armies, holding respectively the main part of the Ypres salient and the sector adjoining this salient on the north, were at first the chief operative force.

The earlier course of the battle was traced in the Fourth Volume. After the initial successes there described, the Allies attacked the German third position on the Gheluvelt-Langemarck Line on the morning of August 16th and, in spite of the difficulty of advancing in deep mud, were immediately successful on the left. Their center was checked by the new German methods of defense, but the right made some gains in spite of stubborn resistance. Almost continuous rains prevented any important action during the remainder of the month, Nature seeming intent upon reducing western Flanders to the primeval bogs which had been the last refuge of the ancient Belgians against Cæsar's Roman legions.

Towards the close of summer the Second British Army extended its left flank to the eastern extremity of the Ypres salient, and its commander, Sir Herbert Plumer, applied himself for about a month to the problem of mastering the new German frontal organization. Finally, the weather showed intervals of improvement, and the battle entered a new stage with a British attack on an eight-mile front,

from the Ypres-Staden railway to the Ypres-Comines Canal, at daybreak on September 20th. By this time the positions of the German pill-boxes had been carefully ascertained.

A fog was dispelled by the rising sun and the British aëroplanes coöperated in the attack with their machine-gun fire. On the left the Fifth British Army won all its objectives. Along the Menin road the Second Army won the key to the Passchendaele Ridge, the easternmost and highest of the crests. During the afternoon and evening von Arnim delivered eleven counter-attacks without any permanent results.

The British attacked on the 26th along a six-mile front in the direction of the northern part of the Passchendaele Ridge, capturing the ruins of Zonnebeke village, which had been the apex of the salient before the retreat in May, 1915. After holding their ground for several days against repeated counter-attacks, the British advanced again on the morning of October 4th and chanced to anticipate an intended German attack by a few minutes, so that heavy losses were inflicted on the German infantry massed in expectation of the signal for departure. The British captured Poelcappelle, Gravenstafel, Broodseinde, and Nordenhoek, occupied a considerable part of the final ridge, and took 5,000 prisoners.

During the remaining operations in Flanders the Allies labored under the almost constant handicap of wretched weather. The skill and pertinacity of the German resistance combined with the adverse natural conditions had largely frustrated the plans of the assailants. It was now too late to realize the main purpose of the campaign, as the preliminary objectives had not even yet been entirely won. But it was considered advisable to continue the offensive, partly to distract the attention of the Germans

from the Aisne sector, where the French were about to deliver an attack.

The British left wing and the French, attacking on October 9th, reached the margin of the Houthulst Forest. The 30th was appointed for an effort of the British to win Passchendaele. The day dawned clear and cold but rain set in about 10 A. M. The struggle was one of the fiercest in the whole campaign. The Canadians won a position on the outskirts of the village, but the British troops coöperating on the left were unable to make a corresponding advance, and the attainment of the goal was delayed until November 6th, when the whole of Passchendaele with the ground to the north of it was taken. This completed the conquest of the main part of the Passchendaele Ridge. The old Ypres sailent, a familiar feature of the front since the third month of the war, now ceased to exist.

Early in June the French had won the main position on the Chemin des Dames, north of the Aisne; but during the summer the Germans made repeated efforts to win back the lost ground. Thus on July 3d about six infantry divisions and shock troops of von Boehn's Seventh Army, advancing from the Ailette valley, attacked on a front of twelve miles between Malmaison and Chevreux Woods, the latter lying north of Craonne. But this assault was repulsed by the French who were in position on the plateau. Two days later the Germans attacked from their position on the plateau at Malmaison, but again without success. On the 19th five divisions of the Prussian Guards won a position on California Plateau north of Craonne, but lost it on the 24th.

At this time the Verdun sector was held by the Second French Army commanded by General Guillaumat, which was confronted by the Fifth German Army under General von Gallwitz. Nivelle's autumn offensive had restored the

French lines on the east side of the Verdun sector to their situation on February 24, 1916, the fourth day of the famous German offensive. But the Germans still held practically intact their northern slice of the original rounding Verdun salient, including Avocourt Wood, the crests of Hill 304 and Mort Homme, and Talou Hill, and their presence in these positions was still a menace.

On June 24, 1917, the Germans attacked on a front of 2,000 yards in the vicinity of Hill 304 and continued their offensive until July 6th, making only slight gains which were afterwards lost. Petain decided to restore the old French front on the north side of the Verdun position as it existed before the commencement of the great German offensive on February 21, 1916, and Guillaumat prepared to attack on the whole front of eleven miles from Avocourt Wood to the north of Bezonvaux. The artillery preparation began on August 17th and the infantry attacked just before dawn on the 20th, quickly overrunning Avocourt Wood, Mort Homme, Cumières Wood, Talou Hill, and Hill 240 north of Louvemont. The German counter-attacks failed. On the 21st the east end of Goose's Crest and the village of Samogneux were taken by the French; Hill 304 was captured three days later; and by the 27th the French had won nearly all their objectives and taken about 10,000 prisoners. Finally, on September 8th they pushed northward from the vicinity of Fosses Wood, driving the Germans nearly back to their original line of departure on the first day of the great Verdun offensive.

In the autumn Petain planned an offensive on the western sector of the Heights of the Aisne, where the opposing lines ran along the top of the plateau, with spurs behind them descending from the main ridge on both sides. Eastward of this sector the French had already won the northern edge of the plateau. The offensive was executed

by seven divisions of the Sixth French Army, commanded by General Maistre, against von Boehn's Seventh German Army, which had six divisions engaged. After a preliminary bombardment beginning October 17th, the French attacked on the 23d along a four-mile front, advancing two and a quarter miles the first day and winning Fort Malmaison, the Montparnasse quarry, where the Germans resisted desperately, and the village of Chavignon, which commanded a view of Laon up the valley of the Ardon, a northern tributary of the Ailette. During the next three days the French drove the Germans down the slopes and reached the Aisne-Oise Canal, and the latter were compelled to relinquish their positions on the Heights of the Aisne entirely.

The general situation in Europe impelled the Western Powers to seize every opportunity of strengthening their position in expectation of a crisis. The military collapse of Russia, becoming daily more manifest, had already enabled the Germans to transfer some of their best divisions from the Eastern to the Western front, and many more would soon follow. The tempest which rent the Italian lines at Caporetto had already served as a terrible portent of the visitation in store for the Allied front in France. Not content with the modest results of the great effort in Flanders, Sir Douglas Haig decided to deliver one more blow before winter, striking suddenly and in an unexpected quarter, where the defense would be relatively weak and could only be reinforced after an appreciable interval of time. He selected the sector in front of Cambrai, where the ground was favorable for the movement of the British tanks, which had been greatly increased in number and efficiency, and where success might threaten an invaluable part of the enemy's zone of communications and impede the development of his supreme offensive, already the

General Sir Julian Byng, commander of the Third British Army during the Allied offensive of the summer of 1917.

General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth British Army during the Allied offensive of the summer of 1917.

General Sir Herbert C. O. Plumer, commander of the Second British Army during the Allied offensive of the summer of 1917.

subject of speculation. General Haig proposed to break through the famous Siegfried Line between the Bapaume-Cambrai road and the Scheldt Canal and, after securing his right flank, to wheel northward and assail the rear of the German positions on the Drocourt-Quéant Line and in the Sensée valley. There was a possibility of undermining the enemy front as far north as the Scarpe and Douai.

The resulting Battle of Cambrai was one of the most instructive of the whole war by reason of the tactical innovations exhibited on both sides. Success for the British depended upon making the most of their initial superiority before the concentration of strong German reinforcements, hence upon surprise. The artillery preparation, as an overt announcement of an intended attack, was therefore entirely omitted. The tanks were entrusted with the task of clearing the way for the attacking infantry. The cavalry was given the active rôle of pushing rapidly northward as soon as the German lines had been breached, and cutting the communications of the enemy front as extensively as possible.

The Cambrai sector was part of the front of the Second German Army under General von der Marwitz, which extended from Bullecourt to the Oise. In the sector attacked by the British there were three German divisions in line and three in reserve. The British operative sector was part of the front of the Third British Army, which had been commanded by Sir Julian Byng since Sir Edmund Allenby was transferred to Palestine in the preceding June. There were six infantry divisions in line on the six-mile front of the principal attack with another in immediate support and four cavalry divisions in readiness for action. Two other divisions were assigned for a secondary attack in the Bullecourt sector to the left of the main action.

The principal field of operations was a rolling area northwest of the Scheldt Canal with ridges culminating in front of the left assaulting wing of the British in Bourlon Wood between the Cambrai-Bapaume and Cambrai-Arras roads. The German defenses consisted successively of a fringe of outposts, the Siegfried Line, which ran northwestwards from the Scheldt Canal at Banteux, with very wide trenches designed to arrest the British tanks, at an interval of about a mile the Siegfried Reserve Line, and then, three or four miles further back, the final position, passing through Masnières and Marquion.

Havrincourt Wood, just behind the British front, afforded a suitable place of concealment for the British tanks, whose concentration completely escaped the enemy's observation.

The firing of a single gun at 6.20 A. M. on November 20th gave the signal for the infantry attack. The numerous tanks crawled forward under a dense smoke barrage, followed by the infantry. Simultaneously the British artillery threw a curtain of fire behind the German trenches. The Germans were taken entirely by surprise. The tanks silenced the machine-gun nests and outlying redoubts, levelled the wire entanglements, and enfiladed the enemy trenches. The British soon gained the Siegfried Line and by 10.30 had overcome the reserve line also. But the success of the different units varied, and the result of the day's action was a deeply indented front. The Sixty-second Division on the left center had advanced four and one-half miles to Anneux, the greatest gain thus far made by any British division in a single day during an attack. The Sixth and Twenty-ninth Divisions had reached the Scheldt Canal. At one place, Masnières, east of the canal, the last German line had been pierced. But the Germans had impeded the advance of the British tanks and cavalry by

damaging the bridge at the last named point, so that the British failed to take the positions east of the canal which would have afforded the indispensable security for their right flank before the intended turning movement northward. There were deep depressions in the British front where the Germans had resisted with greater tenacity, and the attack had fallen short of Bourlon Ridge.

Every hour diminished the advantage of surprise, as strong German reinforcements were being moved in all haste towards the threatened sector. Consequently, the attack was pushed forward with the utmost energy on the 21st in spite of rain. The British enlarged their hold east of the canal. Most of the projections left in the German front were swept away, but Bourlon Wood, swarming with German machine-guns, still resisted. German reinforcements were pouring in by evening. For several days the conflict raged over the possession of Bourlon Wood which had become the critical factor in the situation. Bourlon village changed hands several times. Repeated efforts of the British failed to gain the whole of Bourlon Ridge. On the whole, the British had won by the 27th an area, roughly rectangular in form, ten miles wide and six deep, but without the essential flanking position.

The German High Command, startled by the unexpected blow, acted promptly and resolutely. Von Ludendorff devised the counter-stroke. Sixteen fresh German divisions were assembled and the operation was carried out on a front overlapping the original sector of attack. Von Ludendorff's plan was based on the double enveloping maneuver with staggering blows on the British flanks followed by an attack on the center. Twenty-four divisions were employed and tactics were first practised on the Western front which had been introduced in the offensive before Riga and used with sensational results at Caporetto.

At 7.30 A. M. on November 30th the sector on the British right from Masnières to Vendhuille, a distance of ten miles, was subjected to a heavy bombardment of gas shells. The German infantry in great strength advanced under cover of a thick mist and quickly overwhelmed the opposing lines, threatening to turn the British salient. Fortunately for the British, the Twenty-ninth Division, which had won a splendid reputation on the Gallipoli Peninsula, resisted stubbornly at Masnières, making the German frontal attack impossible. In the meantime British reinforcements intervened and by evening the British front had been reconstituted to the rear of the lost positions.

On the same day the Germans launched an even more formidable attack against three British divisions on the left between Moeuvres and the Scheldt Canal but failed to break the front. The Germans continued to gain ground against the British right flank on the following days and the British were compelled to relinquish their positions east of the canal. A systematic retirement was begun on the night of the 4th and completed by the morning of the 7th, the new British front corresponding in part with the Siegfried Reserve Line. The village of Bourlon was relinquished.

With this operation the Battle of Cambrai came to an end. It had begun with a brilliant British feat of arms, but had come near to becoming a serious British disaster before its close. The British retained sixteen square miles of enemy territory, while the Germans won only seven square miles of British, but the battle had no appreciable effect upon the general course of hostilities. Sir Douglas Haig failed to carry out his plan, mainly because his available forces were inadequate to sustain the attack.

This was the close of the campaign in the West. With persistent efforts the Allies had wrung a series of partial

Hotchkiss automatic rifle.

French trench mortar loaded with aërial torpedo.



German wire-wound wooden *Minenwerfer*.

Big gun, *camouflaged*, mounted on railway truck.

successes from the enemy; but the results were inconclusive. The bright hopes with which the Allies had begun what was thought to be the final campaign were all doomed to disappointment. Not one of the great objectives had been reached. The power of the enemy remained unbroken, his front was still compact, and he was preparing to return to the offensive with more force than ever.

The preceding volume brought the course of operations on the Italian front to the close of the spring offensive, early in June, 1917. For two years the Italians had battered their antagonists, immobilized a large portion of the Austro-Hungarian army on their front, and arrested every counter-offensive. But in spite of toilsome exertions, their territorial gains had been inconsiderable and enormous difficulties still beset the way to the principal objectives. Her limited industrial resources did not permit Italy to dispose of a decisive preponderance of strength at the crucial points. For the operations of 1917 Cadorna besought the Western Allies for batteries and troops, but no troops and only a limited amount of artillery could be spared from the offensives in France and Flanders.

The impending collapse of Russia was ominous of danger for the Italian front. Concurrently with this, a spirit of discontent and of aversion to the war, fomented by secret Teutonic agents, spread among the Italian civilian population, especially in the larger centers, where the laboring class was becoming restive from privations, and threatened to destroy the moral force of the nation. The general Allied plans for 1917, like those of the year before, contemplated a series of vigorous attacks on all fronts at once. Both internal and external considerations prompted the Italian command to spirited action as a means of forestalling the impending dangers.

General Cadorna planned a grand attack on the Isonzo front in the late summer. The spring offensive had won most of the heights bordering the Isonzo on the east between Gorizia and Plava. The main purpose was now to conquer the Bainsizza plateau.

A bombardment was begun on August 18th along the whole line from a point opposite Tolmino to the sea. In the afternoon the Second Italian Army advanced from positions northeast of Plava and during the night threw fourteen bridges across the stream between Plava and Santa Lucia. In the morning the Austro-Hungarian lines were attacked along the slopes and in some places the crest was won by the Italians.

The Duke of Aosta's Third Army attacked south of Gorizia, the Twenty-third Corps under General Diaz distinguishing itself particularly by taking the village of Selo. On the 21st the Italians broke through the enemy lines in the central part of the Bainsizza plateau and on the 24th captured Monte Santo north of Gorizia. More than 20,000 prisoners had thus far been taken in the Italian offensive. But the steep ascents hindered the advance of the Italian artillery to the Bainsizza plateau and enabled the Austro-Hungarian forces to organize new positions. On this occasion, as in all previous offensives, the Italians were unable to sustain their efforts at the necessary pitch of intensity until they had completed the breach in the hostile front.

The struggle turned to Monte San Gabriele northeast of Gorizia, a ridge with an altitude of 646 meters at its highest point and about 2,000 meters long. It was very strongly fortified and now formed a salient in the Austro-Hungarian front. After a furious struggle the main part of the summit was carried on September 3d. But the Austro-Hungarian forces counter-attacking drove the Italians from the crest. The battle swayed to and fro for ten days on this

crucial position and in the end the summit remained about equally divided, but the Second Italian Army was in a position to consolidate its front on the Bainsizza plateau.

On September 5th the Third Army was compelled to retire from the portion of the slopes of Hermada which it had won. The Austrian commander, General von Boroevitch, was constantly receiving reinforcements from the East, increasing the strength of the defensive. The Italians had themselves sustained heavy losses and their offensive died away at the close of September.

Not only had the Italians failed to win any essential objective, but a tempest was already forming which was to sweep them in a few days from all the positions in the region of the Isonzo won by so many toilsome efforts. Under von Ludendorff's direction the Germans were perfecting the new system of offensive tactics which has already been mentioned, greatly intensifying the effectiveness of the attack.

For three years the belligerents had used the offensive tactics based on a powerful artillery preparation as devised to meet the requirements of trench warfare. They had continually increased the violence of their bombardments without entirely breaking down the resistance on any sector of the Western front. The system was cumbersome and unwieldy and the effect of the tremendous bombardments had been partly counteracted by the deepening of the defensive organizations. The necessity of repeating the artillery preparation at successive stages of the offensive often involved a fatal loss of time while the heavy pieces were being moved forward to their new positions. Disclosure of the plan of attack by the preliminary bombardment and unwieldiness in action were the chief drawbacks of the offensive tactics then employed. To realize to a certain extent the advantages of surprise,

the Germans had reduced the artillery preparation in the first attack on Verdun to about ten hours. At Cambrai the British had succeeded in taking their opponents entirely by surprise by giving up the preliminary bombardment and using tanks to prepare the terrain for the advancing infantry. Now, in their turn, the Germans profoundly modified the methods of attack. They substituted a preliminary bombardment with gas shells for the usual demolition fire, paralyzing the enemy defenders instead of destroying the defenses. Neutralization fire by asphyxiating shells had already been used to supplement the regular counter-battery fire for the purpose of exhausting enemy gunners and so putting the enemy batteries completely out of action. But the innovation here referred to was to execute the artillery preparation mainly or wholly with gas shells, thereby reducing it to the shortest possible duration, so that it was no longer incompatible with the full effect of surprise. At the same time, an increase in mobility was secured by rapidity in the assembling of the attacking forces and by the employment of light ordnance to accompany the van of the attacking infantry. Divisions were carefully trained in the new methods, which called for much greater individual initiative and a more accurate correlation of the attacking elements.

The immediate success of the new tactics as applied for the first time by General von Hutier on the Riga sector made little impression on the Allies, probably because they attributed the easy victory of the Germans on this occasion to the disorganization of the Russian army.

Encouraged by the trial at Riga, the Teutonic Allies proposed to use the new system in their plan of crushing the Italians, French, and British successively, before the United States could effectively intervene. General Otto von Below was taken from the Sixth German Army in the

West and placed in command of a new Fourteenth Army forming in Austria of six German and seven Austro-Hungarian divisions. Half of the field artillery was made up of mountain guns and the troops were given special training in the application of the new tactics in rugged country. The German General Staff took over the supreme direction of operations on the Austrian front towards Italy.

Unperceived, the new Fourteenth Army slipped into position on von Boroevitch's right, between Tolmino and Plezzo, facing the northeastern section of the Italian front. The apparently unfavorable character of this region as the zone of departure for a great offensive favored concealment of the Austro-German preparations, although three valleys descending from the east to the Isonzo afforded avenues of advance which are prolonged on the opposite bank by natural routes through the foothills to the Venetian plain.

The general discontent behind the front in Italy, giving rise to serious riots in Turin in August, offered a favorable condition for the insidious campaign of German propaganda conducted with the same thoroughness and skill that had been displayed in undermining the Russian spirit of resistance. The appeal for non-resistance in behalf of universal brotherhood was directed to the Socialistic elements throughout the country.

In the autumn of 1917 the Italian Fifth Army under General Morrone faced the western side of the Trentino, the First Army under General Pecori-Giraldo stretched along the southern and eastern sides of the Trentino as far as the Brenta, the Fourth under General de Robilant occupied the Cadore and Carnic front, the Second under General Capello held the zone of the Isonzo above Gorizia, and the Third under the Duke of Aosta extended from Gorizia to the Adriatic. By the middle of October vague

rumors of impending grave events were in the air, ominous mutterings of the coming storm, and there was a widespread feeling of uneasiness. The first appearance of Germans in action on the Italian front was reported from Cadore. By October 21st Italian aviators noticed the arrival of fresh contingents from the Russian front. But after making every allowance for the unusual dexterity with which the assembling Austro-German forces eluded observation and the natural conditions favoring concealment, we can scarcely account for the lack of discernment exhibited by the Italian command without assuming the presence somewhere of gross incompetence. Apparently the Italian High Command believed that the Austro-Hungarians were too exhausted to undertake further operations on a large scale during the autumn.

From the Bainsizza plateau the Italian lines ran north by west, crossing to the western bank of the Isonzo, traversing a promontory formed by a detour of the river, and then recrossing to the eastern bank, and proceeded northward as far as Monte Nero, whence they bore northwestward, finally passing the river a little below Plezzo. Thus they included a slice of the eastern bank opposite Caporetto and the opening of the defile leading to the Natisone valley, the shortest route to Cividale, Udine, and the Venetian plain.

On the night of October 23-24 the Austro-German forces opened a heavy bombardment of gas shells from the vicinity of Plezzo to the northern part of the Bainsizza plateau. After a pause the bombardment was resumed with great fury on the morning of the 24th and followed immediately by the infantry attack. The Second Italian Army consisted of eight army corps, of which three, the Fourth, Seventh, and Twenty-seventh, in the order mentioned from north to south, bore the brunt of the attack. A heavy mist obscured the landscape so that in places

the Austro-German forces reached the first Italian line before the defenders perceived them. The Italians resisted gallantly on the wings of the threatened sector, but in the region of Caporetto, where the morale of the troops had been undermined, the defensive was shaken from the start. The assailants broke through the lines, crossed the Isonzo, and gained the slopes on the west bank by evening. Depression and consternation spread. Reinforcements advancing from the rear were borne back by the disordered crowds of fugitives pouring through the defiles.

The distressful situation was relieved by some splendid examples of heroism. A body of Alpini cut off on Monte Nero refused to surrender and were reported by aviators as still resisting eleven days later, when the Italian armies were back on the Tagliamento, fifty miles away. A party of Bersaglieri held out on Monte Maggiore until they were annihilated.

General Capello, who was just recovering from fever, turned over the command of the Second Army to General Montuori. By the afternoon the situation left no doubt as to the reality of the calamity; there was only the question of its eventual scope. A large part of the Second Army was in a state of disorganization more or less complete. The enemy was crossing the foothills between the Isonzo and the plain by every available route. The position on the Bainsizza plateau had become untenable. Orders for a general retreat were issued on the evening of the 26th.

The army of von Below swept forward with irresistible force. On the evening of the 27th it occupied Cividale, and on the 28th, Udine, which had been the Italian General Headquarters, situated sixty miles northeast of Venice. On the same day the invaders debouched into the plain.

The rapid advance threatened the retreat of the Third Italian Army. The Tagliamento, Livenza, and Piave

Rivers, rising in the Venetian Alps, cross the plain to the sea from east to west in the order in which they are here mentioned. They were now swollen by the autumn rains and the main routes westward through the plain and the practicable crossing points on the rivers were quite limited in number. Von Below's army was actually nearer the Tagliamento than was the Third Italian Army now abandoning its positions on the Carso. The latter started westward in a race with destruction, engaging from time to time in rearguard actions with von Boroevitch's forces which pursued it, while von Below's army converged from the northeast upon its line of retreat, threatening to cut it off. The difficulties of the retreat were increased by the fugitive population of these regions streaming westward. Continual rain impeded movement, and the frequent fires and explosions lighting up the night added a weird and awful setting to the terrible situation.

This catastrophe was the severest test to which United Italy had ever been subjected. Ignorance of the enemy's preparation gave free scope to exaggeration of the danger and it required no hysterical imagination to anticipate a series of crushing blows delivered by all the armies banded against the Italian front and the complete collapse of the defensive. But a comprehensive offensive was beyond the resources of the enemy, who was probably taken somewhat by surprise at the sensational effect of the attack in the northeast. Lack of prevision of this may have been one of the factors preventing the complete exploitation of the Austro-German success.

In any case, the sudden and terrible character of the Italian disaster made it the most startling calamity of the whole war. The situation provoked a ministerial crisis. The Boselli cabinet resigned on October 26th and the new ministry was announced on November 1st with Signor

Orlando as Premier, Baron Sonnino as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signor Nitti as Minister of Finance, and Signor Alfieri as Minister of War.

The nation recovered quickly from its stupefaction and its resolute attitude was proof of its essential soundness. With the exception of a part of the Second Army, the conduct of the troops was praiseworthy. The retreat of the Third Army, carried out for the most part with regularity and good order, under the command of the Duke of Aosta, was a remarkable achievement. The remnant of the Second Army crossed the Tagliamento at Codroipo on October 30th and the greater part of the Third Army crossed lower down on the next day.

The Tagliamento afforded only a brief respite. It was not a suitable line of front, partly because it could be easily turned in the north, where the railway from the Pontebba Pass descends its western bank. Civilization shuddered at the rumor of a retirement to the Adige exposing Venice to invasion. But the necessity of retaining the naval key to the northern Adriatic as well as the advantage of securing the shortest line of front across the plain led to the choice of the Piave.

The Austro-Germans claimed to have taken 200,000 prisoners and 1,800 guns during the advance to the Tagliamento. With the crossing of this river the Italians passed the most critical stage of the retreat. The enemy was compelled to await the arrival of his heavy artillery and the organization of communications. The stand of a few days at the Tagliamento enabled the Italians to recover somewhat from the first shock.

The line of the Tagliamento, which the Austro-Germans forced at Pinzano on November 3d, was entirely abandoned by the 7th. The Livenza was left the next day. The Italians retreated westward leaving to spoliation one of the

fairest regions of the country, practically untouched by war for centuries. The invasion of this opulent province recalled the inroad of the Huns, when the inhabitants fled in terror to the sandy islands along the coast, establishing the settlements that later became Venice.

By November 10th the Third Army and the remains of the Second were everywhere back on the Piave. This river rises in the Dolomites, flows southwestward through the Venetian Alps, past Belluno and Feltre, turns southwestward near the latter place, and in this direction crosses the plain to the Adriatic. In consequence of the retirement of the Italian armies on the eastern front, the Fourth had to relinquish the lofty positions in the Carnic Alps, won by so many deeds of valor, and retreat southwestward, eventually taking its position between the Third and First Armies on the new front extending from the sea up the Piave to Montello and thence along the chain of Monte Grappa and across the Brenta to the old line on the Asiago plateau. The Third Army held the Piave sector, while the Fourth filled the gap between the Piave and the Brenta and was linked with the right flank of the First which held the Asiago plateau. By the 11th the Fourth Army was in its new position and the Austro-Hungarian forces, which had followed it down the valley of the Piave, came into touch with their comrades in the Val Sugana. Scheuchensteuel's Eleventh Austro-Hungarian Army now faced the First Italian Army on the Asiago plateau, Krobatin's Tenth Army and part of von Below's Fourteenth were opposed to the Italian Fourth from the Brenta to the Piave, and the remainder of the Fourteenth and von Boroevitch's Army confronted the Italian Third on the Piave from Montello to the sea.

One of the most romantic episodes of the war was the action of a detachment of about 1,400 men of the Fourth

Italian Army under Captain Arduino who, cut off in the Cadore Mountains, kept up a stubborn resistance for more than a year, continually harassing the enemy communications.

Two corps of the Second Italian Army were now joined with the Third Army, while the rest were withdrawn from the front to be reformed.

The gravity of the crisis in Italy impressed upon the Allies in the West the need of closer coöperation. Generals Foch and Sir William Robertson hastened to the Italian front at the end of October. Mr. Lloyd George and Generals Smuts and Sir Henry Wilson, together with the French Premier, M. Painlevé, and M. Franklin Bouillon, coming from Paris, were joined by the Italian Premier, Signor Orlando, and Baron Sonnino, Generals Alfieri and Pano, and Generals Foch and Robertson for a conference on the situation at Rapallo, sixteen miles west of Genoa. The result of their deliberations was the first step in the direction of the unified command, the establishment of a Supreme Council of the Allies to meet at Versailles as often as practicable, and a common Military Council to sit permanently at Versailles. General Cadorna became the representative of Italy at Versailles and was succeeded by General Diaz in supreme command of the Italian armies.

General Armando Diaz, the new Italian generalissimo, was born at Naples in 1861. He attended the military college in his native city and the famous military academy in Turin. He had served with distinction as an officer in the Abyssinian and Libyan campaigns. He had been secretary for three successive Chiefs of the General Staff. His brilliant leadership of the Twenty-third Corps had been an outstanding feature of the Carso battles. General Badoglio was now associated with him as Chief of the General Staff.

Much credit for preserving the nation in the perilous situation following the calamity of Caporetto is due to the energy of Italian industry. In spite of the great scarcity of fuel, the manufacturing equipment and production of the country in the lines of greatest military importance had been very largely increased during the war. The chief place in the metallurgical industry was occupied by the huge Ansaldo Works in the vicinity of Genoa, manufacturing steel and the more important articles, devices, and machines of steel and other metals, locomotives, rails, automobiles, agricultural machinery, naval and merchant vessels, and marine engines. The gun factory turned out about 10,000 pieces of artillery during the war and it is said that in about six months this factory alone made good all the losses in artillery suffered by the Italians during the great disaster and retreat.

British contingents forming the Fourteenth Corps and the French Twelfth Corps were dispatched to the aid of Italy under the command of General Sir Herbert Plumer and General Fayolle respectively. The arrival of these Allied troops had an excellent moral effect upon the Italian armies and the population. They first took position on the hills north of Vicenza in readiness to make a stand in case the line of the Piave had to be relinquished. On December 4th they took over the Montello sector on the front, permitting the Italian Fourth Army to concentrate on the defense of the Monte Grappa region.

The sectors of Monte Grappa and the Asiago plateau were now the critical part of the front, because by breaking through them the enemy could turn the line of the Piave. Both these positions were at first included within the Italian lines.

The Austro-German plan was to hammer at the Piave front while driving towards the plain from the north.

Blows were distributed in rapid succession. On November 12th Austro-Hungarian forces effected the passage of the Piave at Zenson, eighteen miles from the sea. On the 13th they captured Monte Longaro northeast of Asiago and on the 16th won a bridgehead at Fogare west of the Piave.

Between the Brenta and the Piave the Italians were gradually forced back to the border of the mountainous region. The struggle raged throughout the rest of November with little change. On December 6th a great bombardment was followed by an Austro-Hungarian double converging attack on the Asiago plateau where the Italians were forced back almost to the edge of the mountains. On the next day Krobatin attacked between the Brenta and the Piave and on the 18th won most of Monte Asolone.

The situation was very critical but the Italians fought stubbornly for their last positions in the mountains and on the 22d won back the southern slope of Asolone. On the 30th the French, who were on the left of the British, executed a brilliant attack on the eastern part of Monte Tomba, taking many prisoners.

With the New Year prospects became more hopeful. Early in January the Italians drove their opponents from the western bank of the Piave at Zenson. The weather was unfavorable for the continuation of the Austro-German offensive operations. The German divisions were withdrawn. Several successful minor enterprises increased the confidence of the Allies and with the close of January the campaign practically came to an end.

The effort of the Central Powers, so auspiciously commenced, revived for a time the martial spirit of Austria, removed the danger on the Isonzo, and probably somewhat alleviated the food situation by the conquest of a

very productive part of Venetia, but failed to force Italy to submission or to gain any decisive advantage.

Italy had suffered serious losses but the spirit of her people had been fused with fresh determination. The union of the Western Allies had become closer. Taken as a whole, however, the Allied situation offered very little ground for complacent reflections. The Italian campaign had been a bitter disappointment, the military power of Russia, as we shall presently see, had collapsed completely, and enormous efforts in the West had brought no commensurate results. Many who had expected the campaign of 1917 to be conclusive even gave up hope of final victory in 1918.

# CHAPTER III

## The Red Tide in Russia

Moral forces and conditions in Russia. Weakness of Nicholas II. Demoralization of the army after the revolution of March, 1917. Operations in Roumania after the Russian collapse of July, 1917. Lenin and Trotsky. Kerensky. Precarious situation of the Kerensky government. The Moscow Conference, August 25th. German offensive on the Dvina and occupation of Riga, September 3d. The alleged sedition of Korniloff and the proclamation of the republic, September 7th. The landing of the Germans in Esthonia. The increasing assurance of the extremists. The Military Revolutionary Committee. Return of Lenin to Petrograd, November 7th; supremacy of the Soviets proclaimed; defection of the troops; flight of Kerensky and capture of the Winter Palace by the insurgents. The Council of People's Commissioners. Trotsky's publication of the secret treaties. The election of the Constituent Assembly and its suppression.

Only lack of organization and definiteness of aim on the part of the revolutionary elements preserved the Russian autocracy from the crisis of 1905, preserving for a brief period this government which rested on a narrow, unsubstantial basis. The character of the Russian governing bureaucracy was undermined by intrigue and dishonesty. The vagaries of a large part of the intellectual class deprived it of sound political influence. An enterprising industrial and mercantile class had grown in strength with the rapid economic development of recent years, but its numbers were still relatively small. The more enlightened rural proprietors were a progressive element in the public life of the provinces. But they were a scanty leaven for the vast, inert mass of the peasantry, engrossed in its instinctive and immediate interests, devoid of any comprehension of national policy or rational patriotism. The

industrial proletariat in the towns had largely broken with traditional restrictions without having gained a ripeness of experience or a compensating sense of responsibility.

With favorable conditions the salvation of the country might have been attained by a gradual, peaceful evolution. But the impaired framework of society collapsed beneath the tempests of the Great War. For the body-politic had become tainted by the decomposing autocratic power. The bureaucracy, monopolizing the administrative experience of the nation, was largely corrupt, while the intelligentsia, with pure and lofty motives, was inexperienced and impractical. The peasants were swayed by their elementary instincts, while the laboring classes in the towns, of immature and uncritical understanding, were easily stirred by the eloquence of demagogues and extremists.

The fall of the former régime was hastened by the political ineptitude of the last of the Romanoffs. Like Louis XVI of France, Nicholas II was a character of mediocre ability overwhelmed by the burden of the rôle which had devolved upon him. His excellent intentions and weaknesses of character recall the same unfortunate French monarch. Morbidly apprehensive and vacillating, he seemed alike incapable of forming rational decisions or of persevering in any decisions when once made. His will-power showed strength only in spasmodic periods of stubbornness. Clearness of vision and firmness on his part might have saved the dynasty. But instead of displaying these salutary qualities he was continually swayed by the stronger characters about him. While loyal throughout to the Allies, his lack of discernment and the instability of the internal situation exposed him to the intrigues and duplicity of a despicable element at court which regarded the war with all its frightful losses and horror as only a

Scene in front of the Public Library on the Nevsky Prospect, Petrograd, July, 1917, when the Bolsheviki attempted to overthrow the Provisional Government.

Kerensky with his cabinet. *Alexander Federovitch Kerensky, Prime Minister, is the fourth seated figure from the left.*

safe form of private speculation. When the immediate causes of the war were obscured by vastly more significant issues and this wretched element saw signs of a vigorous, independent development in Russian society, it became alarmed and was convinced that the triumph of Germany would be less dangerous to its own selfish interests than the victory of the democratic nations of the West. The influence of these and of others who from personal or patriotic motives mistrusted the effect of the popular movements accounted for the reactionary tendencies in the Russian government which offended the generous impulses of the middle class. The event showed that there were reasonable grounds for caution.

The hollowness of the imperial régime was revealed by the suddenness of its fall. But the policy of the liberal leaders of the Duma who constituted the Provisional Government was hesitating and uncertain. The revolution had been achieved with the assistance of a determined extremist minority. From the first the Provisional Government shared authority with the Soviets and its dependence on the radical element increased. It was almost inevitable that fanatic demagogues, by appealing to the popular craving for peace and the distribution of land, would eventually set in motion the red tide that would sweep the nation into anarchy.

The disintegration of the Russian army, an event of foremost importance in the Great War, began with the order of the Soviets transferring the disciplinary power of the officers to committees elected by the soldiers. The army was invaded by a host of itinerant orators intent upon the political enlightenment of the ignorant troops. Demoralization was favored by the great depletion in the number of professional officers.

Soldiers' committees representing units of all sizes from the company to the army corps were continually in session.

At one time it was estimated that in the Fourth Army alone, although it was somewhat less exposed to the general ferment, no less than 40,000 men consumed their entire time in idle discussions as members of the soldiers' commissions and committees, without performing any kind of military service. It is related that on the occasion of a certain attack against the Russian front the Germans noticed that their opponents were holding up their hands and supposed that they were surrendering, but that on approaching they were received with a volley of fire. The Russian troops were in reality voting on the course of action to be adopted.

The inactivity now prevailing on most parts of the Eastern front and the frequent opportunities for contact between the lines enabled the Teutonic commands to institute an effective propaganda for promoting the subversive tendencies in the Russian army.

Since the Russian revolution in March, 1917, public opinion in the West has undoubtedly gone too far in decrying the evils of the Imperial régime, just as in the earlier stages of the war it unduly extolled the newly-discovered Russian virtues. It should not be forgotten that the rule of the Tsars had at least discharged the most elementary function of government, that of providing a fair degree of security for life and property throughout the immense empire. During the war it displayed some instances of great energy. Thus, when Russia was almost isolated from the West by the German control of the Baltic and the Turkish mastery of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, when the gates of the country were locked and the keys were in the hands of the enemy, the port of Archangel being closed six months in the year by ice, the Russian government pushed the construction of a new railway more than eight hundred miles northward through

the wilderness to a harbor on the Murman Coast. Vast numbers of Austro-Hungarian prisoners were employed. The trees were felled to make an opening through the interminable forests and immediately converted into ties. The line was opened in December, 1916, and greatly facilitated the importation of munitions and supplies. Through the action of patriotic Russians all over the country a great improvement had been made in war activity behind the front and the Russian armies had never been so well equipped as on the eve of the revolution.

The Allies had planned the great offensive action for the campaign of 1917 with the expectation of powerful coöperation on the Eastern front. But these plans were confounded by the Russian revolution and the disintegration of the Russian army. The Allies urged a Russian offensive in the summer of 1917 and the Provisional Government concurred in spite of the misgivings of Korniloff. The auspicious beginning was followed quickly by the great collapse already recorded. After the rout of the Russian armies in Galicia, General Korniloff was placed in command of the southwestern front in place of General Gutor.

Laurus G. Korniloff, son of a lowly Siberian Cossack, had won distinction for gallant conduct in the Russo-Japanese War. He was a brigade-commander at the outbreak of the European War in 1914, but was soon promoted to the command of the Forty-eighth Division. Cut off in the Carpathians while conducting the rear-guard defense of his division after the disaster on the Biala and Dunajec in May, 1915, he was compelled to surrender, but his romantic escape from captivity a few months later added much to his popularity. He was a firm, but just, commander, devoted to the welfare of the army and to the interests of his country. Distressed at the progressive

disintegration of the army, he repeatedly urged reforms for strengthening authority and counteracting the baneful tendencies, and his zeal eventually involved him in a fatal controversy with the Provisional Government. But on August 2, 1917, when no one doubted his loyalty, he was chosen by reason of his sound qualities and great popularity with the troops to succeed Brussiloff as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, the command of the southwestern front passing to Valueff for a few days and on August 11th to Denikin.

By the end of July the Eleventh and Seventh Armies were behind the Russian boundary, while the front of the Eighth, which Korniloff had commanded, ran southwestwards through Mielnica, Sniatyn, and Kuty. At the beginning of August the Russians evacuated Czernowitz. But the Teutonic offensive was pushed no further, as the Austro-German command preferred to await the fulfilment of its purpose through the demoralizing tendencies at work within the Russian armies.

There was severe fighting on the Roumanian front, which in July ran southwards along the mountains to the Oitoz Pass, thence along the Putna to its junction with the Sereth east of Focsani, and then along the Sereth to the Danube. The Russian General Sherbacheff commanded this front, which was held in the north by the Russian Fourth Army, in the center by the Roumanian Second Army under Avarescu, and in the south by the Roumanian First Army.

Von Mackensen directed the Teutonic offensive intended to clear Moldavia and open the way for an advance to the Black Sea and Odessa. Demoralizing tendencies were spreading in the Fourth Russian Army, but the Roumanians who had suffered such staggering defeats the autumn before now resisted with remarkable confidence and valor.

The Austro-German attack was chiefly directed against the important junction points of Marasesti and Adjudul. The Roumanians counter-attacked at Ocna on the Trotus, advancing six miles. Von Mackensen brought up more than twelve additional divisions and attacked from the mountains to the Danube. The First Roumanian Army bore the brunt of the fighting in the vicinity of Marasesti, where the culminating effort of the Germans failed on August 19th. The chief attack was then transferred to the region of Ocna, but there the Second Roumanian Army resisted with such success that, in spite of the difficulty of communications with the outside world and the uncertainty of Russian support, the Roumanians confined their assailants to inconsiderable gains of territory.

With the Russian disasters the trials of the Provisional Government were increased. The extremists attempted to seize the power in Petrograd on July 16th, the coincidence of this date with the beginning of the great Austro-German counter-offensive being suggestive. Lenin and Trotsky were now associated in the leadership of the subversive element. Nicholas (Nikolai) Lenin, whose real name was Vladimir Ulyanoff, belonged to a Russian family of the official class. His brother was executed for revolutionary activity in 1889. He himself suffered exile in Siberia, 1897-1899, and then went to Switzerland, where he founded a journal and engaged in intense intellectual and literary activity in behalf of extreme socialism. He returned to Russia on the occasion of the revolution in 1905, but found it necessary to leave again in 1907. He was a man of tireless energy and uncompromising devotion to abstract ideals. His customary austerity of manner did not preclude the power of communicating to his hearers the intense fire of his convictions.

Of quite different temperament was Leo Davidovitch Bronstein, who called himself Leon Trotsky. He was a Jew of Kherson, a character animated by overpowering ambition and fanaticism, adroit and unscrupulous in his means and methods. His versatile intellect and animated style made him a distinguished journalist and a forceful orator. He was a born agitator. Impatient of all intermediary stages in the application of his extreme principles, he transferred allegiance from the Menshevists to the Bolshevists. The vicissitudes of his career are typical of the Russian revolutionists. Arrested and sent to Siberia in 1905, he escaped by way of Japan and joined the Russian exiles in Switzerland. He was expelled from Berlin at the outbreak of the Great War and went by way of Switzerland to Paris, where he started the publication of a socialist paper. When this brought him eventually into difficulties with the government, he went to Spain, sailing thence to Havana and New York. He landed in New York in January, 1917, and became one of the editors of a Russian periodical, the *Novy Mir*, while contributing to other socialist periodicals and living in a flat in the Bronx. Upon receiving news of the March revolution, he took passage on a British ship with the intention of returning to Russia, but was detained by the authorities at Halifax. Later he was allowed to proceed at Kerensky's request.

Discontented soldiers and sailors from Kronstadt joined in the July uprising and there was rioting in the streets of the capital, but the Bolsheviki did not yet control a majority in the Soviets. General Polovtsoff with some Cossack regiments quelled the insurrection; Trotsky was arrested and Lenin fled to Finland. But Kerensky, who succeeded Prince Lvoff as prime minister, refrained from punishing the insurrectionary leaders.

Alexander Federovitch Kerensky was born on April 22, 1881, the son of a gymnasium professor at Sembirsk on the

Volga. The family removed to Tashkent in 1889. He completed his law course at Petrograd in 1904 and associated himself with the Social Revolutionists. After winning fame and the enmity of the Tsar's government by his brilliant advocacy of the accused in political and labor cases, he was returned as a member of the Fourth Duma in the Labor Group, where his generous enthusiasm and wonderful eloquence soon made him an acknowledged leader. The revolution created a situation in which Kerensky was the natural link between the progressive moderate element and the radical Socialists. The rapid evolution of events gave Kerensky, a man of obscure birth, at the comparatively youthful age of thirty-six, the chief control of the enormous empire of the Romanoffs, of Peter the Great and Catherine II, of 180,000,000 people and the largest expanse of territory under a single government in the world. No man had ever had so vast an opportunity of benefiting mankind, if he could perpetuate the work of the revolution by reconciling the extremists with a régime of security and order. But with the noblest aspirations, Kerensky combined the limited political experience common to leaders whose career has been exclusively in the opposition.

The Provisional Government lacked firmness and confidence because it was not supported by a strong, coherent moderate party. Its position between the irreconcilable extremes, the patriotic element on one side, urging drastic measures for restoring authority and discipline, and the opponents of all established order on the other, became daily more difficult. Moreover, the financial system was becoming critical, with the revenues decreasing and the paper circulation increasing at an alarming rate. Industry was languishing and the railways were becoming less and less efficient.

With the hope of evolving a common program for coöperation a great assembly of delegates from organizations throughout the country convened at Moscow, August 25th, under the presidency of the Menshevist, Nikitin. But instead of solving practical problems, this Moscow Conference spent most of its time in deliberations on theories and forms of government.

Nevertheless, Kerensky spoke in favor of army reform, Korniloff explained the causes of the military catastrophe with uncompromising candor, and Alexeieff showed that the original source of the evil was the famous Order No. 1 subordinating the authority of the officers to the soldiers' committees. The majority of the delegates left the Conference in apparent agreement on the necessity of reforms in the army, the restoration of authority, the continuation of the war, and the conciliation of parties. But these excellent opinions were rendered futile by the general apathy of the nation, and the impudence of the extreme Socialists increased.

The German command took this occasion to attack the Riga sector and to test the new system of offensive tactics which has been described. The German Eighth Army under General von Hutier began operations against the Twelfth Russian Army commanded by General Parsky in the last week of August. While engaging the Russians at various points in the region of the lower Dvina, the Germans crossed the river at Uexkull, eighteen miles southeast of Riga, on September 1st, and intercepted the Dvinsk railway line the following day. Riga was evacuated on the 3d, and the Russians retired northeastward. But the German offensive, which had evidently been designed largely for its effect upon the internal movement in Russia, having attained its limited objectives, was allowed to wane.

The apparent danger had provoked a fatal crisis in the internal councils of Russia. Kerensky, stirred by the gravity of the situation, restored the death penalty in the army on September 5th and seems to have considered other steps for strengthening the authority of the executive. The Minister of War, Savinkoff, was sent to confer with Korniloff in the General Headquarters at Mohileff, the government fearing a Bolshevist uprising in Petrograd in addition to the German peril. Savinkoff requested, in the name of the Provisional Government, that a cavalry corps be sent to the vicinity of the capital to insure order. He left General Headquarters on September 7th to return to Petrograd.

On the same day Vladimir Lvoff, a member of the Fourth Duma and at one time Procurator of the Holy Synod, interviewed Korniloff regarding the situation and its remedies. Korniloff and Kerensky contradict each other in their statements on the most essential points of the ensuing conflict and the additional evidence is not sufficient to clear the case entirely from uncertainty. Korniloff claims that Lvoff presented himself as an emissary of Kerensky informing him that the Provisional Government regarded some form of dictatorship as indispensable. But Kerensky denies that Lvoff was authorized by himself or the Provisional Government to confer with Korniloff on the situation. In conversation with the supposed delegate, Korniloff expressed himself freely in favor of a dictatorship and sketched the general lines of a plan of procedure.

Returning to Petrograd on the 8th, Lvoff obtained an interview with Kerensky in the evening and acquainted him with what he represented to be the proposals of Korniloff. Kerensky designates them as an ultimatum to the Provisional Government. According to the statement

of them in writing made by Lvoff in the presence of Kerensky, Korniloff demanded the declaration of martial law in Petrograd, the transference of all military and civil power into his own hands, and the resignation of all ministers, including the premier, control to pass temporarily from the ministers to their assistants, until the establishment of a new cabinet to be selected by himself. Kerensky immediately communicated with Korniloff by telephone and the latter confirmed the fact that he had sent a message by Lvoff, although the substance of the message as delivered to Kerensky was not repeated in the conversation, except as regards the commander-in-chief's proposal that Kerensky and Savinkoff should go at once to the General Headquarters.

Korniloff was left with the impression that Kerensky concurred in his views. But Kerensky claims that these events confirmed evidence already at hand which showed that a dangerous conspiracy was being formed. He immediately placed Lvoff under arrest and on the next day despatched an order relieving Korniloff of his command and directing him to repair to the capital immediately. But Lukomsky, then commander of the northern front, and Klembovsky, to whom the chief command was successively offered, both refused it, and Korniloff, who was taken entirely by surprise at the peremptory despatch, refused to obey it and issued a proclamation in justification of his conduct, declaring that the Provisional Government, under pressure of the Bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the Germans and betraying the country to destruction.

Meanwhile, the Third Cavalry Corps under General Krymoff was approaching Petrograd, apparently in response to Kerensky's summons, but in reality, as the prime minister declared, intending to seize control of the city for a counter-revolution.

On September 10th the Provisional Government proclaimed Korniloff a traitor, and on the 12th Kerensky became commander-in-chief with Alexeieff as his chief of staff. Krymoff, finding himself opposed by the government, with his communications cut in the rear, took his own life. Finally, Korniloff surrendered his command to Alexeieff and was placed under arrest. Suspicion of complicity in counter-revolutionary plots involved many officers in persecution.

There is little doubt that Korniloff intended to save Russia from disaster and disgrace by drastic measures. He had felt the demoralization of the army as a personal tragedy. At a time when the Germans were pouring over the Dvina, when national existence seemed to be at stake, he saw resistance paralyzed by the subversive element that exulted in the dissolution of the army. He had virtually declared from the first that he would save the nation at any cost, if its existence were endangered. While his motives were sincerely patriotic, although perhaps misguided, other individuals were doubtless working behind him for the overthrow of the Provisional Government who were impelled by far less estimable incentives.

The Kerensky-Korniloff controversy was the great turning point in the revolution. It was followed immediately by the withdrawal of the moderate element from the cabinet, and the government was concentrated in a council of five: Kerensky, Terestchenko, General Verkhovsky, Admiral Varderevsky, and Nikitin. Russia was proclaimed a republic on September 16th although the question of the form of government had been reserved for the decision of a constituent assembly.

The danger of a reactionary conspiracy proclaimed in the government's denunciation of Korniloff inflamed popular indignation and served as a trump card in the hands of

the agitators. A strong reaction in favor of the extremists accelerated the process which at all events was probably inevitable. The Bolsheviki obtained for the first time a substantial majority of the Petrograd Soviet in a vote on September 13th.

The Germans steadily increased their hold on the Baltic coast without spending energy on a decisive blow. Von Hutier took Jacobstadt on the Dvina, about seventy miles from Riga, on September 23d. On October 12th a large German force was landed on Oesel Island, lying between the Gulf of Riga and the Baltic Sea, and within a few days Mohn and Dagoe Islands were also occupied. The German fleet attempted to cut off the retreat of the Russian fleet through Mohn Sound but most of the Russian vessels escaped. On the 21st the Germans made a landing on the Esthonian coast, threatening the right flank of the Russian Twelfth Army, but they subsequently relinquished this position.

In the meantime Kerensky, finding the need of orderly government stronger than the impulse of his abstract principles, was drawing towards the moderate element. Early in October a Democratic Conference, similar to the Moscow Conference in its manner of formation, assembled at Petrograd and concurred in the formation of a coalition ministry on October 4th, which included four Cadets and a number of Moscow business men, and in the calling of a provisional parliament, called the Council of the Republic, pending the election of the Constituent Assembly.

The Council of the Republic held its first session on October 20th. Kerensky made a passionate appeal, bitterly attacking the Bolshevists, and was answered by a vote of confidence of only 123 to 102, twenty-six of the members present not voting and a number being absent. The Bolsheviki could now regard Kerensky's denunciations

with indifference. In the confusion of aims and purposes following the revolution, theirs had been the one definite, consistent policy, since they had aimed solely at the destruction of the existing order so as to clear the ground for the erection of a new society. Since their unsuccessful attempt in July they had bided their time, certain of ultimate victory through the cumulative force of popular uneasiness and discontent. In the seven months that had passed since the revolution in March, the government had neither satisfied the demand of the peasants for land nor the craving of the populace for peace, and it was clear that no intellectual radical, like Kerensky, would desert the Allies or confiscate the rural estates.

A portent of the coming triumph of the extremists was the election of Trotsky as president of the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky prepared his organization for the approaching revolution in the Military Revolutionary Committee for correlating and directing the forces of the Bolshevists in the army and navy and in the industrial centers. The leaders were fanatics who had returned to Russia with a concentrated frenzy nourished through years of banishment, delusion, and privation.

On November 5th the Military Revolutionary Committee summoned the Petrograd garrison to place itself under their orders. Kerensky suppressed the leading Bolshevist paper and called on the loyal troops to defend the government. On the 6th important points in the city were occupied by the military cadets, who stood guard around the Winter Palace, a futile precaution against the menacing outbreak.

Lenin arrived in Petrograd on the morning of the 7th. The Bolshevists made their headquarters in the Smolny Institute, a girls' school in a remote part of the city, and proclaimed the fall of the government and the transfer of

the power to the Soviets. A majority of the regiments of the garrison declared for the insurrectionary régime and became part of the Bolshevist Red troops. On the same morning Kerensky fled. The Red troops captured the Winter Palace and by evening the city was in their hands. An All-Russian Congress of Soviets meeting on the 8th ratified the result of the revolution. The government was placed in the hands of a Council of People's Commissioners, of which Lenin was President; Trotsky, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs; and Krylenko, formerly an ensign, Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The Kerensky government, without coherent backing, vanished over night. In the general state of apathy and weariness no element could stand against the resolute minority that seized the power. Kerensky raised a force and approached Tsarskoye-Selo, but while he hesitated the Red troops dispersed his followers and he disappeared.

The Bolshevistic government invited all the Allied powers to join in an armistice for the purpose of negotiating a peace "without annexation or indemnities." As this proposal was unheeded the Bolsheviki decided to negotiate separately and on November 28th the German Command in the East agreed to arrange an armistice and hostilities actually ceased on December 2d. A definite armistice agreement between Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey was signed on December 15th and became effective at noon on the 17th for a period of twenty-eight days.

Although the Allied governments had formally protested against the steps taken by Russia for an armistice, Trotsky vainly invited them again to participate in the coming peace negotiations with the Central Powers.

The intractability of the Entente may have been one of Trotsky's motives for publishing a number of secret state

documents, mainly agreements between the old autocracy and the Entente governments, found in the Imperial archives. By thus revealing the alleged imperialistic aspirations of the Allied governments, the Bolsheviki hoped to arouse the proletariat in the respective countries and thus hasten the advent of the world revolution.

Among these documents there was a telegram dated February 24th (presumably 1916), from the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, Isvolsky, declaring that Russia was willing to leave France and Great Britain free to determine the western boundaries of Germany, provided the latter granted Russia the same freedom with respect to the eastern boundaries of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Russian Ambassador was directed to insist that the Polish question be excluded from international discussion and that there be no attempt to place Poland under the guarantee or inspection of the Powers.

A telegram from Pokrovsky (second Foreign Minister after Sazonoff) to Isvolsky, dated January 30, 1917, expressed Russia's compliance with the French aim of reannexing Alsace-Lorraine and of obtaining a favorable situation in the Sarre coal-basin, as well as the wish of France that an independent state be formed of the remaining German territory west of the Rhine, and confirmed in general the earlier expression of assent to the claim of France and Great Britain.

The same policy was formulated in a note of the Russian Foreign Minister to the French Ambassador in Petrograd of February 1, 1917.

A telegram from Isvolsky to the Russian Foreign Minister on February 16th of the same year reported that France recognized the right of Russia to fix her own boundaries on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

There was a memorandum of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the secret convention between Russia and Great Britain and France relative to Turkey and Persia. By this agreement Russia was to annex Constantinople; the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles; southern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line; a section of Asia Minor opposite, between the Bosphorus, the Gulf of Ismid, and the Black Sea; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, and Imbros and Tenedos. The passage of the Straits was to be free to merchant vessels and Constantinople was to be a free port for goods in transit. The rights of Great Britain and France in Asiatic Turkey were to be respected. The neutral zone established in Persia by the Russo-British agreement of 1907 was to be added to the British sphere of influence.

A despatch from the Russian Foreign Minister to the Russian Ambassador in London, March 7, 1915, instructed the latter to thank Sir Edward Grey for the definite adhesion of Great Britain to the proposed disposition of Constantinople and the Straits and stating Russia's compliance with the freedom of passage of the Straits for merchant vessels and freedom of transit at Constantinople for all goods not destined for or coming from Russia. It should be noted that one of the early acts of the Provisional Government after the March revolution in Russia was to renounce all intention of annexing Constantinople.

Among the secret documents published at this time was the treaty between Italy, Russia, Great Britain, and France, signed April 26, 1915, ratifying the conditions on which Italy intervened in the war as an ally of the Entente, the details of which may be conveniently postponed for treatment in a later chapter.

In the mean time the elections were held for the Constituent Assembly, the opening of which had been set for December 11th. But by that day less than a half of the

Leaders of the Russian Bolshevistic government.

Leo Davidovitch Bronstein, known as Leon Trotsky, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

Vladimir Ulyanoff, known as Nikolai Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissioners.

appointed number of delegates arrived, there being 204 Social Revolutionaries and only 116 Bolsheviki among them, and the Bolshevist government, annoyed at the large majority of moderates, delayed the opening until January 18th. The sessions finally began with the reading of a manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets by Sverdloff, its chairman, declaring that Russia was a Republic of Soviets and announcing various rights of the working classes. Sverdloff called upon the assembly to approve this statement. But an opposing declaration of the moderate Socialists was read by Tseretelli, condemning the usurpation of the Bolsheviki and maintaining that the supreme power was vested by right in the Constituent Assembly. By a vote of 237 to 146 the Assembly refused to discuss the Soviet declaration and at this the extremists withdrew. Early the next morning sailors broke up the meeting of the Assembly, which was dissolved by a decree of the government on the ground that it was unduly representative of the attitude of the middle class.

The body of organic laws adopted by the All-Russian Soviet Congress in January, 1918, declared that Russia was a federation of the Councils of Workmens', Soldiers', and Peasants' Delegates (Soviets) and that all the central and local authority was vested in these bodies. It established the principle of the equality of all citizens before the law, irrespective of race or stock, and repudiated special privileges of every sort and the oppression of national minorities, yet it declared that, for the present, in view of the impending decisive struggle between the proletariat and its exploiters, it was inexpedient to admit the latter to any of the organs of government.

The active and passive suffrage belonged to all persons of both sexes who had completed their eighteenth year and earned a livelihood by productive labor useful to society,

including members of the military and naval forces. But the votes of urban workmen counted very much more than those of rural laborers. There was supposedly a Council of Workmens', Soldiers', and Peasants' Delegates, or Soviet, in every town and village in Russia. The Soviets chose executive committees from their midst to carry on the local administration. The village Soviets sent delegates to the cantonal assemblies. Representatives of the cantonal assemblies and of the urban Soviets in the proportion of one delegate for 2,000 municipal electors and one for 10,000 rural electors formed the district assemblies. These in turn chose delegates for the assemblies of the governments or provinces. Finally, the governmental assemblies sent delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the supreme organ of authority. The All-Russian Congress elected as representative of its supreme power, while it was not in session, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, not more than 250 in number, and these in turn chose from among themselves the Council of People's Commissioners, a ministry of eighteen members which carried on the general administration of the country.

This graduated system of assemblies, each proceeding from a lower order, was a natural development, after elimination of the "exploiting classes," from the previously existing local organization, in which the cantonal assemblies were made up of deputies of the village communities and in turn sent their delegates to the district zemstvos, while the latter were represented in the governmental zemstvos. But the Bolshevistic leaders perverted the democratic character of these institutions by their ruthless methods in setting up the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat," in reality nothing more than a despotic oligarchy.

# CHAPTER IV

## Events and their Reactions in the Central Empires

Purpose of the chapter. Proclamation of Polish independence by the Central Powers, November 5, 1916. The Polish question and the Austrian Empire. Political changes in Austria and Hungary. Considerations behind Germany's decision for unrestricted submarine warfare. Depression and discontent in Germany. Discussion of war aims; the Stockholm Conference; Erzberger's speech in the Main Committee of the Reichstag, July 6, 1917; the Kaiser's proclamation, July 11th; peace resolution of the Reichstag, July 19th. Von Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded by Dr. Michaelis as Imperial Chancellor. The Chauvinistic reaction; von Tirpitz and the Fatherland Party. Events confirming the war spirit and favoring the revival of confidence in the nation: the military collapse of Russia, the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Dr. Michaelis replaced by von Hertling. Timeliness of the Russian offer of peace for the interests of the Central Powers; the waning of German hopes in the Orient; the shifting of interest from the Bagdad line and Asiatic Turkey to the Danube and Russia. Commanding geographical position of Germany for Russian trade. The new Russian policy of the Central Powers.

In the heat of indignation produced by Germany's offenses against humanity, probably undue prominence has been given to the belief in a carefully laid plot of the German leaders to dominate the world. In reality, Germany's responsibility for the war was due as much to anxiety and stupidity as to lustful ambition on the part of those controlling its foreign policy. Some of the principal military leaders had stood in constant apprehension of the expected perils of warfare on opposite fronts and had been obsessed by the specter of the overwhelming future might of Russia.

With the outbreak of the war, the patriotic fervor of the people, convinced that they were victims of a wicked conspiracy of envious powers, and the remarkable succession of victories gave rise to extravagant speculations on the results for Germany of the great contest.

There existed a wide range and many shades of opinion, from the uncompromising Chauvinists, who nevre ceased to clamor for a vigorous prosecution of the war for complete victory and a "German peace," to the Minority Socialists, who demanded the restitution of all conquests and the establishment of peace on the basis of the *status quo ante*. The program of the Pan-German group, representing largely the great industrial and mercantile interests, called for the freedom of the seas, whatever they meant by that, and the annexation of the Belgian coast and some of the French Channel ports and the Briey mineral basin in French Lorraine. The Mittel-Europa group advocated the formation of a compact league of states in Central Europe, closely united in the military, political, and economic sense. A group represented by Delbrück and Solf urged the expansion of the German colonial empire in Africa. The Conservative Junkers of the northeast were eager for the extension of German rule to the Baltic provinces of Russia, so as to create a new "eastern march" against the Slavs and at the same time increase their own influence in Prussia by the accession of a class of large rural proprietors with interests and an environment like their own.

But the unexpectedly long duration of hostilities, the reverses at Verdun and on the Somme, and the increasing difficulties with the food supply had had a sobering effect upon public opinion in general. A large part of the nation no longer expected to dictate terms at its own discretion, but set its hopes upon a negotiated peace which would

give Germany compensation for the great losses of the war. The nation generally regarded itself as victor and its position as unconquerable and denounced the inhuman obstinacy of the Allies, who refused to acknowledge the obvious logic of facts. Yet, in the circumstances, the balance of opinion wavered with events. The moral force of the nation was deeply affected by the external occurrences and its variations were in turn reflected in the course of operations. The purpose of the present chapter is to consider a critical period in the internal history of the Central Powers with special reference to this double relationship of the events and their reactions.

On November 5, 1916, the Central Powers made formal proclamation of their intention of establishing an independent Poland as a hereditary, constitutional monarchy. Thus, by creating, in Russian Poland exclusively, the semblance of an independent kingdom, under the hereditary sovereignty of some German or Austrian house, the German government expected to be able to avail itself of a new Polish national army, "whose organization, training, and command were to be regulated by mutual agreement."

In response to this, the Tsar's government reiterated the indefinite promise of Polish autonomy made by Grand-duke Nicholas at the beginning of the war. But not to have anticipated the Germans with a specific statement of intentions in respect to Poland was a stupid blunder on the part of the Russian Imperial Government. Such a step would have cost Russia nothing and would probably have been a source of embarrassment to the enemy, especially Austria-Hungary.

The Polish question was a continual preoccupation in the Hapsburg realm, partly because the Austrian government suspected the designs of Germany in Russian Poland and partly because the Polish element in Galicia was an

obtrusive factor in the domestic politics of Austria-Hungary. The Polish delegation in the Austrian Parliament held a sort of balance of power between the Germans and the other Slavs. By eliminating the Poles, the Germans could obtain a small majority in the Reichsrat.

The preceding volume brought the account of the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary down to the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph at the age of eighty-six, after a reign of sixty-eight years, on November 21, 1916, and the succession to the thrones of Austria and Hungary of his great nephew, the Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, son of the Archduke Otto, who was the younger brother of the murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Mention was also made of the resignation of the Austrian Premier, Dr. Koerber, on December 13th of the same year.

After Dr. Spitzmüller had failed in an attempt to form a new ministry, Count Clam-Martinitz became Austrian Prime Minister on December 20th. Favorable reports of the new Austrian sovereign immediately spread in Western Europe. He was represented as independent and open-minded, eager to liberate the monarchy from the tutelage of Berlin, favorable to the federation of the nationalities of the monarchy on equal terms, and an advocate of peace. The chief basis for this opinion was the fact that both the new Austrian Prime Minister and Count Ottokar Czernin, who succeeded Baron Burian as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, were Czechs. But in reality, there was at first no fundamental change in policy.

The most pressing task before the ministry was the renewal of the Ausgleich, or terms of union, between Austria and Hungary, and this required the summoning of the Austrian Parliament for the first time since March, 1914. In anticipation of this event the German Nationalists demanded the exclusion of Galicia with its large Polish

population from Austrian parliamentary representation and certain other organic changes to insure German predominance over the Slavs. The Poles themselves favored the policy of exclusion from the Austrian Parliament because it implied the concession to Galicia of a far greater degree of local autonomy.

Public opinion in Austria-Hungary was deeply stirred by news of the March revolution in Russia. The Austrian Poles, although they had been treated very considerately under the Austrian Empire, turned their attention to liberalized Russia with fresh hope for the redemption and union of the Polish nation. The peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy generally were thrilled with the expectancy of peace with Russia. The Russian situation immediately outweighed all considerations of domestic policy. It was thought necessary to impress favorably the new Russian government by a conciliatory policy towards the Austrian Slavs. Overtures of peace were made by Austria-Hungary to Russia on April 14th and two days later the ministry decided to summon parliament at once without the preliminary measures urged by the German Nationalists.

The Austro-Hungarian proposals for peace were not accepted by the new Russian government, which had no intention of deserting its Allies by making a separate peace. But the Austrian Parliament assembled on May 30th. The proclamation of complete independence for all the Poles recently made by the Russian government strengthened the national spirit of the Galician Poles. Stanek, the leader of the Czech Nationalists declared in parliament that the dual system of government in Austria-Hungary had proved a failure and urged that "the reshaping of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federation of free national states, enjoying equal rights, has become a matter of imperative necessity."

A similar declaration was made by Korasec on behalf of the Jugo-Slavs.

The young emperor appears to have cherished the best intentions for an equable reorganization of the monarchy on the basis of autonomous nationalities. But this policy was beset by the fatal difficulty that the habitat of the two great Slavic national groups of Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs comprised territory in both parts of the Dual Monarchy. No plan of establishing new autonomous states which involved a curtailment of Hungarian sovereignty would have any prospect of success against the uncompromising spirit of the Magyars.

In the meantime there had been disagreement as to the details of the proposed measure for Galician autonomy, and at a critical juncture the decision of the Polish delegation to vote against the budget in the Austrian Parliament provoked the resignation of Count Clam-Martinitz on June 24th. Dr. von Seidler, entrusted with the formation of a new ministry, succeeded in making a working agreement with the Poles.

As evidence of his conciliatory attitude, the Emperor granted a general amnesty for all political offenders on July 3d. Among others, Dr. Kramarsch, the Czech leader, was released from prison. Late in the year the government elaborated a proposal for the reorganization of local autonomy in Austria with nine provincial assemblies to legislate in regions defined according to the principle of nationalities. But the boundary between Austria and Hungary remained intact, with the Slavs in one state isolated from their brethren in the other, so that the proposed reform was futile. There was no power in Austria-Hungary capable of applying a radical remedy for the organic evils which threatened the existence of the Dual Monarchy.

In the meantime Count Tisza had fallen from power in Hungary during the last week in May and was succeeded as prime minister by Count Maurice Esterhazy. Although this implied no important change in policy, it created in Western Europe a naïve thrill of expectancy, especially as Count Esterhazy had been educated at Oxford as well as Budapest and was reputed to be an admirer of British institutions. His administration was of short duration. In the middle of August the cabinet was reorganized with Dr. Alexander Wekerle as premier. The latter submitted a bill for Hungarian suffrage reform in December, 1917, but to no purpose.

Down to the close of 1916 the five Austrian and five Hungarian war loans had produced in the aggregate about twenty-eight and one-quarter billion crowns, which was about seventeen and one-half billion less than the entire war expenditure during the same period. The sixth Austrian war loan in the summer of 1917 brought in about 5,125,000,000 crowns and the sixth Hungarian about 3,250,000,000 crowns.

By the autumn of 1916 Germany was ready for a peace based on the actual military situation. Since the victorious campaigns of 1915 in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, Germany had been in possession of practically all that it expected as the fruit of warlike operations. Its aim was now to insure and consolidate the gains already made. Even at the best the prolongation of hostilities implied for Germany the continued expenditure of men and means without the prospect of any further positive advantages as compensation and was likely to jeopardize the favorable situation already won.

The German people considered themselves as the victors. But the leaders, in spite of their unqualified expressions of confidence, must have regarded the future with serious misgivings. The Central Powers had withstood the combined

enemy offensive of the previous summer. The victories in Roumania and the capture of Bucharest had restored the prestige of German arms and renewed the buoyancy and zest which are nourished by spirited, successful offensive operations. But the original impression that time was on the side of the opponents could not be entirely effaced. Contrary to expectation, the British had adopted compulsory service and were bringing to bear the full measure of their strength. The Allies were increasing their forces and equipment and were learning to correlate their efforts. The German margin of superiority in organization was diminishing. The predicted downfall of Russia was still problematical. While the food situation in Germany was not actually critical, the future nourishment of the German people depended on very uncertain conditions. There was always the possibility that the resolution of the German people, so sorely tried by afflictions and privations, would fail. The general situation called for drastic efforts to bring the conflict to a speedy termination.

The forces and means of the belligerents were too closely matched on land to expect a decision within a reasonable period of time. But Germany still possessed in the submarine a weapon of vast and only partly tried possibilities. It was inevitable that, as soon as a sufficient number of these vessels had been completed, the German leaders, repudiating every restriction, would employ them with ruthless energy to cut off importation of the necessary supplies for the Western Allied front, to reduce the British Isles to starvation, and thus to end the war. The adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare implied that the German High Command despaired of forcing a decision by land operations alone and also that it did not consider the hostility of the United States, clearly an almost inevitable consequence, as a controlling factor in the military situation.

The new departure was preceded and accompanied by a systematic campaign for weakening the moral unity and resolution of the enemy. With the intensifying of every effort under the supreme direction of von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff, greater attention was given to the psychological side of warfare. Plans for assailing the enemy's morale were carefully developed and coördinated with the strategy of military operations. Thus no efforts were spared to undermine the Russian government and cause the disintegration of the Russian army. The most comprehensive maneuver was the so-called "peace offensive" for beguiling public opinion in the enemy countries by an elusive prospect of peace by negotiation on reasonable terms. The resignation of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, von Jagow, in November, 1916, and the succession of Herr Zimmerman, who had been Under Secretary in this department, may be taken as indicative of a change in policy.

The Chancellor foreshadowed the approaching "peace drive" in an address before the Main Committee of the Reichstag on November 9, 1916. He affirmed anew that Germany had drawn the sword solely for self-protection and threw the responsibility for the war on Russia in consequence of the latter's mobilization on the night of July 30-31, 1914. He professed agreement with the idea of an international league and arbitration for preserving peace as already suggested in a speech by Lord Grey and claimed that Germany would agree to any arrangement providing for its own free and just development.

Allusion has already been made to the famous peace offer by the Quadruple Alliance of December, 1916. But the motives leading to it deserve special attention in connection with the subject matter of the present chapter. This "peace offensive" was cleverly designed for internal as well as external effect.

Regarding themselves as victors, the German people were naturally perplexed at the seemingly illogical prolongation of the conflict, and, convinced, as they were, that the war had been forced upon them, and that they were fighting solely in self-defense, they were puzzled by the continual presence of the German armies on foreign soil. While the German leaders were doubtless well aware that Great Britain and France would not listen to the idea of a negotiated peace, they calculated that the rejection of their own impalpable peace offer by the Allied governments would demonstrate to the German people that responsibility for the continuation of the war rested on the enemy. This would confirm the determination of the German people to maintain the struggle with the utmost firmness. Furthermore, Baron Burian had begun in the summer of 1916 to agitate for official action in favor of peace, urging that the declaration of a readiness to negotiate on reasonable conditions would improve the state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, an appeal of this kind to the pacifist sentiment in Great Britain and France, creating the impression that peace could be obtained on reasonable terms, was likely to impair the national spirit and embarrass the governments of these two countries. The German government realized the immense desire for peace in Russia and it seemed evident that if the Russian government persisted in war from loyalty to its alliance with Great Britain, France, and Italy, the extremists would swing the favor of the Russian masses to the side of the Germans who offered peace.

Finally, in view of the contemplated ruthless submarine campaign, it was important to try any means for preventing or delaying the intervention of the United States on the side of the Entente. The rejection by Great Britain, France, and Italy of a plausible German offer of peace doubtless

seemed to be the most likely means for turning American sentiment against the Allies.

The Germans had cherished a vague hope of results advantageous to themselves from the presidential election in the United States in November, 1916. Von Bernstorff had expressed the opinion that President Wilson, if reëlected, would undertake to mediate between the belligerents. Others, for no reasonable motives, looked for a favorable turn in American policy in case Mr. Hughes, the Republican candidate, were elected president.

In reality, President Wilson's invitation to the belligerents to indicate the terms on which they were willing to negotiate, coming as the ingenuous response of a neutral to the German peace move in December, 1916, tended to counteract the effect aimed at by the German proposal, by exposing its hollowness.

The failure of Germany's peace offer strengthened the insistence of the military and naval authorities for the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare. The head of the navy promised to reduce Great Britain to submission before the next harvest. The High Command of the Army declared that delay would be the renunciation of final victory. A large part of the people placed entire confidence in von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff. The greater part of the press clamored for unlimited submarine warfare. Von Bethmann-Hollweg regarded the efficacy of the submarine as doubtful, but the intervention of the United States as certain. But even the Kaiser would have been powerless to uphold a chancellor against the chiefs of the army. A Bismarck as chancellor, declared von Bethmann-Hollweg, might possibly have maintained his supremacy in the administration. But von Bethmann-Hollweg's objections to the submarine were overwhelmed by the enormous authority and weight of the opposing forces,

and yet he remained tamely in office, although he regarded the submarine policy as perilous and unwise.

The American Ambassador, Mr. James W. Gerard, declared in an address at a banquet of the German-American Chamber of Commerce, held in honor of his recent return from the United States, January 6, 1917, that the relations between the two countries had never been better, and this statement was received with much satisfaction by the German public. President Wilson, after his remarkable address before the Senate on January 22d, intimated to the German Ambassador in Washington his desire to continue working for peace and asked for definite information as to Germany's terms. Count von Bernstorff communicated the president's attitude to Berlin and besought a delay in the commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare, the announcement of which was already in his hands to be communicated to the American government on the 31st. Von Bethmann-Hollweg left Berlin on the evening of the 28th to discuss von Bernstorff's despatch with the military chiefs at the Great General Headquarters. The reply expressed satisfaction at President Wilson's attitude, but stated that it was too late to recall the preparations for unrestricted submarine warfare, although operations of this kind would be stopped when an understanding had been reached on the crucial questions of international law.

And so the fateful announcement of the German government was published on January 31, 1917, that from February 1st all traffic within certain maritime zones adjoining the British Isles, France, and Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean "would without further notice be prevented by all weapons." The submarines of the Central Powers would sink at sight within these areas all vessels, neutral or enemy, in retaliation for the alleged illegal Allied blockade and the rejection of the peace offer.

On February 23, 1917, the Reichstag voted the usual semi-annual war credit of fifteen billion marks. At the end of March it authorized a considerable increase in the war profits tax, a 20% tax on coal, and a tax on railway transportation.

In response to interpellations on the government's war aims by the Conservatives and Social Democrats, von Bethmann-Hollweg declared before the Reichstag on May 15th that a specific statement in the actual situation was not in the public interest but the German nation desired a peace which would guarantee the existence, the political and economic position, and the freedom of development of the empire, and would frustrate the British design of excluding Germany from world-trade. On the next day the Reichstag adjourned until July 5th.

The German government regarded with favor the proposal for an international Socialist conference for discussing terms of peace. The Internationale, which had been transferred from Brussels to The Hague, issued invitations for such an assemblage at Stockholm, and a Dutch-Scandinavian standing committee was formed under the presidency of Branting, the leader of the Swedish Socialists. The Russian Soviets clamored for the conference as an agency for establishing their formula for peace with "no annexations or indemnities." In June delegations were sent to Stockholm by the Socialists of all the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The German government granted passports to the Majority Socialists and eventually to the Independent Socialists also. The former, headed by Herr Scheidemann, acting in full understanding with the German government, offered a peace program based ostensibly on the principle of "no annexations or indemnities" adroitly interpreted to give Germany ample advantages.

The German Majority Socialists proposed as the basis of peace the renunciation of all annexations and indemnities,

the complete restoration of Belgian independence, the independence of Poland as limited by the Congress of Vienna, equal rights for Alsace-Lorraine with the other states within the German Empire, limitation of armaments, abstention from commercial warfare after the war, and the abolition of secret diplomacy.

The Minority Socialsts went further in proposing financial reparation besides independence for Belgium, the independence of Prussian and Austrian, as well as Russian, Poland, and a plebiscite to determine the destiny of Alsace-Lorraine.

The German delegates conferred with the neutral representatives. But at first the French Socialist and British Labor Parties refused to accept the invitation to Stockholm. Later the French National Socialist Council resolved to send delegates to Stockholm for a separate meeting with the standing committee. But on June 1st the Ribot government announced that it would refuse passports for this purpose. The British Seamen's and Firemen's Union refused to permit conveyance from Great Britain of delegates who might be sent to Petrograd at the invitation of the Soviets, although the British government had expressed its willingness to grant them passports.

It was proposed to hold a plenary session of the Stockholm Conference in August and four emissaries of the Soviets toured Western Europe to organize favorable sentiment for it. These showed themselves to be entirely indifferent to national grievances and aims and solely concerned with preparation for the universal war of classes. At this time Mr. Arthur Henderson returned from a visit to Petrograd converted to the idea of the conference as a necessary means for conciliating the extreme elements in the Soviets and for exposing the real purposes of Germany.



Dr. Georg Michaelis, Chancellor from July to October, 1917.



Chancellors of the German Empire.

Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor at the opening of the war, who resigned July 14, 1917.

Count von Hertling, successor to Dr. Michaelis.

The question arose as to whether the conference should be mandatory or only consultative. A French majority voted to make the decisions binding, but a congress of the British Labor Party voted on August 10th for participation on condition that the function of the conference be purely consultative. On the next day Mr. Henderson resigned his seat in the War Cabinet in consequence of the government's attitude towards the conference and was succeeded by Mr. G. N. Barnes. On August 20th a second congress of British Labor reversed the decision of the earlier congress by a large majority against the Stockholm Conference.

In the closing months of 1916 and the first half of 1917, public opinion in Germany displayed two very marked tendencies. One was a general decline of confidence in the military outcome, persisting in spite of favorable events in the field occurring in this period. There were a number of causes for this tendency. Neither the popularity of von Ludendorff and von Hindenburg nor the victorious campaign in Roumania entirely effaced the impression of the Allied blows in 1916. Russia had not collapsed. The Allied operations in the West were still disquieting. The people, so often assured that decisive events were at hand, had become impatient for results from the submarine campaign. The hostility of the United States undoubtedly contributed to the general depression, notwithstanding repeated assurances that the transportation problem presented insurmountable difficulties to America's active participation in the war. The food situation was becoming more serious. From certainty in an eventual peace, dictated by the sword, the German people had largely passed to a state of anxiety lest prolongation of hostilities destroy their chance of gleaning advantage from a negotiated understanding with their enemies.

The second dominating tendency, political discontent, was partly the consequence of the first. An increasingly numerous element, convinced that national safety required immediate steps for peace, called for a larger share in the control of public policy, because the government persisted in continuing the war. The people were incensed by reports of corruption and profiteering, by certain obvious blunders and abuses in the food administration, and by the well-known evasions of the food regulations by the rich. The popular ferment was stimulated by the effect of the Russian revolution, because a people regarded with disdain for its political ineptitude and backwardness had won rights denied the enlightened, efficient German nation. The demand for the democratization of the Empire and its component states, already loud before the war, had now become the great political question of the hour. The observations brought back from Stockholm by the Socialist delegates in June, 1917, added force to the demand for democratic reform as an indispensable condition for international peace and reconciliation.

The Reichstag reassembled on July 5th in an atmosphere charged with the impending storm. The temporizing, opportunist policy of the government had earned the disapproval of all the positive groups in the Chamber. The tempest was precipitated by a speech of Herr Erzberger, leader of the democratic wing of the Center Party before the Main Committee on July 6th. His motive may have been partly to anticipate the Socialists in gaining party prestige from the troubled situation, and he doubtless had the moral backing of the Austrian court, which yearned for peace. Erzberger attacked the government very forcibly and criticized the conduct of the war. He laid stress upon the failure of the submarine campaign and declared that it was impossible to starve Great Britain out. He

insisted upon far-reaching reforms in both domestic and foreign policy and demanded the immediate negotiation of peace without annexations or indemnities. The military situation, he declared, although favorable, would be no better a year later than at that time.

For the moment the National Liberals, Center, Radicals, and Majority Socialists stood together for reform. The coöperation of the National Liberals with the parties of reform was the most surprising feature of the situation. Strongly united under competent leadership, the reformers might have converted their advantage into a complete victory. The Chancellor's reply to the attack was futile. The emergency brought together the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, von Hindenburg, and von Ludendorff in special conference in Berlin. On July 11th the Kaiser, convinced of the necessity of conciliatory measures, formally instructed von Bethmann-Hollweg to carry out the reform of the Prussian franchise on the basis of equal suffrage in accordance with a promise which he had made in an Easter proclamation of April 7th.

The reformers no longer needed to consider the Chancellor's favor; the reactionaries and chauvinists despised him as a weakling. It had been a matter of principle with the Imperial Government to hold itself aloof from and above the parties. Von Bethmann-Hollweg had tried to steer a middle course between the extremists. But now left with no compact party backing and having forfeited the Kaiser's confidence because of his inability to control the Reichstag, the Chancellor found his position untenable and resigned on July 14th.

The choice of a successor fell on a comparatively obscure Prussian bureaucrat, Dr. Georg Michaelis, sixty years of age, who in the course of an administrative career had become Commissioner of the Food Supply in March, 1917.

He was of conservative, strongly religious temperament, and gave no indication of unusual genius or breadth of vision.

On the 19th a resolution aiming to define German policy, supported by the Center, the Radicals, and the Majority Socialists, passed the Reichstag by a vote of 212 to 126. According to this resolution the object of the war was solely to defend the liberty, independence, and territorial integrity of Germany, and the Reichstag aimed at an understanding between parties at home and peace without annexations or political, economic, or financial oppression.

The adoption of this formula, which undoubtedly expressed the feeling at that time of a large majority of the German people, implied the impossibility of winning an absolute victory, of dictating terms with the sword. The resolution produced for the time a sensational effect. In chauvinistic and reactionary circles it was regarded as outrageous and humiliating. With its adoption the question of war aims, which had increasingly embarrassed von Bethmann-Hollweg, confronted his successor at the very outset in the most acute and urgent form. The new Chancellor evaded the issue by declaring that he hoped to carry out the aims of the German people within the terms of the resolution, *as he understood it;* an expression no less ambiguous than the oft-repeated statement of a willingness to conclude peace on terms that would provide for the untrammeled development of Germany.

At this juncture the progressive parties in the Reichstag allowed the chance of securing real parliamentary government to slip from them as they had done in certain political crises before the war. The legislative body apparently accepted the Chancellor's declaration as satisfactory, compliantly voted a credit of 15,000,000,000 marks, and adjourned on July 20th until September 26th.

The peace resolution of July 19, 1917, proved to be a turning point in the general attitude of the German nation towards the war. It provoked a reaction, which, gathering strength from a series of favorable circumstances, in the course of a few months restored the feeling of assurance, increasing confidence in the established authorities, and hushing the cry for reform. The factors tending to revive the spirit of optimism will be enumerated and explained in connection with other events and in the order of their succession.

The influence of military operations at once became propitious to the rising tide of confidence. Thus the collapse of the Russian armies in Galicia was even coincident with the July peace resolution of the Reichstag. The defiant elements, Junkers, Conservatives, Pan-Germans, representatives of large industrial and mercantile interests, who stoutly upheld a vigorous prosecution of the war, organized with the leadership of von Tirpitz as the Fatherland Party, which claimed to be non-partisan, and instituted an active propaganda extending to the army and navy. Von Hindenburg did not openly profess the principles of the new party, but was apparently not adverse to its purposes. The attitude of publicists became more aggressive and soon a rise in German exchange was observed in neutral countries.

With Dr. Michaelis as Chancellor there were associated: Dr. Helfferich, as Vice-Chancellor; Baron von Kühlmann, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Count Roedern, as Minister of Finance; Admiral von Capelle, as Minister of Marine; and Herr Solf, as Minister of the Colonies.

In a note dated August 1, 1917, but published about the middle of the month, the Vatican invited the belligerent states to consider peace on the basis of certain definite proposals: the diminution of armaments; the arbitration of

international disputes; the freedom of the seas; the reciprocal condonation of military damages; the general restitution of occupied territory, particularly the complete evacuation of Belgium and France and the restitution of the German colonies; and the examination in a conciliatory spirit of the other territorial questions, such as those between Italy and Austria and Germany and France, and others relating to Armenia, the Balkan states, and Poland.

This proposal, which was doubtless actuated in part by sympathy with the Austrian court's desire for peace, was favorably regarded by Germany. President Wilson, replying in the name of the United States, really expressed, deferentially but firmly, the attitude of the Allies. He declared that a program based on a return to the *status quo ante bellum* could form no permanent basis for peace in the presence of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which planned to dominate the world, proceeded to execute its plan by a stealthy attack in violation of the most sacred obligations and principles of international law and honor, and committed the most ruthless acts of cruelty and barbarity. No reliance could be placed in the pledges of such a power. Peace upon the plan proposed would make necessary the creation of a permanent hostile combination of the nations against Germany.

He continued as follows, referring particularly to the American people:

"They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of governments, the rights of peoples, great or small, weak or powerful, their equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German peoples, of course, included, if they will accept equality and not seek domination.

"The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing government on the one hand and of a group of free peoples on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied.

"The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world—to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather in vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient, and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as the guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German government, no man, no nation, could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Empires. God grant that it may be given

soon, and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of the nations and the possibility of a covenanted peace."

President Wilson had repeatedly and publicly expressed a friendly feeling for the German people and had declared that they were not responsible for the war and that the only bar to peace was the autocratic German government. The document cited above is an important illustration of the president's policy of creating a breach between the German people and their government. Many experienced observers declared that it was vain to assume a gulf of sentiment between the rulers and the ruled in Germany or to suppose that in any conceivable circumstances the German people would renounce their allegiance and thus speed the termination of the war. But events have shown that the president's course was not without justification.

The trial of Sukhomlinoff, former Russian Minister of War, for corruption and treason was now in progress at Petrograd. Evidence brought out in connection with this case in the early autumn was interpreted in Germany in a sense that tended to exculpate the German government from responsibility for the instigation of the war. General Janushkevitch, Chief of the Russian General Staff at the outbreak of the war, testified that at 3 P. M. on July 29, 1914, when he gave the German military attaché his word of honor that mobilization was not in progress (See Volume II, page 438), mobilization had in reality not commenced, but the Imperial ukase ordering it was in his pocket at the time.

After the ukase for a general mobilization had been signed on the 30th, the Tsar, who had received a conciliatory telegram from the Kaiser, ordered Sukhomlinoff and Janushkevitch by telephone in the evening to suspend mobilization, but the Minister of War assumed the

responsibility of instructing the Chief of the General Staff not to heed the Imperial command. On the 31st the Tsar reverted to his original purpose and thanked Sukhomlinoff for his prevision. Thus the moral force of the German people was fortified through the conviction that the war was brought on by deception practised by the Tsar's ministers.

General Sukhomlinoff, who had given evidence before the war of considerable administrative ability, was absolved of treason, but found guilty on the charge of corruption.

In spite of many reassuring events the Reichstag came together in October in a refractory mood. There had been serious disorders in the fleet, provoked in part by the chauvinistic propaganda which the government was believed to have encouraged. An interpellation on the subject of this Pan-Germanist activity was introduced by the Majority Socialists on October 6th. When General von Stein, the Minister of War, made light of the matter, the Reichstag manifested its displeasure by referring back to the committee the proposed additional vote of 300,000,000 marks for war expenses. On October 9th the Independent Socialist, Dittmann, spoke on the naval mutiny and accused the government of treating the sailors unjustly. In reply, Admiral von Capelle declared that he had documentary evidence to prove that the principal instigator had worked in collaboration with the Independent Socialists. Violent indignation was expressed because the government had thus made public use of this court martial evidence without having given the incriminated members of the Reichstag an opportunity to hear it and answer to it beforehand. A few days later the Chancellor virtually disavowed von Capelle by asking for his resignation and the Reichstag passed the vote for war expenses and adjourned until December.

Like his predecessor, Dr. Michaelis had failed to control the Reichstag and this failure led to his resignation. The semblance of adhesion to the principles of parliamentary government was given to the appointment of the next Chancellor in that Count von Hertling, upon whom the choice fell, was not invested with the office until he had secured a promise of support from the leaders of all parties in the Reichstag except the Socialists. In reality the appointment was a victory for the anti-parliamentary reaction. Count von Hertling was a Bavarian, seventy-four years of age, who had been a professor in the University of Bonn and for a time the leader of the Center in the Reichstag. A devout Catholic, he became Chancellor of the Empire and therefore Minister President of Prussia on October 31, 1917, the 400th anniversary of the day on which Martin Luther affixed his theses to the church door in Wittenberg.

The opportunity of making an advantageous peace with Russia in December, 1917, came at a very timely moment for Germany, as we shall see. Only a diminishing minority of the German people still expected at that time to win a complete victory and dictate terms of peace to prostrate opponents. The hope of the majority was to obtain fair compensation for the losses suffered. But there was increasing anxiety at the threatened commercial boycott of Germany after the war. The extension of German influence eastwards or southeastwards was the best means of counterbalancing the injurious effect of a hostile commercial policy on the part of the Entente. Even if Germany were defeated in the West, she might still hope to retrieve her fortunes by expansion towards the southeast or east. German enthusiasm had been immensely aroused by the prospect of establishing German supremacy as far as Egypt, Arabia, and Persia. The realization of this policy would

undoubtedly have offered a great opportunity for future development. But in the actual situation, Asiatic Turkey had been of no practical value as a source of food or raw materials for Germany. Its advantages were mainly potential and the Allied blockade left no time to speculate on future possibilities. The Central Powers needed immediate access to lands producing an excess of food supplies and raw materials. Moreover, with the British capture of Bagdad in March, 1917, and the British irruption into Palestine in November, the dream of an empire extending to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf was vanishing.

Just at this critical moment, when Germany stood in urgent need of an exploitable field for commercial and political expansion as well as a moral offset for departed hopes, the movement of events offered a vastly greater opportunity. The Russian offer of peace, for the realization of which German diplomacy had worked many months in secret, filled the hearts of the German people with a grateful sense of relief and satisfaction. The cessation of warfare on the Eastern front was welcomed as the prelude to a general peace. The opening of Russia to German enterprise and penetration was justly regarded as a guarantee of Germany's future political and economic preponderance in Europe.

Peace with Russia concurred wonderfully with a change which had been taking place in German policy. The conquest of Wallachia had opened an important source of food supply and had tended to divert attention from the Near East. Later, the submission of the rest of Roumania opened the great waterway of the Danube for communication between the Central Powers and the ports of the Black Sea. The Danube supplanted the Bagdad Railway in popular estimation. The great political objective was now southern Russia with its limitless natural

resources, instead of Asiatic Turkey. The German government hoped that the Western Powers would sacrifice Russia in exchange for their own immediate advantages. In that event Germany could freely expand eastward, leaving the remoter fields of colonial enterprise to her opponents in the West.

The Central Powers covered the land frontier of Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea and commanded the principal avenues of approach by sea. But to comprehend fully the advantageous position of Germany and Austria-Hungary in respect to Russia we must consider the general configuration and hydrography of the territory occupied by these two powers. The northwestern and northern part of this central European area is drained by a series of navigable rivers, the Rhine, Weser, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula, into the North Sea and the Baltic, while the southern and southeastern part is drained by the Danube and its tributaries into the Black Sea. Thus the two great natural divisions of the territory were respectively connected by navigable waterways with the two seas from which the most productive regions of Russia were accessible. In particular, the enormous actual productivity of southern Russia and the great economy of transportation by water on the Danube far outweighed the problematical resources of eastern Turkey and the facilities offered by the Bagdad Railway.

The advantages possessed by the Central Powers,—and particularly Germany,—in their internal waterways were very great and were capable of prodigious future development. A network of canals fed the traffic on the German rivers and only a central section between Hanover and Magdeburg was lacking in a main east and west canal to connect the Rhine, Weser, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula.

Great eventual importance attaches to the possibility of connecting the two great systems of interior waterways by a canal of considerable capacity across the intervening crest. Several routes have been proposed for such a canal. The route with the lowest maximum altitude runs from the head of navigation on the Oder through the depression between the Sudetes and Beskids, from Silesia into Moravia, and descends the valley of the March to the Danube. Its maximum altitude is only 275 meters above sea level. The canal as already planned by this route would form with the connecting rivers the shortest waterway from the German seaports to the Black Sea. The cost of this Oder-Danube canal was estimated in 1908 as 260,000,000 crowns. The canal as planned was to have a depth of three meters in the middle and a breadth of 29.5 meters on the surface. It was designed to accommodate barges of 670 tons. It was believed that the necessary freight charges by the interior route thus formed from the North Sea ports of Germany to the Black Sea would be no higher, while those from the productive centers of the interior would be much lower, than the charges by the all-sea route. Within a few years, upon the completion of this canal, German industry would stretch its tentacles from the manufacturing area of Silesia with its rich mineral resources as a central base, southwards and eastwards by the Danube and the Black Sea, to Roumania, the fertile plains of Southern Russia and the oil-fields of the Caucasus, and northwards and northeastwards by the Oder and the Baltic, to the Baltic ports of Russia, the natural gateways of vast productive regions.

With skill and tact on the part of German diplomacy, the Russian offer of peace might have become a great turning point in history and an event of unparalleled advantage for Germany. The immense territories of the

Russian Empire were opened exclusively to German penetration, as long as Western Europe remained at war. Geographical conditions gave the Central Powers great advantages for trade with Russia. With the disorganized condition of Russia, German customs, German science, and German methods of thought might have inevitably followed German trade, and Teutonic civilization might have prepared the way for German political domination. The use made by the Germans of this great opportunity will be considered in the following chapter.

# CHAPTER V

## The Central Powers and the Russian Border Lands

Economic power and physical needs of Germany. Value to Germany of the regions of Southeastern and Eastern Europe bordering the Black Sea. The situation in the western border lands of Russia: Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukrainia. The separatist tendencies in these regions. The Peace Conference at Brest-Litovsk: preliminary conference, convening December 5, 1917; armistice agreement signed December 15th; opening of the sessions for discussion of peace terms, December 22d; Russian proposals and counter-proposals of Central Powers; the question of the evacuation of the occupied provinces of Russia; treaty between the Central Powers and Ukrainia, February 9, 1918; close of the Conference. Renewed German operations against Russia after the expiration of the armistice on February 18th. Peace of Brest-Litovsk, concluded March 3d. Plight of Roumania; Treaty of Bucharest, May 7th. Occupation of Ukrainia by the Central Powers. German intervention in Finland. Completeness of the transformation in the Eastern European situation.

A brief survey of Germany's economic power as well as physical needs will help to illuminate the new motives and aims as briefly sketched in the preceding chapter. The prosperity of Germany has been largely the result of mineral resources, advantages of situation, and the systematic application of scientific methods to industry and agriculture.

Germany possessed by far the greatest mineral resources in Europe, especially in coal and potash; an unrivalled system of interior waterways; and an invaluable strategic position in the center of the continent, serviceable alike for commercial conquest or military aggression.

The wealth stored in the subsoil of the country has been a powerful factor in the astonishing industrial and agricultural development of recent years. Besides the largest reserves of

coal and potash in Europe, Germany possessed important deposits of iron ore and other minerals.

According to the report of the International Geological Congress at Toronto in 1913, the coal reserves of Germany, "exploitable under present conditions," amounted to 423,356,000,000 tons, as compared with 189,535,000 in the case of Great Britain, 60,106,000,000 in that of Russia, and 59,269,000,000 in that of Austria-Hungary.

German territory was less richly endowed with iron ore. In 1913 German furnaces produced 16,700,000 tons of pig iron from 37,800,000 tons of iron ore and 700,000 tons of manganese. Of the iron ore, 25,900,000 tons were extracted in Germany and 11,900,000 tons were imported, 4,300,000 coming from Sweden, 3,700,000 from Spain, and 2,200,000 from France. The percentage of iron in the German ore was generally rather low. Three-fourths of it was extracted in the narrow strip of the Minette ore district on the western border of German Lorraine. The larger part of the Minette district lay in France, but it also extended northward into Luxemburg and Belgium. The German reserves of iron ore were estimated by the International Geological Congress at Stockholm in 1910 as amounting to 2,300,000,000 tons. While Germany was partly dependent on imported ore, the proximity of some of the foreign sources, as the French Minette region of Lorraine, and the convenience of transportation from others made the position of the country very favorable as regards supply.

Agriculture in a highly developed state is largely dependent on potassic, phosphatic, and nitrogenous fertilizers. Germany possessed enormous deposits of potash, which is particularly valuable for heavy crops, grain, potatoes, and roots. The German production of potash salts in 1913 was greater than that of any other country, amounting to 11,607,510 metric tons of crude salts and 1,674,906 tons of

NORTH SEA
DENMARK
SWEDEN
BORNHOLM (To Den.)
BALTIC SEA
MEMEL
Konigsberg
FREE CITY OF DANZIG
Danzig
Stolp
EAST FRIESIAN IS.
Kiel
Rostock
Lubeck
Bremer-haven
Hamburg
Stettin
GERMANY
Bremen
Elbe
Oder
Vistula
POLAND
Hanover
Osnabruck
Berlin
Frankfort
Posen
Warsaw
Brunswick
Munster
Magdeburg
Weser
Rhine
NETHERLANDS
Essen
Dusseldorf
Elberfeld
Cologne
Cassel
Halle
Leipzig
Dresden
Gorlitz
Breslau
Aachen
Coblenz
Chemnitz
BELGIUM
LUXEM-BURG
Frankfort
Mainz
Mannheim
Main
Prague
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Nurnberg
Regensburg
Stuttgart
Danube
FRANCE
Rhine
Freiburg
Basle
L. of Constance
SWITZERLAND
Munich
Vienna
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
ECONOMIC MAP OF GERMANY
SCALE OF MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100
MINERALS
COAL
COPPER
IRON ORE
LEAD
LIGNITE
SILVER
SALT
ZINC
C.S.H.& CO.NY

refined salts. Germany, formerly almost without domestic phosphates, discovered a source of supply in the process of smelting iron ore containing phosphorus. The Lorraine ores are rich in phosphorus which makes the iron brittle. The introduction of the Thomas-Gilchrist process for extracting the phosphorus in 1878 made these Lorraine ores available for smelting. The removal of the phosphorus is effected in converters lined and partly filled with lime. The phosphorus in the ore unites with the lime and forms a scum, which, upon rising to the top, is drawn off. When it has cooled, it is ground into a fine powder called basic slag which is a very valuable fertilizer. Germany had been the largest importer of Chilean nitrate of soda used as the principal source of nitrogen for fertilizers. This supply was at once cut off with the outbreak of the Great War.

In the generation before the war German agriculture had accomplished wonders. Through persevering energy, the diligent application of scientific methods, and the abundant use of artificial fertilizers, rural production had shown relatively a greater increase than the population.

By far the greater part of the food of the German people was produced within the limits of the Empire. In the period immediately before the war Germany had imported annually somewhat more than 10,000,000 tons of field, meadow, and garden products, valued at about 2,500,000,000 marks, coming chiefly from Russia and America. Considerably more than half of this consisted of fodder. At the beginning of the war the country possessed 21,000,000 horned cattle and 25,700,000 swine.

Germany was admirably situated, endowed, and equipped for intensive industrial and commercial activity. On the eve of the war its economic situation was excellent. Germany was constantly strengthening its position in the markets of the world, while it produced a very large proportion of its

food and much of its raw material in the limited home territory.

But the fruits of their efforts did not free the Germans from misgivings as to the possibility of maintaining in future the same continual progress with the essential conditions remaining the same. Science could not increase indefinitely the productiveness of a restricted area, and overseas trade was liable to uncontrollable vicissitudes. German statesmanship was constantly preoccupied with the problem of providing food and employment in future for the constantly increasing population. To this standing incentive for the expansion of trade opportunities, the progress of the war, with the inevitable decline of rural production in the Central Empires, now added the immediate necessity of opening new sources of supply accessible by inland routes which could be controlled by the armies.

In the last chapter mention was made of the erroneous supposition that the Near East would be an important source of supplies for Germany. In reality, Turkish grain production before the war had not quite sufficed for domestic requirements. There was also a misleading idea that the alliance with certain parts of Southeastern Europe would materially lighten the food problem of Germany in wartime.

In the matter of food supply Germany obtained practically no aid from its allies. Not only had Austria-Hungary as a whole been a grain-importing country before the war, but its agriculture suffered more than that of Germany from the effects of the war. The situation in Austria, moreover, was aggravated by the thorough incompetence of the public organization for food distribution. Austria was in a critical situation most of the time and had to be helped by Germany in the winter of 1916–17.

Thanks to its very fertile soil, Hungary normally produced a large surplus of grain. But its rural economy lagged

far behind that of Germany. Estates of inordinate extent, often indifferently managed, stood in marked contrast with pitifully inadequate holdings. The wheat crop of 4,500,000 tons in 1913 represented a yield of 19 bushels per acre, as compared with 20 in France, 29 in Germany, and 32 in the United Kingdom. Hungary scarcely used one-tenth as much artificial fertilizer as Germany in proportion to the area cultivated.

Bulgaria had never been an exporter of grain. The agricultural territory was almost entirely divided into small peasant properties where advanced methods of farming were unknown.

With the conquest of Wallachia in the autumn of 1916 the Central Empires gained control for the first time of an important extraneous source of grain supply. Sufficient Roumanian grain was obtained by Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1917 to feed the populations of the two countries thirty-seven and fifty-seven days respectively on a daily ration of 250 grams per head. The trend of circumstances, as we have seen, made the conquest of Wallachia the preliminary step towards a new policy. The Russian offer of peace opened the prospect of an incomparable field for exploitation and expansion to the Central Empires.

In the preceding chapter it was shown that the Central Powers, and Germany in particular, occupied a commanding position, commercially and strategically, in respect to Russia, and that convenient water routes connected even the interior industrial regions of these two countries with the leading Russian ports. Untrammeled intercourse with Russia and the benevolent neutrality of the Russian government might have made Germany unconquerable in war, and the continuation of the same intimate relations after the return of peace might have given it the industrial and commercial supremacy of the world.

In the period directly before the war Germany had imported annually an average of 6,849,000 tons of rural products from Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Russia, that is, from Southeastern and Eastern Europe. Of this total, Russia alone furnished 5,947,000 tons.

But the importance of Russia for Germany was chiefly due to the great natural resources of the south, particularly the Ukraine. Before the war the Ukraine probably furnished more than nine-tenths of the grain exports of Russia. It contained 30,000,000 head of cattle, a third of the stock of European Russia. The Donetz basin in the Ukraine supplied 20,000,000 tons of coal, three-fourths of the entire Russian production. The Ukraine and Poland together furnished 92% of the Russian output, which amounted to 26,580,972 tons in 1911. But the coal resources of Russia had been far from adequate for the vast empire with its extensive railway system. The comparative poverty of Eastern Europe in iron ore gave special importance to the two rich iron ore beds of the Ukraine, which contain ore deposits calculated at about 1,000,000,000 tons. Near Nikopol on the Dnieper there is a deposit of manganese, a very valuable mineral for modern metallurgical industry.

After three years of the Allied blockade the German dream of dominion overseas had been obscured by anxiety for immediate subsistence. But present and future requirements could alike be satisfied by the expansion of German activity in the rich lands of Eastern and Southeastern Europe bordering the Black Sea, accessible by railways and by the great Danubian waterway.

Before the war the greater part of the wheat exported from the Black Sea ports had been conveyed by the maritime route to Great Britain, shipments of English coal forming the return cargoes. But the shortage of tonnage and excessive freight charges after the war would probably discourage

Signing the armistice agreement between Germany and Russia, December 15, 1917, at Brest-Litovsk.
*The delegates of the Central Powers are on the left, Prince Leopold of Bavaria is in the act of signing first. The Russian delegates are on the right. Joffe, president of the Russian delegates, is opposite Prince Leopold, and on his left is Kameneff.*

this traffic and the disappearance of British trade would insure the rapid development of the Danube route.

The agricultural production of Southeastern Europe was capable of an enormous development. The heavy emigration from some of these countries was almost entirely due to the unsatisfactory division of the land. An enlightened agrarian policy and the introduction of scientific farming would retain the peasantry and soon enable Southeastern Europe to furnish all the food and fodder imported by Germany. Southeastern and Central Europe were economically complementary. Each could supply the greater part of the other's wants.

The machinery and textile fabrics of Germany would be an offset in value, but not in weight, for the grain, fodder, oil, and ore from the Black Sea. With the opening of the Oder-Danube canal, however, it was expected that the downstream shipments of Silesian coal would equalize the traffic, supplanting English coal in the Black Sea markets.

With such possibilities in view, the German delegates went to a conference which aimed to regulate the destiny of half of Europe, a meeting that might well become a great historical landmark.

From the time that Constantine the Great founded his new capital on the Bosphorus and divided the Roman Empire into an Eastern and a Western half, on the lines of ancient differences in speech and culture, the distinction which was thus officially recognized had been a primary fact in European history. Western Europe received the impress of the learning, faith, and law of Rome; while Eastern Europe derived religion, customs, and civilization from Constantinople. The two currents flowed parallel without mingling. Lack of mutual comprehension, rather than instinctive hostility, perpetuated the estrangement. Under German pressure the Conference of Brest-Litovsk pretended to define the political

boundary between the West and the East, in regions where it had fluctuated throughout the centuries from lack of a natural delimitation.

More specifically, the territorial questions discussed at Brest-Litovsk concerned the Russian border lands. The Germans did not presume to interfere directly in the destiny of Great Russia, which their armies had not penetrated.

The Great Russian, or Muscovite, core of the Empire was enclosed on the west and southwest by a broad irregular zone of border lands, consisting of Finland, Esthonia, Courland, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukrainia, inhabited by peoples varying greatly in the degree of their distinction from the inhabitants of Great Russia. While the Ukrainians scarcely formed a different nationality at all, the mutually related Finns and Esths are absolutely distinct from all their neighbors, and have a Mongolian origin.

Finland with an area of 144,253 square miles and 3,269,401 inhabitants, stretching from the Gulf of Finland nearly to the Arctic Ocean, formed the extreme northwestern sector in the zone of western Russian border lands.

Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland were commonly known as the Russian Baltic provinces. In all these a Teutonic gentry, small in number, stood in sharp ethnological contrast with the mass of the population. Esthonia comprised an area of 7,605 square miles between the Gulf of Riga and the Gulf of Finland, extending eastward to Lake Peipus, with a population of about 500,000. Livonia lay east of the Gulf of Riga, between Esthonia and the Dvina, having an area of 17,574 square miles and a population of about 1,778,000. Courland extended from the Dvina and the Gulf of Riga to the northeastern border of East Prussia, covering 10,435 square miles with a population of 812,000.

The Esths formed the bulk of the population of Esthonia and about two-fifths of that of Livonia. The Letts were the

most numerous element in Livonia and formed the bulk of the population of Courland.

In the thirteenth century the Order of the Brethren of the Sword subdued the Letts and Esths to insure their conversion to Christianity. The rural oligarchy, springing from the Teutonic Knights, held the native populations in social and economical subservience until the present time. The Esths and Letts adopted Protestantism, but the Lutheran clergy, mainly of German extraction, were generally instrumental in keeping the people submissive to the landowning class. The domination of the latter was not disturbed by the cession of Esthonia and Livonia from Sweden to Russia by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721.

The territory inhabited by the Letts is about equally divided by the course of the Dvina flowing into the Gulf of Riga. This people, about 2,000,000 in number, form with the Lithuanians a distinct branch of the Indo-European family of nations. The chief distinction between the two is in the matter of religion, as the Lithuanians are Roman Catholics. The Teutonic landlords held more than two-thirds of the soil of the Lettish country, one magnate possessing no less than 500,000 acres.

Lithuania consisted of the Russian governments of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, and Minsk and parts of Mohilef and Vitebsk. The Lithuanians embraced Christianity as the result of the marriage of their ruler Jagello with the Queen of Poland in 1386. Jagello ruled over both countries and the Poles elected his descendants as their kings for many generations. The Poles claimed that the marriage of Jagello constituted an organic union of Lithuania and Poland. The fusion of the two was formally proclaimed by an assembly at Lublin in 1569 in spite of protests of the Lithuanians. The more advanced condition of Poland gave it the dominant position in this union and the Poles have clung tenaciously to their claim to Lithuania.

In the final partition of the Kingdom of Poland in 1795, Russia took Lithuania proper, except the province of Suwalki, which was annexed to Prussia, but later became part of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw founded by Napoleon. Suwalki was comprised in the Polish territory conferred on Tsar Alexander I by the Congress of Vienna and formed a conspicuous northeastern salient in the territory of Russian Poland. The Lithuanians number about 5,000,000.

The Little Russians, or Ukrainians, with the closely related Ruthenians in eastern Galicia, altogether about 30,000,000 in number, occupying an unbroken expanse of territory, present certain distinctive historical, linguistic, and literary characteristics, which have been advanced in support of a claim to separate nationality.

The overthrow of the Tsar's government not only set in action the forces destructive of society, but burst the administrative framework which had confined the diverse peoples of the Russian Empire in an uneasy union. Among the earliest effects of the centrifugal forces thus released was the development of a line of cleavage between Great Russia and the regions on the Baltic, whose civilization, derived from Western Europe, had never been assimilated by the Muscovite supremacy. Now, with compulsion removed, the Baltic nationalities were naturally drawn towards the system from which they had been arbitrarily separated.

One of the first acts of the Revolutionary Government in Russia was to abolish all the restrictions on Finnish autonomy which had been imposed by the Imperial Government during the past thirty years, restoring the old constitution of the grand-duchy confirmed by Alexander I when he wrested Finland from Sweden in 1809. An amnesty was also granted for all political offenses and the Finnish Diet was convoked.

But the diet claimed that the sovereign rights over Finland had been vested in the person of the Tsar and were not

transmitted to the Provisional Government; that, in other words, upon the abdication of Nicholas II the grand-duchy became *ipso facto* independent. The Kerensky Government, unwilling to admit this extreme view, dissolved the diet on August 3, 1917. In the elections for a new diet, the Socialists, who had had a majority in the recalcitrant assembly, only obtained ninety-two seats as against 111 for the groups opposing them. Unwilling to accept defeat, they rose in insurrection on November 16th, declaring that the new diet was illegal and calling for the return of the old one, but after several encounters the government secured the temporary mastery. In December a bill was passed declaring Finland to be an independent republic, and the Soviet Government recognized the independence of Finland on January 9, 1918.

A national Esthonian diet, authorized by the Russian Provisional Government, met at Reval in July, 1917, and established an administration. After the Bolsheviki seized the reins of government at Petrograd in November, the Esthonian diet declared for an independent republic. The Bolsheviki intervened and dispersed the diet, but in January, 1918, the Esthonian administration with the support of the majority of the people repeated the claim to independence.

A conference representing the Lettish nation met at Riga in August, 1917, and demanded "a united, undivided, politically autonomous Lettland, within the Russian Republic." But the Germans, who had conquered Courland in 1915, occupied the greater part of Livonia in the autumn of 1917, so that the natural inclination of the people was for the time inoperative. Nevertheless, Bolshevism made many converts. The presence of the Germans in Lithuania concealed the tendency to independence in that region also.

In this connection it will be convenient to consider briefly, for a comprehensive view, the course of events in Poland, although all communication between the Polish provinces

and Russia had been severed many months before the Russian Revolution.

After the occupation of Poland by the Central Powers in 1915, the country was divided for administrative purposes into a German sphere, governed from Warsaw, and an Austro-Hungarian sphere, governed from Lublin. As already mentioned, the Central Powers in the autumn of 1916 declared their intention of establishing Poland as an independent monarchy. An important motive of this policy was illustrated by the transference of the Polish Legion from the Austrian Army to the Governor General of Poland, von Beseler, on April 13, 1917, to serve as nucleus for a Polish national army, which, it was hoped, would enter the field as a willing ally by the side of the armies of the Central Powers.

But the Poles were restive at the delay in the establishment of a national civil administration of the country. They were impatient for the settlement of their boundaries which involved perplexing questions on every side. Their suspicion was aroused by the formation of a separate Lithuanian administrative council under the German Command in the East, which seemed to evidence an intention of creating an autonomous Lithuania in contempt of Polish claims. On June 24th General Pilsudsky, commander of the Polish Legion, was arrested for suspicious conduct and this organization reverted to Austrian control.

Indications of discontent did not prevent the gradual transference of the administrative functions to civil organs. On September 15th a regency of three persons was established, consisting of Mgr. Krakowsky, the Archbishop of Warsaw; Prince Lubomirsky, the Mayor of Warsaw; and Ostrowsky, a large rural proprietor, to represent the vacant kingship. On December 8th the State Council was converted into a Polish ministry with Kucharzewsky at its head.

The Russian Revolution brought the Ukrainian nationalists into prominence. A Ukrainian congress, meeting at Kieff in April, 1917, adopted the policy of an autonomous Ukrainia within the future Russian Republic. As defined at that time, the Ukraine extended to the Pripet River on the north, the Kuban River on the east, the Sea of Azoff and the Black Sea on the south, and the governments of Lublin and Grodno on the west, and embraced the governments of Kieff, Podolia, Volhynia, Chernigoff, Poltava, Yekaterinoslaff, Kherson, and Taurida.

The Rada, or national parliament, was organized and at the beginning of July this body issued a manifesto declaring for complete autonomy for the Ukraine with its own ministry, army, and diplomatic service, and separate representation at the peace conference. In August the Kerensky Government consented to the formation of a subordinate ministry at Kieff to conduct the administration until the Russian Constituent Assembly should establish the organic law for the whole land. The Ukrainian ministers were to be chosen by the Rada subject to the approval of the Petrograd government.

But the November revolution in Petrograd was soon followed by dissension between the Bolshevist and Ukrainian governments. The impending revolutionary changes in the system of agrarian tenure in Russia was a source of mutual suspicions. The Rada, strongly influenced by the prosperous class of Ukrainian peasants, shrank from the extreme communism of the Bolsheviki; while the latter were incensed at the capitalistic bias which they imputed to the Ukrainian government.

After several encounters between Ukrainian and Bolshevist forces, Trotsky sent an ultimatum demanding that the Ukraine withdraw its support from Kaledin and the Cossacks of the Donetz, who were in arms against the

Bolsheviki, and permit the Red Army to cross its territory. The Ukrainian government replied, refusing to admit interference in its internal affairs and Trotsky in turn accused it of supporting the middle class and Kaledin against the authority of the Soviets. This state of animosity prevailed when Ukrainian delegates made their appearance at the Peace Conference of Brest-Litovsk.

On December 5, 1917, the Russian delegates met representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey for a preliminary conference at the headquarters of Prince Leopold of Bavaria at Brest-Litovsk, under the presidency of the German commander's Chief of Staff, General Hoffmann. It was characteristic of the complete social upheaval in Russia that the Russian delegates at this time were a peasant, a private soldier, a sailor, and one or two Bolshevist politicians, accompanied by several minor staff officers.

An armistice agreement, signed on December 15th, provided for a truce of twenty-eight days on the Eastern front, effective from noon on the 17th. Germany agreed to transfer no troops from the Eastern to the Western front during the truce, but did not strictly observe this promise. Trotsky invited the Allied governments to define their attitude towards the peace negotiations, reminding them that in case of refusal to negotiate they would bear the responsibility for the further bloodshed.

The sessions for the discussion of peace were formally opened at Brest-Litovsk on December 22nd. The most prominent members of the Russian delegation were Joffe and Kameneff. Von Kühlmann and Count Czernin, the German and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministers, were both present. The Peace Conference of Brest-Litovsk was unique in the contrasted character, methods, and aims of the principal participants. The seemingly ingenuous assurance of the

Map showing the territory lost by Russia according to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Bolsheviki was matched against the calculating subtlety of German diplomacy, experienced in intrigue and covert propaganda. Each side aimed to exploit the occasion for its own crafty purposes. The Bolsheviki, who were convinced that their own principles were irresistible and needed only to become known to the masses of all lands to prevail, regarded the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk above all as an opportunity for wholesale propaganda among the inactive German troops. The Germans expected to use the conference as a means for sowing discord among the Allies and isolating, and then dividing, Russia. The attitude of the German delegates was eventually dictated by the militarists backed by the Fatherland party.

There had been three Chiefs of the German General Staff with fairly well defined methods. Von Moltke was devoted to the idea of outflanking and crushing the enemy in the West by the march through Belgium, but he failed at the Marne and in the race to the sea. The general program of von Falkenhayn was less distinctive. His chief success was in crushing some of the smaller Allies, but this had no decisive effect on the course of the war. Finally, with the authority of von Hindenburg, as Chief of the General Staff, von Ludendorff was putting the final touches to his supreme strategic project. He intended, after Russia had been made utterly helpless, to launch the full force of the Teutonic Empires against the Western Allies.

The Russians proposed seven principles as a basis of peace: (1) no forcible appropriation of territory taken in the course of the campaigns; (2) the immediate withdrawal of the armies from occupied territory; (3) the restoration of complete political independence to all peoples who had lost it during the war; (4) the right of self-determination for all nations; (5) no indemnities; (6) the return of the war requisitions and compensation for sufferers from the war by

a special fund to be levied on all belligerents according to their resources; (7) the same treatment for colonies as for the parent countries and no economic boycott after the war.

The Central Powers declared that the first three of these principles were unacceptable. But on December 25th Count Czernin announced that the Central Powers were ready for peace without annexations or indemnities, provided the Allies pledged themselves to these principles and joined in the negotiations.

The directors of German policy at that time had not the slightest intention of adhering honestly to such a proposition. It was part of the same diplomatic strategy which had inspired von Bethmann-Hollweg's peace offer a year before; a safe experiment, because it was perfectly obvious that the Allied Powers would ignore it; and a very clever ruse, in view of the actual political situation. Proposed by an Austro-Hungarian statesman, it would offer Vienna salutary proof of the futility of attempting to conciliate the Western Powers. Concurred in by the German delegates, it served as evidence to the German people that their government adhered to the Reichstag resolution of July 19, 1917. Rejected by the Allies, it would serve as justification for the Russians in proceeding with the negotiation of a separate peace. Formal sessions were adjourned until January 4, 1918, so that the Western Allies could have an opportunity of considering this proposal.

Two articles prepared by the Central Powers suggest the subterfuges by which the Germans intended to satisfy their ambition while maintaining the semblance of fairness and magnanimity. The first of these articles declared that the state of war was at an end and provided that, as soon as peace had been concluded and the Russian armies had been demobilized, the Germans would evacuate the occupied Russian territory. The second provided a special commission to

deal with the Russian border lands, Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and parts of Livonia and Esthonia, where, it was alleged, the people had already manifested their wish for separation from Russia and the acceptance of German protection, and where the decision of the ultimate political status should be left to plebiscites.

The Russian representatives refused to accept this proposal; the question of the evacuation of the occupied territory became the crucial problem of the negotiations. The attitude of the Bolshevist authorities in regard to the dismemberment of Russia was not entirely clear or consistent. The Bolsheviki were pledged to the doctrine of the self-determination of all nations, according to which the Finns, Esths, Letts, Lithuanians, and Poles, if not the Ukrainians, were entitled to choose their own form of government. But at the same time, Lenin and Trotsky and their followers regarded national conflicts and differences as of minor importance in comparison with the expected international war of classes. They knew that under one pretext or another German occupation of the border lands would be prolonged indefinitely and they were not disposed to relinquish any territory before it had been planted with the quickening seed of their new faith and doctrine.

As the Western Allies were still obdurate on January 4th, Trotsky, who arrived at Brest-Litovsk on the 6th, expressed a disposition on the 10th to proceed with negotiations for a separate peace. On the next day he acquiesced in the presence of a distinct Ukrainian delegation at the Conference.

On the 14th Germany definitely rejected the Bolshevist proposals for the evacuation and reconstruction of Russian territory occupied by the Germans. Von Kühlmann declared that no Russian territory could be relinquished by the Germans until a general peace had been concluded. The Germans, emboldened by the prospect of negotiating

separate treaties of peace with Roumania and Ukrainia, and of realizing thereby the essential advantages of their eastern policy, felt little need of humoring the susceptibilities of the Bolsheviki. To Trotsky's great indignation, separate negotiations between the Central Powers and Ukrainia were begun on January 16th. The Peace Conference adjourned on the 18th with neither the Bolsheviki nor the Germans willing to yield on the question of the evacuation of the occupied Russian territory.

Sessions of the Conference were resumed on January 30th. The Bolsheviki, who had meanwhile broken with the Rada and had invaded the Ukraine with the coöperation of the extremist element in that region, took Kieff on February 3rd and put the republican government to flight. This aggression naturally drove the Ukrainian moderate elements into the arms of Germany and hastened the conclusion of the separate peace between Ukrainia and the Central Powers. In spite of the indignant remonstrances of Trotsky, who declared that the Rada had been deposed and therefore possessed no treaty-making power, peace between the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Central Powers was signed on February 9th at Brest-Litovsk. Ukrainia acquired a questionable distinction as the first element of the Allied coalition to make terms with Germany.

This treaty of peace stipulated that there were to be no indemnities or annexations. Diplomatic and commercial relations were to be immediately resumed and Ukrainia engaged to export considerable quantities of food-stuffs to the Central Powers. The Poles were incensed at the assignment of the greater part of the district of Chelm to Ukrainia.

The Germans steadfastly refused to relinquish the occupied area of the former Russian Empire and Trotsky adhered to his determination not to sign a treaty without the evacuation of this territory. The German High Command

General Erich von Ludendorff,
Quartermaster General, German Army.

Field-marshal Paul L. H. von Hindenburg,
Chief of the German General Staff.

was clamoring for a drastic settlement in the East, without which the proposed offensive in the West was hopeless. There was no room for further negotiation and the final session of the Conference took place on February 10, 1918. Trotsky denounced German imperialism and declared that Russia would never agree to the German terms. But at the same time he announced that the war was over and that the Russian forces would be demobilized.

Trotsky was powerless to vindicate his pretensions by force. The only effective weapon of the Bolshevists was propaganda among their opponents. The Bolshevist delegation had insisted that the proceedings at Brest-Litovsk should be made public, less from hatred of the old-time secret methods of diplomacy than from a desire to make the conference a tribune from which they could address the whole world. Subsequently, Trotsky admitted that he had protracted the discussions so as to give the seed of Bolshevism time to germinate in Central Europe.

But the action of propaganda was too slow to help him in the immediate situation. Trotsky sought to cover his chagrin by a semblance of injured dignity.

At a German Crown Council at Homburg on the 13th the military party, overruling the objections of the Chancellor and Foreign Secretary, prevailed upon the Kaiser to denounce the armistice, as the prelude to forceful military action.

The Russians counted in vain upon a chivalrous reluctance of the Germans to assail an unarmed opponent. The German plans required a definite settlement on the Eastern front and Trotsky's diplomatic whimsicalities could not be tolerated. Von Eichhorn's armies were given orders to advance in case no treaty were signed before the expiration of the armistice which had been prolonged until noon on February 18th. Two hours after its termination the Germans

were marching into Dvinsk. There was a simultaneous advance all along the Great Russian front. The Germans, encountering no serious resistance, advanced very rapidly. The Bolshevist Government announced by wireless its willingness to accept the German terms, but General Hoffmann refused to regard the message as official, because it necessarily lacked the original signatures and asked that an authentication in writing be sent to Dvinsk.

Meanwhile, the German forces pressed forward, taking immense quantities of booty and disarming thousands of the Red Guardsmen, welcomed by a considerable part of the population of Livonia and Esthonia who rejoiced at the reëstablishment of order. The Germans took Minsk on February 21st.

On the 23rd, Baron von Kühlmann communicated the German terms, rendered harsher since the termination of the Conference, and demanded acceptance of them within forty-eight hours.

After a discussion lasting nearly all night, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet delegates voted at 4.30 A. M. on February 24th to accept the German conditions, and delegates were immediately sent to Brest-Litovsk. Yet the Germans continued their advance, occupying Pernau and Dorpat on the 24th and Reval and Pskoff on the 25th.

The treaty of peace between the Soviet Republic and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance was finally signed at Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. By it the contracting parties declared that the war was at an end and agreed severally to abstain from all agitation against the other signatory powers. Russia renounced all right to interfere in the former Russian territory west of an "agreed line" passing through Mohn Sound, leaving the coast of the Gulf of Riga at a point a little northeast of the mouth of the Livonian Aa, and running southeastwards to the Dvina just above

Uexküll, along the Dvina and the Courland boundary to the most easterly point of the latter, then southwestwards across the Vilna-Smorgon railway west of Slobodka to the Niemen, southeastwards up this river and its tributary, the Selvianka, to Rashany, and then southwestwards to the Ukrainian frontier at Prushany.

This provision meant the absolute relinquishment of Courland (with Riga), Lithuania, and Poland, for reorganization under German direction. Furthermore, Russia agreed to evacuate Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, and Ukrainia and to conclude peace with the latter, acknowledging thereby Ukrainian independence. Esthonia and Livonia were to be policed by German forces until the native institutions had become sufficiently strong to insure security and order. The eastern frontier of these two states was defined by a line passing up the Narva, through Lakes Peipus and Pskoff, and thence to Lievenhof on the Dvina. Russia undertook to evacuate the eastern Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire together with Ardahan, Kars, and Batum, which had been taken from Turkey in 1878. Russia engaged not to interfere in the reorganization of the last-named districts, which was to be carried out with the advice of Turkey. It was provided that Russian war-vessels in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and Arctic Ocean were to be interned in Russian ports or disarmed until a general peace had been concluded. The Russian forces were to be completely demobilized. Provision was made for the restitution of prisoners held on both sides. No war indemnities were exacted. The Russo-German commercial treaty of 1904, which had been so favorable to Germany, was renewed and diplomatic and consular relations were resumed.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ratified the separation from Russia of 430,000 square miles of territory and a population of about 55,000,000. Russia was thereby deprived of about

37% of its crops, 92% of its coal production, 77% of its iron production, and 26% of its railway mileage. Trotsky resigned rather than sanction this instrument and was succeeded as foreign minister by Tchitcherin. But he became minister of war on April 10th. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meeting in Moscow, March 14–16, 1918, ratified the treaty by a vote of 704 to 261.

With the harsh terms, peace brought the Bolsheviki at least one distinctive advantage in the right of maintaining their ambassador in Berlin to spread their insidious teachings under cover of diplomatic immunity, an opportunity which they were quick to utilize.

The dissolution of the Russian armies and the triumph of the Bolsheviki left Roumania in a perilous situation. After months of heroic resistance, the Roumanians, deserted by their allies, with chaos and treachery on their flank and in the rear, were menaced with subversion by the overwhelming forces of the enemy.

The armistice in the East was extended to the Roumanian front on December 5, 1917. Roumania observed a purely passive attitude until, on February 6, 1918, General von Mackensen threatened the Roumanian government with formidable consequences unless peace negotiations were instituted within four days. The cabinet evaded the responsibility by resigning and new ministers were found willing to endure discredit for saving the remnant of the country.

Later, an even more peremptory summons constrained Roumania to accept the terms dictated to it in a preliminary agreement of February 25th and in a formal treaty signed at Bucharest on May 7th Roumania surrendered the Dobrudscha to the disposal of the Central Powers, ceded to Austria-Hungary several small areas in the frontier zone on the side of Transylvania which included the main Carpathian passes, agreed to demobilize its army, and



Signatures of the delegates to the armistice arranged at Brest-Litovsk.

Delegates of the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. *Reading left to right are General Hoffmann, the German commander's Chief of Staff and president of the Council; Count Czernin, Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Talaat Pasha, from Turkey; and von Kühlmann, German Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

granted the Central Powers the right of transporting troops across its territory in the direction of Odessa, as well as certain special economic concessions, which were evidently intended to place the commerce and industry of the country largely under the financial control of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Simultaneously with the movement against the Great Russians, recorded above, the German and Austro-Hungarian forces advanced into Ukrainia as alleged protectors of the country and allies of the forces opposed to the Bolshevists.

The natural aversion for the Germans among the substantial classes in Ukrainia was undoubtedly less intense than the fear inspired by the frenzied invaders from Great Russia. The Teutonic forces under von Linsingen, coöperating with the Ukrainians, quickly cleared the country of the Bolsheviki. They occupied Kieff on March 2nd, Odessa on the 14th, and Kherson on the 21st. Later, Field-marshal von Eichhorn succeeded to the command of the troops in Ukrainia.

The chief concern of the Germans was to insure the exportation from Ukrainia of the quantities of food-stuffs stipulated in the treaty. But their consequent eagerness to insure a stable administration led them to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. Naturally inclined to favor the middle class and landholders, they engineered a coup-d'état at Kieff on May 2nd, by which General Pavloff Skoropadsky was installed as the head of the state with the title of Hetman.

The Germans were now seated on the coast of the Black Sea. The policy of expansion by way of the Danube had apparently been realized. Besides all the other successes, Fortune, apparently favoring the Germans beyond the most extravagant dreams, offered an opportunity of widening their

sphere of influence to the border of the Arctic Ocean. The situation in Finland created a specious motive for German interference.

In January, 1918, the extreme Socialists in Finland revolted and set up a government in the style of the Soviet Republic. They were joined by many Russian troops who had remained in Finland, received arms and munitions from the Bolsheviki, and gained possession of Helsingfors and the southern part of the country. The existing government directed by Senator Svinhufvud retired to Vasa. Being in great need of military equipment it appealed to the Socialistic cabinet of Sweden, but in vain. A desperate struggle was in progress between the Red Guards of the extreme Socialist government and the White Guards who had been formed to oppose them. In its extremity the government at Vasa applied to Germany for help and a treaty of alliance was concluded on March 7th. This was followed by the announcement of a treaty between the Finnish Reds and the Soviet Republic of Russia on March 10th, by which the latter recognized the sovereign rights of the former.

The Germans took possession of the Aland Islands as a naval base, the key to the adjacent waters, especially the Gulf of Bothnia. Early in April a force of 40,000 Germans with 300 pieces of artillery landed in Finland. Coöperating with the White Guards, they defeated the Reds and took Helsingfors on April 14th. Viborg, where the Reds made their last stand, fell on the 30th. In May, Finnish and German troops moved in the direction of the Murman coast, apparently to seize the railway from the interior of Great Russia to the Arctic port of Alexandrovsk. In June the Finnish government announced officially that its real purpose was to gain possession of Russian Carelia to which Finland claimed to be entitled by virtue of the principle of nationality.

Germany's eastern policy had attained results transcending in extent and importance the most sanguine expectations of those who had formed it. The predominance of Germany in Eastern Europe could only have been attained through the reduction of the Russian Empire to helplessness. Now the Bolshevist upheaval, secretly encouraged by Germany, had paralyzed Russia, and the secession of Ukrainia, openly supported by the Central Powers, had dismembered it. The extension of German influence eastward depended upon unimpeded communication between Germany and Russia. But the series of weak states between the two powers, erected under German tutelage, were not likely to interpose an effective barrier.

The fundamental strategical importance of the results obtained is obvious. The whole character of the war was profoundly modified.

If Germany could gain time to develop the economic possibilities in the East, her situation would become invulnerable. She could no longer be reduced by starvation and the work of the British blockade would be undone.

The German imagination was dazzled by the economic and political possibilities created by these events in Eastern Europe. The *Drang nach Osten* had been diverted into a field ten times more extensive. Germany's economic protagonists would descend from the industrial strongholds of Silesia into the fertile plains of Southern Russia. The routes would be open to the grain fields of Ukrainia, the oil wells of Baku, and the cotton plantations of Turkestan. There would be no power to withstand the triumphant march of German influence. Hundreds of thousands of prisoners of the Central Powers were already in Siberia to serve as the vanguard of German penetration. The vast expanse of the Eurasian continent from the Black and the Baltic Seas to the Pacific Ocean might become the hinterland of Germany, tributary

to German industry, German commerce, and German finance. German enterprise would accomplish a work of transformation more wonderful than any previous movement of the kind. German merchants, contractors, and engineers would be the pioneers of higher culture. The cities of Central Asia would be embellished with public monuments in the German style and the language of Goethe and Schiller would become the medium of polite intercourse on the banks of the Irtush and the Yenisei. Humanity would have to own that the German blows which brought low the Russian colossus were wielded in behalf of civilization and enlightenment.

German industry would no longer depend upon the importation of raw materials by sea. The interests of Germany were not incompatible with an eventual combination with Japan for the division of Asia, or a triple alliance with Japan and a regenerated and grateful Russia that had sat at the feet of the great master of efficiency. For the first time in history a continental system might be established which would neutralize the vast influence of the British dominion of the seas.

There was a seeming inconsistency in the attitude of many advocates of national self-determination in the Western countries who bitterly denounced the spoliation of fallen Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, wholly ignoring the fact that no territory was specifically detached from Russia by this document in which the population did not claim the right of self-determination on the basis of the approved opinions of fair and liberally-minded authorities and that the treaty ostensibly conferred this privilege upon the inhabitants in question.

The Central Powers had acted with characteristic relentlessness, but the wrong did not consist in depriving Soviet Russia of territory to which it had no moral or ethnological

right, but in the refusal of Germany to give any assurance that the former Russian border lands would be evacuated within a reasonable period of time and that the freedom of the peoples to determine their future status would be respected. An instance of German methods was revealed in the announcement on March 15, 1918, that the State Council of Courland, a body almost entirely composed of the aristocratic, pro-German minority, had decided to offer the crown of the duchy to the House of Hohenzollern.

The German Eastern policy had been conducted in such a way as to lay the foundation for a vast expansion of German imperial supremacy without violating the letter of the Reichstag resolution of July 19, 1917. But the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a turning point in the psychology of the war. While the Germans won enormous potential advantages at Brest-Litovsk, the German cause suffered an irreparable moral injury. Without formally annexing a single rod of ground, Germany appeared to the world as an insatiable conqueror, the antagonism of the Slavic peoples was renewed, and the democracies of the West, accepting the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as evidence that the German spirit was still unchanged, were confirmed in their determination of fighting on to a victorious conclusion as the only guarantee of liberty and independence.

The avarice of the German military group overreached itself. Prizes which Germany had won through intrigue and duplicity withered in the German clutch. The arrogance of German agents alienated the Ukrainian peasantry, provoking among them a wide-spread spirit of sullen resistance to German demands and German requisitions. Attempts to enforce the economic provisions of the treaty led many localities to open hostility and bloodshed. Disorder culminated in the assassination of Field-marshal von Eichhorn in Kieff, July 30th. This spirit of resentment, together

with the disorganization of the railways almost entirely, deprived the Central Powers of the expected material assistance from the former Russian territory.

After signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany might well have yielded Belgium and withdrawn from Northern France, retired from the Balkans and Constantinople, restored Alsace-Lorraine, and renounced all claim to its colonial empire and the Berlin-Bagdad project in return for freedom to develop the wonderful opportunity stretching eastward to Vladivostok. No specious conventions, no idealistic agreements would have restrained Germany from this richest of all prizes. The possible elements of resistance would doubtless have yielded to adroit diplomacy, free to hide its ambition beneath the mask of courtesy and tact.

But the fatal exigencies of Germany's situation and the cynical impatience of the military leaders took away all opportunity for diplomatic subtlety, not to mention magnanimous coöperation and forbearance. Vast, but intangible, advantages were scornfully thrust aside in the frenzied quest for the immediate and practical.

# CHAPTER VI

## The Internal Affairs of the Western European Allies

Influence of events in Russia on the political life of Western Europe. Resignation of the Briand ministry in France, March 17, 1917. The Ribot Cabinet. The government and General Nivelle. Changes in the French High Command. Development of French pacifism and international Socialism. The discussion regarding participation in the Stockholm Conference. Weakening of Ribot ministry; its resignation on September 7, 1917. Difficulties encountered by the Painlevé ministry; attitude of the Socialists and disloyal intrigues. M. Clemenceau's succession to the premiership. His previous career and determination to extirpate disloyalty. Noteworthy cases of disloyalty: M. Malvy, Bolo Pasha, the *Bonnet Rouge*, M. Caillaux. The British War Cabinet. The Eighth Imperial Conference. Submarine peril defied. Measures for the increase of British production, conservation of supplies, and acceleration of shipbuilding. Lord Lansdowne's letter, November 29, 1917. President Wilson's address to Congress on December 4th. Statement of Mr. Lloyd George on war aims, January 5, 1918. President Wilson's fourteen points proclaimed on January 8th. Responses of Count Czernin and Count Hertling. President Wilson's address to Congress on February 11th.

Previous chapters have shown how deeply, although diversely, the Russian upheaval affected the political life and military prospects of Germany. The March revolution and the overthrow of the Tsar's government encouraged the liberal movement in Germany, while the subsequent triumph of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia aroused the activity of the German extremists and helped to dissipate the warlike spirit of the German people. Yet the desertion of the Allies by the Bolshevists gave the Central Powers for the time a very great military advantage over their remaining opponents.

We shall presently see that the repercussion of the mighty events in Russia was also felt in Western Europe, where,

for instance, the example of Russian Socialism, acting concurrently with the German peace intrigues, impaired the concord of the French, dissolved the "sacred union" of their parties, and created a spirit of bitterness and suspicion which seriously impaired the effectiveness of the administration. The year 1917 was, politically, the most critical period for France.

A gradually developing cabinet crisis was precipitated by a comparatively insignificant occurrence on March 14, 1917, when General Lyautey, Minister of War, in replying to an interpellation, expressed unwillingness to confide a knowledge of certain technical details of French aviation to the Chamber of Deputies, even in secret session, believing that it would imperil the national defense. The minister's attitude brought forth a storm of protest and he immediately resigned his portfolio and returned to Morocco, where he resumed the very important task which his presence in the ministry had interrupted. The Prime Minister, M. Briand, finding it impossible to replace the Minister of War, resigned with the entire ministry on the 17th. Two days later M. Alexandre Ribot, who had been Minister of Finance since October 30, 1915, formed a new cabinet, in which he took for himself the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, assigning that of Justice to M. Viviani, of Marine to Admiral Lacaze, of War Manufactures and Munitions to M. Albert Thomas, and of the Interior to M. Louis J. Malvy. That the change was not due to a profound transformation of political sentiment is shown by the retention of six members of the former cabinet in the new one. The principle of a coalition of parties was maintained. The new ministry was composed in all of nineteen members.

Lack of proper coöperation in the relations of the higher civil and military powers was a chief cause of the deplorable state of feeling in the French Army and of the disappointing

Members of the French Cabinet formed by Paul Painlevé.

*Premier Painlevé, who was also Minister of War, is the middle seated figure, on his left is Alexandre Ribot, Minister of Foreign Affairs. This cabinet was formed in September, 1917, and resigned in November of the same year.*

results of the offensive in the spring of 1917. Indications of a latent apprehensive feeling on the part of the civil power towards the supreme military command had already appeared at times. The choice of General Nivelle, commander of a single army, instead of Foch, Petain, or Castelnau, who were commanders of army groups, as successor of Joffre, appeared singular at the time and was probably due in part to the government's instinctive predilection for a tractable agent. The circumstances of his appointment probably made General Nivelle as commander-in-chief especially amenable to the wishes of the ministry. In spite of Nivelle's heroic qualities, the choice was not altogether fortunate.

With the change of cabinet in March, 1917, the Ministry of War had been entrusted to one of the most illustrious savants of France, M. Paul Painlevé, professor of mathematics at the Sorbonne, on the ground that warfare had become a highly scientific undertaking. Whatever the new Minister of War thought of Nivelle, he did not prevent the execution of the latter's plan for an offensive between Soissons and Reims, where the enemy held strong positions.

General Nivelle had expected to disrupt the enemy front completely within three days. But the Germans had obtained information of the French plan and had strengthened their front accordingly, so that the assailants suffered heavy losses and only made small gains. Nivelle's subsequent plan met with emphatic opposition from some of his subordinates, particularly Petain. The effect of dissensions and uncertainty was felt by the army and the Minister of War intervened to prevent the execution of the operations as planned. The victory of May 4th did not reëstablish Nivelle's prestige or restore concord. Finally, in the middle of the month, General Petain was substituted for General Nivelle, and General Foch was appointed Chief of Staff with the Ministry of War. But the demoralizing effect of discord,

which had beclouded the early part of the campaign, was only gradually dispelled.

This crisis was the most conspicuous of the many distressing consequences of the suspicious attitude displayed by a portion of the legislative body towards the High Command. In secret sessions of the Chamber the commanding generals were fiercely assailed as incompetent or ineffectual. In the face of these denunciations the government was often wavering and timid. There were deputies who clamored for the appointment of parliamentary commissions to control military policy. The frequent changes in the Ministry of War were largely due to this insensate opposition. The spirit of the secret sessions encouraged the contumacy and intrigues of the disaffected elements and the German authorities were secretly informed of all these indications of discord.

The influence of pacifism in France, of the element which held that the war could be terminated by agreement, was negligible in the early part of the conflict. But the extreme wing of French Socialism, which placed universal aims above patriotism and wished to end the war by an international movement of the laboring classes, had been gradually increasing in strength since 1915 and now received a great impetus from the Russian revolution. The French Socialist Congress in May was characterized by a bitter debate on the Stockholm Conference terminating in the decision to send delegates with a view to defining war aims and preparing for the restoration of the Internationale.

But M. Ribot declared before the Chamber of Deputies on June 1st that to authorize participation in the Stockholm Conference would endanger the stability of public opinion among the people and in the army. He denounced as infamous the reports then in circulation that agreements of an aggressive character existed between France and Russia before the war. He declared that dark forces were working

behind the strikes in France and that individuals of concealed identity were trying to create the impression that the labor troubles were leading to revolution. The question of Alsace-Lorraine was discussed and the Chamber expressed concurrence in the government's determination to secure the restoration of the lost provinces with a vote of confidence ending in the following noteworthy passage:

"Removed from all thought of conquest and of the enslavement of foreign peoples, the Chamber relies upon the efforts of the Armies of the Republic and of the Allied Armies to enable it—when Prussian militarism has been struck down—to obtain lasting guarantees of peace and independence for peoples great and small in the already prepared organization of a society of nations. It trusts that the government will obtain these results by the coördinated military and diplomatic action of all the Allies, and, rejecting all amendments, passes to the order of the day."

The United Socialists, with some exceptions, abstained from signing this resolution. A minority resolution condemned secret diplomacy and any policy of imperialism and conquest and adopted the Russian popular formula of peace without annexations or indemnities and the right of self-determination of peoples.

The refusal of the government to grant passports for the Stockholm Conference antagonized the Socialists. These also noted with disapproval Ribot's failure to publish all the treaties between France and other powers, as he had promised on June 1st, "to silence all who condemned France as the aggressor." The German Imperial Chancellor disclosed the existence of the agreement between Russia and France of January, 1917, by which Russia promised to support France, not only in recovering Alsace-Lorraine, but in creating a buffer state of the remaining German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, probably with the expectation

that this new entity would inevitably fall under French tutelage.

There was alarming evidence of German propaganda carried on through French channels and ugly rumors of corruption and treasonable intelligence with the enemy implicated prominent individuals. A particular aim of this propaganda was to implant the conviction, known as *défaitisme*, that victory for the Allies was impossible.

The cabinet was exposed to opposition on both sides. It had antagonized the Socialists, and, although M. Ribot's views were acceptable to the ultra-patriotic groups, the government was severely criticised for its failure to stamp out disloyalty. M. Malvy, Minister of the Interior, against whom suspicion had accumulated, resigned on August 31st, averring unwillingness to embarrass the cabinet by his presence in it. But his retirement still further estranged the radical elements. The position of the cabinet became untenable and M. Ribot and his colleagues resigned on September 7th.

President Poincaré, chagrined at the failure of a Prime Minister whose convictions accorded with his own, entrusted M. Painlevé with the task of reforming, rather than replacing, the cabinet. While assuming the premiership, M. Painlevé retained the portfolio of War. M. Klotz became Minister of Finance. The continued presence of M. Ribot in the cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs deprived the new government of Socialist coöperation, M. Thomas withdrawing from office.

The position of the new cabinet was soon found to be weak. The Prime Minister was a poor speaker and a failure in the Chamber. The resentment of the Socialists at the government's refusal to grant passports for the Stockholm Conference was unabated. The groups favoring a policy of international reconciliation suspected the ministry of


GROSS TONNAGE IN THOUSANDS OF TONS
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION PLUS MARINE RISK
LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY ACTION
1914 AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1915 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1916 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1917 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC
1918 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC

Gross tonnage losses per month of allied and neutral merchant vessels from the beginning of the war to the signing of the armistice. *The heavy line shows losses due to enemy action. The broken line shows losses due to enemy action plus*

imperialistic aspirations. The Socialist Congress at Bordeaux in October, 1917, was the scene of a fierce conflict between the groups demanding peace by negotiation and those led by M. Thomas who stood for the winning of peace by victory. The assembly finally adopted the principle of supporting the war and participating in the government, but at the same time that of representation at Stockholm.

In the meantime the press was full of insinuations and charges of disloyalty, the existence of treasonable intrigues became the question of the hour, and the government was continually attacked for its alleged leniency towards internal enemies.

During a debate in the Chamber on November 13th, an immediate interpellation on the government's policy in respect to the cases of disloyalty was voted by 279 against 186 in spite of M. Painlevé's request that the matter be deferred until November 30th. The ministry resigned in consequence of this rebuff.

With the alarming military crisis after Caporetto added to these domestic preoccupations, France turned at last from all temporizing expedients and committed itself once for all to a relentless prosecution of the war, when the stern critic and uncompromising patriot, M. Georges Clemenceau, was called to the premiership on November 16, 1917.

The Third Republic has produced no figure more striking or characteristic than that of M. Clemenceau. He was born near Fontenoy-le-Comte in La Vendée on September 28, 1841, and received an enduring impression from the convictions of his father, a country physician, ardently anti-royalist and anti-clerical. He was deeply imbued, too, from his early environment with the French peasant's passionate attachment to the native soil of France. When a student in Paris he was imprisoned for two months in 1862 for having celebrated on February 24th the anniversary of the revolution

of 1848. Expelled from the Medical School in Paris for his persistent republicanism, he spent four years in the United States, supporting himself by teaching French literature in a young ladies' seminary at Stamford, and was married during this period of expatriation. Returning to France in 1868, he finished his studies and began to practise medicine in the Montmartre quarter of Paris, but his inclination inevitably led him into political activity.

Clemenceau was at first an enthusiastic supporter of Gambetta. He was elected a deputy in 1876. Four years later he founded a periodical, *La Justice*, distinguished for the subsequent prominence of several of its youthful collaborators, among whom were M. Stephen Pichon and M. Alexandre Millerand.

Clemenceau was harsh and relentless in debate. His sharp, incisive literary style soon made him a dreaded opponent. He parted from Gambetta, who remained a political opportunist, and formed the Radical Socialist party. He was a staunch defender of republican institutions against the Boulanger conspiracy.

Through certain corrupt deputies of his party, Clemenceau became involved in the disgrace of the Panama scandal in 1893, and it was even alleged that he had accepted money for his paper. This cost him the loss of his seat in the Chamber of Deputies and resulted in his retirement from parliament for a period of nine years, which he devoted to literature and journalism. Hatred of bigotry and obscurantism made him a vehement defender of Captain Dreyfus.

After returning to public life as senator in 1902, Clemenceau brought about the overthrow of the Combes ministry in 1905. Looked upon generally as a forceful, but turbulent, factor, he entered the Sarrien cabinet in March, 1906, soon became the real power in the government, and succeeded to the premiership in October of the same year. His

administration lasted until July, 1909, a period disturbed by international crises and serious labor conflicts.

M. Clemenceau was distinguished among the more advanced French statesmen of the recent period by his intense spirit of nationalism. No subsequent preoccupations dulled his bitter recollection of the humiliation of France in 1871. He opposed the policy of far-flung colonial enterprises, which were likely to distract attention from the idea of vengeance, as well as from the needed program of reforms at home. In Clemenceau the radical spirit became more and more subordinate to patriotic sentiment. He was a determined advocate of the restoration of the three years' compulsory military service and his position on national questions naturally brought him into frequent conflict with M. Jaurès.

The journal *L'Homme Libre* founded by M. Clemenceau in 1912 was suppressed for its fearless criticism of the government's shortcomings during the early stages of the war. It was replaced by *L'Homme Enchaîné.*

The cabinets of Briand, Ribot, and Painlevé passed quickly. Lyautey, Roques, and Painlevé followed one another at short intervals in the Ministry of War. The campaign of 1917 had been one of great disappointment for the Allies. Its close was marked by the great disaster in Italy. The military power of Russia had collapsed. The spirit of unanimity in France was being undermined by extreme Socialism and by German propaganda. The situation called for a national leader of unflinching tenacity of purpose, absolute courage, and persistent optimism. So far as France was concerned, the struggle entered its final stage when the destinies of the country were entrusted to M. Clemenceau.

In the new cabinet M. Clemenceau combined the portfolio of War with the premiership. M. Pichon became Minister of Foreign Affairs; M. Klotz, Minister of Finance;

and M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions. On November 20th M. Clemenceau declared before the Chamber that his purpose was the unrestricted prosecution of the war and he received a vote of confidence carried with frantic applause by a majority of 418 to 65.

It was soon evident that the new Premier intended to deal relentlessly with the disloyal elements in France. A brief account of a few of the most notable cases of treasonable practices will illustrate the nature of the offenses and in part the general character of German intrigues.

Sinister reports, as we have seen, had reflected upon the character of M. Malvy, Minister of the Interior in the Ribot Cabinet. On October 5th a letter from M. Léon Daudet, director of the reactionary journal *L'Action Française,* denouncing M. Malvy as a traitor, was read in the Chamber of Deputies. M. Malvy was accused of having betrayed military secrets to the enemy, particularly the plan of the French attack on the Chemin des Dames in April, 1917. M. Malvy protested his innocence, but on November 29th the Chamber of Deputies resolved that he be deprived of his parliamentary immunity and placed on trial. He appeared finally before the Senate, sitting as the High Court, on July 17, 1918, and on August 6th he was acquitted of the charge of treason, but found guilty of culpable negligence and sentenced to five years' banishment.

M. Paul Bolo, a Frenchman who had received the title Pasha from the dethroned Khedive of Egypt, was arrested on the charge of using funds derived from German sources in attempting to corrupt public opinion in France. Bolo was an adventurer who had turned his wits to the most varied pursuits and expedients. With the wealth of his second wife he had engaged in a number of unsuccessful speculations and was in serious financial straits at the outbreak of the war. Frequent trips to Switzerland, Italy, and Spain brought him

into suspicion and eventually the United States Secret Service reported that sums amounting to about $2,000,000 from German sources had been deposited to the credit of Paul Bolo in American banks. By 1917 most of this money had been remitted to him. He was placed on trial on February 5, 1918. It was shown that his operations were part of a project for obtaining control of a number of prominent French papers in German interests, with the aim, particularly, of fostering defeatist sentiment. Thus Bolo furnished Senator Humbert the funds for the purchase of *Le Journal.* He had been in communication with the enemy through the ex-Khedive, a Signor Cavallini, and other individuals. He was condemned to death on February 14th and was shot at Vincennes on April 17th.

Concurrently with other manifestations of enemy intrigue, the Paris periodical *Bonnet Rouge* was transformed from a weekly of harmless character into a daily voicing defeatist sentiments detrimental to the national cause. Suspicion was aroused by the numerous trips to Switzerland of M. Duval, the director of the paper, and investigation showed that he had received large sums of money from a German source. Mystery was added to this case by the fact that M. Almereyda, editor of the *Bonnet Rogue,* arrested on a charge of complicity as having received a check of 200,000 francs from M. Duval, was found dead in his cell through an unknown agency. The trial of the other persons involved began on April 29, 1918. It was proved that M. Duval had met a certain Herr Marx, a banker of Mannheim, ten times in Switzerland and had received from him sums aggregating 1,000,000 francs. Significance was attached in some quarters to the fact that M. Duval's passports were issued by the office chief of M. Malvy, then Minister of the Interior. A number of persons were convicted on May 15th in connection with this affair and M. Duval was sentenced to death.

M. Joseph Caillaux had been a disturbing element in French politics, however reasonable some of his professions may have seemed. He was absent from the sessions of the Chamber of Deputies from the beginning of the war down to the summer of 1917. His conduct meanwhile was often strange and enigmatical. The press accused him of treasonable dealings in Italy and of complicity in the Bolo Pasha and *Bonnet Rouge* affairs. This former premier was a man of engaging manners and wide popularity and seemed to stand beyond the reach of all attacks. But no step was too drastic for M. Clemenceau in his determination to eradicate treasonable activity from France. A demand was made for the trial of M. Caillaux on charges of treason preferred by General Dubail. The Chamber of Deputies voted to suspend his parliamentary immunity on December 22d, and the public was amazed by his arrest on January 14, 1918. The trial of M. Caillaux was postponed until after the war and with it the present narrative is not concerned. But his imprisonment throughout the remaining period of hostilities, however arbitrary it may seem, insured the public spirit of France against a dangerously subversive factor.

Meanwhile, the political and social life of the British nation was more than ever absorbed by the exigencies of the struggle. In his first speech as prime minister before the House of Commons on December 19, 1916, Mr. Lloyd George outlined a drastic program for the more thorough utilization of the national resources for war. He proceeded at once to create an efficient inner cabinet for the supreme direction of the war, consisting of himself as chairman, and Mr. Bonar Law, Earl Curzon, Lord Milner, and Mr. Arthur Henderson. The Prime Minister devoted his time and energy entirely to the great task of directing the work of the government as a whole and particularly to the War Cabinet, the position of First Lord of the Treasury, which

he held in accordance with custom as head of the ministry, implying no special duties. Mr. Bonar Law as Chancellor of the Exchequer carried the burden of responsibility for a great department. But Earl Curzon had only the lighter duties of President of the Council and Lord Milner and Mr. Arthur Henderson held no ministerial portfolios. On the whole, therefore, the War Cabinet was comparatively free from particular administrative tasks. In the main its members could devote their time and attention to the task of initiating policy and coördinating the work of the government departments. This small, distinctive group, including the highest administrative talent of the nation, was henceforth the most vital factor in the government.

The War Cabinet was in almost daily session. Its deliberations were animated by the magnetic energy, powerful imagination, and inexhaustible optimism of the prime minister. It drew to itself the most important functions of government and beside it the rest of the ministry fell into comparative obscurity. The War Conference of the British Empire, held in the spring of 1917 for the purpose of correlating more closely the efforts of the vast, composite realm, was really an extension of the British War Cabinet by the accession to it of the prime ministers or other representatives of the Dominions and the delegates from India.

This War Conference of the British Empire was the Eighth Imperial Conference. Down to the spring of 1917 British diplomacy and strategy had been conducted exclusively by the metropolitan authorities. But at that time the Mother Country invited the self-governing colonies and India to full participation in this responsibility.

The activity of the British government was rapidly increased under the new Cabinet. Ministries were formed for Labor, Shipping, Food Control, Air Warfare, National

Service, Pensions, and Reconstruction, and all these were responsible to the War Cabinet.

Lieutenant-general Smuts was subsequently admitted to the War Cabinet, and Mr. Henderson resigned, as we have seen, because he disagreed with the government's policy regarding the Stockholm Conference, and was replaced by Mr. G. N. Barnes, in August, 1917. In July, 1917, Sir Edward Carson, who had become First Lord of the Admiralty in the latter part of 1916, entered the War Cabinet as a minister without portfolio, and was succeeded in his former post by Sir Eric Geddes.

The tendency to gain greater governmental efficiency by the concentration of responsibility in a few hands was exemplified in France by the drastic reduction in number of the Briand cabinet and by the establishment of the inner War Committee. It remained for the Allies to attain the supreme degree of efficiency in the control of military operations when necessity finally compelled them to accept the unified chief command.

In consequence of the great need of reinforcements in the British Army for the campaign of 1917, the physical requirements for enlistment were relaxed, great numbers of discharged and rejected persons were reëxamined, and questions of classification and exemption were handled with far more severity.

The greater destruction wrought by the German submarines had already become a serious preoccupation in the autumn of 1916, before the limitations on their activity had been removed, but the inauguration of the unrestricted submarine campaign was followed by such a startling increase in the activity of these craft that they quickly became a vital peril to the British nation. With unflinching resolution government and people faced the critical situation, responding with intenser energy to the hostile fury. Vigorous

measures were taken for the increase of production, economy in the distribution and use of food-stuffs, and the acceleration of ship-building.

Farmers were encouraged to enlarge the area planted to wheat, oats, and potatoes by the guarantee of minimum prices ensuring a satisfactory profit, and minimum wages were established for agricultural laborers. Unused plots of ground were everywhere converted into war gardens for potatoes and vegetables. The potato crop in 1917 exceeded the demand and the government had to meet the difference between the actual selling price and the guaranteed minimum price of £6 to £6 10 shillings per ton.

A food problem had scarcely existed in the United Kingdom before the third year of the war, and even then the actual shortage of supplies was probably due less to the direct effect of the German submarines than to a falling off of production in many countries and the increasing demands on British tonnage.

On November 17, 1916, extensive powers for controlling the manufacture, distribution, and consumption of food were conferred on the Board of Trade. By virtue of this authority, Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, issued a milling order on November 20th making obligatory a 76% extraction of flour from wheat. On December 5th the first Public Meals Order limited the number of courses to be served at luncheon and dinner in hotels, restaurants, and clubs and established thereby 5¼ pounds as the maximum weekly consumption of meat for each individual eating in public places.

Among the innovations of the Lloyd George government was the creation of the distinct Ministry of Food on December 22, 1916, with Lord Devonport as first Food Commissioner. The reserves of cereals had become low and a national campaign was conducted for the elimination of

waste and the voluntary adoption of a scientific dietary schedule. The addition to wheat flour of meal ground from other grains was made compulsory. But Lord Devonport, incurring severe criticism for failure to stem the rising tide of prices, resigned and was succeeded on June 15, 1917, by Lord Rhondda, who had already earned a reputation for great organizing and administrative ability.

Lord Rhondda at once attacked the problem of high prices. An order-in-council conferred upon the Food Ministry the same power of requisitioning food supplies as that exercised by the military authorities, together with the right to control prices. The regulation of prices involved the right of examining dealers' books. The Food Ministry undertook to limit profits in the necessary food industries at every stage of production, manufacture, and distribution to a fair remuneration for the service rendered. The price of bread was stabilized at nine pence for the standard four pound loaf, 50% above the peace price, by means of a government subsidy amounting to about £40,000,000 a year. The prices of practically all the other ordinary articles of food were eventually regulated.

In February, 1917, the coal mines had come under government control. The effort to conserve the national strength and resources led to a control over all the necessary supplies in the interest of the public. The control of the distribution of food-stuffs was largely carried on through local food committees.

A serious stringency was first felt in the case of sugar. But towards the close of 1917 indications of a scantiness in the supply of butter and fats created widespread anxiety. Expectant purchasers stood for hours in long lines before the provision shops. By January, 1918, a similar condition had developed in the case of meat.

The government hesitated to establish compulsory rationing, partly from reluctance to interfere with the nation's habits, partly, perhaps, from fear of encouraging the hopes of the enemy. But a popular demand and the obvious evil of the food lines compelled them to adopt a series of measures to this end. After three months had been spent in creating an organization, a general system of rationing was applied to sugar on December 31, 1917. Sugar was henceforth sold only by dealers registered with the local food control committees. At first each household, subsequently every individual, received a sugar registration card, part of which was deposited with the dealer selected for regular purchases. The amount of the individual sugar ration was a half-pound weekly. Rationing was first applied to tea, butter, and margarine by the local committee in Birmingham, and other localities generally followed this example. The Food Ministry's Public Meals Order was revised so as to reduce the daily meat allowance for each individual eating in public places to six ounces and to enforce the observance of two meatless days weekly, while the bread allowance was increased. Cards for meat, as well as butter and fats, came into use in London and the adjacent counties on February 25, 1918. A full system of rationing for sugar, fats, meat, and bread was in force on July 13, 1918.

During April, 1917, the loss of Allied shipping by enemy action and marine risk reached the appalling aggregate of 894,000 gross tonnage (555,000 being British). The efforts of the naval forces were not alone enough to meet this peril. It was clear that the submarine menace would not be overcome until the combined cargo-carrying capacity of the merchant marines of the United Kingdom and of the Allied and the neutral nations could be maintained or even increased, in spite of the losses suffered, by new construction and the more effective use of the existing tonnage.

Efforts to increase construction in the United Kingdom were moderately successful. The ship-building achievement of the United States was more remarkable. Sir Joseph Maclay, of Glasgow, was made shipping controller by the British Government with power to regulate matters of tonnage. He requisitioned British shipping and concentrated tonnage on the routes where it could be used to the best advantage for the nation. The shipping was managed by the established companies and the owners were guaranteed a fair return by the government.

During 1917 the submarines sank more than 6,000,000 tons of merchant shipping. The net reduction of the world's tonnage from the beginning of the war to the close of 1917 was more than 5,000,000 tons (British tonnage about 4,000,000). During 1917 ship-building amounted to 1,163,474 tons in the United Kingdom and 1,539,881 abroad. The increasing effectiveness of naval action against the submarines is shown by the reduction of sinkings from 2,236,934 tons (1,361,870 British) in the second quarter of 1917 to 1,272,843 (782,889 British) in the last quarter of the same year. By the close of 1917 the peak of danger had been passed. During the last four months of the war the world's output of shipping exceeded the losses.

Proof of the unimpaired financial stability of Great Britain was afforded by the amazing result of a new war loan early in 1917. The total subscriptions from January 11th to February 16th, for 5% bonds at 95 and 4% tax-compounded stock at par, represented £941,476,710 in new money, or, including conversions of short term securities, £2,119,406,-634. In October, 1917, the British Government inaugurated the continuous sale of securities in the form known as National War Bonds, which yielded a total sum of £1,446,625,-613 down to January 11, 1919.

Such varied causes as the German peace propaganda, the failure of the Allies to win decisive results in the campaign of 1917, the upheaval in Russia, and the spirit brought into the conflict by the United States led inevitably to a fresh discussion of war aims and possible bases of peace. In consequence of profound changes in the great political factors of the struggle, it was natural that expressions on these questions should represent all degrees of opinion from the extreme of Chauvinism to that of pacifism, from confidence in a complete military victory to doubt and pessimism. Indications began to point to an eventual collision, in case the Allies were victorious, between the traditional, selfish conception of statesmanship and a newer tendency which preferred the general welfare of humanity to the interests of particular lands and peoples. The international or humanitarian attitude did not ignore the existence or reasonable claims of nationality, but held that the permanent happiness of the different nations depended upon the general welfare of mankind.

The contrast was particularly marked between the advocates of a peace of reconciliation and those of a peace of repression. British opinion was deeply stirred by a letter of Lord Lansdowne, a former Foreign Secretary, on the possibility of peace, published in the London *Daily Telegraph* on November 29, 1917. Lord Lansdowne boldly suggested that steps be taken for a settlement with the enemy in a broad spirit of compromise. He believed that the German peace party could be so strengthened that Germany would be led to negotiate on an acceptable basis, if the Allies would give solemn assurances on the following five points: (1) that they did not seek to annihilate Germany as a great power; (2) that they did not aim to impose a form of government on the German people contrary to their choice; (3) that they did not intend to destroy Germany's commercial future;

(4) that they were willing to examine in conference the international questions involved in a settlement, including the freedom of the seas; and (5) that they were ready to enter into an international agreement for the decision of all international disputes by peaceful means.

This plea for peace by negotiation was loudly condemned by a considerable part of the press and public opinion. But there was nothing in these proposals that specifically disagreed with the official expressions of the Allied statesmen or the most enlightened public opinion in the Allied countries. It will be instructive to compare the words of President Wilson in his address to Congress of December 4, 1917, in which he recommended a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary. In discussing the military aims and a final settlement based on impartial justice, he spoke as follows:

"You catch, with me, the voices of humanity that are in the air. They grow daily more audible, more articulate, more persuasive, and they come from the hearts of men everywhere. They insist that the war shall not end in vindictive action of any kind; that no nation or people shall be robbed or punished because the irresponsible rulers of a single country have themselves done deep and abominable wrong. It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, 'No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.' Just because this crude formula expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere, it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue to lead the people of Russia astray—and the people of every other country their agents could reach, in order that a premature peace might be brought about before autocracy has been taught its final and convincing lesson, and the people of the world put in control of their own destinies."

In his belief, such a perversion of a just idea should not prevent the proper use of it as soon as the defeat of autocracy

made it possible to establish the rule of right among the nations. The immediate task was to win the war, and the war could be regarded as won as soon as the German people were ready to agree to a settlement based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs committed by their rulers. The wrong to Belgium would have to be repaired and the power extended by Germany over Austria-Hungary, the Balkan states, and Turkey would have to be relinquished.

"We owe it," he said, however, "to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not purpose or desire to dictate to them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small. We shall hope to secure for the peoples of the Balkan peninsula and for the people of the Turkish Empire the right and opportunity to make their own lives safe, their own fortunes secure against oppression or injustice and from the dictation of foreign courts or parties. And our attitude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with its internal affairs. We should deem either the one or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the principles we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred throughout our life as a nation.

"The people of Germany are being told by the men whom they now permit to deceive them and to act as their masters that they are fighting for the very life and existence of their empire, a war of desperate self-defense against deliberate aggression. Nothing could be more grossly or wantonly false, and we must seek by the utmost openness and candor as to our real aims to convince them of its falseness. We are in fact fighting for their emancipation from fear, along with

our own,—from the fear as well as the fact of unjust attack by neighbors or rivals or schemers after world empire. No one is threatening the existence or the independence or the peaceful enterprise of the German Empire.

"The wrongs, the very deep wrongs, committed in this war will have to be righted. That of course. But they cannot and must not be righted by the commission of similar wrongs against Germany and her allies. The world will not permit the commission of similar wrongs as a means of reparation and settlement. Statesmen must by this time have learned that the opinion of the world is everywhere wide awake and fully comprehends the issues involved. No representative of any self-governed nation will dare disregard it by attempting any such covenants of selfishness and compromise as were entered into at the Congress of Vienna. The thought of the plain people here and everywhere throughout the world, the people who enjoy no privilege and have very simple and unsophisticated standards of right and wrong, is the air all governments must henceforth breathe if they would live. It is in the full disclosing light of that thought that all policies must be conceived and executed in this midday hour of the world's life. German rulers have been able to upset the peace of the world only because the German people were not suffered under their tutelage to share the comradeship of the other peoples of the world either in thought or in purpose. They were allowed to have no opinion of their own which might be set up as a rule of conduct for those who exercised authority over them. But the congress that concludes this war will feel the full strength of the tides that run now in the hearts and consciences of free men everywhere. Its conclusions will run with those tides. . . . Justice and equality of rights can be had only at a great price. We are seeking permanent, not temporary, foundations for the peace of the world and must seek them

*Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada; W. F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand; and General Smuts, Minister of Defense, South Africa.*

On second row, from left to right: Sir Sinha, Maharajah of Bikanir; Sir James Meston; Austen Chamberlain; Lord Robert Cecil; Walter Long; Sir Joseph Ward, Minister of Finance, New Zealand; Sir G. Perley, Minister of Canadian Expeditionary Corps; Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, Canada; J. D. Hazen, Minister of Marine, Canada.

In the garden at Downing Street after a meeting of the British War Conference in the spring of 1917

candidly and fearlessly. As always, the right will prove to be the expedient."

In conclusion the President declared that every impediment to the successful prosecution of this war for freedom and justice should be cleared away and pointed to the existence of a very embarrassing obstacle in the fact that the United States was at war with Germany but not with Germany's allies. Congress was therefore urged to immediately declare the United States in a state of war with Austria-Hungary, the latter having become a vassal of the German government. The war could only be conducted successfully if the Central Empires were regarded as one. But the practical necessity of declaring war against Turkey and Bulgaria had not yet arisen. A joint resolution of Congress declaring the country to be at war with Austria-Hungary was passed in the Senate and in the House of Representatives on December 7th.

Mr. Lloyd George declared on December 14th that a peace of victory was essential for the Allies, since a true peace required reparation and the punishment of the wrongdoers, but the wrongdoers could not be expected to negotiate honestly on these matters. In the same month a special British Labor Conference adopted a memorandum on war aims which fairly embodied the general feeling of the Allied peoples. This document was accepted by the Interallied Labor Conference meeting in London in the following February.

The publication of various secret treaties by the Bolsheviki was added to the other reasons for a definite official statement that would dispel any serious misgivings or misconceptions about the ultimate war aims of the Allies. On January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George made an extensive declaration on this subject to the conference of Trade Union delegates at Westminster. According to the Prime Minister, the

British Empire was fighting for the complete restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Roumania, with indemnification for the losses; the restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine; an independent Poland to include all genuine Polish elements desiring to be incorporated in a national state; real self-government for the nationalities of Austria-Hungary that desired it; and the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of Italy and Roumania. Constantinople might remain the Turkish capital, in case the passage through the Straits were internationalized. Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine were entitled to recognition of their distinctive national characters. Disposition of the German colonies in Africa should be made by a conference on the basis, chiefly, of the interests of the natives. The enemy should make reparation for injuries committed in violation of international law. An international organization should be created to limit armaments and diminish the possibilities of war.

In view of the general discussion of war aims and particularly the attempt to draw the Allies into a conference for peace at Brest-Litovsk, President Wilson delivered his most important address on peace bases before Congress on January 8, 1918. He alluded to the fact that the statement of general principles submitted by the delegates of the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk for peace with Russia, which had seemed susceptible of a liberal interpretation, was followed by a specific program of terms of unqualified harshness, which would have left Germany and Austria-Hungary in possession of all that their armed forces had occupied. This contradiction doubtless reflected the contrast between the views of the more liberal statesmen and those of the military leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary, so that the incident was full of significance. A military and imperialistic minority was defying the spirit and intention of the Reichstag

resolutions of the preceding July. Nevertheless, in the President's opinion, the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Powers challenged their adversaries to state the kind of settlement that they would consider just and satisfactory. Such a challenge should be responded to with the greatest candor, although the aims of the Allies had been repeatedly stated with sufficient definiteness. Just at the time, moreover, the voice of Russia, prostrate before the relentless enemy, was raised with a compelling eloquence in an appeal for such a statement. The President proceeded as follows, developing his ideas of peace in the famous fourteen points:

"We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are, in effect, partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

"1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

"2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as

the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

"3. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

"6. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

"7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they

have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

"8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored; and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

"9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

"10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

"11. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

"12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

"13. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably

Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

"14. A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

These declarations revealed the essential harmony of view of the British Prime Minister and the American President. But the latter included in his program freedom of navigation in peace and war and dealt more fully with the idea of the League of Nations. The Fourteen Points were accepted as expressing most adequately the attitude of enlightened Allied statesmanship.

Count Hertling and Count Czernin replied to them in public speeches. They welcomed the idea of a League of Nations, freedom of navigation, and the repudiation of economic warfare and secret diplomacy. Count Hertling insisted, however, that the terms of the agreement at Brest-Litovsk were the exclusive concern of Russia and the Central Powers and that the conditions of the evacuation of French territory could only be discussed with France. Both regarded the future of Poland as a question between the Central Empires alone. They rejected the proposals regarding Turkey and declared that the questions in the Balkan states should be settled with the concurrence of Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Count Hertling refused to consider the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. He claimed that the forcible annexation of Belgium was no part of German policy, but that Belgium could not be evacuated until the Allies accepted the territorial integrity of the Central Empires and their allies. The German colonies would have to be returned without discussion. He was not opposed to the

limitation of armaments but thought that the solution of this question would be imposed automatically by the economic conditions prevailing after the war. Count Czernin rejected the claims for Italy, Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro.

In addressing Congress on February 11th, President Wilson reduced the requirements for peace to the following general principles: "(1) that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent; (2) that peoples and provinces are not to be bargained about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but (3) that every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and (4) that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

At a time when the defection of Russia left the Central Powers free to strike with full force on the Western front, where the Allies were threatened with the most terrible onslaught of all times, principles were being formulated in the White House which renewed the moral force of the Entente and sowed the seeds of eventual discord and doubt among the enemy.

Count von Hertling ostensibly accepted President Wilson's four points of February 11th in a speech before the Reichstag on the 25th, difficult as it is to reconcile such a profession on

his part with the attitude of the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.

Two remarkable revelations strengthened Allied convictions on the eve of the great German offensive in March, 1918.

A memorandum composed by Prince Lichnowsky on his mission as German Ambassador in London, 1912–1914, dated August 16, 1916, intended as a private family record, was made public through a breach of confidence. This document showed how British policy had been animated throughout those critical years before the war by a spirit of candor and fairness in striking contrast with Germany's petulant, suspicious attitude. In contradiction to the misconceptions disseminated in Germany, the author declared that Great Britain would never have drawn the sword on account of the growth of the German fleet or the increase in German trade alone. Prince Lichnowsky had steadfastly endeavored to improve the relations between the two countries and he had met with a loyal response from Sir Edward Grey, a statesman "incapable of deceit and subterfuge." Unfortunately Prince Lichnowsky's efforts had been constantly thwarted in Berlin, largely in consequence of personal jealousy. The German government had been misinformed by certain of its other diplomatic representatives, particularly Count Pourtalès at St. Petersburg, and conducted blindly into the fatal course which led to war. Prince Lichnowsky was convinced that if Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference had been heeded, the crisis could have been settled in two or three sittings, and he had urged its acceptance, forcibly but in vain. He was told that it would be wounding to Austria's dignity. At that time a hint from Berlin to Vienna would have averted the war. The closing passage of the document refers to the ambassador's departure from London after war had been declared: "A special train took

us to Harwich, where a guard of honor was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our own policy." As commentary on Prince Lichnowsky's treatment in England, the reader should compare the incidents attending the close of the British Ambassador's mission in Berlin, related in the Appendix of Volume II.

About the same time there was published in Germany a letter of Dr. Mühlon, a former member of the Krupp directorate, then living in Switzerland, which corroborated the Lichnowsky disclosure as to the bellicose attitude in prominent German circles before the war.

The other important revelation was made by M. Pichon in a speech delivered on March 1, 1918, in commemoration of the forty-seventh anniversary of the protest against the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany by the deputies from those departments in the French National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871. M. Pichon read the text of confidential instructions sent by the German Chancellor to Baron von Schön, July 31, 1914, when the attitude of France in the event of war between Germany and Russia was still uncertain. The despatch had been recently deciphered by French experts and the text was as follows:

"If French government declares that it will remain neutral, your Excellency will kindly state that we must, as a guarantee of that neutrality, demand the handing over of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we shall occupy and hand back on the conclusion of the war with Russia. The reply to this last question must reach here before four o'clock on Saturday."

The moral effect of these disclosures on the Allies was intensified by the overbearing attitude of the German Chauvinists. Thus on April 17th the Fatherland party passed

resolutions declaring that Belgium and Flanders must be held by Germany under complete political, military, and economic domination and that Germany should annex the mineral basin of Briey and Longwy, recover its colonial empire with additions, and enforce the freedom of the seas.

Arrogance had destroyed the lingering effect of the German peace proposal of December, 1916. The confusion and uncertainty of public opinion in the Western Powers was cleared by a conviction of the absolute incompatibility of German pretensions with endurable conditions for their own national existence and development. The Allies faced the supreme trial with a degree of unanimity and determination never reached before.

# CHAPTER VII

## The Mobilization of American Resources

**The financial effort. Organizing the material resources of the United States: Council of National Defense and Advisory Commission, War Industries Board, Food and Fuel Administration, control of railways, United States Shipping Board and Emergency Fleet Corporation, War Trade Board. Commissions of the Allied Powers in the United States. Expansion of the United States Army: Regular Army, National Guard, National Army. Officers' training camps. Standard organization of the infantry division. Equipment of the army. Zone of American activity in France. Organization of transportation and supply: Base, Intermediate, and Advance Sections. American General Headquarters at Chaumont. The earliest American divisions at the front. American forces placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief of the Allies.**

The time was now approaching when the prodigious effort of the United States in raising, organizing, training, and equipping a great army, in concentrating it at the sea-ports and transporting it 3,000 miles across the ocean was to become a crucial factor in the struggle. The unusual nature of the task achieved and the intimate interest attaching to this great movement demand attention, however summary the treatment of the different phases must be.

Of prime consideration by the government was the financial question involved in carrying out this unprecedented task.

Congress promptly voted a special war fund of $100,000,000 for the President to use at his own discretion. An act passed on April 24, 1917, authorized the issue of bonds to the amount of $7,000,000,000 and another act of September 24th of the same year provided for raising $11,538,945,540 on bonds, treasury certificates, and war-savings stamps, and an extensive system of new taxes was created.

Reassuring evidence of national soundness was revealed in the popular financing of the war by millions of the people.

The First Liberty Loan was announced on May 14, 1917, with the offer of bonds to the amount of $2,000,000,000, maturing in thirty years and bearing 3½% interest, with principal and interest exempt from all taxation except estate or inheritance taxes. The subscriptions closed on June 15th and the total amount subscribed was $3,035,226,850. From October 1st to 27th of the same year subscriptions were open for the bonds of the Second Liberty Loan, bearing interest at 4%, maturing in twenty-five years but redeemable after ten, and exempt (with certain limitations) as regards principal and interest from all taxation except estate or inheritance taxes, surtaxes, and excess profits and war profits taxes. The amount offered was $3,000,000,000. The number of subscribers was about 9,500,000; the aggregate subscriptions were $4,617,532,300; and the amount actually allotted was $3,808,766,150. Outstanding treasury certificates were applicable in payment for these securities.

The bonds of the third and subsequent loans bore interest at 4¼% and, unlike the earlier issues, were inconvertible. Subscriptions for the Third Liberty Loan were open from April 6 to May 4, 1918. The unprecedented number of 18,376,815 persons subscribed for $4,170,019,650, which was all allotted. The bonds, maturing in 1928, had the same exemption from taxation as those of the preceding loan. Subscriptions for the Fourth Liberty Loan, September 28th–October 19th, reached the total of $6,989,047,000, the largest sum ever raised in a single national loan, the number of subscribers, more than 21,000,000, eclipsing that of the third loan. The bonds mature in 1938.

Towards the close of 1917 Congress authorized the issue of war-savings stamps and certificates for an aggregate amount of $2,000,000,000 and the sale began on December 3d. These included thrift stamps for twenty-five cents and war-savings stamps for five dollars at maturity. Down to

November 1, 1918, the total cash receipts from these sources amounted to $834,253,213.44.

Appropriations for eventual war purposes totalling $1,977,-210,000 had been made in the second session of the 64th Congress which adjourned March 4, 1917. The 65th Congress, in its first session, April 2,–October 6, 1917, appropriated $16,901,967,000 for the war and authorized contracts for $2,511, 954,000 for the following fiscal year. This made a total of $21,390,731,000, of which $7,000,000,000 was devoted to loans to the Allies.

It was estimated that foreign war loans amounting to $2,500,000,000 had been floated in the United States before this country entered the war. Afterwards the volume of credit extended to the Allied governments for the purchase of war supplies in the United States increased very rapidly, but these loans were henceforth financed by the American government. The United States Treasury accepted the obligations of the foreign governments covering the advances made to them. The loans thus made bore interest at the rate paid by the United States for the corresponding funds, 3% and later 3¼% for the money raised by treasury certificates and successively 3½%, 4%, and 4¼% for the money obtained by Liberty Loans. Down to January 15, 1919, the United States had in this way loaned to the different Allied Powers a total of $8,598,773,702, distributed as follows: United Kingdom, $4,175,981,000; France, $2,436,427,000; Italy, $1,310,000,000; Russia, $325,000,000; Belgium, $256,145,-000; Greece, $39,554,036; Cuba, $15,000,000; Serbia, $12,000,000; Roumania, $6,666,666; Liberia, $5,000,000; and the Czecho-Slovaks, $17,000,000.

The first step in organizing the resources of the country was the creation of the Council of National Defense in 1916 in view of a possible warlike emergency. This consisted of the heads of the Departments of War, the Navy, the

Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, and its purpose was the "coördination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare." An Advisory Commission was created to assist the Council with special and expert advice. Its members were: Mr. Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, for matters of transportation and communications; Mr. Howard E. Coffin, a well-known consulting engineer, for munitions, manufacturing, and industrial relations; Mr. Julius Rosenwald, president of the Sears-Roebuck Co., for supplies; Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, a prominent business man of New York, for minerals, metals, and raw materials; Dr. Hollis Godfrey, president of the Drexel Institute, for engineering and education; Mr. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, for questions of labor; Dr. Franklin H. Martin, regent and general secretary of the American Society of Surgeons, for medicine, surgery, and sanitation.

Many subordinate organs of the Council of National Defense were established as war emergencies developed.

Most of the functions of the Advisory Commission were eventually carried on through the organization of the War Industries Board, which acted as a clearing-house for the government's needs for the nation's products of war industry.

One of the first concerns of the administration after the declaration of war was for the coördination of American food production and consumption with the needs of the Allies in Western Europe. Measures were required to guarantee an adequate supply of food at reasonable prices for the American people and at the same time, by stimulating production and curtailing waste, to provide the largest possible quantity for exportation to the Allies. The substitution of North American products for those from far more distant sources in supplying the needs of the Allies in Europe was a most important factor in the economical employment of

the available ocean tonnage. The Committee on Food Supply and Prices was formed on April 11, 1917, and Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, who, after earning a world-wide reputation as chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, had been compelled to leave that country when the United States became an enemy of Germany, was placed at its head. On May 20th Mr. Hoover was appointed Food Commissioner by President Wilson. "Food will win the War" became the popular slogan in a campaign against wastefulness and in favor of increasing production, particularly through the utilization of neglected spaces for war gardens. The Food Control Act signed by the President August 10, 1917, created the office of Food Administrator and established rules for the food administration, making it unlawful to speculate in or hoard food. As Food Administrator, Mr. Hoover provided for stabilizing prices through the purchase of the 1917 wheat crop by the government at $2.20 a bushel and also guaranteed to take all wheat that could be raised in 1918 at $2.00 a bushel.

Mr. Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams College, was appointed Fuel Administrator on August 23, 1917. Prices of coal at the mines and jobbers' profits were fixed. The congestion of coal traffic, causing temporary scarcity in the winter of 1917–18, was one of the motives for the assumption of control of the railways by the government.

On April 11, 1917, the railways had organized a voluntary Railroad War Board for coöperation and the elimination of competition among themselves. At the same time the government abrogated some of the regulations which had been designed to insure the perpetuation of competition among the railways. But the emergency required, for the most effective employment of the railway equipment of the country, the operation of the railways as a single system. Pooling the facilities was impractical without pooling the

earnings. On December 26, 1917, the President, by virtue of a law of August 29, 1916, appointed Mr. William G. McAdoo Director General of the Railroads in addition to his cabinet office of Secretary of the Treasury. By an act of March 21, 1918, Congress authorized the continued operation of the railways by the government throughout the war. Each company was granted a net operating income equal to the average net operating income in the three years prior to June 20, 1917. On December 31, 1917, the Railroad War Board resigned.

The embarrassment to American commerce from the general lack of ocean tonnage during the war led to the establishment of the United States Shipping Board in January, 1917. For the purpose of developing the American merchant marine, this board was empowered to build or purchase ships and operate them through the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This the government originally supplied with a capital of $50,000,000, which rose to $750,000,000 in June, 1917, and $1,934,000,000 in October with the vast increase in the shipping acquired. When this country declared war there were seventy-one German vessels of 535,000 gross tons in the ports of the United States, twenty-three of 86,000 tons in Philippine ports, and one of 6,600 tons in the harbor of a Pacific island belonging to the United States. The government seized in all ninety-five German and Austro-Hungarian vessels in the harbors of the United States and the possessions, including such famous liners as the *Vaterland, George Washington,* and *Kaiser Wilhelm II,* and turned them over to the Shipping Board. On October 15, 1917, the Emergency Fleet Corporation requisitioned all merchant vessels of 2,500 tons or more under construction, 400 vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 2,721,933. Major-general Goethals resigned as manager of the Emergency Fleet on July 24, 1917. At that time Mr. Edward H. Hurley became chairman of the



General Pershing receiving Marshal Foch at the door of the American Army General Headquarters at Chaumont.

President Wilson and some of the members of the Council of National Defense and Advisory Commission. *Bottom row: Benedict Crowell, William G. McAdoo, President Wilson, Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, Bernard M. Baruch. Top row: Herbert C. Hoover, Edward H. Hurley, Vance McCormack, Dr. Harry A Garfield.*

Shipping Board and Rear-admiral W. L. Capps head of the Emergency Fleet. Finally Mr. Charles M. Schwab became head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. From July 1, 1917, until October 1, 1918, there were built in the United States 384 steel, seagoing vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 1,847,824, and 289 wooden seagoing vessels of a total tonnage of 504,108.

The War Trade Board was established by an executive order of October 12, 1917, in compliance with the Trading with the Enemy Act. It consisted of representatives of various government departments and agencies. License by this board was required for the exportation and importation of all commodities in commerce. Such control of foreign trade was required by the exigent shipping situation and the percolation of goods to the enemy through neutral countries.

Soon after the declaration of war by the United States, many of the Allied governments sent official delegations to confer with the American authorities. A British mission was headed by the Foreign Secretary, the Honorable Arthur J. Balfour; and a French mission by M. Viviani, premier at the beginning of the war, and including Marshal Joffre. These missions brought experts on military and naval matters, who contributed invaluable assistance in preparing the American forces. An Italian mission, headed by Prince Udine, arrived shortly after the British and French missions.

An important errand of these missions was to urge upon the American authorities the necessity of the early appearance of an American contingent on the Western front as a token of the reality of American assistance, for the purpose of counteracting the widespread feeling of weariness and depression prevailing in the Allied countries.

By legislation described in Volume IV, Congress empowered the President of the United States to raise all organizations of the Regular Army to the maximum enlisted strength

authorized by law, to draft the National Guard and National Guard Reserve into the military service of the United States, and to raise by draft two contingents, each of 500,000 men. The armed forces of the United States fell, therefore, into the three general classes of the Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army, although in the course of the war the distinctions between them tended to disappear and were entirely abolished on August 7, 1918.

The "Act for making further and more effective Provision for the National Defense" of June 3, 1916, had provided for a military establishment comprising sixty-four regiments of infantry, twenty-five of cavalry, and twenty-one of field artillery, together with seven regiments and two mounted battalions of engineers, the coast artillery corps, the brigade, division, and army corps headquarters, and special service units, with a total of about 12,000 officers and 293,000 men, to be attained by five annual increments in strength.

On May 14, 1917, the Secretary of War issued orders for the creation of all the new units required to bring the Regular Army to the total number contemplated in the National Defense Act of 1916. This involved the organization of twenty-seven new regiments of infantry, twelve of field artillery, six of cavalry, and four regiments and two mounted battalions of engineers. This increase in the number of units was made possible by splitting up the existing ones so as to obtain nuclei of trained officers and men for the new formations. The size of the units was also increased, so that the Regular Army, as organized under the National Defense Act of 1916, would have an aggregate strength of 18,033 officers and 470,185 men, and the National Guard would number 18,377 officers and 456,800 men.

The graduation of two classes from the Military Academy, April and August, 1917, anticipating the normal dates by two and ten months respectively, provided 290 new officers

for the Regular Army. There were 6,169 Regular officers on June 30, 1917, besides 7,957 enrolled as Reserve officers who had had only a very rudimentary military training.

At the time when the United States entered the war, the National Guard was being reorganized to make it a suitable first line force to supplement the regular establishment in case of war. The National Guard had benefited by the exposure of serious defects in its organization at the time of the recent concentration on the Mexican frontier. For the present emergency it was mustered into the federal service on August 5, 1917, and trained under its own officers.

The promptness with which Congress applied a great lesson of the war in adopting obligatory service, despite the national tradition, and the willingness with which the people generally acquiesced in the decision made, was a most auspicious indication of the spirit of resolution pervading the country. The first increments of the National Army created by the draft arrived at the several training camps in September, 1917. The National Guard could spare no officers, and the Regular Army but few, for the training of the National Army. Provision was made to meet this need by an extensive application of the idea of the citizen training camps which had been established in 1916 at Plattsburg and elsewhere under the impulsion of Major-general Leonard Wood.

From the first officers' training course, held in fifteen different camps, 27,341 candidates were graduated and received commissions. The second course added 17,237, and the third, filled chiefly with men chosen from the ranks, 12,729. For the fourth period instruction was started in twenty-four National Guard and National Army training areas as part of the activity of the corresponding divisions. Subsequently eight permanent schools for officers were established and they contained on November 1, 1918, approximately 46,000 students.

The standard organization for the infantry division of all parts of the army called for a strength of 979 officers and 27,080 men and consisted of two infantry brigades, each made up of two infantry regiments and one machine-gun battalion of three companies; one brigade of field artillery, containing three regiments of field artillery and one trench mortar battalion; one regiment of engineers; signal service; train; and supply and sanitary services. The infantry regiment, of 103 officers and 3,652 men, was divided into three battalions, each of four rifle companies, one supply train, and one machine-gun company.

Centers of instruction for officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates were established in the divisional cantonments and other camps. The officers in charge of training had the indispensable assistance of the prominent technicists detailed from the French and the British Armies in imparting acquaintance with the nature and use of the most recent weapons and devices and methods of warfare.

At the time of entering the war the United States had a stock of 600,000, and a daily production of not more than 700, Springfield rifles, model of 1903. There were available 780 light and 144 medium, but no heavy, field pieces. A new, 1917 model, rifle was adopted, like the British Enfield, but having a chamber adapted to the American Springfield cartridge. The new American army had to depend very largely on the French for its field artillery. The divisional artillery brigade of the American Army consisted of two regiments, each equipped with twenty-four French 75-millimeter guns (range 8.5 kilometers, weight of shell 6.2 kilograms) and one regiment with twenty-four French Schneider 155-millimeter howitzers (range 11 kilometers, weight of shell 53 kilograms). The army corps artillery used the American 4.7 inch gun and the French 155-millimeter gun. The artillery of the army used the French 155-millimeter




Map of France showing the American ports of debarkation, camps, supply bases, and railway lines.

and the American five and six inch guns, and the British eight inch and American 9.2 inch howitzers.

The automatic rifle used by the American Army was an adaptation of the French Chauchat. Vickers and Hotchkiss machine-guns were used until they could be replaced by the Browning machine-gun manufactured in the United States.

Soon after the United States entered the war a huge air service program was announced. Congress appropriated $640,000,000 for aëroplane construction, and it was decided to order 11,500 combat planes. Such an enormous production was possible only by standardizing both engine and plane construction. For directing efforts in this field, an Aircraft Construction Board was organized under the Council of National Defense with Mr. Howard E. Coffin as chairman.

The first requisite was to design a single type of engine that could be used with all the necessary kinds of planes. The Liberty Motor, designed for this purpose by the joint efforts of many accomplished engineers, was tested with satisfactory results at Washington, July 3, 1917, and 22,500 motors of this type were ordered. But subsequent changes in the design delayed production. Later, French manufacturers accepted orders for 6,100 combat planes for the American Army on condition that American mechanics replace the requisite number of French workmen in the motor-car industry.

The first American aëroplane did not make its appearance on the Western front until February, 1918. Failure to realize with the expected promptitude the ambitious aëroplane construction program, which had appealed so strongly to the national imagination, caused great disappointment and gave rise to bitter criticism.

By the summer of 1918, the experimental stage had been passed and American production of aëroplanes was increasing rapidly. At the time of General Pershing's report,

November 20, 1918, the American Army had obtained 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes from the French and had received 1,379 planes from home.

Among the first questions for deliberation between General Pershing and the French High Command was that of the future American zone of activity; ports of debarkation, lines of communication, and combat region at the front. Since the available facilities of the Channel ports in northern France were already largely taken up by the British, points of debarkation were assigned to the Americans mainly along the Atlantic coast from Brest southward to the Loire. The section of front originally chosen for the American Army was in the region of Lorraine which was at that time comparatively tranquil. Direct lines of communication from the Atlantic ports to the Lorraine front passed conveniently south of the main French communication zone.

The organization of transportation and supply was one of the most conspicuous features of the American activity in the Great War. The amount of shipping available for ocean transportation for the American Army rose from 94,000 tons at the end of June, 1917, to 3,800,000 tons at the time of the armistice. From June, 1917, to November 20, 1918, 2,053,347 American troops had crossed to Europe or were still en route and 5,153,000 tons of material and supplies had been transported from the United States for their use. The material included 1,145 locomotives, 17,000 standard gauge freight cars, and 34,433 motor trucks. A considerable number of troops were first transported to England and crossed from there to the continent after a period of training in British camps. The amount of material and supplies obtained in Europe for the American forces was about twice as much as the aggregate shipments from the United States. On November 20, 1918, there were 1,338,169 American combatant troops in France.

The American service of communications in France was divided geographically into the Base, Intermediate and Advance Sections.

The Base Section included the points of debarkation on the Atlantic coast of France. These were at Brest, at the ports on the estuary of the Loire, at La Rochelle, La Pallice, and Rochefort, and on the Gironde. The estuary of the Loire, with St. Nazaire as the chief port, was known as Base I; the lower Gironde, with activity centering at Bassens, as Base II. These two received together 62.3% of all the material and supplies arriving for the American Army in France. The facilities at St. Nazaire were improved, and the shipbuilding yards and construction shops at Penhouet nearby, with cranes of a capacity of 150 and 180 tons, were used for unloading great weights, mounting the rolling stock brought from the United States, and repairing French and Belgian locomotives turned over to the American Army. The 19th Engineers were assigned to this service. In 1915 the French had begun the construction of docks at Bassens five miles below Bordeaux on the right bank of the Gironde. These were now turned over to the Americans, who greatly expanded the equipment and erected additional warehouses and a great refrigerating plant for meat. At the time of the armistice, in all, berths for ninety-eight ships were being used by the Americans in France, of which eighty-five had been constructed previously by the French and twelve were entirely of American construction.

Large storage depots were erected near Montoir, four miles northeast of St. Nazaire, and at St. Sulpice near Bassens, on the line of the Paris-Bordeaux railway. The warehouses near Montoir had a capacity of 14,000,000 cubic feet.

Mr. M. W. Atterbury, former vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, was made Director General of Transportation for the American Army in France with the rank of

major-general. From the various ports used by the Americans on the Atlantic coast, railway lines converged on the main line running through Nantes, Tours, Bourges, Nevers, Chagny, Dijon, and Is-sur-Tille, 446 miles in length, from which branches reached various points in the Advance Section. This was operated by the Americans as their own system. They laid in all 957 miles of standard gauge track in France, mostly in terminals, yards, and multiple tracks of the French lines. The longest section of original main-line construction laid by them was one of only 5.41 miles.

Enormous storage depots were located in the Intermediate Section, conveniently for the distribution and forwarding of material and supplies and at a safe distance from enemy air raids. These were grouped within the triangle Tours-Châteauroux-Bourges.

The greatest installation of the kind erected by any army at any time in the Great War was the general intermediate storage depot at Gièvres for engineers, medical, quartermaster, ordnance, and gas supplies. The plans (not entirely carried out at the time of the armistice) provided for 4,492,000 square feet of floor space for storage and called for 243 miles of railway trackage. The Intermediate and Advance Sections contained many remount depots, automobile parks and repair shops, refrigerating plants, bakeries, storage plants, and ordnance depots of remarkable extent and thoroughness of equipment.

The General Headquarters of the American Army in France was established at Chaumont, Department of Haute-Marne, in September, 1917. The first Chief of Staff, Colonel (subsequently Major-general) James G. Harbord, was succeeded by Major-general James W. McAndrew on May 5, 1918. The General Staff was organized in five sections, each under a brigadier-general, with ordinary designations and functions as follows:

Major-general James William McAndrew, Chief of Staff, A. E. F., May 5, 1918, to May 26, 1919.

Major-general James Guthrie Harbord, Chief of Staff, A. E. F., May 14, 1917, to May 5, 1918.

Major-general William Luther Sibert, commander of the First Division, A. E. F., when it first went into action.

Major-general Omar Bundy, commander of the Second Division, A. E. F., October, 1917, to July, 1918.

Major-general Clarence Ransom Edwards, commander of the Twenty-sixth Division, A. E. F.

Major-general Robert Lee Bullard, commander of the First Division, A. E. F., December 14, 1917, to July 14, 1918.

G—1: Organization and equipment of troops, reinforcements, questions of tonnage, etc.

G—2: Positive and negative intelligence.

G—3: Military plans, operations, and liaisons.

G—4: Transport, supply, and evacuations.

G—5: Principles, methods, and schools of instruction, manuals and regulations.

The first Adjutant-general was General Benjamin Alvord. He was succeeded by General Robert C. Davis. The Adjutant-general's office had charge of records, the framing of orders, affairs of the personnel, printing, and recruiting.

A large number of army schools, including the Army General Staff College, were established at Langres. There were also instruction centers for the army corps and schools and training centers for the divisions.

The First American Division was formed of the 16th, 18th, 26th, and 28th regiments of Regulars under Major-general Sibert for early service in France. The ships making up the convoy, carrying 15,000 men and 16,000 tons of material, sailed at different times between June 12th and 17th, 1917, and arrived at St. Nazaire on the 26th. On July 15th the division went into camp for training near Gondrecourt, with the 47th French Division encamped nearby as guide and model. In September the First Division was transferred to the Sommerviller sector on the Lorraine front east of Nancy, where the American infantry battalions were interspersed with the French. Here the first American losses were suffered. A simple cross near Bathelémet commemorates them with the following inscription:

*"Ici reposent les premiers soldats des États-Unis tombés sur le sol de la France pour la cause de la Justice et de la Liberté."*

[Here rest the first soldiers of the United States to fall on the soil of France for the cause of Justice and Liberty.]

After a second period of training at Gondrecourt, the First Division, then commanded by Major-general Robert L. Bullard, was again transferred to the front, this time to the zone of the Thirty-second French Army Corps, and took over a sector north of Toul, facing the Woëvre, extending from Carré Wood east of Seicheprey to a pond near Bouconville, with headquarters at Ménil-la-Tour. There, on March 1, 1918, a party of 240 German shock troops were repulsed in an attack on an American company holding Carré Wood. Later the First Division was transferred to the region of active operations in Picardy.

The Second Division, also composed of Regulars, under Major-general Omar Bundy, completed its training about the middle of January, 1918, and went into line with the Tenth French Corps near Les Éparges. The Twenty-sixth Division, National Guardsmen from the New England states, under Major-general Clarence R. Edwards, after training at Neufchâteau, entered the organization of the Eleventh French Corps north of the Aisne, bordering the Chemin-des-Dames, on February 9, 1918, and later took the place of the First American Division north of Toul. The Forty-second American Division was placed with the Seventh French Corps between Baccarat and Parroy in the Vosges.

General Pershing's aim from the first was to create in France a complete autonomous American army, imbued with ardor for the offensive. But as soon as the adoption of the united Allied command was announced at American Headquarters in the critical period of the great German offensive in March, General Pershing hastened to General Foch's headquarters at Clermont-sur-Oise and placed the American forces at the unqualified disposal of the new commander-in-chief, only suggesting that in cases of associating American troops with those of the Allies, the integrity of the American units below the brigade or regiment should be preserved.

# CHAPTER VIII

## The United States Navy Lends a Hand

The naval situation after the Battle of Jutland. German naval policy. Frightfulness campaign. Coast raiders. Sinking of hospital ships. The American navy enters the war. Admiral Sims in London. Work of the Navy Department. Ships and leaders. Operations of the United States forces against the submarine. The convoy. American warships overseas. The United States aviation force. The North Sea mine barrage.

The illusion that the British navy could be defeated by an offensive in force was dispelled by the Battle of Jutland. The German vauntings over the "Victory of the Skagerrack" were mainly tunes whistled in the dark to cheer the soul, for, in the final summing up, in spite of tremendous sacrifices on both sides, the naval situation was unchanged by the events of May 31-June 1, 1916. It is true that the British losses were more spectacular, but they were relatively no more serious than those of Germany, for in the end the Grand Fleet remained master of the North Sea and the German navy a prisoner in the Bight of Heligoland.

The Battle of Jutland was the turning point of the World War, for Germany as the result of it made the great decision that brought defeat. It will be recalled that Admiral von Tirpitz and the others who advocated the unrestricted use of the submarine suffered a temporary eclipse. Against them were arrayed the political leaders, such as the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and to a less degree, the Emperor and his group. The effect of unlimited submarine

warfare on neutral powers, especially the United States, was very clear to the German government. Germany had been warned in no uncertain tones by the American Ambassador and by the reports of her own agents in America. Yet the advocates of a more cautious policy found themselves helpless before the public outcry for the policy of von Tirpitz. The propaganda of the Navy League had at last borne fruit and again the political leaders of Germany were forced to submit to the military doctrine of necessity.

Perhaps the most significant portions of the revelations of von Tirpitz and Ludendorff are those narrating their efforts to persuade the Kaiser to adopt the policy of frightfulness. According to von Tirpitz he was the chief obstacle. The Kaiser, he said, "had a love for peace that was almost notorious." He even proposed to thrust him aside, along with the German Chancellor, for he tells us that "I see only one way out. The Emperor must report himself ill for the next eight weeks or longer. Hindenburg must replace Bethmann and have control of everything—army and navy."

It is clear that the Kaiser did not long stand against public opinion and the constant pressure of the extremists, for von Tirpitz's diary, as early as April 3, 1915, tells us that "The Emperor has really given way and allows an absolutely free hand to the U-boats."

The advocates of frightfulness did not maintain their advantage. The first striking result of their campaign, the sinking of the *Lusitania* (May 7, 1915), brought such a storm of condemnation from the whole world, and such representations from the United States that the policy was abandoned for the time and von Tirpitz retired in disgust (March 16, 1916). It was then that Admirals von Capelle and Scheer were permitted to try out a fleet offensive with the resulting battle off Jutland Bank.

Josephus Daniels,
Secretary, United States Navy.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
Assistant-secretary, United States Navy.

There is reason to believe, however, that the penitence of Germany was mainly assumed and that all the while every shipyard was building submarines. Hence the navy was ready when the decision was made to resume the campaign of unlimited sinking of merchant vessels. The German leaders discounted everything that should have caused them to hesitate. That the United States would be drawn into the conflict they had no doubt, but they acted upon the assumption, based with German thoroughness upon exact estimates, that they could make such inroads upon the British lines of communication that within a few months the war would be over before America could become a determining factor.

They were correct. Had von Tirpitz's policy been adhered to consistently the story of the Great War would have had a far more tragic ending for the Allied cause. Von Tirpitz, however, was not allowed a free hand. He was subject to the control of the Great General Staff, the members of which were soldiers who estimated the situation mainly from the military and not the naval point of view. Furthermore the influence of political leaders intervened to prevent a thorough-going application of his policy. These were disturbed by the fear of neutral opinion and the danger of adding new enemies to the forces arrayed against them.

The military leaders furthermore felt confident that it would not be necessary to resort to such extreme measures. The successes in Russia and Serbia, and the failure of the British at the Dardanelles, led them to believe that the defenses on the Western front would soon be broken down. Verdun, the Somme, and Jutland constituted the reply of the Allies to this, and the Germans saw that Paris and victory were no nearer than before. In disappointment and anger they turned again to von Tirpitz and his policy. A

program of 10 new submarines per month was adopted and plans were made for entering upon the campaign at the most auspicious moment. But it was too late. The pause of eight months in submarine construction probably proved fatal. If Germany had possessed 200 submarines, instead of 150, in February, 1917, the crisis in Allied shipping, which was precipitated in January and February, 1918, might have occurred fully six months earlier, and the intervention of the United States, indeed, would have been unavailing.

Even so, the situation confronting the Allies in the spring of 1917 was most critical; how critical the world did not know until Admiral Sims, Admiral Jellicoe and other naval leaders of the Allies revealed it. These alone knew, during the spring and summer of 1917, how dark was the prospect and how precarious was Britain's control of the sea. They alone knew that failure to curb the submarine would result in a German victory or an unsatisfactory peace.

Admiral Sims's description of the situation at the British Admiralty at the moment of America's entry into the war reveals how desperate were affairs at that time. In his first interview with Admiral Jellicoe, he was presented with a record of tonnage losses that was amazing. The British Admiral in presenting these figures tacitly confessed that the announcements of sinkings were understatements and tended to deceive the public. Furthermore he informed Admiral Sims that if losses continued at the same rate the Germans would win the war. To Admiral Sims's question: "Is there no solution to the problem?" Admiral Jellicoe replied, "Absolutely none that we can see now."

It was clear, therefore, that warfare had undergone an inconceivable change. All of the transcendent heroism, individual and mass, could not obscure the fact that the contest had assumed a phase in which the German will to victory was not to be restricted by any humane considerations

whatever. Germany, indeed, resorted to military methods that had been abandoned long ago because they did not pay; she thought they would in the present instance, if applied with sufficient thoroughness and singleness of purpose. At any rate, she could apologize later if she won.

How nearly she came to winning, the world now knows, yet her surmise was just enough wrong to bring defeat. The German leaders assumed that an American army of sufficient strength could not be organized and trained in time to prevent the breakdown of the Entente, provided the U-boats continued their depredations on the same scale. It has been figured out that the transport allowance for an army, fully equipped, is 5 tons per man. Hence an army of 1,000,000 men would require a shipping tonnage of 5,000,000. As the Allies had only 2,000,000 tons available in 1917, the reason only 300,000 American soldiers went overseas during the first year of the war is clear. It is a fact not generally known that Great Britain devoted her entire colonial communications to the transportation of American soldiers during 1918. For ten months she was entirely cut off from the Imperial possessions. German estimates, however, were based upon the sinking of merchant vessels being maintained at the rate of 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons per month. In this they erred, for they had omitted the United States from their calculations. It was not foreseen that America was already in a position to supply immediately the instrument most needed to supplement British naval efforts—destroyers.

The experience of three years of war had taught the British that the most effective offensive weapon against the submarine was the destroyer. All other modes of operation were merely defensive and palliatives at the best. The destroyer, however,—the race-horse of the sea,—on account of its light draft and speed was relatively immune

from torpedo attack, and, as it carried a more powerful armament than the submarine, could either destroy it or drive it under water where it was harmless. Later, when the convoy system was adopted, the submarine could no longer lie in wait for its quarry. It was forced to hunt for it and attack under most adverse conditions. One of the chief advantages of the convoy system, as pointed out by Admiral Sims, was the fact that it forced the submarine to confront its arch-enemy, the destroyer, before it could reach its quarry, the merchant ship or transport.

That the British navy possessed an inadequate number of destroyers was manifest from the outset of the war. She had approximately 300 destroyers, of which 260 were required in North Sea operations. This left only 40 available for commerce protection, and as half of these were in the Mediterranean, there were, accordingly, only 20 British vessels of this type available in the critical area. It was this, as Admiral Sims tells us, that prevented earlier adoption of the convoy system.

The months that followed the Battle of Jutland, therefore, were marked by no spectacular operations, but day after day came in the reports of merchant vessels sunk, raids on the British coast, with bombardments of undefended ports, sinkings of hospital and Red Cross ships. The Allies did not at first perceive clearly the outlines of the German strategy. They thought that these examples of frightfulness were merely expressions of the German temper; of the wilful desire to destroy. Gradually, however, it dawned upon the British that these acts were the outgrowth of a definite and well-conceived policy. They were not only systematic but purposeful. Their purpose was to distribute and disorganize the British naval forces to such a degree that the submarines could carry on their campaign with the least opposition. Admiral von Tirpitz




Chart comparing World's merchant tonnage constructed to World's losses by quarters of the years from the beginning of the war to the signing of the armistice.

knew the weakness of the British in destroyers, and he also knew that in general the people of the Allied nations were unaware of this weakness and what it signified. Nor were they fully informed concerning the far-reaching results of the submarine attacks on the ocean lines of communication. Furthermore, as has been noted, it was the policy of the German General Staff to obscure its true aims by diversions of no great military but of vast political importance.

This was the primary object of the attacks upon undefended ports of the Eastern coast of England, "tip and run" raids, as the British termed them. Attention has already been called to the raids on Lowestoft, Yarmouth, etc. These were followed on the night of October 27, 1916, by an attack on the Channel lines of communication by a force of flotilla vessels under Commodore Michelsen, which was intercepted by two British destroyers, the *Nubian* and the *Flirt*. The *Flirt* was sunk, and the stern of the *Nubian* blown away, six drifters, or patrol vessels, in addition, being destroyed. It is an interesting fact that the bow of the *Nubian* was salved and was later united to the stern of the *Zulu* whose bow had similarly been blown away by a mine. The reconstructed destroyer later performed valiant service under the composite name of the *Zubian*.

In the course of this operation the German vessels reached Folkestone on the English coast, sinking an empty transport, *The Queen*, at anchor in the harbor. This raid created much excitement in England and brought forth a public statement from Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty. He pointed out that slight damage of military importance had been done, but promised that the enemy would not escape so cheaply the next time.

Yet it was but a few weeks later (November 23) that the coast of Kent was raided and Ramsgate shelled, and on November 26th, the Norfolk coast was bombarded and the

trawler *Narval* was sunk. The promise that the Germans should not continue these operations with impunity was finally redeemed, however, by an engagement between British and German light craft at Schouwen Bank, off the coast of Holland (January 22, 1917). The German forces, apparently, were starting out on a raiding operation when they were met by British destroyers. The German vessels were severely mauled and driven back, their flagship, the *V-69*, in a sinking condition, with her commander, Captain Schultz, dead on board, finding refuge in the Dutch harbor of Ymuiden.

This check, however, failed to stop the raids, for three days later (January 25, 1917,) the Southwold coast was bombarded, with no damage done, followed on February 12, by the shelling of Bayonne, France, which resulted in the wounding of five persons. Again, on March 18th, Ramsgate was shelled and, on March 28th, Lowestoft again visited, the armed trawler *Mascot* being sunk. Dunkirk, on the coast of France, was also shelled at 2 A.M., March 27th.

These activities, however, received a sudden and humiliating check April 20, 1917, when a force of six German destroyers was met and defeated by two British destroyers, the *Broke*, commanded by Commander E. R. G. R. Evans and the *Swift*, commanded by Commander A. M. Peck. Two, and possibly more, of the enemy vessels were sunk and the remainder driven back. This engagement stands among the heroic episodes of the war, Commander Evans thereby adding to his laurels gained as a member of the Scott expedition to the South Pole and by earlier success in the war.

With this affair the Channel raids virtually ceased, either because their futility had at last dawned upon the Germans or because they had become too hazardous. From the beginning these "tip and run" raids had yielded but the

slightest military advantage, hence the persistence with which the policy was adhered to can only be explained by the hypothesis that the German aim was essentially political, with the idea of *strafing* the *Engländer* as a by-product. Although as a political maneuver this policy was open to the grave objection of intensifying British feeling and thereby aiding recruiting campaigns, nevertheless, on several occasions it seemed that its effect upon public opinion would result in modifications, perhaps for the worse, of the general naval policy and strategy of the war. We have seen that a number of times the British government was importuned by representatives of the towns and counties of the eastern coast for better protection. The result of course would have been a dispersion of units of the Grand Fleet, which still would be unable to guard every point, for in these affairs the Germans had the initiative and could strike where they pleased.

The true situation was strongly presented to the deputation from Ramsgate, Margate, and Broadstairs which conferred with Sir Edward Carson, First Lord of the Admiralty (April 5, 1917,) after the Lowestoft bombardment on the night of March 28, 1917. In his reply Sir Edward Carson promised them, thanks to the entry of America into the war, more protection. The British navy, he said, could not achieve the impossible, and if the warships endeavored to defend all the unfortified ports of England, that task alone would keep them sufficiently occupied. Furthermore such a policy would play directly into the hands of the enemy for it would leave the submarines free to carry on their depredations, which was probably the end in view.

A still more unscrupulous endeavor to dissipate the energies of the naval forces of the Allies was the torpedoing of hospital and relief ships. That this, again, was not due to the chances of war but to a coldly-conceived policy was

virtually admitted by the German Admiralty. The sinkings were justified by the Germans on the pretext that the British were transporting troops and material on vessels marked by the Geneva Cross. In all, fourteen hospital ships were torpedoed and three destroyed by mines. Several of these were sunk in the Mediterranean, notably the *Britannic* (November, 1916. Fifty lives lost); *Braemar Castle* (November 24, 1916); *Dover Castle* (May 26, 1917); *Rewa* (January 4, 1918). The majority of the others were sunk in British waters, among the number being the *Gloucester Castle* (March 30, 1917); *Lanfranc* (April 17, 1917, fifteen wounded Germans drowned); *Guildford Castle* (June, 1918); and the *Llandovery Castle* (June 27, 1918. One hundred and thirty-four lives lost).

In reprisal for these outrages the British Air forces instituted aërial raids on the Rhine cities of Germany; Freiburg being bombarded on April 14, 1917. During August, 1917, an agreement was made between the British, the French, and the German governments under the terms of which each hospital ship was to carry a Spanish naval officer, appointed by the King of Spain, who was to vouch for the proper use of the vessel. However, in spite of Germany's promise to allow hospital ships to proceed freely under this compact, six were destroyed after the arrangement was made.

The great cruising radius of the later types of the U-boats, rendered possible another form of operations which aimed to effect a dispersal of the naval forces united against Germany. This consisted of attacks on points far distant from the areas of main operations, such as the bombardment of Funchal, Madeira Islands (December 3, 1916), during which the French gunboat *Surprise* was sunk; Ponta Delgada, Azores (July 4, 1917,) and Monrovia, Liberia, April and June, 1918. The attack on Ponta Delgada,

however, resulted in a rather unpleasant surprise for the raider, for, as chance would have it, an American supply vessel was anchored in the harbor at the time and opened fire upon the German vessel with such effect that it hastily retired.

The last example of submarine operations mainly political in aim occurred after the United States had entered the war. These were the raids on shipping off the American coast. From the date of America's entry into the war there were occasional rumors of the sighting of U-boats off American coasts, all of which proved baseless. More authoritative, however, was a message that came from London on October 16, 1917, to the effect that the German Admiralty had determined to declare the waters of Canada, the United States, and Cuba a war zone, and that submarines would soon be active in those areas. Considerable importance was attached to this report by the naval authorities at Washington, but it turned out to be, as some anticipated, merely a bit of German bluff. In fact it was not until May, 1918, that the U-boats appeared in American waters, and these, apparently, were individual units and not acting according to any thorough-going plan. According to best information only five enemy submarines made raids off the eastern coast of the United States. Considerable damage was done, 24 vessels of more than 500 tons being sunk. However, commerce destroying, in this offensive, was secondary, the primary object being the creation of panics among the coast cities to the end that a large proportion of United States naval forces would be kept in home waters. In this, to a degree, they were successful for it has been said that a greater percentage of these forces was held for coast defense than the conditions warranted. Much to the surprise of nervous American citizens, who were constantly tormented by visions of U-boats

rising from the waters and shooting up the town, the German navy restricted itself to a few mild raids. The enemy, however, was wiser than our citizens, for any other policy than the one pursued would have been suicidal. The practical results would have been vastly incommensurate with the risks involved.

As we have seen, every political and military act of Germany which directly or indirectly involved the United States seemed designed to force America into the war. It is possible, for it is characteristic of Teutonic psychology, that the results of their acts were negligible to the Germans. At any rate, the situation had become so intolerable by the end of the year 1916 that neutrality was no longer consistent with national dignity and honor. Germany's promises regarding the *Lusitania* and the *Sussex* proved merely additional scraps of paper, and it was clear to all familiar with the situation that the intervention of America was a rapidly approaching event.

It was in anticipation of this that Rear-admiral William S. Sims, then President of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, was ordered to proceed to London to confer with the British naval authorities. Accordingly, after an interview with Secretary Daniels, he sailed on the liner *New York*, in company with his aide, Commander J. V. Babcock. Both wore civilian clothes and were entered on the passenger lists under assumed names. War had already been declared when they reached British waters, a fact that was unpleasantly emphasized by an enemy mine which damaged their ship just before making port at Liverpool. Admiral Sims was therefore free to assume openly his position as the representative of the American navy in Europe.

No better selection could have been made. Not only had Admiral Sims consecrated all the energy and enthusiasm of a singularly virile and clear-visioned personality to the

developing of the American navy, but he also had the confidence and admiration of Admiral Jellicoe and the officers of the British navy. Better than any other American officer he was equipped by friendships and long experience to understand the viewpoint and methods of the great organization with which America had become aligned. Furthermore, Admiral Sims had shown himself throughout his whole career a man of absolute fearlessness, who stood for the right word and the right deed though the skies should fall. It was this quality that gained for him the friendship of another essentially courageous American, Theodore Roosevelt, through whose support as President he was permitted to introduce certain reforms that doubled the efficiency of the navy in gunnery. In this he played a rôle in the United States navy corresponding to that played in the British by Sir Percy Scott, his warm friend and adviser. When it is recalled that Lord Fisher, Sir Percy Scott, and Admiral Jellicoe were the creators of the modern dreadnought fleet, it can readily be understood that the appointment of Admiral Sims solved in advance what might have developed into a most serious problem—the harmonious coöperation of the naval forces of Great Britain and America.

In order to make this coöperation absolute and not formal Admiral Sims adhered throughout to a definite policy, which was to consider the American navy a reinforcement to the Allied navies, lending it for use in any and all ways that might be of the greatest service. It was clear to him that an independent American fleet would play an inadequate part, however much it might satisfy national pride. It would not, in short, reinforce the Allied fleets in the manner most productive of immediate results. This, in time, became clear to all, hence the recommendations of Admiral Sims were adopted. A similar policy was eventually pursued by the United States army. In both cases a

certain amount of prestige of doubtful value was sacrificed to the greatest good of the cause. The outcome demonstrated the wisdom of these important decisions. Both army and navy took their places without friction in the vast and intricate system arrayed against German might, and in due time the added weight of America's contribution proved decisive for victory.

We know from Admiral Sims's own words, emphasized by those of Admirals Jellicoe and Weymss, that Britain's greatest need was for light craft, destroyers in particular. Admiral Jellicoe insisted that this need be presented to President Wilson and Secretary Daniels in no uncertain light. As the result of this appeal the destroyer forces were recalled from their winter base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on April 3, 1917, and on April 24th, the first division was on its way to Queenstown, arriving May 4, 1917. The arrival of the destroyer forces in European waters was not officially announced until May 16, 1918, when a report to that effect was issued by the British Admiralty. The world then knew that for the first time since Colonial days the men of England and America were fighting side by side in a great war, and for a common cause. What the spirit of these adventurers from the West was, is best indicated by the reply of Captain Taussig, the commander of the destroyer division, to the British Admiral, Sir Lewis Bayley, who inquired upon their arrival when the American vessels would be ready for service, in the words, "We are ready now, sir."

The Secretary of the Navy in summing up the situation in his report for 1917 stated, that the naval problems arising from our entry into the war were the following:

1. Preparation for impending and actual war, calling for the largest program of construction, the best plans to supply the larger fleets and the study of the new agencies to be employed in a war without precedent.


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VESSELS SUNK BY MINES
TONNAGE SUNK DURING MONTH APRIL 1917 875,023 TONS

Chart locating the sinkings of Allied shipping during the month of April, 1917.


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O VESSELS SUNK BY MINES
TONNAGE SUNK DURING MONTH APRIL 1918 · 687 767 TONS

Chart locating the sinkings of Allied shipping during the month of April, 1918.

*A comparison of the two charts shows how effective was the convoy system in restricting the losses by submarines.*

2. The coördinating of our efforts with those of the countries with which we are aligned in the war.

3. The carrying on of offensive operations against the naval forces of our opponents.

4. Providing safe passage for ships charged with the duty of transporting a large army across the ocean and conducting military operations 3,000 miles overseas.

5. Maintaining available naval forces in a state of readiness for battle.

6. Providing additional fighting units necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

7. Training personnel to man the new units of the navy and to assist in manning the merchant marine.

The tremendous outlay of effort and expense in the carrying out of this program did not discourage the United States navy. This organization, so silent and unnoticed in time of peace, suddenly revealed itself ready to respond to the most searching tests of war. It is true that in its normal status it was insufficient to meet the demands of a contest so far-reaching. However, the peace time navy proved itself an instrument of extraordinary flexibility and powers of expansion, and served admirably as a nucleus around which grew the vast establishment demanded by the exigencies of war. When we consider that the United States, in spite of enormous coast lines, has in no sense been a maritime nation, this sudden transformation, alone, was impressive.

When war was declared the United States navy had a personnel of 3,810 officers and 65,777 men. On April 1, 1918, it had expanded to 18,585 officers and 283,717 men, and at the date of the armistice comprehended 32,474 officers and 497,030 men, of which 21,985 officers and 290,-346 men were members of the Naval Reserve. These figures justify the statement of Secretary Daniels in 1918 that the establishment of the Reserve Force (August 29,

1915) "was one of the wisest provisions ever made for the navy."

The expansion in ships and material was no less remarkable. At the outbreak of hostilities the navy consisted of only 197 vessels of all types; at the date of the armistice the number was 2,003. To obtain these ships was one of the most serious problems that confronted the Department, and one that would have been almost insoluble had it not been for the generous aid and patriotic spirit of many private owners of vessels. Owners of splendid private yachts turned these over to the Government, sometimes without reward, fully conscious that they were subject to possible destruction and certain damage. Some of these vessels were so well-constructed and speedy that it needed only armament and certain alterations to transform them into efficient anti-submarine craft. Twenty-nine of these yachts were operating with distinguished success during the last year of the war, among which were the following: *Alcedo* (G. W. C. Drexel, owner); *Aphrodite* (O. H. Payne); *Corona* (Cleveland H. Dodge); *Corsair* (J. P. Morgan); *Lydonia* (C. H. K. Curtis); *Noma* (Vincent Astor); *Sultana* (Mrs. E. H. Harriman); *Utowanah* (A. V. Armour); *Wanderer* (H. A. C. Taylor).

Passenger and merchant ships, tugs, in fact all vessels that might be useful in any way, were taken over, refitted and immediately set to work. These were supplemented by interned German ships, seized by the United States, some of which were of enormous power and carrying capacity, such as the *Vaterland*, now the *Leviathan*.

The experience of the other nations during the three years of belligerency made it possible for the United States to avoid some of the initial mistakes committed by the Allies. The tremendous scope of the conflict and the power of the enemy were known, hence American preparations were

made on the most comprehensive scale. In fact, as President Wilson had promised, all the powers and resources of the nation were gathered together and united to one end, that of foiling the attempt of Prussia to dominate the world. Accordingly the entire social and economic fabric of the country was readjusted to meet war conditions, its resources were mobilized, and bodies of representative men from all spheres of activity were called upon to lend their expert aid and service.

A number of advisory boards were organized, among which were the Naval Consulting Board, the War Industries Board, the Council of National Defense, National Research Council, Aircraft Production Board. Aiding the Secretary in directing naval preparations and operations was the Advisory Council within the Department itself, consisting of the Secretary; the Assistant-secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt; Admiral W. S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations; Rear-admiral Leigh C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; Rear-admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance; Rear-admiral Robert S. Griffin, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering; Rear-admiral David W. Taylor, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair; Rear-admiral Samuel McGowan, Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Rear-admiral W. C. Braisted, Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; Rear-admiral C. W. Parks, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Rear-admiral G. R. Clark, Judge Advocate General; Major-general George Barnett, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

During the course of naval operations overseas the different areas of operations were visited by various officials and members of Congress. Among these were the Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Josephus Daniels, the Assistant-secretary, Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Admiral Henry T. Mayo,

Admiral W. S. Benson, and a special sub-committee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, consisting of Hon. W. B. Oliver (Chairman), W. W. Venable, Adam B. Littlepage, James C. Wilson, Frederick A. Britten, John A. Peters, and Frederick C. Hicks.

The Assistant-secretary spent six weeks abroad in inspecting the various naval units and in studying the activities of the American forces abroad. He returned with valuable data upon which he based recommendations for the more complete working together of the officers overseas and the officials charged with responsibilities at Washington.

Admiral Mayo was also abroad to study the situation and to confer with the officers overseas. He was present in Great Britain with Admiral Benson at the close of hostilities, the presence of these distinguished officers being most helpful at that critical moment. Admiral Mayo's greatest responsibility, however, was the Atlantic Fleet, which was developed to a point of exceptional fitness under his command—ready for any emergency that the chances of war might bring.

The Office of Naval Operations, a new one in the United States naval organization, was in fact a form of naval general staff. As such, under the wise direction of its first chief, Admiral Benson, it fulfilled this function admirably, proving "a great factor in the utilization of all the resources of the navy to the best advantage for the supreme purpose of winning the war." It also formulated plans for the consideration of the department to meet any exigencies which might arise, and such plans in operation have demonstrated their wisdom in the actual test of war. Admiral Benson, during the period following the signing of the armistice, served as American naval adviser during the preliminary discussions leading to final peace. (*Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1918*).

The little group of American destroyers that arrived at Queenstown on May 4th consisted of the *Wadsworth* (Commander J. K. Taussig), *Conyngham* (Commander A. W. Johnson), *Porter* (Lieutenant-commander W. K. Wortman), *McDougal* (Lieutenant-commander A. P. Fairfield), *Davis* (Lieutenant-commander R. F. Zogbaum, Jr.), and the *Wainwright* (Lieutenant-commander F. H. Poteet). These were under the command of Commander J. K. Taussig, who, like Admiral Sims, was well acquainted with British naval methods, and furthermore had fought side by side with Admiral (then Captain) Jellicoe in the Boxer uprising, both being wounded and in the hospital together. This force was increased to thirty-five destroyers by July, 1917, and in November, fifty-two were operating in European waters, in addition to which there were twenty-seven converted yachts.

It is reasonable to assume that the officers and men of the American navy hoped for an opportunity to show their metal in a decisive action, but this anticipation was never realized. It was clear that Germany had abandoned all hope of attaining any definite advantage from the use of her High Seas Fleet, and had finally staked the whole game on the submarine. It was undoubtedly a humiliating situation for von Tirpitz and the others who had toiled for so many years to build up a navy capable of defeating Britain's sea power, yet it was one that he more than any other had contributed to bring about. The decision in favor of the submarine, the weapon of a nation on the defensive, proved that the German navy, subordinated to political and not military ends, had abandoned all hope of victory by fair fighting. Naval operations, therefore, from America's entry into the war until the end, were, with a few exceptions, such as the Zeebrugge affair, merely a gruelling contest with the submarine. It was an arduous task, full of discomfort and decidedly

lacking in glory. Furthermore, it was one for which there had been but slight preparation and training, and the scene of operations was in strange and unfamiliar seas.

The casual individual might think that the operations of the United States navy against the U-boats brought results vastly disproportionate to the expenditure of effort and money, for during the whole period of their activities only 13 submarines are known to have been damaged or sunk by American vessels: 6 by the North Sea mine barrage, 2 by patrol boats, 3 by destroyers, 1 by yachts, and 1 by submarines. Yet such conclusions would be based upon wholly false premises. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the objective of the campaign was not the sinking of the underwater vessel. This was merely an incident or by-product of the operations. The real mission of the anti-submarine forces was protection of the lines of communication, hence if the supply of troops, munitions and food was not materially disturbed, the point was gained whether the U-boats were sunk or not. If they could not attack, they were as harmless as if they were destroyed. In fact, during the whole war, in spite of the concentrated efforts of the Allied naval forces, less than three-fifths (203) of Germany's available submarines were sunk or captured. She still had 168 underwater craft of various types capable of service at the close of hostilities.

It is therefore evident that the anti-submarine operations were ultimately successful because they prevented the U-boat from sinking transports and merchant vessels, thereby breaking down the morale of the German nation through the failure of its last desperate effort to obtain a decision at sea.

It is conceivable that U-boats were sunk of which we have no record, for the submarine both in life and death is a secret thing. Often the only evidence of its destruction was a "slick," or patch of oil on the surface of the sea. This, too,

was sometimes deceptive, for the wily Teuton would occasionally release oil and wreckage to mislead his foe. In two cases, however, there can be no doubt of the destruction of enemy submarines by United States forces. One of these was the sinking of the *U-58* by the U. S. Destroyer *Fanning*. For reasons best known to the Allied naval leaders and quite in opposition to the policy pursued by them regarding the destruction of submarines, wide publicity was given to the sinking of the *U-58* by the *Fanning* (Lieutenant A. S. Carpender, commander), November 17, 1917. The *Fanning* and the *Nicholson* (Commander Frank D. Berrien) were escorting a convoy off the Irish coast, when the periscope of an enemy submarine was sighted. Depth-charges were dropped immediately, damaging the submarine to such a degree that it came to the surface, the officers and crew surrendering. The sea-valves, however, had been opened, hence the submarine sank before boats could be lowered from the destroyers, three Germans being drowned. The *Fanning* therefore was denied the glory of bringing her prize into port.

The other instance of the certain destruction of a German submarine occurred in the Mediterranean on May 8, 1918. In this case the converted yacht *Lydonia* (Lieutenant-commander R. P. McCullough, commanding), assisted by H. M. S. *Basilisk,* sank the *UB-70*. This, however, was not the first submarine killing credited by the British Admiralty to the yachts, for only a few weeks later (May 21, 1918,) the *Cristabel* (Lieutenant-commander M. B. McComb, commanding), one of the vessels stationed at Brest, France, damaged the *UC-56* so seriously that it was forced to intern at Santander, Spain.

It is a military axiom that there is a defense for every type of weapon, however novel or destructive. For a time the submarine seemed to be an exception to this rule. In

spite of the most heroic efforts the U-boat campaign steadily developed until the end became almost a matter of mathematical calculation. The law, however, again held good, for the methods of the Allies not only checked the U-boat but eventually neutralized it. Nor was this due to any specific, guaranteed to cure—the wild dream of so many inventors during the war—but to the combined effect of many modes of attack and defense, all of them united in the same end. These may be roughly classified into four groups: (*a*) arms and instruments for detecting and destroying the submarine; (*b*) limitation of its area of operations by mine-fields; (*c*) destruction of its bases; (*d*) the convoy system. No one of these methods would have proved adequate, but joined together they were decisive.

One of the agents found useful against the submarine was the airplane, an instrument of warfare more recent even than the underseas boat. It is reported that German submarine commanders feared airplanes, as their boats, save when deeply submerged, were clearly visible to observers a few thousand feet in the air. The airplane's special service was, therefore, reconnaissance, but not seldom they dropped bombs from aloft, rendering the submarine so uncomfortable that it made a hasty retreat from the surface. Another invention that proved of great value was the hydrophone, or listening device, by means of which the presence of the enemy vessel was detected and its position ascertained. These were usually installed on patrol vessels. It was very difficult for a submarine to shake off its pursuers when they were equipped with the listening apparatus.

The most efficient device, however, was the depth-bomb, or "ash-can" as it was known in the navy. The idea for this had come to British naval officers early in the war. The British type, however, proved dangerous, and a number

of accidents resulted from premature detonation. It therefore remained for American ingenuity to devise a more reliable type. This was developed at the U. S. Torpedo Station, Newport, R. I., under direction of Chester Minkler, who also perfected the mine that made the great North Sea barrage possible.

These bombs were either dropped over the vessel's stern or projected from a form of mortar, and were exploded by a hydrostatic device which could be set for any depth. In this way the explosion could be so timed as to occur in close proximity to the submerged vessel. It is estimated that 35 submarines were destroyed by depth-bombs, about one-sixth of their total number. This is a large percentage, in view of the fact that it was not until the last year of the war that listening devices made it possible to perfect depth-bomb tactics.

A number of submarines were also sunk by mystery ships, the so-called "Q" boats. These in appearance were harmless-looking merchantmen, outwardly easy marks, but concealed behind false bulwarks were powerful guns and other offensive arms, and the vessels were under the command of experienced naval officers. A submarine that attacked a "Q" boat by gunfire rarely survived to attack another.

It was the convoy, however, that contributed most of all to the submarine's undoing. During the early years of the war the method adopted by the British navy for protecting merchant shipping consisted in laying mine-fields and in patrolling certain areas. This proved most inadequate, for it was a physical impossibility, with the forces at hand, to guard all danger points. Furthermore, the submarine had not only the advantage of invisibility but also possessed the initiative. It could lie in wait and strike when it pleased.

It was clear, therefore, that some more efficient method of protecting merchant shipping must be devised. The only one that presented any reasonable prospect of success was the convoy. This was no new thing in naval science; it had, in fact, been in common use by the sea powers of the ancient world, by the maritime city states, like Venice and the Hansa Towns, and particularly by nations at war during modern times when privateering was a recognized mode of warfare. It was then a necessity, but was discarded after the Declaration of Paris (1856) which abolished privateering and declared neutral vessels immune from capture when not carrying contraband. Its revival, therefore, was the direct consequence of Germany's appeal to outlawed modes of naval warfare.

The convoy system, however, was not adopted by unanimous consent. There were many who thought the task of protecting merchant shipping in this way an impossible one. Certain force was given to their arguments by the fate of a convoy on its way from the Shetlands to Norway, several months after the system had been adopted (October 17, 1917). On this occasion, the convoy, which consisted of twelve merchant vessels escorted by two British destroyers, the *Mary Rose* and the *Strongbow*, was intercepted by German cruisers, which sank the destroyers and nine of the merchantmen. Furthermore, the convoy system had the disadvantage of reducing the speed of the group to that of the slowest vessel. But this was overcome to a large degree by the organization of homogeneous groups of ships, all of about the same speed.

An application of the convoy had been in operation in the British navy from the beginning of the war, for all the transports had been escorted by warships. Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, announced on February 15, 1915, that the British navy had transported

one million men in six months without an accident or loss of life, and the statement is made in the British War Cabinet Report for 1917 that during three years thirteen million human beings had been carried with only 3,500 casualties.

The burden of this protection necessarily fell upon the British Empire and it is easy to see that the task of transporting and protecting troops, munitions and supplies for her own armies and those of her allies proved a tremendous strain on the naval resources of the nation. Hence when Germany began her attack on the world's commerce with the avowed intention of sinking every ship on sight the breaking point seemed near at hand. Great Britain was confronted by the dilemma of sacrificing troops and supplies for her armies, or food for her people and for the people of Europe. That she could not satisfy both needs became a certainty during the spring of 1917.

It was the intervention of the United States that solved the problem. Admiral Sims went to London confirmed in his adherence to the principle of the convoy, and it is doubtless due, in a large degree, to his influence and his promise of American coöperation that it was adopted. This radical change of policy, of course, meant reorganization of the forces and sweeping readjustments, but the presence of American reinforcements made the transition easier, hence by September, 1917, the new system was working smoothly. However, before a decision was finally made, two experimental convoys were sailed, one from Gibraltar, of seventeen ships, and the other from the United States of twelve. Both arrived safely, thus proving beyond question the feasibility and usefulness of the plan. One of the most serious difficulties, at first, was the attitude of the ship-owners and the masters of vessels. The former, especially those possessing fast vessels, objected to the delays caused by the system. Every day lost in waiting for a convoy to be

organized was so much income lost. On the other hand, the ship-masters found the restraints of naval discipline irksome and they were untrained in the evolutions required in controlling large groups of vessels. Yet these difficulties were quickly overcome, and in time the convoy had no stronger advocates than the men of the merchant marine.

The United States navy immediately assumed a large share of the burden of convoy operations. Three main bases were established in Europe, the most important being situated at Queenstown, Ireland, under the immediate command of Captain J. R. P. Pringle, Aide on the Staff of Admiral Sims, while the organization and control of convoys was under the direction of Captain Byron A. Long, stationed at Headquarters, London. The other bases were at Brest, under the command of Vice-admiral H. B. Wilson, and at Gibraltar, under Rear-admiral A. P. Niblack. At the time of the armistice the following vessels were stationed at these points: two cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers, twenty-five armed yachts, five gunboats, and five coastguard vessels, or, a total of one hundred and five vessels suitable for escort duty. Owing to the close coöperation of the two navies it is difficult to determine the exact proportion of the work done by American vessels. The following estimates, however, give an idea of their service: the United States navy escorted 350 convoys (2,123 ships) across the Atlantic, or about 30% of the total number of Atlantic convoys; 710 convoys (7,000 ships) were escorted by the vessels based at Queenstown and Brest, in addition to 600 individual ships. At Gibraltar, 200 convoys out of a total of 273 were escorted by United States naval vessels. It is estimated that the relative proportion of escort service of all kinds among the Allied navies is 70% for Great Britain, 27% for the United States and 3% for France. In the matter of transportation

of American troops overseas, 53% (1,060,000) were carried in American ships, 45% (900,000), in British, and 2% (40,000) in French.

There can hardly be any doubt but that the adoption of the convoy solved the most serious problem of the war. While defensive in nature, its results were essentially offensive, as the German submarine commanders soon discovered. It forced them to confront the destroyer, a vastly different thing from attacking an unarmed or poorly-armed merchantman. Furthermore the difficulty of picking up the convoy on the open seas forced the U-boat to operate near land, where it became easier prey to the destroyers and patrol boats. When the Germans saw the effect of the new system, they revised their tactics and became more daring in their operations against the convoys. The Allied navies countered this by use of the protective barrage and the circling attack. In the latter maneuver the destroyer steamed in a circle around the assumed position of the submarine, dropping depth-charges on the presumption that one or more would explode near enough to the enemy boat to injure or drive it away.

During the early years of the war the most conspicuous results in U-boat operations, next to those achieved by the destroyers, were obtained by the Allied submarines and by the small patrol craft. It was therefore requested that the United States supply as many of these vessels as possible. In response to this two divisions of submarines were ordered to European waters, the first sailing on October 13, 1917. It is conceivable that the experiences of these boats in actual warfare were not more memorable than their voyages across the Atlantic. The first group, consisting of the *K-1*, *K-2*, *K-5* and *K-6*, left Provincetown under tow of the tenders *Bushnell* and *Chicago*. They had a particularly stormy passage but reached their base in the Azores safely on the 28th.

Their experience was mild, however, in comparison with that of the division which sailed from Newport on December 4, 1917. This consisted of submarines of the *AL* class, namely *1*, *2*, *3*, *4*, *9*, *10*, *11*, and *E-1* of Division 4. These were towed by the *Bushnell* and the tugs *Genesee*, *Conestoga*, and *Lykens*. At that time the winter, which was the severest experienced in years, had begun in earnest.

Three days after their departure the vessels found themselves in a severe gale which raged for forty-eight hours. It was impossible to keep the flotilla together, hence one tug and one submarine returned to the United States, the others reaching the Azores safely. Their troubles, however, were not ended. Leaving the *E-1* with its division stationed at the Azores, the *Bushnell*, with one tug and six submarines again set out for Queenstown, and again the flotilla was separated by storms, one submarine returning to the Azores, another, the *AL-10*, finally reaching her destination under her own power, a remarkable bit of seamanship, considering the condition of the seas. The *Bushnell* with the remainder of the submarines was driven fairly all over the surface of the Atlantic, finally arriving at its base on February 5, 1918. They had a tale to tell of storms, of ice-covered decks, and passages with merchantmen that mistook them for enemy submarines. The Division was completed (February 21st) by the arrival of the two units which had returned to the Azores and the United States respectively. The Division was based at Berehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland, from which regular service was instituted on March 6, 1918. One of the group, the *AL-2*, had the vicarious honor of being indirectly responsible for the sinking of an enemy submarine. The U-boat, it appears, attempted to torpedo the American vessel. The torpedo either described an erratic course and blew up its own craft, or struck a second submarine which was present.

The United States shipping industries had been supplying the Allied navies with patrol boats prior to the entry of America into the war. These, however, being only 80 feet in length, had proved inadequate for service on the open sea. Accordingly, for the American navy, a new standardized type was designed, 110 feet long, of about 80 tons displacement. Of these some 450 were built, the majority being equipped with listening and other devices for detecting submarines. These were to be supplemented by 112 "Eagle" boats, craft of about 500 tons, ordered from the automobile firm of Henry Ford. The Eagle boats were so designed as to combine some of the qualities of a destroyer and a sub-chaser. They were not, however, tested by war as the armistice was declared before they saw service overseas.

The little vessels of the Patrol Service played a valiant part in the war. They operated mainly from three bases, Plymouth and Queenstown, Ireland, and the Island of Corfu, Greece. They had numerous brushes with submarines, and each group has a submarine sinking credited to it. The special duty of the Corfu group was to guard the straits of Otranto, a very difficult task and one most creditably performed. These vessels also participated in the attack on Durazzo by Italian warships (October 6, 1918), in the course of which they conducted themselves with such courage that the thanks of the Italian Naval Staff were sent to their commanders.

It was not until December, 1917, that American dreadnoughts united their power with the British Grand Fleet. These became the Sixth Battle Squadron of the Grand Fleet under the command of Rear-admiral Hugh Rodman, and consisted of the battleships *New York* (Captain C. F. Hughes, commanding), *Delaware* (Captain A. H. Scales, commanding), *Florida* (Captain T. Washington, commanding),

and *Wyoming* (Captain H. A. Wiley, commanding). As an integral part of the Grand Fleet, this squadron united with it in all its operations, twice leaving its anchorage at Scapa Flow in the expectancy of meeting enemy men-of-war.

The assignment of these warships to European waters was due less to urgent need for such reinforcement of the Allied navies than as an earnest of the intention of the Government of the United States to do everything in its power to aid the cause. The naval preponderance of Great Britain was so great that there could be no mistrust of the result of a contest with the battle-fleet of the enemy. The American dreadnoughts only made assurance doubly sure. Their moral effect, however, outweighed the physical. The Germans themselves unconsciously testified to this when they fled before the British on the Mole at Zeebrugge, shouting "The Americans have come."

On July 30, 1918, the *Delaware* was relieved from overseas duty, its place being taken by the *Arkansas* (Captain L. R. De Steiguer, commanding) with 67 officers and 1,581 men, and on February 11, 1918, the *Texas* (Captain Victor Blue, commanding) was added to the squadron in order to permit the maintenance of four ships in the line of battle in case repairs might be required.

During the summer of 1918, two additional units of the United States Battle Fleet, Division Six, were ordered overseas. These consisted of the *Utah* (Captain W. C. Cole, commanding) and the *Oklahoma* (Captain C. B. McVay, commanding). These ships, under the command of Rear-admiral T. S. Rodgers, were based at Berehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland, being stationed at this point in order to support the forces protecting the convoys and to guard against raids of battle-cruisers planned, according to trustworthy information, by the enemy.




Chart of the North Sea showing the mine fields between the Orkney Islands and Norway. *Out of a total of over 70,000 mines laid by the United States and British navies the former laid 56,571. The great number of mines and the manner in which the various fields overlapped made it almost impossible for a submarine to pass through.*




Chart of the southern portion of the North Sea and English Channel showing the mine fields laid off the German naval bases.

The naval losses of the American navy, in comparison with those of the British, were relatively small, only 13 vessels of any great importance being sunk or destroyed: 1 armored cruiser; 2 destroyers; 1 gunboat; 3 converted yachts; 1 collier; and 4 others.

Barring loss of life, which was small in this case, the most serious disaster was the mining of the cruiser *San Diego*, formerly the *California*, off the Long Island coast on July 18, 1918. The mines were probably laid by a German submarine which had been operating in American waters a week or so before. The *San Diego* was an armored cruiser of 13,680 tons, 504 feet in length, and carried a complement of 1,300. All on board, with the exception of six enlisted men, were saved when the vessel sank.

Great as was this loss, it was really less of a handicap to naval operations than that of the two destroyers, the *Jacob Jones* and the *Chauncey*. The former was one of the late type of destroyers, having been commissioned in 1915. She was torpedoed in the English Channel, December 6, 1917, 62 lives being lost. The ship at the time was under command of Lieutenant-commander D. W. Bagley, the brother of Ensign Worth Bagley, the first victim of the Spanish-American War. The *Chauncey* was sunk in the Mediterranean, November 19, 1917, as the result of a collision with a merchant vessel, the *Rose*, 18 lives being lost. Two other destroyers, the *Cassin* and the *Manley*, were seriously damaged, but succeeded in reaching port, where they were repaired and placed in service again. The *Cassin*, which was torpedoed October 15, 1917, was saved from a still more serious disaster by the heroic act of Gunner's Mate Oswald K. Ingram, who sacrificed his life in order to throw depth-charges overboard. Had these been detonated the ship undoubtedly would have been totally destroyed.

Three converted yachts were lost during the progress of American naval operations: the *Alcedo*, torpedoed in the Bay of Biscay, November 15, 1917, the *Guinevere*, wrecked on the French coast, January 25, 1918, and the *Wakiva II*, sunk by collision on May 22, 1918.

The greatest loss in personnel and one of the most mysterious happenings in American naval history was the disappearance of the collier *Cyclops* during the month of March, 1918, with 280 souls on board. On March 4, the *Cyclops* coaled at Barbados, British West Indies, from which point she departed never to be heard from again. For months the Atlantic was searched but no trace could be discovered of the missing ship. Like the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*, she had gone to the port of missing ships, but from the *Cyclops* not a soul has returned to tell her story. Whether she foundered in mid-ocean or whether a torpedo sent her to the bottom, *spurlos versenkt*, no one knows.

A phase of America's naval effort not destined to attain its fullest strength before the armistice was aviation. It is most strange, in view of aëronautic developments in Europe during the first three years of the war, that there should have been, in the United States, such lack of interest in a phase of warfare of almost overshadowing importance. America created the aëroplane, but she seemed content to let Europe bring it to perfection. Perhaps the situation would have been different had it been appreciated that she would be drawn into the conflict, but the fact remains that when hostilities began the United States army had no efficient aviation corps and the navy but the rudiments of one. Yet in spite of this, the first American fighting forces to set foot on the soil of France were the Naval Aviators, who reached Bordeaux on June 5, 1917.

Although the air force organization had to be built up under fire, as it were, there were no delays in getting under

way. September 16, 1917, the Navy Department authorized the establishment of 15 Naval Air Stations abroad, and October 1st, general headquarters were established at Paris, with Captain Hutch I. Cone in command of all the forces, under Admiral Sims. At the date of the armistice there were 27 United States Naval Aviation Stations in Europe, of which 18 were in France, 7 in Great Britain and 2 in Italy. A year was spent in preparatory work, during which time scarcely any American machines reached the forces abroad.

What caused this delay is not wholly clear. Perhaps it was a passion for perfection on the part of the airplane designers and manufacturers or, as was more likely, it was the very enormity of the program outlined that prevented the achievement of immediate results. It was certainly not due, as has been asserted, to lack of patriotism and honesty on the part of those in direction of this great work. They thought, as did almost every one, that the war would continue for months, perhaps years. Had this been the case, the work of the aërial forces would have been vastly more impressive. As it was, the American naval aviators performed invaluable service. The little group, numbering 7 officers and 125 men, that landed in France on June 5th, expanded until the total personnel of the aviation forces consisted of 1,500 officers and 15,000 men. A total of 22,038 flights were made by 481 aircraft of all types, a distance of 549,070 sea miles being covered. For the greater part, these flights were made in foreign aircraft, as but few American battle-planes arrived in time to be of service.

The most ambitious plan of the naval aviation forces was known as the Killingholm Project. This was based at a village of that name near the mouth of the Humber, and its mission was the bombing of German bases in the Heligoland

Bight. It was proposed to transport the machines on lighters to points within easy striking distance of their objectives, which they would attack and then return to their bases. The end of the war prevented the realization of this scheme although the Killingholm squadrons accomplished much useful patrol service. The 46 seaplanes stationed there made, in all, 404 flights during which many bombs were dropped upon submarines or traces of submarines.

Another important but equally unfinished scheme was the Northern Bombing Group. This was based behind the French and Belgian lines in the Calais-Dunkirk region, and its mission was to execute day and night raids on the German submarine bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge and Bruges. When the armistice was signed this force consisted of 294 officers and 2,154 men, equipped with 35 land planes. Operations were commenced on October 14, 1918, when the railway siding at Thielt was bombed, and were continued until October 27th, 8 raids, in all, being carried out. Prior to the arrival of the American planes, the naval aviators coöperated with British squadrons, the personnel serving with the British aviation forces for training and in attacks on the enemy.

The results obtained by the naval aviation forces are all the more remarkable when the fact is considered that recruiting was almost wholly from the Naval Reserves, and that few, indeed, among officers and men knew even the elements of aëronautics when they entered the service.

The majority of the methods adopted in coping with the U-boat were defensive and palliatives at the best. This was due to the very nature of things, for the submarine, even under adverse conditions, still retained the two most important elements of the offensive, freedom of action and the initiative. While the Allied navies more and more

hampered its operations and rendered its service increasingly perilous, yet it continued to make serious inroads upon their lines of communication. It was accordingly clear that operations of an unmistakable offensive nature must be undertaken if the submarine menace were to be removed.

The ideal plan, of course, would be the destruction of all the submarine bases, but this was manifestly impossible; or, if possible, too costly to be considered, for it would have necessitated combined operations against coasts protected as never before in the world's history, guarded, too, by the German High Seas Fleet, which Jutland had shown to be worthy of certain consideration.

Instead of embarking upon the hopeless enterprise of digging out the German fleet, the plan was therefore adopted of limiting the operations of the U-boats to the greatest degree. That this was the strategy of compromise and was not thorough is clear, but it was based, apparently, upon the theory that an offensive of this nature would supplement the increasingly efficient defensive operations to such a degree that it would break the back of the submarine campaign. The results proved this hypothesis to be correct.

In accordance with this theory, it was accordingly decided (*a*) to restrict the operations of the German submarines as far as possible to the North Sea, and (*b*) to block or destroy their bases on the Belgian coast. The traffic on the North Sea was extensive but its importance to the Allies was negligible in comparison with that carried on the ocean lanes of the Atlantic. If the overseas lines of communication could be rendered relatively immune, the sacrifice of North Sea commerce would be well worth while, particularly as there was good reason for believing that a large percentage of Scandinavian and Dutch imports eventually reached Germany.

It has already been pointed out that the later types of German submarine cruisers could remain at sea for months and had a radius of 20,000 miles. The damage vessels of this kind could do, would, of course, be limited only by their opportunities and the number of torpedoes they could carry. They were sighted in all areas of the North Atlantic, they cruised to the coasts of America and Africa, and entered the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar. To cut them off from their hunting grounds was the object of the first offensive operation, the great mine barrage across the North Sea.

This was no new scheme, for the British navy had already considered the plan, but the vastness of the task, its expense, and the fact that no mine had been devised that seemed to meet the conditions, prevented the effort from being made. The great resources and productivity of the United States, however, minimized the first difficulty and an improved mine, developed in America, overcame the last. This mine was based upon a suggestion of a Salem, Massachusetts, inventor, Ralph C. Brown, and developed at the Torpedo Station, Newport, Rhode Island. Exhaustive tests indicated that it had twice the efficiency of the older type.

The most serious problem was that of personnel. Although training in mine-laying had been carried on for two years, the navy was far from being prepared to undertake a work of such magnitude. Nevertheless, in a very few months the difficulties in personnel and material were surmounted and cargoes were *en route* during February, 1918, to the bases on the west coast of Scotland. There were two of these, one at Fort William on the Caledonian Canal, and the other at Kyle on Loch Alsh, opposite the Isle of Skye. From these points the mines and equipment were forwarded by canal and rail to Inverness, the main base of the mining fleet.

The only serious accident that occurred during the hazardous operation of transporting this vast quantity of explosives through submarine-haunted seas was the loss of the *Lake Moor*, one of the transports.

The mining-fleet in the meanwhile had been fitted out and departed from Newport on May 11, 1918. The forces were under the command of Rear-admiral Joseph Strauss, while Captain Reginald R. Belknap commanded the mine-fleet and had immediate direction of the mine-laying operations. The fleet consisted of the following vessels: the cruisers, *San Francisco* (Captain H. V. Butler) and the *Baltimore* (Captain A. W. Marshall); and the following converted merchantmen: *Aroostook* (Captain J. Harvey Tomb); *Canandaigua* (Captain W. H. Reynolds); *Canonicus* (Captain T. L. Johnson); *Housatonic* (Captain J. W. Greenslade); *Quinnebaug* (Commander Pratt Mannix); *Roanoke* (Captain C. D. Stearns); *Saranac* (Captain Sinclair Gannon); *Shawmut* (Captain W. T. Cluverius); the tugs, *Patuxent* and *Patapsco*, and the tender, *Black Hawk*. The force comprised about 4,000 men.

Mine-laying was begun June 6, 1918, and, thanks to the careful preparations made in advance, was carried to completion virtually without accident. From time to time submarines were reported in the neighborhood of the fleet, but if any were present they failed to attack. During the course of the operations, the mine forces were protected by supporting fleets of battleships, usually British, but on two occasions by the U. S. Sixth Battle Squadron, under Rear-admiral Rodman.

The mine-laying was begun at the three-mile limit off the coast of Norway and was gradually carried towards the Orkney Islands, the western terminus. This field was 250 miles long and contained 70,117 mines, of which the United States forces laid 56,571 and the British 13,546. In planting

these, 13 excursions were made by United States vessels and 11 by British. Some very remarkable records were made, the U. S. S. *Canonicus*, for instance, laying 860 mines in 3 hours and 35 minutes, covering a stretch as far as from Washington to Baltimore. The American ships, during the course of the operations, steamed a distance of 8,700 miles in 775 hours.

The armistice coming so soon after the completion of this operation prevented it from revealing its full utility as a war measure. That a number of submarines were destroyed there can be no doubt, as there were reports of submarine losses in the region of the field soon after the work was initiated. It is reported that the mines of the barrage accounted for at least fourteen enemy submarines, of which six were sunk by the mines laid by American forces. The exact facts may never be revealed, for only the North Sea knows the tragic story of those hapless U-boats that strove to break through the barrier of death.

Whatever may have been the actual losses, this great mine-field did its work well, for it is generally admitted that the breakdown of German morale was due to the failure of the submarine campaign, and there can be no question but that the North Sea barrage strongly contributed to that end.

In summing up the naval operations of the Great War, one of the outstanding facts was the coöperation of the American and British navies. The peace of a hundred years that had existed between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race was sealed by the warships of the United States and Great Britain united in one force against a common enemy. An eloquent reference to this was made by Secretary Daniels during a visit to London in May, 1919. In the course of his remarks he said:

"And in America they loved to remember that in the fateful days that followed, when the German admiral

A German submarine raising ship.

Depth bombs and Y gun on stern of a submarine chaser. *The bombs, loaded with 300 pounds of T. N. T., are projected from the Y guns and the charge is fired by a hydrostatic device which can be set for any depth of water.*

sought to embarrass Dewey, it was a great British sailor, Admiral Chichester, who balked him. The German admiral called upon Admiral Chichester and asked him: 'What will you do if I move my ships over to where Admiral Dewey's flagship, the *Olympic*, is anchored?' The British admiral was a diplomat, as were most of the naval officers, and he replied to the German in two words, 'Ask Dewey.' It was a delphic answer to those who did not understand the significance of it, but if I might say so, it was very illuminating. They could never forget that Dewey's victory was secured by the coöperation and the fine spirit of the British admiral.

"He did not know what we should call this war in history, but he trusted and believed that it would be called 'the great war against war.' The ships of the two navies had different flags, but they were united in everything, and they might as well have sailed under one flag. They were united in sentiment and in valor, and their flag was that of the Anglo-Saxon people fighting for Anglo-Saxon liberty. Their men had brought back a spirit of comradeship, and to the motto 'Match the Navy' might be added to-day another, 'Hands Across the Sea and Brotherhood with Great Britain.'

"Ten years ago Admiral Sims, speaking at a banquet in London, made a speech in which he said that if the time ever came when the soil of Great Britain was threatened with invasion, the American people would fight with the English people shoulder to shoulder. Nor did they forget that the admiral was rebuked for that speech, for the President, in pursuance of policy, sent him a formal reprimand. That reprimand, in the light of this hour, was a decoration of honor. He rejoiced that in this coöperation with the British navy, the navy of the United States was represented by a courageous, a wise and a brave man, who understood the very heart of the struggle, and who entered into it

with sympathy and the heartiest feeling for his British comrades.

"It was our pleasure, and we gladly embraced the opportunity shortly after the United States entered the war, to send over a portion of our fleet to be associated with your British Grand Fleet. Our fleet and yours acted together to lay mines in the North Sea, to convoy ships bringing troops, to fight the stilettos of the seas in all zones of danger, and in every naval activity courage and skill were united. We kept all other ships of our navy ready for sailing orders when the Allies felt a larger naval force might be needed, for from the day the United States entered the war there was no thought but readiness for the fullest and quickest coöperation and use of all our sea power where joint naval statesmanship felt it could be best employed.

"It was a gratification to us at home to know that British experts regarded our fleet in home waters, well disciplined and ready to come over at a moment's notice, as an invaluable reserve, as indeed we always deemed it. Our fleet at home was kept busy in the invaluable work of training recruits, and especially in training armed crews for merchant ships. It was tedious, and in a sense, work that brought no glory to officers and men. It was well done, while our British brothers of the Grand Fleet waited in enforced inaction for the Germans and suffered a great tedium, and both were making ready for the expected crisis, but each in a different way. Sometimes, it is to be feared, civilians of both countries never appreciated the essential power and use of these portions of our fleets not in the most infested areas, but removed from the area where we expected—nay, where we hoped—the decisive great naval engagement would give striking proof of the incomparable power of the Allied fleets. In America we hoped for that hour, for which all other hours were only preparations. Here your naval

fighters, as ours, were kept for the day when, in fair combat in the open sea, the opposing forces might in battle give the seal and eternal proof that the sea power of our countries would win as notable a victory as Nelson's or Dewey's.

"That this opportunity was not given, because the Germans knew the fate in store if they dared win or lose all by the sea fight, it must be confessed, took away some of the anticipated satisfaction of the men of our navies. But we should remember that the victory was all the more complete. Though lacking the glory of a titanic conflict and denying the human satisfaction of demonstrating that the men of the British and American navies of to-day are of the same stuff as in the days when neither wind nor rain nor guns nor any other power could withstand their naval supremacy.

"It was the most humiliating spectacle in the annals of naval history—was the tame surrender of the much-vaunted fleet that was organized with the boasted purpose to conquer the seas, as the Prussian troops were to dominate the land. In truth, that inglorious, limping spectacle of defeat and disaster had a greater significance of complete undoing in the eyes of the world to-day and in history, than could have come from a magnificent victory in a sea duel. It was not thrilling nor spectacular. It did not stir the blood—the thing navy men had made ready for and coveted as their heart's desire. But it did more; it wrote on sea and sky the imperishable doom, the 'thou art weighed in the balance, and found wanting,' and carried the same lasting message as when these fateful words were interpreted by the prophet of old. To Americans and to British peoples in the vast expanse of both countries, the call is 'Match the Navy' of your country in mutual appreciation, in clear understanding, in full fellowship and in that loving brotherhood and helpful comradeship which will forever

unite the two countries in championship and sacrifice for democracy, liberty and fraternity.

"We love to think in America, and always with deeper love for the British navy and the British people, of the spirit of friendship displayed by your Admiral Chichester at Manila. Every American officer on duty in southern waters at Vera Cruz in 1914 felt the same grief which bowed down the British navy when the news came of the death of your Admiral Craddock, when superiority in gun power gave victory to the Germans at Coronel. Close association at that time gave us to see the wisdom and statesmanship of your admiral and to conceive for him genuine admiration and regard. His spirit hovers over us now, drawing the nations nearer together in imperishable friendship. May we not in confidence assert the peoples of both countries will 'match the navy' in actual regard, interchange of ideas and closer fellowship which will make the intercourse between the nations as noble and helpful as that which existed between the men of both navies?

"I believe I am the interpreter of American wishes from one end of our country to the other when I say that the spirit of comradeship which Chichester and Dewey sealed in Manila Bay is the spirit which the American people devoutly trust may prevail between us to the end of time. Americans want naval coöperation, not naval competition, with Great Britain—coöperation in the maintenance of human liberties the world over, such coöperation as they carried out in European waters during the great war and such coöperation, under God's providence, as they will carry out again wherever and whenever freedom is assailed by the powers of evil and tyrannical aggression."

# CHAPTER IX

## The Allied Navies, the Armistice, and the Surrender of the German Fleet

The French navy in the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean. The Russian fleets in the Baltic and the Black Sea. The Italian navy in the Adriatic. Blocking of Zeebrugge and Ostend. The curtain falls with the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet.

The strategy and the dispositions of the navies of France, Russia and Italy were determined by the policy of the British navy. This, as has been indicated, was the situation from the very outbreak of the war. It was clear that the North Sea would be the ultimate naval battlefield, hence Great Britain with her overwhelming force assumed responsibility for this and the adjacent area. This duty devolved upon her all the more strongly in view of the fact that her own coast-line was washed by the waters of the North Sea.

The disposition of the British fleet had already been profoundly modified before the outbreak of the war. The majority of its battle units were withdrawn from the Mediterranean and other distant seas and concentrated in home waters. Publicly the occasion for this concentration was a grand review of the British fleet, but fundamentally it was a preparedness measure. To those in direction of British naval affairs, war was either feared or foreseen.

The naval strength of Great Britain, therefore, being concentrated in the area of the North Sea, it devolved upon

France to guard the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean. Russia, of course, was to maintain her forces in the Baltic and the Black Sea. The accession of Italy to the ranks of the Allies effected a still further rearrangement of forces, the French withdrawing from the Adriatic proper, entrusting the operations against the Austro-Hungarian navy within that area to the Italian navy, the French, however, maintaining their patrol forces at the Strait of Otranto, in order to prevent egress of Austrian vessels. The entrance of the United States navy into the war produced no change in these dispositions, as we have seen, the United States forces serving in general as reinforcements. They coöperated with all the Allied Powers, serving in every way that might be helpful. This discussion of the policy and strategy of the French navy is based upon the article in Brassey's *Naval Annual* (1919) contributed by the French Naval General Staff.

During the first weeks of the war the French Second Light Cruiser Squadron, under Admiral Rouyer, coöperated with four British cruisers in guarding the Channel against raids by enemy cruisers. A line of battleships was also maintained between Brest, France, and the Lizard on the southeastern coast of England. These were reinforced by every type of naval craft that could be armed. During the latter part of August, a second line of defense was instituted to protect communications with the port of St. Nazaire. By the end of 1914 the loss of the British cruisers *Cressy*, *Aboukir*, and the *Hogue* and wider activities by German submarines forced the withdrawal of large cruisers from patrol service, this task being entrusted to the lighter craft. This change was completed by April, 1915.

Calais was defended against German attacks by torpedo boats and submarines, and later, nets and other devices were installed to protect the port against enemy submarines.

The vessels operating in the Bay of Biscay were based at Brest and St. Nazaire.

The first mission of the French naval forces in the Mediterranean was the defense of troops coming from Algeria to France. As long as the German battle-cruiser *Goeben* and the light cruiser *Breslau* were at large, the whole of the French forces were devoted to this task, but after these vessels found harbor at Constantinople (Sept., 1914), the greater part of the French Mediterranean fleet was detailed to guard the Strait of Otranto in order to lock up the Austro-Hungarian fleet in the Adriatic.

When the British navy instituted operations against the Dardanelles the French were called upon to contribute their quota of men and material. Since the flight of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, French vessels had been coöperating with the British in blockading the entrance of the Dardanelles. From time to time attacks were made upon Turkish fortresses, the battleships *Vérité* and the *Suffren*, joining, on November 3, 1914, in bombarding the forts at Sedd-ul-Bahr and Kum Kalé. In pursuance of the plan of the British Admiralty of forcing the Dardanelles, the request was made that the French forces be still further augmented. In response, the French Dardanelles Squadron was organized under command of Admiral Guépratte, acting under orders of Admiral Carden. This consisted of four battleships, torpedo boats, submarine trawlers and aëroplane mother ships. General operations against the Turkish defenses were initiated on February 19, 1915, the disastrous results of which have already been narrated in a previous volume.

During the progress of operations against the Gallipoli peninsula, the French vessels coöperated in every possible way. Thus during the first weeks in March, Bulair was bombarded by four battleships and an attack made on forts

Sultan and Napoleon on the Gulf of Saros. On March 6, 1915, they participated in the general attacks on the forts defending the Narrows, covering at the same time the disembarking of demolition troops of British marines.

At the end of April, 1915, French vessels were sent to reinforce the British, who anticipated an attack on the Suez Canal. These ships, the *Jaurequiberry*, *Requin*, and *Pothuau*, under command of Admirals Aube and Entrecasteaux patrolled a section of the Canal, the defense of which was under the general direction of Admiral de Spitz. From the middle of 1915 until 1917 no naval events of importance, in which the French vessels played an active part, took place on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. In the latter year, however, they coöperated with the British troops in the operations against Jaffa and Askalon, also at Rabegh, and in the Red Sea.

One of the immediate results of the entry of Austria into the war was to make the Adriatic Sea a very important area of naval operations. Austria's navy was based at Trieste, and at Pola were her shipyards and drydocks. The Austrian fleet was relatively small, and thoroughly outnumbered by its foes, yet it was capable of doing much damage if permitted to operate in the Mediterranean. Therefore, as soon as the transport conditions between Africa and France permitted, the bulk of the French Mediterranean fleet, under command of Admiral Boué de Lapayrère, set watch upon the Strait of Otranto. The Austrian fleet, however, made no attempt to emerge, contenting itself, like the German, to remain a "fleet in being." The operations in the Adriatic, therefore, were mainly carried on by submarines and light craft.

One of the first moves of the Austrians was to sow the Adriatic with mines, many of which went adrift endangering not only the vessels of Italy, then a neutral, but those of

Austria as well. This was abandoned in response to the demand of the Italian government, but the mines remained a menace for many months. It was while sweeping up these mines that French forces in the Adriatic first came in contact with the enemy, meeting on August 16, 1914, a group of three Austrian vessels, the light cruiser *Zenta* and two torpedo boats. In spite of the overwhelming superiority of the French, the Austrians refused to surrender, and in a few minutes the *Zenta* and one of the torpedo boats were sunk, the third escaping, badly damaged, to her base at Pola.

This event was followed by the bombardment of the Dalmatian port of Cattaro on August 30, 1914, and on September 27th, the island of Lissa was bombarded and occupied by Allied troops. During the progress of these operations French vessels, especially submarines, made constant cruises up and down the eastern coast of the Adriatic. Communications were kept open with Montenegro, through whose ports supplies were forwarded to Serbia. The operations of Austrian submarines and the menace of mines caused the larger units of the French fleet to withdraw from the Adriatic during November, 1916, the patrol force at the Strait of Otranto being strengthened in order to prevent Austrian submarines from proceeding to the Dardanelles.

When Italy entered the war the Allies agreed to entrust the area of the Adriatic to her navy. The other powers did not withdraw entirely, both France and Great Britain maintaining greatly diminished forces, that of France consisting of twelve destroyers, two divisions of torpedo boats and six submarines. Operations thereafter became more active. Both sides assumed the offensive from time to time and losses became numerous. The *Bisson* sank the *U-12* (Sept. 20, 1915), the *Palin* torpedoed an Austrian torpedo boat, the *Casque* sank the *Triglaf* (Dec. 29, 1915), while the *Fresnel*

was wrecked at Bojana and the *Monge* was sunk by the *Helgoland*. In 1916 the *Renaudin* and *Fourché* were sunk by submarines.

The most important duty of the French navy in the Adriatic was the support of the Serbian army, its provisioning and finally its rescue. Prior to October, 1915, the Serbians were supplied by way of the Albanian coast. The provisions and material were collected at Brindisi from which point they were forwarded to Medua and Durazzo, the main bases in Albania. Stationed here was a French liaison commission entrusted with the duty of transmitting the supplies to the Serbians.

One of the results of the Russo-Japanese War was the rebuilding of the Russian navy. At the close of that disastrous episode in her history, Russia had but the fragments of a fighting force at sea, but, owing to the efforts and devotion of Admiral von Essen, an indefatigable worker, Russia found herself possessed of a small but most efficient navy at the outbreak of the war. Von Essen was not permitted, however, to direct for any length of time the instrument he toiled so long to perfect. He died of pneumonia during the first months of the war and was succeeded by Admiral Kanin, a capable officer but lacking von Essen's force and initiative. Russian naval strategy as developed by Kanin was purely defensive, and perhaps of necessity so. The peculiar maritime problem of Russia, with coast lines on two land-locked bodies of water, the Baltic and the Black Sea, rendered offensive operations of any consequence beyond question. Russia, indeed, could not assist, save indirectly, her allies by her naval forces, and it was equally difficult for them to coöperate with her. The only exception to this was the operations of the small group of British submarines that penetrated into the Baltic, playing there a most distinguished and useful rôle.

In general the Russian naval strategy was linked up with the land strategy. The navy was viewed merely as an extension on water of the battle-line that stretched from Riga to Odessa. The Baltic fleet was conceived as doing its duty if it prevented the German naval forces from enveloping the flank of the Russian army.

Both the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets operated on the defensive throughout. Their situation was profoundly different from that of the other Allied navies in that any losses experienced could not be made good. It is true that there were construction and repair bases at Petrograd, Kronstadt and Libau in the Baltic area, and at Sebastopol and Nicolaieff on the Black Sea, but these were incapable of responding to the enormous demands of the war, granting that sufficient material could be obtained. This, however, was impossible, hence it was incumbent on Russia to avoid operations that might jeopardize the major units of her fleets. Furthermore, as long as the Russian Black Sea fleet could maintain its status, it had virtual control of that area; while the Baltic fleet was sufficiently strong to defend its waters as long as the British navy maintained pressure upon the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea. On the other hand, the threat of the Russian Baltic fleet, had a determining influence upon German naval policy. As long as Russia had a "fleet in being," however inferior it might be to the High Seas Fleet, the Germans dared not throw their whole naval power against Great Britain. They must keep a watchful eye upon the foe on the right flank. It can thus be seen that the Russian navy played a most vital part in determining the course of naval policy and strategy of the war. To do this, however, demanded that the Russian fleet be brought to the highest possible degree of efficiency and maintained at that point.

On the other hand, the German fleet in the North Sea failed to exert to the utmost its superiority over the Russian fleet. It would, however, only be just to say that it, too, was fulfilling its function, even when not on the offensive. Just as the British navy had shut it up in the Bight of Heligoland, so did it, in turn shut up the Russian fleet in the Baltic. The Russians could neither escape into the outer seas, nor could reinforcement come to them, save such as came in the form of the few adventurous British submarines. Hence the Russian fleets in the Baltic and the Black Seas were as completely isolated as if they were on another planet. The part they played in the grand strategy of the war by guarding the two flanks of the great battle-line that stretched across eastern Europe, and in protecting their particular areas, was negligible compared with the part they might have played had they been able to maintain communications and coöperate with their allies. This, however, was impossible as they were not only cut off by the German and the Turkish forces but by something stronger still,—their geographic situation. The Dardanelles and the tortuous channels of neutral Scandinavian waters apparently were insoluble problems.

During the first six months of the war the Russian naval forces were relatively inactive, the operations being restricted to giving support to the land forces. The dash over the German frontier which resulted in the capture of Memel (March 18, 1915) was made under protection of the Russian fleet. The Russians, however, occupied Memel only three days, retiring to their own territory. Germany replied to this by an advance towards Libau in April, capturing the town on May 9, 1915. The naval operations, however, were unimportant, being confined to a few skirmishes between patrol boats. Libau was strengthened by the Germans and used as a base of operations in

the Baltic, reconnoitering forces being sent out from time to time.

Several times, during the early spring, the opposing light craft came into contact, the Russian mine-layer *Yenesei* being sunk by a torpedo from the *U-26* during one of these skirmishes (June 4, 1915). A few days before, a German cruiser force, consisting of the *Roon*, the *Augsburg*, and the *Lübeck*, accompanied by several torpedo boats and the mine-layer *Albatros* made a reconnoissance cruise towards the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. After laying mines, the squadron divided, one part consisting of the *Augsburg*, the *Albatros*, and some torpedo boats, coming in contact, early in the morning of July 2d, with a Russian squadron consisting of four cruisers, *Admiral Makaroff*, *Bayan*, *Oleg*, and *Bogatyr*. The German vessels were severely punished, the *Albatros* being driven ashore at Ostergarn, Island of Gothland, in a sinking condition. The *Augsburg* fled, and, owing to her speed made her escape; the torpedo boats, however, remained as long as possible in order to aid the *Albatros*. The other vessels of the German Baltic fleet rushed to the scene of battle and met with such a warm reception that they retired badly damaged, the *Roon*, in particular, having received the concentrated fire of the Russian ships, was so much injured that she made port with great difficulty.

During the course of the fight the Russians fired on the *Albatros* after she had stranded in the neutral waters of Gothland Island. This incident led to diplomatic interchanges between Russia and Sweden, but the Russian explanations and apologies were accepted and the incident was closed.

The Germans began a general naval offensive against the Russian forces in the Gulf of Riga during August, 1915. On the 8th a large group of warships consisting of nine

battleships, twelve cruisers and many flotilla craft appeared off Oesel Island which guards the mouth of the Gulf. A minor engagement ensued between light craft, in the course of which the Germans lost two mine-sweepers.

This affair was followed on August 10, 1915, by a bombardment of the defenses established on the Aland Islands, preliminary apparently to extensive operations on the part of the Germans against the Russian naval forces in this area. It was clear to the German leaders that the only decisive method of meeting the menace of the British submarines was to destroy their bases. They soon discovered that they had undertaken no easy task, for the entrances to the Gulf were most thoroughly protected by mines and nets. An effort to make a breach through these, made on August 17th, precipitated an engagement between destroyer forces in which there were losses on both sides. Three days later a clear channel was opened and the German cruiser forces entered the Mohn Island Passage. Here they came in contact with the Russian vessels and a bitter contest ensued.

This time the Germans received a decided check, the Russians, reinforced by British submarines, proving themselves more than capable of holding their own. In the course of this attack the German battle-cruiser *Moltke* was torpedoed by the British submarine *E-1* under command of Commander Lawrence. The Russian official account of the operations claimed that their forces had damaged or sunk two German cruisers and eight torpedo boats. This account admitted at the same time the loss of the *Sivoutch*, a Russian gunboat, with all on board, destroyed by gunfire on the evening of August 19th. The Germans, on the other hand claimed to have sunk, in addition to the *Sivoutch*, the gunboat *Koreitz* and several torpedo boats. Three of their own torpedo boats are admitted to have been mined.

During the attack, the German fleet bombarded the shore batteries and destroyed a Russian steamer and several sailing vessels. On their retirement the Germans made an attempt to close the channel by sinking four block ships but were unsuccessful. The losses experienced by the Germans in the operations against Riga were so serious that the remainder of the year 1915 was marked by nothing more than what may be called naval bushwhacking.

In the operations in the Baltic a most important part was played by a group of British submarines which appeared in these waters early in 1915. The pioneer of these submarines was the *E-9* under command of Commander Max Horton, who sank the German destroyer *S-116* off the mouth of the Ems (in the North Sea) on October 6, 1914. On January 29, 1915, the German light cruiser *Gazelle* was attacked by a submarine which was at first reported to be Russian, but Swedish accounts later indicated that a British vessel was responsible. That this was probable is indicated by the fact that the *E-9* sank the German destroyer *G-173* off the coast of Denmark three days later. On May 11, 1915, Commander Horton sank a transport and is reported to have torpedoed the German battleship *Pommern* and as the Germans admitted its sinking in the Battle of Jutland, a year later, this has led to the belief that the vessel sunk in that battle was an *ersatz* or new battleship assigned the old name. It is possible, however, that either the *Pommern* was not sunk, but damaged and afterwards repaired, or that a sister ship was the victim in the Baltic affair.

During 1915 other submarines passed through the channel between Denmark and Sweden, one of which, the *E-13*, went ashore on the coast of the island of Saltholm, where, although in neutral waters, it was shot to pieces by a German warship. The British submarines, however, were not

without their revenge, for they collected a heavy toll from the German naval forces, the greatest losses being the cruisers *Prinz Adalbert* (October 23, 1915), the *Undine* (November 7, 1915), and the *Bremen* (December 17, 1915). Virtually all on board the *Prinz Adalbert* were lost. In reporting the loss of the *Bremen*, the German Admiralty stated that the greater part of the crew was saved.

The British submarines continued their operations throughout the year 1916, but in the spring of 1917 it became certain that their romantic career was drawing to a close. The end was no less impressive. It became evident that the Germans were going to establish control over the Baltic. The German peace with the Bolshevists and the loss of their bases due to enemy occupation of Finland rendered the situation of British submarines hopeless. Escape by the route they came was also impossible, so it was decided to destroy them. Four of the seven boats, *E-1*, *E-8*, *E-9*, *E-10*, therefore, put to the open sea on April 17th, each carrying torpedo warheads arranged to explode automatically, where they were abandoned and blew up. The next day the remainder of the group, the *C-26*, *C-35*, *C-27* and two tenders were destroyed in the same manner.

After their failure to force the channels leading into Riga Gulf, the Germans made no further attempts in 1915 against this region by sea. The next great drive against Petrograd was to be by land, which of course would be supported by the German fleet. The Russians in anticipation of this attack again occupied themselves during the winter with preparations for the campaign. The German advance, however, did not materialize, for Brussiloff, himself, decided to take the initiative. Furthermore the tragic failure at Verdun and the questionable "victory" of Jutland had given the General Staff something more important to contemplate than an unfruitful drive into Russia. This was no time

Admiral Meurer of the German navy boarding Admiral Beatty's flagship *Queen Elizabeth* to arrange the surrendering of the German High Seas Fleet.

Surrendered German submarine.

for weakening the lines on the Western front. The Baltic therefore did not become a center of naval activities during 1916. There were a number of minor activities, the most important being a flotilla action which occurred near Landsort on June 30, 1916, in which the German vessels were driven off.

The blockade was tightened around the German Baltic ports, rendering her Scandinavian trade so precarious that it became necessary to adopt the convoy system. Admiral Kanin retired during October, 1916, giving over the command to Vice-admiral Nepenin, formerly in command of the flotilla forces. It was a tragic promotion for Admiral Nepenin, for already the virus of Bolshevism was beginning to poison the morale of the Russian navy. Five months later (March 16, 1917) he was murdered by his own men at Helsingfors. At the same time Admirals Protopopoff, Nebolsin and many other officers were killed. The last message Admiral Nepenin forwarded to the Admiralty ended with these words: "The Baltic Fleet has ceased to be a military force." The outbreaks began on March 14, 1917, starting in the naval barracks at Kronstadt, and from there spread to Reval, Helsingfors and still more distant stations. A republic was declared at Kronstadt, the officers were forced to yield all their authority, control of the forces being vested in committees elected by ballot, and for the time being all discipline was thrown to the winds. The situation was rendered still more hopeless by the order of Kerensky, on June 25th, abolishing all grades of warrant and petty officers.

The revolt extended to the Black Sea but conditions there did not immediately assume such a desperate phase. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Koltchak, one of the strongest men in the Russian navy, endeavored to maintain some form of order and discipline. In June, however, during an outbreak which occurred in Sebastopol, Admiral Koltchak was

accused of fomenting a counter-revolution, and his resignation was demanded by a committee of sailors. When ordered to give up his sword he threw it into the sea but to avoid bloodshed resigned and advised his fellow officers to do the same.

The naval situation in the Black Sea did not differ materially from that in the Baltic at the outbreak of the war. The Russian fleet was probably stronger than the Turkish at the beginning, but the arrival of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* overcame the Russian superiority to a large degree. The Russian naval forces therefore found themselves confronted in both seas by a foe equal or superior in strength, yet neither Germany nor Turkey saw fit to avail themselves of their advantage, so the first months of the war were marked by minor engagements, raids and skirmishes between light craft.

Belligerent naval activities had been initiated by Turkey before the declaration of war, the first act being the forcible removal of two German ships from the Rumanian port Sulina (October 25, 1914) by the German cruiser *Breslau*. This was followed on October 29th by a raid on the shipping in the harbor of Odessa. Without warning of any sort the Turkish destroyer *Muvenet-i-Milet* approached and directed a hot fire against the docks and vessels in the port, sinking the gunboat *Donetz* and damaging her sister ship the *Kubanetz* and the mine-layer *Prut* to such a degree that they sank the next day. Theodosia and Sebastopol were also shelled but with less serious results. As a consequence of these acts of belligerency Russia declared war on Turkey October 30, 1914.

In retaliation the Russian fleet began raids on Turkish coastal points, Anatolia and the fortifications on the Bosphorus being bombarded on November 10th, and a number of transports and merchant ships were sunk here, four transports at Zunguldak and five at Trebizond.

The only naval action of importance that occurred in the Black Sea took place on November 18, 1914. The Russian vessels returning from Anatolia were intercepted by a Turkish fleet headed by the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. The first shot of the Russian flagship *Evstafi* took effect on the *Goeben*, causing an explosion. The fact that the *Goeben* delayed returning the fire for several minutes indicated that the damages she experienced were serious. This mischance was one of many that occurred in the career of this battle-cruiser after her escape from the British and French in the Mediterranean to cast her lot with the Turks. The fact that she proved unable to meet warships less powerful would indicate either that the Turks were unable to man her properly or that a large portion of her fighting equipment had been removed to strengthen the defenses of Constantinople. At any rate in this action she scored only one hit, and in company with the *Breslau* and the other vessels withdrew from the field after an action of only fourteen minutes.

This was the last serious challenge made by Turkey against Russia in the Black Sea. After this, naval operations settled down into a sort of *petit-guerre*, guerilla operations at sea, marked by raids on seaports, strewing of mines and commerce-destroying. The Turks, in particular, suffered enormously from disturbance of their communications. More than 1,500 vessels were sunk during 1914–1915 constituting a loss of $80,000,000. Many of these ships were carrying coal and other fuel, the lack of which was keenly felt in Constantinople and throughout Turkey.

The first victim of this warfare was the cruiser *Hamidieh*, which was damaged by a mine in the Bosphorus, December 12, 1914. This was followed by the mining of the *Goeben* on December 26, 1914 and again on January 10, 1915, her damages being so serious that she was out of commission for several months. On January 5th, the Russian cruiser

*Pamyat Merkurie* in company with a destroyer, the *Erievny*, drove off the *Medjidieh* while escorting a transport and sank the latter.

The year 1915 opened with raids on the southern coast of the Black Sea, Sinope being bombarded on January 5th, and Surmeneh, near Trebizond, on the 7th. Surmeneh at the time was guarded by the cruisers *Breslau* and *Hamidieh* but they were unable to prevent the Russian vessels from bombarding the port.

The attempt of the Allied fleets to force the Dardanelles placed new duties and responsibilities on the Black Sea fleet. It was called upon to increase its pressure upon the Turkish forces at the Bosphorus, thereby preventing Turkish concentration at the Dardanelles. Accordingly a strong demonstration was made on March 28, 1915, against the forts at the entrance to the Bosphorus. The Russian fleet appeared off the coast and directed its fire against the batteries at Elmas and Fort Rivas. Cape Panas, on the European side, was then shelled and this was followed by a general bombardment of the coast defenses at a range of 8,000 yards. During these operations a transport was sunk. A similar demonstration occurred during April, the lighthouses and forts again suffering heavy damages. By these activities the Russian fleet was most useful in relieving the pressure on the Allied forces on the Gallipoli peninsula. The question raised whether the Russians could not have done more was answered in a report by the Minister of Marine, who stated that the Russian fleet was not so strong as the united Turko-German navy. It was doing its duty, he said, if it immobilized a considerable proportion of the enemy forces without suffering undue losses. At any rate, even had the Russians exerted themselves more strongly, it is doubtful whether their effort would have materially changed the result of this unfortunate enterprise. According to Ambassador

Photograph taken from an aëroplane of a convoy of merchant ships.

The British ship *Furious*, a "hush" cruiser, "dazzle" painted, used as a floating aërodrome. *The ship is covered with a long, broad platform upon which the aëroplanes start and alight.*

Morganthau, victory was almost in the grasp of the Allies when they retired from Gallipoli.

The blockade and raids on lines of communication and the resulting scarcity of coal in Turkey, caused the adoption by the Turks of the convoy system, but it did not prove entirely successful, the Russians on a number of occasions succeeding in driving off the escorting vessels and sinking the transports.

The entry of Bulgaria into the war (October 5, 1915) increased the burdens of the Black Sea fleet. The port of Varna became a base of operations, projecting the enemy naval front some 200 miles nearer the Russian bases at Odessa and Sebastopol. This involved the patrol and mining of a vastly greater coast line and operations against ships and fortifications on the Bulgarian coast. Furthermore, enemy submarines appeared, doubtless forwarded overland from Germany in sections. During October, Varna was bombarded several times, on the 27th the land defenses being supplemented by the guns of the warships *Goeben*, *Breslau*, and *Hamidieh*.

The Black Sea fleet coöperated with the land forces during the campaign of Grand-duke Nicholas in the Caucasus region, which resulted in the capture of Trebizond, Erzerum and other important strategical points. The forces that captured Trebizond were landed at Atina, sixty miles east, under cover of the guns of the Russian fleet, which supported them in their progress towards Trebizond. In the official *communiqué* of Grand-duke Nicholas (April 18, 1916) announcing the capture of this important point, he paid a tribute to the assistance given by the Black Sea fleet: "The successful coöperation of the Fleet permitted us to effect the most daring landing operations, and to give continual artillery support to the troops operating in the coastal region."

Rumania's entry into the war, which at first promised so much for the Allied cause and in the end proved so disastrous, brought increased duties to the Russian fleet. This was particularly the case when Constanza fell (October 22, 1916) during Mackensen's victorious drive through the Dobrudscha. The fleet was especially helpful during the evacuation of this city, rendering it possible to transfer valuable stores and still more valuable troops.

From the fall of Constanza to the breakdown of the fleet caused by the Russian revolution, naval operations in the Black Sea were of a minor character, consisting mainly of patrol duties, skirmishes between light craft, and maintenance of the blockade. The most serious loss during this period was that of the new dreadnought *Imperatriza Maria* which was destroyed by fire and explosion while at anchor in the port of Sebastopol. An effort was made to prevent the fire from reaching the magazines but to no avail. These exploded, killing more than 200 of the crew.

That the Italian navy would be called upon to play a very important part when Italy entered the war was obvious, for Italy is essentially a maritime power. Furthermore, in the great struggle, with the most important ports of Austria on the Adriatic, that sea bore the same relation to Italy that the Baltic bore to Russia, and the North Sea to Great Britain. By the logic of circumstances the destiny of Italy lay bound up in the Adriatic. A glance at the map reveals how true this is. An enemy power in control of the eastern shore of the Adriatic would have the whole of Italy quite at its mercy, for this great body of water, by some whim of nature, has no harbors worth the name on the Italian coast. The harbors there are shallow, are exposed to storms and are difficult to defend. The eastern shore, however, presents a very different picture. There are many excellent harbors along that coast, such as Pola, Trieste, Fiume,

Cattaro, Sebenico, Spalato, Ragusa, Durazzo, and Valona. Some of these have deep waters, winding channels for entrances, and are surrounded by heights easy to fortify and defend.

At the beginning of the war, Italy had a small but efficient navy, consisting of nine modern battleships, with two more under construction; ten armored cruisers built or building; seventeen destroyers; one hundred and twenty-five torpedo boats; and six submarines. In addition there was an extensive merchant marine and a rapidly growing shipping industry. There were three important naval bases: Spezia, Naples, and Venice. The personnel of the navy was excellent in intelligence and training, indeed, some of the Italian officers, notably Bernotti, have gained distinction for their writings on naval science, while Benedetto Brin and Cuniberti stand among the foremost naval constructors of their time. The last named, it is claimed, was the one who first proposed the idea of the modern dreadnought.

As has already been noted, the policing of the Adriatic was the duty, mainly, of the French navy prior to the intervention of that of Italy. The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces, Admiral Boué de Lapayrère, pursued the policy of blockading the Strait of Otranto at the entrance of the Adriatic, and made no effort to attack the main bases of Austria at Pola and Trieste. In fact such effort by naval forces alone would have been hopeless in advance, as nothing but combined operations on land and sea could have reduced these strongly defended points.

The naval policy adopted by France in the Adriatic, however, could not be pursued when Italy became belligerent, for at that moment her great eastern coastline of nearly five hundred miles, on which were situated famous cities like Venice, Rimini, Pesaro and Ancona, would become the prey of Austrian raiders. An agreement was therefore entered

into under the terms of which Italy was assigned the task of defending the Adriatic, the French and British to coöperate when desirable and to maintain their blockading forces at the Strait of Otranto. During the course of naval operations in the Adriatic, the Italian Commander-in-Chief was changed three times, Admiral Viale retiring in September, 1915, to be succeeded by Vice-admiral Camillo Corsi, who was succeeded after a service of two and a half years by Vice-admiral Count Thaon di Revel.

Italy's navy entered a field of operations already active, but her situation was vastly more difficult than that of the French and British forces in the Adriatic for she had the problem, as we have noted, of protecting her own littoral from attack. As long as Italy remained neutral her shores were immune, but that immunity ceased with her change to a belligerent status. The enemy made no delay in emphasizing this fact, for the day after war was declared Austrian warships bombarded the port of Ancona. This was the first of numberless raids of this sort which continued throughout the period of the war. In one of these, on May 24, 1915, the Austrian destroyers *Csepel*, *Lika*, and *Tatra* were intercepted near Barletta by Italian destroyers and one of the latter, the *Turbine* was sunk by gunfire. On the same day, the *Zeffiro*, a small Italian destroyer, penetrated into the harbor of Porto Buso in the Bay of Trieste and damaged to a considerable extent the quays and harbor constructions, capturing the garrison of the town. The *Zeffiro* later raided the aërodrome at Parenzo, totally destroying it. On June 17, 1915, Italy lost her first submarine, the *Medusa*, torpedoed by an enemy submarine.

On May 26, 1915, a blockade of the Austrian coast was proclaimed by the Italian government, which was still further strengthened on July 23d by a declaration closing the whole area of the Adriatic to all vessels save those carrying

supplies for Serbia and to Montenegrin ports. The status of the Adriatic was now that of the North Sea.

The lesson taught other naval powers by sad experience was soon learned by Italy. This was, that the open sea was no place for a battleship unprotected by an adequate screen of destroyers and other light craft. Italy, however, lost the armored cruiser *Giuseppe Garibaldi* before this lesson was thoroughly learned. This ship, which formed part of a detachment bombarding the railway near Cattaro, July 18, 1915, was torpedoed by the Austrian submarine *U-4*, and so badly injured that she sank in a few minutes, the majority of the crew of 540 escaping. The *U-4* in its turn, however, soon came to grief, for it was sunk by the French cruiser *Waldeck Rousseau*, off Cattaro, during the next October.

Naval operations in the Adriatic soon settled down to a series of actions between minor craft, marked now and then by episodes of striking individual daring. In these a number of Italian officers distinguished themselves by entering Austrian ports and attacking vessels at anchor behind their defenses. One might say that it became customary to attack dreadnoughts single-handed. In all, the Austrian bases were raided fourteen times by torpedo boats and motor craft, some of the boats being so small that they could be lifted over the booms protecting the harbors.

The first of these was the audacious attack on Pola, November 2, 1916. The harbor was entered by three destroyers and stripped of everything save battle equipment. Two of the vessels remained in Fasana channel, while the third, under direction of Commander Goiran, penetrated into the heart of this very important naval base. Torpedoes were fired, after which the destroyer escaped. No great damage apparently was done on this occasion, but a similar incident, which occurred on December 9, 1917, was more fruitful of results. On this occasion Commander Rizzo, with

two small motor torpedo boats, cut the steel hawsers that guarded the harbor of Trieste and entered that port. Two torpedoes were fired, both of which found their marks, one sinking the old battleship *Wien*, the other seriously damaging her sister ship, the *Budapest*. Another daring exploit was that of Lieutenant-commander Mario Pellegrini, who, with a small squad of men, penetrated the harbor of Pola and fired torpedoes at a battleship, said to have been the *Viribus Unitis*, which was either sunk or damaged sufficiently to put her out of commission.

Perhaps still more audacious was the exploit of Commander Rizzo and Sub-lieutenant Aonzo in attacking the Austrian battle-fleet with two motor torpedo boats off the coast of Dalmatia, June 10, 1918. With these tiny craft, two of the Austrian battleships of the latest type, the *Szent Istvan* and the *Prinz Eugen*, were torpedoed and the former sunk. Thus, without taking part in a single action worthy of the name, three of Austria's dreadnoughts were destroyed.

Italy, on her part, suffered serious losses, in a somewhat similar way. Thus one of her latest type of battleships, the *Leonardo da Vinci*, was blown up in the harbor of Taranto on August 2, 1916, and the *Benedetto Brin* was destroyed by internal explosion at Brindisi on September 27, 1915. It was thought that treachery caused the loss of the *Leonardo*. In addition to the *Garibaldi*, already referred to, Italy lost two other major units of her fleet, the *Amalfi*, torpedoed on June 7, 1915, and the *Regina Margherita*, mined off Valona on December 11, 1916.

The greatest task performed by the Italian navy was undoubtedly the saving of the Montenegrin and Serbian armies. This work was done in coöperation with French and British forces, but the greatest burden fell upon the Italians. When Uskub, Novi-Bazar, and Mitrovitza, successively, fell into the hands of the Austrians and Bulgars it was clear that the

armies of Serbia and her civil population were completely enveloped by her enemies, and the annihilation of a nation seemed to be the only outcome. There was one avenue of escape, however. This was the Adriatic, and the aid of the Allied navies made this means of extricating the Serbians a possibility. In preparation for this, therefore, Italian troops were landed, December 16, 1915, at Valona, Albania. Here preparations were made for receiving the 200,000 fugitives, from which point they were to be convoyed to the island of Corfu and to various ports in Italy. Valona was selected because of its excellent harbor, but Durazzo and San Giovanni di Medua were also occupied and defenses established.

The condition of the Serbians who straggled into these ports was pitiful in the extreme; the necessity for supplying medical attention, clothing and food rendered the task of the Allies still more difficult, to which must be added the necessity for holding the occupied points against attacks of the enemy. The Allies had no hope of maintaining a foothold longer than the period necessary to take off the fugitives from the Balkans. Hence the work of caring for and transporting the Montenegrins and Serbians went on feverishly, while the Austrian armies gradually pushed their way toward the ports of debarkation. The efforts of the Italian navy were heroic and were wholly successful, for by the time Scutari fell (January 29, 1916), thousands had already found refuge. Durazzo was still crowded with refugees, when Medua, one of the debarkation points, was occupied by the enemy. The great movement, however, continued and the last convoy left Durazzo (February 27, 1916) under fire of Austrian guns, the transports and escort vessels lit up by the flames of burning storehouses and supplies.

It was a race against time, with infinite chances for accident, but the careful planning and perfect organization of

the whole operation resulted in saving an army of approximately 150,000 Serbian soldiers, and 12,000 civilian refugees. In addition some 23,000 Austrian prisoners were transported from Valona to Asinara. In this operation, 27 Italian vessels were used, 20 French, and 7 British, about 240 voyages being made. In conveying food to Corfu for the rehabilitation of the Serbian army, 24 steamers were used, of which 17 were Italian. These made 73 voyages transporting in all 22,000 tons of food, fodder, clothing, medicine, etc. Guarding these operations was a force of 170 cruisers, destroyers and other craft, of which the majority were Italian.

As was the situation in every other maritime area, naval operations in the Adriatic consisted mainly of submarine hunting, with an occasional skirmish with destroyers and other minor craft. Only a few incidents of this nature worthy of noting occurred during the course of activities. One of these was the raid of the Austrian light cruiser *Novara* (July 9, 1916) on the patrol craft stationed in the lower Adriatic. Two of the patrol vessels were sunk and others damaged. More disastrous still was the attack made in May, 1916, when Austrian naval forces again raided the patrols at Otranto, this time sinking 14 British drifters. The enemy was driven off by British and French cruisers, the British *Dartmouth* and *Bristol* engaging in a running fight with them until they reached a point off Cattaro where the appearance of enemy battleships forced the Allied vessels to retire. The *Dartmouth* was torpedoed during the action, but reached port. The Strait of Otranto was the scene of another raid on December 22, 1916, but the Austrians were driven off by French destroyers.

The Italian navy, reinforced by British monitors, rendered invaluable assistance to the Italian army in its drive towards Trieste. The port of Montfalcone was captured (June 10, 1915) as the result of combined operations of the army and


WHITE SEA
1 SUB. INTERNED
10
4 SUBS. INTERNED
1 SUB. INTERNED
2 SUBS. INTERNED
10 SUBS. BLOWN UP
10
1 SUB. INTERNED
1 SUB. INTERNED
3
Longitude 20° West 15° from 10° Greenwich 5° 0° 5° Longitude 10° East 15° from 20° Greenwich 25°
SUNK IN NORTHERN BARRAGE
NUMBERS IN 3 MEANS EXACT LOCATION UNKNOWN
6 LOST UNIDENTIFIED
4 LOST IN BLACK SEA
3 LOST IN BALTIC SEA

Chart showing the positions of all submarines belonging to the Central Powers sunk or interned during the war.

the navy. This was followed by the capture of Porto Rosega at the head of the Gulf of Trieste. The loss of Montfalcone, an important ship-building base, was a serious blow to the Austrian navy. The navy also aided the Italian army in the Carso region, the Italian and the British warships covering the right flank of the army, and shelling the Austrians from the sea.

The last important naval operation in the Adriatic, and one which is of special interest to Americans owing to the part taken by United States Naval forces, was the bombardment of Durazzo on October, 2, 1918. Detachments from the Italian, French, British, and American fleets operating in that area took part, under the command of Rear-admiral Palladini of the Italian navy. The attacking force consisted of the Italian battle-cruisers, *San Giorgio*, *Pisa*, and *San Marco*, the British light cruisers, *Lowestoft*, *Dartmouth*, and *Weymouth*, supported by eight British and Italian destroyers, four coastal torpedo boats, eight motor boats, and twelve American submarine-chasers from the forces stationed at Corfu. The attacking vessels were protected from molestation by the Austrian fleet by a covering force under command of Rear-admiral Mola. The United States vessels consisted of sub-chaser units *B*, *G*, and *H* and were directed by Captain C. P. Nelson, commanding the forces at Corfu.

A preliminary attack was made by Italian motor-launches on the night of October 1st, torpedoes being discharged against the quays and shipping, which were greatly damaged. This was followed the next morning by aërial attacks supported by the guns of the ships. The main attack, however, began at noon, the Italian vessels taking the initiative, directing their fire on the base at a range of 13,000 yards. The Italians having completed their bombardment, the British light cruisers, under command of Commodore Kelly, opened fire at a range of 11,000 yards. During the whole

operation the little United States boats acted as a screening force and with such efficiency as to gain for them the thanks of the naval authorities of both Italy and Great Britain. They are credited with the destruction of one enemy submarine and the damaging of another.

Vastly more dramatic was the blocking of the harbors of Zeebrugge and Ostend by British naval forces on the eve of St. George's Day,—of good omen to Englishmen,—April 22, 1918. The difficulties attending an operation of this type were well known. Nor did the experiences of past wars offer much encouragement to those who essayed the task. The failure of Hobson at Santiago and of the Japanese at Port Arthur sufficiently vouched for the hazardous nature and doubtful success of such enterprises. Yet this was a war of technique, and perhaps past failures contained lessons of profit to the British. At any rate they essayed it, with the dominant idea that if the scheme should turn out to be a failure it should not be due to lack of preparation.

The Belgian coast had been a thorn in the flesh of the Allies since the war began. The Germans failed to capture Calais and the other Channel ports, but in Zeebrugge and Ostend they obtained bases of operation against British lines of communication nearly as useful. When the Western front had become immobilized, after the Battle of the Marne, the German leaders turned their attention to the Belgian coast and the English Channel. The result was the Battle of Flanders, which began in October, 1914. Outnumbered three to one, the Allied forces fell back, evacuating Bruges, Zeebrugge, and Ostend on October 12th, the German armies taking possession two or three days later. For some reason, perhaps through inability, the Belgians failed to destroy the canals, mole, and other constructions which made a seaport out of the inland city of Bruges. It was a costly mistake, for the enemy obtained, ready-made, a

base of operations of the greatest menace to the coast of England and to the lines of communication across the Channel.

These harbors and canals were too shallow to permit the passage of warships, but constituted a thoroughly safe refuge for destroyers, submarines, and other light craft,—types of vessels best fitted to harass Allied operations. How important the Germans considered these points is indicated by the defenses they established. In fact, the whole triangle formed by Zeebrugge, Bruges, and Ostend was a perfect maze of fortifications. It bristled with guns of every type and size, from the machine-gun to great pieces with a range of twenty miles. So perfect were these defenses that the Germans fancied themselves immune from any attack save, perhaps, aërial bombardment. This impression was doubtless shared by the British, for barring aërial attacks and long-range bombardments by light-draft monitors, which did slight damage, Zeebrugge and Ostend remained undisturbed.

From time to time plans were suggested for "digging the rats out of their holes," but none of them appeared to offer any reasonable hope of success. Hence it was not until late in 1917 that any definite move was made towards this end. The appointment of Admiral Jellicoe as First Sea Lord, November 29, 1916, and the accession of Lloyd George as Prime Minister two days later, were preludes, doubtless, of a more strenuous policy in the conduct of the war. This was particularly evidenced in the naval operations. Merely defensive operations against the submarine, as has been indicated, had proved inadequate. The fact became more and more impressive that unless the submarine could be checked the Allied outlook was gloomy indeed. The intervention of the United States was a tremendous gain, and perhaps decisive, yet it was clear that offensive operations alone could solve the problem.

It had long been known to the Allied navies that Belgian ports were the principal bases of the submarines operating in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This thrust the German naval front virtually three hundred miles nearer the scene of the submarine's operations. It could not only reach the commercial lanes in less time but could remain at sea a greater length of time. It was evident, therefore, that an offensive operation directed against Zeebrugge and Ostend, if successful, would bring most decisive results. The first thing was to find the man capable of directing it.

The man was found. He was Sir Roger Keyes, an officer in the Plans Division of the Admiralty. The plan of attack was drawn up under his direction and submitted to Admiral Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, early in December. After some hesitation on account of the risks involved, especially to the personnel, the decision to try out the scheme had been made before Admiral Jellicoe retired from the Admiralty (December 24, 1917). It was doubtless with this operation in view that Keyes succeeded Vice-admiral Bacon as commander of the Dover Patrol, the unit of the British navy that watched the Belgian coast and the Channel communications.

The thoroughness with which the plans were worked out and all their details rehearsed is shown by the fact that a replica of the Zeebrugge mole was constructed in order to familiarize the men with it and determine in advance the exact service each member was to perform.

Not only should the personnel and material be perfectly adapted to the task but conditions of weather, tide, etc., should also be favorable. These conditions, as stated by Keyes, should be: (*a*) a certain state of the tide; (*b*) calm weather; (*c*) a more or less favorable direction of the wind; and (*d*) absence of fog, with, if possible, a moderate amount of haze. Furthermore the whole operation must be timed so

Rear-admiral William Shepherd Benson, Chief of Naval Operations.

Rear-admiral Hugh Rodman, commander of the American dreadnoughts which made up the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

Rear-admiral Henry Thomas Mayo, commander of the Atlantic Fleet.

accurately that the voyage of 63 miles, of seven hours' duration, should be made as far as possible during the night, both going and coming. How nicely this was worked out is indicated by the fact that the *Vindictive* reached the Zeebrugge mole exactly one minute after the scheduled time. On two occasions prior to April 22d, the flotilla got under way, but each time the attempt was abandoned owing to adverse conditions. Sir Roger Keyes states that although these attempts were abortive, they proved very helpful as rehearsals.

The expedition comprised the following vessels: For attack on the Zeebrugge mole, the old *Vindictive* and two Mersey ferryboats, the *Iris* and the *Daffodil*, selected because of their light draft, great power and carrying capacity; as blocking ships for Zeebrugge Canal, the old cruisers *Thetis*, *Intrepid*, and *Iphigenia*, filled with cement, with the *Sirius* and the *Brilliant* similarly equipped for blocking the canal at Ostend. In addition, the following took part: the British destroyers *Warwick*, *Phoebe*, *North Star*, *Trident*, *Mansfield*, *Whirlwind*, *Myngs*, *Velox*, *Morris*, *Moorsom*, *Melpomene*, *Tempest*, *Tetrarch*, *Termagant*, *Truculent*, *Manly*, *Attentive*, *Scott*, *Ulleswater*, *Teazer*, *Stork*, *Mentor*, *Lightfoot*, and *Zubian;* the French destroyers *Lestin*, *Capitaine Mehl*, *Francis Garnier*, *Roux*, and *Bouclier;* the monitors, *Erebus*, *Terror*, *Marshal Soult*, *Lord Clive*, *Prince Eugene*, *General Craufurd*, *M-24* and *M-26*, the old submarines *C-1* and *C-3* to blow up the viaduct, and the mine-sweeper *Lingfield*. To these were added a force of 80 patrol boats and other light craft, 134 in all. Supporting this flotilla and protecting it from German attack in the rear were vessels of the Harwich Patrol, under command of Rear-admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt.

The men for this hazardous operation were drawn from every unit of the British navy, and it need hardly be stated that the personnel of the force was of an exceptionally high order of efficiency.

The mission was dual, with two distinct objectives in view, the major being the blocking of the Ostend and Zeebrugge channels; the minor, the attack on the mole. The latter, however, was essentially a diversion, its main purpose being to distract the attention of the enemy from the real object of the operation. If the mole and the defenses of the ports could be damaged, well and good, but that was secondary; the success of the expedition depended almost entirely upon blocking the channels.

Another important point was to prevent the Germans from getting wind of the operation. Absolute secrecy was imperative, for a strong cruiser and destroyer attack would have disorganized the flotilla to such a degree that the whole affair would have failed. Every precaution to preserve secrecy was observed. Indeed, up to the moment of sailing many who took part were not fully acquainted with the nature of the enterprise.

It was a very heterogeneous collection of vessels that set out from Dover and Harwich on the night of April 22d. The weather conditions were perfect and the voyage across the Channel was uneventful. Before reaching the Belgian coast the flotilla divided, one force proceeding to Zeebrugge, the other to Ostend. Almost at the predetermined moment the vessels arrived within sight of the mole. The motor boats rushed in advance, laying a smoke-screen, and attacked an enemy destroyer with torpedoes. The success of the whole attack, to a large degree, was due to the effectiveness of the smoke-screen, generated without flames, the fruit of experiments made by Wing Commander Brock, who was killed during the storming of the mole. In the meanwhile, the monitors were bombarding the shore batteries, and so effectual was their firing that some of these were temporarily silenced. It had been planned to have an air attack, also, but weather conditions prevented.

Just at midnight, the *Vindictive*, accompanied by the *Iris* and the *Daffodil*, emerged from the smoke-screen. They were brilliantly illuminated by the German star-shells and became targets for numberless guns of every type. Their course was held, however, and a few minutes after twelve, the vessels were alongside the mole. The *Vindictive* was fired upon by five or six guns on the mole, the fire being returned by every gun on the ship. Efforts were made to anchor the *Vindictive* to the sea-wall of the mole, but these were unsuccessful, so the *Daffodil* was signalled to place her bow against the cruiser and hold her in place. This being done the brows, or landing gangways, which had been constructed on the port side of the *Vindictive*, were lowered and the storming forces from the *Daffodil* and the *Vindictive* went over the top of the mole parapet. The greater part of the gangways were destroyed by enemy fire, and scores of the storming party were killed or wounded. In addition to the difficulty of advancing in the face of a storm of projectiles, the swell of the sea, transferred to the ship, raised the brows high in the air, or slammed them against the mole.

In spite of extreme peril the men did not hesitate, and in a few moments three or four hundred landed and began to fight their way along the mole, covered by a barrage. In the meantime the *Iris* had also pulled alongside the mole in advance of the *Vindictive*, and endeavored to grapple it, but without success. The attempt was abandoned, the *Iris* taking position astern of the *Vindictive*. Only a few of her men, therefore, got into the action before the recall was sounded.

The *Vindictive* was protected by the mole, hence she was hit in the hull but few times. Her superstructure, however, was riddled, many casualties resulting from steel splinters. Captain Carpenter, who directed the operations from a temporary steel shelter on the bridge, had left it for a moment when a shell demolished it.

While these events were taking place, the submarine *C-3* was proceeding towards the viaduct, a portion of the mole near the shore which had been left open to permit the flow of the tide. The submarine approached the viaduct without opposition, under observation of the Germans, who laughed at what they considered a foolish attempt. They evidently thought that the vessel was trying to pass between the piles, a thing they knew to be impossible. However, when the submarine jammed into the viaduct, and its commander, Lieutenant Richard D. Sandford, and the crew hastily disembarked in a small motor-skiff they saw that they had wholly misconceived the purpose of the submarine. They had but a few minutes of doubt, for after a brief period the submarine blew up, destroying thirty yards of the viaduct. The propeller of the skiff had been shot away, hence the crew of the *C-3* were forced to resort to oars. They were scarcely two hundred yards from the submarine when it blew up. The launch was later picked up by a picket-boat, commanded by Lieutenant Sandford's brother, Lieutenant-commander Francis H. Sandford.

The *C-1*, which was detailed to aid in this phase of the operations, was delayed by the breaking of its tow-line and arrived too late to be of service.

As we have noted, these events, impressive though they were, were of secondary importance. They were distinctly a diversion and as such were completely successful. The stirring happenings on the mole directed the attention of the enemy from the old cement-laden cruisers, *Thetis*, *Iphigenia* and *Intrepid* which rounded the lighthouse end of the mole twenty minutes after the attack began. The *Thetis* was in the lead, and picked up the net which guarded the harbor. This fouled her propellers, causing her to run aground near the entrance to the canal. In response to a signal from her, the other vessels pressed ahead into the canal. They finally



Zeebrugge after the British naval raid. *View from a British aëroplane of the block ships in the entrance to harbor.*

grounded and were sunk at a point three hundred yards behind the German shore batteries. In some miraculous way, the crews of these ships escaped by the motor-launches detailed for that purpose.

When the success of this operation was apparent, the signal for withdrawal was given from the *Iris* and the *Daffodil*, the siren of the *Vindictive* having been rendered useless. Accordingly, after a careful search for survivors the flotilla put about for its home ports. The whole affair consumed less than an hour, but it was an hour of the most intense activity. The losses in personnel both at Zeebrugge and Ostend were large in proportion to the numbers involved, but the results more than justified this great sacrifice. The loss in material was extensive but capable of replacement; these men picked from all divisions of the fleet could not be. Yet their sacrifice was not in vain. Aëroplane reconnoissance made after the attack proved, in spite of German denials, that the Zeebrugge channel was effectually blocked to any but the smallest craft. In addition it was silting so rapidly that only the greatest activity on the part of the Germans could preserve that precarious exit. Thus the task that many, some even to the last moment, considered a mad enterprise proved entirely feasible. The failure of Hobson and of the Japanese was not due to the impossible nature of the tasks they essayed but to an underestimate of the difficulties confronting them and to lack of careful preparation. This apparently was the secret of the success of the present operation; as far as human foresight could go, the British navy left no detail unprovided for.

Even so, the plans did not work out perfectly, and the first attack on Ostend was a failure. This it seems was due to two things, unfavorable weather conditions and to the fact that the Germans had moved the buoy marking the entrance to the Ostend Canal 2,400 yards to the east. It may be that

the enemy had some inkling of the coming attack and by shifting the buoy had made it impossible to discover the channel. The wind also shifted about, rendering the smoke-screen ineffective. As a result the block ships grounded and were blown up outside the entrance. The losses in this phase of the operations were very severe, but this did not deter the British navy from making another effort, this time to be crowned by success. The old *Vindictive*, in spite of her tattered condition, a second time was called into service and on the night of May 9, 1918, again made the voyage to the Belgian coast. She was loaded with concrete and explosives and under Commander A. E. Godsal, who had command of the *Brilliant* in the previous operation, was sunk just within the mouth of the Ostend Canal.

The *Vindictive* was guided to the entrance by an illuminating buoy of enormous candle-power. This lit up the ships of the attacking forces, especially the *Vindictive*, which became the target of intense firing. It was at this moment, just before grounding, that the *Vindictive's* commander, Commodore Godsal, was killed by a shell. After the vessel was sunk, the order for retirement was given, the flotilla withdrawing through heavily-mined waters. The destroyer *Warwick* encountered one of the mines, and was severely damaged. However, she reached Dover under tow.

In comparison with the operation of April 22d, the losses during the second attack on Ostend were relatively small, only two officers and six men being killed. The results again were imperfect, but the channel was sufficiently closed to give serious trouble. In fact, it was not navigable until the *Vindictive* was moved, which the Germans had succeeded in doing prior to the date of the armistice.

While it was clear that the events of the summer of 1918 had shattered the military power of Germany and her allies, nevertheless its breakdown came with a suddenness that

surprised the world. That vast fabric constructed with so much patience and such consummate skill seemed to fall in a twinkling like a house of cards. The first to go was Bulgaria, who realized, finally, that she had made a sorry bargain; then Turkey, on October 31st, yielded; followed by Austria-Hungary on November 3d.

Now, at last, Germany stood alone—the real moving force in this conspiracy against the peace of the world. Confronting her was an unbroken barrier of enemies created mainly by her own acts. In view of this fact it is not strange, therefore, that when the German Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, appealed to President Wilson for lenient terms of peace, the President referred him to the Allied military leaders who presented to Germany terms of surrender more drastic than any hitherto recorded in modern warfare.

The Germans raged against the severity of the demands of the Allies, but to no avail. Germany was tempted to continue the struggle but the fear of greater defeats, of invasion of the Fatherland, wherein the Allied armies might treat the German peoples as they had treated the French and the Belgians,—these thoughts, perhaps, had a determining influence. The German will for peace in 1918 was as strong as the will for war in 1914, and so an armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. The Central Powers had invoked the law of the jungle and the rude justice of that law found its expression in that remarkable document.

Especially drastic were the terms that related to the navies of Germany, Austria, and Turkey. It was clearly the intention of the Allies to make it impossible for the Central Powers to make war by sea for a generation. The record of land warfare as waged by Germany and her allies has been marked by many particular crimes, but, barring the acts committed during the first weeks of the war in Belgium and France, few of them have been due to a systematic policy of

inhumanity. They had, in fact, conformed roughly to the rules of warfare waged *à outrance*. On the sea, however, Germany, in her submarine campaign, instituted a system of warfare that set at naught all the gains made in past ages towards humanizing war. Nothing but the assurance of success gained by foul means could have warranted such a renunciation of national honor. Even this now had failed, and in the moment of humiliation and defeat the German people could not protest when confronted by terms of peace that left them shorn of their vaunted sea power.

The naval clauses of the armistice were fourteen in number and contained the following demands: 1. Immediate cessation of hostilities and notification to neutrals of freedom of navigation; 2. Prisoners to be returned without reciprocity on the part of the Allied Powers; 3. Unconditional surrender of all submarines of all types; 4. Internment in Allied ports of 6 battle-cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, and 50 destroyers of the newest type; 5. German minefields to be indicated and to be swept by Allies; 6. Freedom of access to the Baltic; 7. Blockade of Germany to be maintained, Germany to be provisioned by the Allies; 8. All aircraft to be immobilized in certain German bases; 9. Belgian coast to be evacuated and all shipping and material to be left intact; 10. Black Sea ports to be evacuated and all shipping and material to be left intact; 11. Captured Allied merchant ships to be restored without reciprocity; 12. No destruction of any ships or material before signing of peace treaty; 13. German government to notify neutrals that all restrictions on commerce have been cancelled; 14. No transfers of merchant vessels to neutral flags to be made.

Virtually identical terms were presented to Turkey and Austria-Hungary, but the navy of Austria had already been transferred to the Jugo-Slavs, being vested in the South Slav National Council by the Austrian government "without

prejudice to any claims of ownership which may be made in future by non-Slav nationalities."

The Turkish fleet was surrendered at Constantinople in the presence of the Allied naval forces on November 13, 1918. The transfer of the battered *Goeben* in a way seemed to symbolize the passing of an alliance between the East and West that has left its own peculiar trails of wrong.

These events in the Adriatic and the Sea of Marmora, however, were minor in comparison with those that took place a few days later in the North Sea. Nowhere in the history of nations is there record of an episode so singularly humiliating. There have been unconditional surrenders on land and sea, and there have been ships that have gone down with colors flying, but never has there been the yielding of a great fighting machine still intact without striking a blow that justified in some degree its enormous expense in money and effort. It would seem that Germany's adventure into submarine brigandage had utterly destroyed the morale of her fleet proper, or if not, at any rate the proud ships of the *Hoch Sees Flotte* were paying the penalty for the crimes of the U-boat.

The German ships were surrendered in two groups and at different ports: the submarines at Harwich, England, on November 20, 1918; the battle-fleet at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth, on November 21, 1918. The tragic element that marked the internment of the great warships of the German fleet was wholly lacking from the surrender of the submarines. As Archibald Hurd says, in his *Heroic Record of the British Navy:* "Conceived in sin these had been foul from the beginning—they had never been built but as instruments of murder—and it was perhaps fitting that they should be the first of the German fleet to be handed over. Nor had any admiral earned a better right to receive them than Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt."

The submarines were met eight miles out of Harwich where all the members of their crews save those necessary

to run the engines were transferred to transports and their places taken by British officers and men. The U-boats then proceeded to their final anchorages at Harwich. During the course of the day one hundred and twenty of these terrors of the sea found berth in the alien waters of the Stour, becoming a nine-days' wonder to the thousands of sightseers who, a few short months before, had shivered at the thought of them.

There was no glamour about the U-boats and no pomp or element of tragedy in their surrender. Like wild things suddenly tamed they were herded together and left to float, sullenly, at anchor. How different it was at Rosyth! Here a thing happened that stands apart in the chronicles of naval warfare. There could be no more adequate testimonial of the utter failure of Germany's vast plans than this array of powerful ships humbly passing between the silent ranks of their enemy vessels, finally to cast anchor and lower their colors in the harbor of a foe that most of all they challenged.

The arrangements for the surrender had been drawn up by Vice-admiral Sir David Beatty and Admiral Meurer of the German navy two days before, according to which the designated German ships were to be met in the North Sea at ten o'clock on the morning of the 21st by the British Grand Fleet. Preliminary to this Admiral Beatty issued an order defining the relations of the personnel of the Grand Fleet with the men of the German ships. This is a vivid expression of the state of feeling held by the British regarding their foes. It said in so many words that the officers and men of the German navy by their methods of warfare had deprived themselves of all those courtesies due a defeated enemy save the most formal:

"1. It is to be impressed on all officers and men that a state of war exists during the armistice. 2. Their relations with officers and men of the German navy with whom they may now be brought into contact are to be of a strictly formal character. 3. In dealing with the late enemy, while courtesy is obligatory,

## INTERNMENT OF GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET

TWENTIETH, ELEVENTH, AND TWELFTH FLOTILLAS

THIRTEENTH FLOTILLA
*Champion*

TWENTY-FIRST AND THIRD FLOTILLAS

**GERMAN FLOTILLA**
**49 Destroyers and Torpedo Boats**

FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH FLOTILLAS

*Valorous*, *Valhalla*, *Valentine*, *Anzac*, *Grenville*, and *Castor* (Flag)

FRENCH FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQ.
- *Inconstant*
- *Galatea*
- *Royalist*
- *Caledon* (Flag)

SIXTH LIGHT CRUISER SQ.
- *Caradoc*
- *Calypso*
- *Ceres*
- *Cassandra*

FIRST CRUISER SQ.
- *Glorious*
- *Courageous* (Flag)

FIFTH BATTLE SQ.
- *Warspite*
- *Valiant*
- *Malaya*
- *Barham* (Flag)

SIXTH BATTLE SQ. (U. S.)
- *Florida*
- *Wyoming*
- *Arkansas*
- *Texas*
- *New York* (Flag)

SECOND BATTLE SQ.
- *Agincourt*
- *Conqueror*
- *Monarch*
- *Thunderer*
- *Orion* (Flag)
- *Erin*
- *Centurion*
- *Ajax*
- *King George V* (Flag)

FLEET FLAGSHIP
- *Queen Elizabeth* (Flag of C. in C.)

FIRST BATTLE-CRUISER SQ.
- *Renown*
- *Repulse* (Flag)
- *Tiger*
- *Princess Royal*
- *Lion* (Flag)

FOURTH LIGHT CRUISER SQ.
- *Cordelia*
- *Comus*
- *Constance*
- *Cambrian*
- *Calliope* (Flag)

### GERMAN SHIPS

Light Cruisers
- Brummer
- Bremse
- Frankfurt
- Emden
- Nürnberg
- Karlsruhe (Flag)

*Phæton* (Br.)

*King Orrey* (Br.)

*Blanche* (Br.) *Boadicea* (Br.)

Battleships
- Markgraf
- Kronprinz Wilhelm
- Grosser Kurfürst
- Bayern
- Kaiser
- Prinz Regent Luitpold
- Kaiserin
- König Albert
- Friedrich der Grosse (Flag)

*Fearless* (Br.) *Blonde* (Br.)

Battle-Cruisers
- Von der Tann
- Derfflinger
- Hindenburg
- Moltke
- Seydlitz

*Cardiff* (Flag) (Br.)

THIRD LIGHT CRUISER SQ.
- *Birkenhead*
- *Chester*
- *Southampton*
- *Chatham* (Flag)

SECOND LIGHT CRUISER SQ.
- *Melbourne*
- *Sydney*
- *Yarmouth*
- *Birmingham* (Flag)

SECOND CRUISER SQ.
- *Minotaur* (Flag)
- *Vindictive*
- *Furious* (Flag)

FOURTH BATTLE SQ.
- *Bellerophon*
- *Colossus* (Flag)
- *St. Vincent*
- *Neptune*
- *Hercules* (Flag)

FIRST BATTLE SQ.
- *Canada*
- *Marlborough*
- *Iron Duke*
- *Benbow*
- *Emperor of India* (Flag)
- *Royal Oak*
- *Royal Sovereign*
- *Resolution*
- *Revenge* (Flag of 2d in C.)

SECOND BATTLE-CRUISER SQ.
- *Inflexible*
- *Indomitable*
- *New Zealand*
- *Australia* (Flag)

SEVENTH LIGHT CRUISER SQ.
- *Undaunted*
- *Aurora*
- *Penelope*
- *Cleopatra* (Flag)

the methods with which they have waged the war must not be forgotten. 4. No international compliments are to be paid and all conversation is forbidden, except in regard to the immediate business to be transacted. 5. If it is necessary to provide food for German officers and men they should not be entertained, but it should be served to them in a place especially set apart. If it is necessary to accept food from the Germans a request is to be made that it is to be similarly served."

At four o'clock on Thursday morning, November 21st, the Grand Fleet weighed anchor and put to sea to meet the German vessels. The ships steamed out into the mist in two lines, six miles apart, Admiral Beatty leading the northern line on the *Queen Elizabeth*, and Admiral Sir Charles Madden, in command of the southern, on the *Revenge*. At eight o'clock the German vessels were sighted by destroyers in advance, and by ten, led by the British light cruiser *Cardiff*, they were passing the two columns of the Grand Fleet. There were, in all, 69 German ships, consisting of the battle-cruisers *Seydlitz*, *Moltke*, *Hindenburg*, *Derfflinger*, and *Von der Tann;* the battleships, *Friedrich der Grosse*, *König Albert*, *Kaiserin*, *Prinz Regent Luitpold*, *Kaiser*, *Bayern*, *Grosser Kurfürst*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Markgraf;* the cruisers *Karlsruhe*, *Nürnberg*, *Emden*, *Frankfurt*, *Bremse*, and *Brummer*, and forty-nine destroyers. The cruiser *Köln*, broke down on the voyage over and was forced to return to her home port and one of the destroyers was blown up by a mine in the North Sea. Slowly they passed down the lines of steel monsters all in battle trim ready to blow them out of the water at the slightest hint of treachery. Yet nothing untoward happened; the German vessels proceeded silently to their designated anchorages in the Firth of Forth, shepherded by the Grand Fleet. Steaming with the British ships was the Sixth Battle Squadron, the United States dreadnoughts, the *Florida*, *Wyoming*, *Arkansas*, and *Texas*, headed

Crew on the deck of a surrendering German submarine.



The *Vindictive* after returning from the attack on Zeebrugge.

by the *New York*, flying the flag of Admiral Rodman, with Admiral Sims and his staff on board.

The day after, the German ships were dispatched to Scapa Flow, under a strong escort, to remain there until the peace treaty was signed. One final act remained still to be played. On Saturday, June 21, 1919, by order of Admiral Reuter, the interned vessels of the German fleet were sunk at Scapa Flow during the absence of the main British fleet. Thus ingloriously the waters of the North Sea closed over the instruments by means of which Germany had planned to dominate the world.

On the morning of June 22, 1919, the Allied nations were amazed by the report that the German ships interned at Scapa Flow had been sunk at their moorings, Saturday afternoon, June 21. The universal opinion was that the Germans, in committing this act were consistent, even in defeat. The London *Times* in commenting on it remarked with considerable bitterness that "the propensity of the German sailor for scuttling has continued to the end."

The situation of the interned German fleet was unprecedented in the history of warfare. The ships were, in reality, spoils of war, yet the appearance of German ownership had been preserved, the ships being manned by skeleton crews of German officers and sailors—about 1,400 in all. No close watch was kept, the only guard being a patrol service of three British drifters, or light craft, armed with 12-pound guns, and the vessels were screened from direct observation from the anchorage of the Grand Fleet by the island of Cava. Furthermore, it was the policy of the British fleet to make practice evolutions from time to time, one of these being in progress in Pentland Firth during the afternoon of June 21. When the ships returned to their anchorage, a strange sight met the eyes of the British sailors; virtually all the German warships were sinking or had been

beached off the Isle of Hoy. Of the 74 vessels interned, only one battleship, the *Baden*, was afloat, the famous ships of the war, the *Seydlitz*, the *Derfflinger*, the *Von der Tann*, the *Kaiser*, the *Friedrich der Grosse*, and the others having disappeared in water 20 fathoms deep. Three of the light cruisers were beached, and half of the 50 destroyers wrecked. By this act, vessels aggregating 500,000 tons, valued at $300,000,000, were virtually annihilated, and the result was that Germany passed in a few minutes from the second place in rank as a naval power to the fifth or sixth.

The commander of the German maintenance forces, Rear-admiral von Reuter, was placed under arrest. He admitted his responsibility for the sinkings, explaining that he was under the impression that the treaty of peace had been signed, and, as the provisions of the armistice no longer held, he was free, as the representative of the German people, to dispose of his ships as he saw fit. This, of course, was pure "camouflage." He knew, as did everyone else, that the Allies proposed to destroy Germany's naval prestige for an indefinite period. Hence he was under no illusion that the ships would be restored to the Fatherland, and rather than have them apportioned among his enemies he decided upon their destruction. It was a rather drastic solution to a problem that had been widely discussed in the Allied press since the signing of the armistice; various schemes of disposing of the German ships having been proposed, among them that of Secretary Daniels, who suggested that they be conducted to the middle of the Atlantic and there sent to the bottom. The Scapa Flow incident put a sudden end to these speculations and there is little doubt but that, mixed with the general indignation over the act, was a feeling of relief. It was a solution, however bad, of a situation that contained seeds of infinite misunderstandings among the Allied nations.

# CHAPTER X

## The Supreme Venture of the Central Powers

Events and tendencies leading to the great effort of the Germans in the West in 1918. Circumstances favoring the great offensive. German aim, strategy, and tactics. The front of attack in Picardy; the British forces; the organization of the British front; the German forces; the German preparations. Second Battle of the Somme begun with great German attack on March 21, 1918; continuation of the desperate conflict on the 22d and 23d. General retreat of the British. French assistance. The struggle for the line of the Somme south of Péronne on the 24th; critical situation north of the Somme. Further retirement of the British; fall of Noyon, March 25th. Adoption of the unified command by the Allies and the appointment of Foch as generalissimo on the 26th. Continued progress of the Germans on the 26th and 27th. The readjustment of commands. The fruitless German attack on the Arras sector on the 28th. Supreme effort of the Germans before Amiens on April 4th and 5th. The bombardment of Paris. Considerations behind the German offensive in the region of the Lys. Bombardment begun on April 7th and infantry attack launched two days later. Breaching of the Allied front; passage of the Lys by the Germans on the 10th. The perilous situation. Arrival of French reinforcements. Kemmel Hill taken by the Germans. The final episode of the battle, April 29th, and the results. Survey of the general situation. The German offensive in the region of the Aisne; the forces involved. Opening of the attack, May 27th, and the advance to the Marne in four days. Fresh offensive launched on the Montdidier-Noyon sector, June 8th. The situation in Italy. Motives of the great Austro-Hungarian effort. Offensive begun, June 15th. The failure of the attacks in the hills. The initial success and final collapse of the offensive on the line of the Piave. The Italian counter-offensive. Foch's plans. Rapid increase in American forces in France. Von Ludendorff's plan for the renewed offensive on the Marne and in Champagne. The German attack begun on July 14th. Foch's great opportunity.

Through many extraordinary vicissitudes the course of events had been leading the German High Command to a juncture in which it would stake all on a supreme effort to impose its own terms upon the enemy.

The trying situation in which Germany was placed throughout the summer of 1916 had been aggravated by the intervention of Roumania, when von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff assumed the control on August 29th. The Central Powers were fiercely assailed on all sides and at the same

time threatened with a munitions shortage. The crisis was gradually alleviated by the crushing of Roumania, the subsidence of the hostile offensives in East and West, and the vigorous measures taken for extending the civilian service and increasing the production of military material in the interior. But the year closed with the prospect of an even greater enemy superiority in numbers and equipment with the coming of spring. Upon the failure of the German peace proposals, the military and naval leaders overruled the objection of the political chiefs in their demand for unrestricted submarine warfare as the only means of winning victory. They promised decisive results before the United States could effectively intervene in Europe. In expectation of significant results from the submarine operations the front was shortened and a strictly defensive attitude maintained in the Western theater.

The Russian revolution, although long considered possible, came as a fortunate surprise to the German High Command. With the progress of the upheaval, the military aspect of Europe was profoundly changed. Russia ceased to be an active belligerent and the Central Powers were no longer assailed on opposite fronts. But by October, 1917, it became evident that the submarine had failed to achieve decisive results; its only positive effect had been to bring the United States into the conflict. The hostility of the United States made even more strict the control of commerce with Germany through neutral countries. The shortage of food and raw materials in Germany and Austria became increasingly severe. Germany extended its domination in the Baltic Provinces and sent troops into Finland for the purpose of isolating, and eventually controlling, Soviet Russia. The Central Powers intervened in Ukrainia with the expectation of gaining a rich source of supplies. The Germans seized Crimea and converted the Black and the Azoff Seas into



French sappers at work in a tunnel digging a mine.
*From a French official photograph.*

Crater caused by the explosion of a mine.

German lakes. They encouraged the Turks to push across Trans-Caucasia to the Caspian Sea and lay claim to Baku. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Soviet government turned over the disposition of the Russian border lands to the Central Powers. Instead of the relatively modest Hamburg-Bagdad project, Germany was dazzled by the variety and vastness of the possibilities for imperial expansion.

But the disorganized conditions of transportation and the antagonism of large masses of the population of the Ukraine to German methods thwarted the expectation of an extensive importation of food-stuffs from that country. Germany's allies were approaching the limit of their endurance. The infection of Bolshevism threatened to spread to the Eastern German front. American troops in defiance of the submarine blockade were reaching Europe in ever increasing numbers. In spite of grandiose victories and diplomatic triumphs the prospect for Germany was serious. The only chance of final success appearing to the German High Command was to forestall the culmination of the adverse tendencies by striking at once in the West and striking hard. The stage was set for the final act of the great world drama.

Circumstances were favorable for launching a prodigious German offensive in the West. The defection of Russia had released the greater and more vigorous part of the Teutonic forces in the East. The transfer of a comparatively small part of these forces had enabled the Central Empires to strike Italy the terrible blow on the Isonzo. The entire offensive force of Germany could now be marshalled in the West for the campaign of 1918.

Germany and Austria-Hungary had maintained together 147 divisions on the Russian front. About fifty German divisions were transferred from Russia to the Western theater, leaving thirty-two mediocre German divisions in the East. Six German divisions were withdrawn from Italy. In

October, 1917, Germany had had 145 divisions in the West. By the end of the year these had become 155, and by March 21, 1918, when the great offensive was inaugurated, they had risen to 205, of which seventy formed the force of maneuver. The Allied Western front was held by about 176 divisions: 108 French, about sixty British, six Belgian, and two Portuguese. Thus the Germans had at the front a marked superiority of about thirty divisions. Moreover, with half of the recruits of the 1920 class, who were then ready for service, there were 700,000–800,000 German reserves to supplement or replenish the strength of the divisions at the front. This made in all about 2,800,000 combatants available for the West.

German equipment had been greatly increased from the booty captured in recent exploits. It was claimed that 2,800 pieces of artillery and 3,000 machine-guns had been taken from the Italians and that 4,381 pieces of artillery and 9,490 machine-guns accrued from the February advance in Russia.

The convex German Western front, the interior lines of communication, and the intricate network of railways gave the German High Command every advantage for the rapid concentration of troops and for the concealment of its intentions. A main base line of communications ran through Sedan, Mezières, Charleville, Hirson, Valenciennes, and Lille, and from the General Headquarters at Charleville troops could be despatched by radiating routes in the direction of the Argonne, Reims, Soissons, St. Quentin, and Cambrai, and with equal facility from Valenciennes towards St. Quentin, Péronne, Arras, Béthune, and Lille. By means of the excellent system of routes the German attacking forces could arrive unexpectedly and in greatly superior numbers on a given sector chosen and studied in advance. The Allies were kept in uncertainty until the last as to the area where the first great blow would fall. The French had concentrated

in unusual strength between Reims and Soissons, expecting the offensive in that quarter.

Von Ludendorff had become almost a military dictator of Germany, while remaining nominally the subordinate of von Hindenburg. In February the two leaders explained their plan in a secret session of the Reichstag and promised complete victory in the field before autumn. The plan was to crush the right wing of the British armies in Picardy, drive the British and French apart, immobilize the former in a narrow space between the Somme and the Channel, and then turn to break through the latter's front and take Paris. The supreme purpose was to destroy the power of the British and French before the American army could take the field in force.

The German offensive tactics elaborated upon the new system which had been tried out before Riga and employed with sensational effect in the more serious operation at Caporetto. They depended upon secrecy in the preliminary movements and the greatest flexibility in the maneuvering of the units in action. This required very careful training of the troops and very great resourcefulness in all the unit commanders.

The great task of the offensive had thus far been to overcome the defensive organization of the opposing front and to this problem the Germans had devoted the greater original intellectual effort. With this purpose in view, since the beginning of stationary warfare in the autumn of 1914, both sides had striven to adapt the action of the artillery to the requirements of all the successive stages of the offensive. In the artillery preparation for the attack the proper function of the larger artillery pieces, firing at long range, was to interrupt the communications and break up the rear organization of the enemy front. The dispersion of fire of the artillery of longer range made it less suitable for use against lineal targets such as trenches. The lighter field artillery, operating at shorter range, was used for the destruction of the more

prominent redoubts and resistance centers. The destruction of trenches, or the forward works which had been substituted for them, was largely left to the trench mortars of short range and a great variety of sizes and calibers placed in the front lines.

But the difficulty of moving artillery of any of these classes over furrowed ground as the attack advanced had repeatedly caused interruptions which enabled the enemy to reorganize his front on new defensive lines. Furthermore, the coöperation between these forms of artillery and the advancing infantry had never been accurate enough to ensure the suppression of every obstacle in the latter's way. The tank was devised as a means of transporting machine-guns or light artillery under cover of armor in front of the attacking waves of infantry. But the tank had thus far proved too unwieldy to suit all purposes. A need was felt for a light artillery piece, very flexible in action, that could accompany the infantry everywhere, and this demand grew with the increased depth and less clearly defined character of the defensive organizations, as with the substitution of resistance points for continuous trench lines.

The Germans adopted for this kind of accompanying artillery a light, muzzle-loading 76-millimeter trench mortar with rifled barrel .415 meter long, available for either high-angle or flat-trajectory fire, and equipped with recoil brakes for the latter use. It had a maximum range of 1,000 meters and could be mounted on two wheels and drawn by one man or hung on shafts and carried by four men in pairs. Each infantry battalion was to be provided with eight of these pieces by December, 1917.

The German High Command freely avowed its intention of launching a prodigious offensive, expecting perhaps to inspire apprehension in the enemy. The German troops were taught to believe that this would be the final effort and the German press disseminated the conviction that victory was now in sight.

After the operations of 1917 the hostile fronts ran westward along the heights of the Aisne, formed an elbow north of Soissons, and then kept a sinuous but generally uniform course north by west past St. Quentin to La Bassée. Von Ludendorff chose for attack a section of the British front extending from the Oise, just north of the elbow, northward to the region of the Sensée, with an actual lineal development of more than fifty miles. He counted on shattering the British front and driving a German wedge across the old battle-field of the Somme to the crucial center of Allied communications at Amiens. At this time the Third British Army under Sir Julian Byng extended from just north of the Arras-Douai road southward to a point near Gouzeaucourt with eight divisions in line and seven in reserve. On its right the British Fifth Army, commanded by Sir Hubert Gough, which had been recently transferred to this area from the region of Ypres, extended to a point five miles south of the Oise. The forces of the Fifth Army were dangerously attenuated, there being eleven divisions in line on a front of forty-one miles and three infantry and three cavalry divisions in reserve. The greater part of the troops, moreover, were new to their positions.

Throughout much of the section in question the British front ran along a series of low plateaux between the basin of the Somme and the basins of the tributaries of the Scheldt, but possessed no important natural advantages for defense. The forward zone consisted of an outpost line and a resistance line of redoubts about 2,000 yards apart, armed with machine-guns to sweep the intervals. The so-called battle zone was from one-half to five miles behind the forward zone. It was deep, elaborately wired, and studded with redoubts and strong points. The final defensive zone a mile or two further back had not been completed.

On the German side, in March, 1918, the new Seventeenth German Army, commanded by Otto von Below, who had

been leader at Caporetto, five army corps (twenty-three divisions), extended from opposite Arras southwards to Cambrai. The Second German Army of equal strength under von der Marwitz held the front from Cambrai to just north of St. Quentin. South of this as far as the Oise stood the new Eighteenth Army of four army corps under Oskar von Hutier, who first applied the new tactics before Riga. The right wing of von Boehn's Seventh Army south of the Oise participated in the action to some extent. The armies of von Below and von der Marwitz were included in the army group of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, while von Hutier's army formed part of that of the Imperial Crown Prince.

In preparing for the great offensive the German command carried concealment to the last degree of refinement. Very minute rules governed the movement of forces. The last twenty-five kilometers before the front were covered by the troops moving in small groups by night. The concentration of the attacking forces was not completed until the night preceding the battle.

In the initial attack forty-two German divisions were launched against the nineteen British divisions in line. But soon sixty-four German divisions were engaged with the thirty-two divisions of the British Third and Fifth Armies. The German infantry attacked in successive waves, relieving divisions passing from time to time through the divisions in front, so that the forward movement could be evenly maintained. Each German division had twelve field batteries and six heavy batteries. Two regiments of each division stood side by side in the first wave, with the three battalions of each regiment echeloned in depth. Picked shock troops in small groups with the special accompanying artillery pieces and numerous machine-guns formed the van to perforate the outer surface of the British front, so that the infantry could penetrate by a process of infiltration. The field artillery

came close behind the attacking infantry for its immediate support.

At 4.45 on the morning of March 21st the Germans opened a terrible bombardment which extended to certain sections far from the intended front of attack. The British back areas and support lines were deluged with gas shells. The infantry attack, started at different times in the different sectors, was everywhere in movement by ten A. M. Under cover of a dense fog the German shock troops slipped by the British outposts. The condition of the atmosphere prevented communication by visible signalling and in many places the attacking infantry fell upon the British resistance line before its approach had been noted.

In spite of the gallant defense of the British forward zone, the German infantry was almost everywhere in contact with the battle-zone by noon, and at Ronssoy the battle-zone had been deeply indented. The forward zone was almost everywhere lost except in the Flesquières salient opposite Cambrai. At one P. M. the weather cleared and the German aëroplanes coöperated in the attack. By night the British forward zone was reduced to the section within the area of the Ninth Division on the left wing of the Fifth Army. The British still clung to the battle-zone, but in places it had been worn very thin. The greatest advance of the Germans was 8,000 yards in the region of the Oise on the extreme right of the British. The lack of British army reserves made counter-attacks impossible.

The Germans concentrated larger masses for the continuation of the offensive on the second day. During the night the British line was straightened by withdrawal from the Flesquières salient. The 22d also dawned with a dense fog so that the British artillery could not be used effectively against the advancing German infantry. The main effort of the attack was directed against the British Fifth Army, and by the late afternoon on this part of the terrain the British front had been everywhere pressed back to the third

defensive zone. Finally, a gap was opened between the right wing of the Fiftieth Division and the left wing of the Sixty-first and Twentieth Divisions and the Germans poured through. By this time a French division was assisting on the line of the Crozat Canal between the Somme and the Oise; but the last British reserves had been thrown into line and there was no further available help for the Fifth Army. The critical situation necessitated a hasty retirement of the Fifth Army to a partially entrenched bridgehead position just east of the section of the Somme that flows parallel with the battle-front, just above Péronne, and the Third Army had to retreat in conformity with this movement. All through the night of the 22d–23d the wearied Fifth Army retreated under constant pressure. The troops had been fighting without rest for forty-eight hours. During the night General Gough decided to continue the retreat to a position behind the Somme.

Early on the morning of the 23d the troops on the right center began the withdrawal to the left bank of the Somme, a very difficult operation in the face of the immensely superior forces of the enemy. The British front very nearly lost its cohesion. The Germans crossed the Somme at Ham and Pithon but at first made no progress on the left bank. By 3.15 P.M. the British Nineteenth Corps had completed the crossing of the river and had taken its stand on the left bank, while the Seventh continued the line north of the Somme on the old front held by the British before the German retirement in March, 1917. In three days the Germans had advanced a distance of about ten miles at the deepest point.

The French High Command had now agreed to take over the battle-front as far north as the Somme at Péronne, so that the Nineteenth, Eighteenth, and Third British Army Corps, fighting in the order mentioned, from north to south, passed under General Fayolle, but no great increase in fighting strength was immediately available.

MARSHAL FERDINAND FOCH

Generalissimo of the Allied Forces.

Fog still prevailed on the morning of the 24th. The French now had two infantry divisions and one cavalry division in line on the right of the British Fifth Army. Péronne was lost. All day the crossing points of the Somme were hotly contested, but at evening the line of the west bank was still held by the Allies between Epenancourt and the bend at Péronne. The situation of the British was very critical between Péronne and the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the Germans entered Combles and advanced along the high ground which had been so obstinately contested in the First Battle of the Somme. The right and center of the Third Army was compelled to make a comprehensive withdrawal. The left wing of the Fifth Army in desperate plight was forced back along the north bank of the Somme. The Germans were driving a broad wedge into the center of the British front.

The situation became even more critical with the retirement of the British north of the Somme. Thus while the Nineteenth British Corps was still holding the line of the Somme in the sector south of Péronne, the Seventh Corps on its left, north of the river, had retreated several miles further westward and stood, with its left wing receding, obliquely to the stream. The Fifth Corps further north had swung back with its right to conform. Bapaume had been lost, and the front of the Fourth Corps was pressed back in a recess in front of it. The whole front was held precariously without prepared positions and the left flank of the Nineteenth Corps was left in the air, covered only by the narrow bed of the Somme. The Seventh Corps was now incorporated with the Third Army.

On the 25th the attack continued with great fury north of the Somme. The Seventh Corps held its ground against greatly superior forces, but the Fifth gave way and the right flank of the Fourth was turned. The situation was desperate and a retirement was ordered to a line corresponding in

part with the course of the Ancre. The Seventh Corps fell back to a position between the Somme and Albert, the Fifth to the line of the Ancre from Albert to Beaumont-Hamel, and the Fourth to a prolongation of the same general line northward beyond the Ancre.

The Third Army was now being reinforced and the violence of the attack was temporarily abated somewhat from exhaustion and the difficulties of transportation across the desolate region of the old Somme battle-field.

But the retreat of the Third British Army north of the Somme made inevitable a corresponding movement on the south, where the withdrawal of the larger units on a rounding front along diverging lines was attended with the greatest danger of disruption. The Nineteenth and Eighteenth Corps were in serious straits all day, but were finally reinforced by the Third, whose sector was occupied by the French. Noyon fell at dusk and the Allied front east of the town had to be withdrawn south of the Oise. At night there was danger of a break in the front between the French and the British about Roye, between the Fifth and Third British Armies, and between the Fifth and Fourth Corps in the Third British Army zone.

As the Allied front was made to bulge out more and more towards the west and southwest, the lines became ever thinner and the cohesion less secure. Disintegration was imminent. The fortunes of all the Allies were involved in this critical situation. The peril was common and could only be met by the prompt and most effective application of the common available resources in accordance with a single coherent plan. The danger was too urgent for decisions arrived at by agreement in conference between independent leaders, however competent and well-intentioned. The lack of a single guiding spirit in Allied strategy had never been so conspicuous.

Unity of command had been one of the enemy's chief assets, extricating him from more than one perilous situation,

enabling him to strike promptly when and where he would. The Italian disaster at Caporetto had led to the creation of the Military Council of the Allies at Versailles. This was an avowal of the need of closer correlation, but it was not a satisfactory substitute for a unified supreme command.

M. Clemenceau had urged unity of command in many articles. The French in general favored the idea. The Americans were its supporters from the first. Mr. Lloyd George had compromised his position as head of the British government by his emphatic advocacy of it. But the British and Italian armies were reluctant to accept the principle of a superior military command which would belong logically to France. Now, however, Fate left no alternative. Apparently the Allies had to accept the single command or perish.

Therefore, Lord Milner, M. Clemenceau, and Sir Henry Wilson met Sir Douglas Haig and General Petain at Doullens behind the front of the Fifth British Army on March 25th in conference and the proposal for a supreme commander-in-chief, urged by the two statesmen, was accepted by the British and French commanders. There was only one possible choice for the new position, General Foch being universally recognized as the greatest mind among the Allied generals.

It will be recalled that on May 15, 1917, General Foch had been appointed Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. In this capacity he had been installed at the Hôtel des Invalides in Paris as the technical adviser of the government, a function for which he was admirably fitted by reason of his comprehensive vision. At a time when the defection of Russia, by completely transforming the higher problems of the war, created situations demanding the soundest strategical judgment, a perfect understanding between the government and the military command in France, and the closest coöperation of the Allies in the West, it was providential that General Foch occupied the most responsible intellectual

position. As representative of France, moreover, Foch presided in the Military Council of the Allies at Versailles.

It was announced on March 26, 1918, that General Foch had assumed supreme responsibility for the correlation of the Allied forces. The title of generalissimo was given later.

In the meantime, General Gough was improvising a reserve force of motley elements. The Nineteenth Corps, unable to hold its exposed position, was ordered to retire to the line Le Quesnoy-Rosières-Proyant and connect with the Third Army at Bray on the Somme.

On the same day the Germans broke through the Allied front between the Fourth and Fifth British Corps north of the Ancre and reached Colincamps, the extreme point of invasion in that section, but were driven back by the New Zealand Division which had just arrived. On this occasion the light British tank made its first appearance in the field. Von Hutier struck southwestwards in the direction of Montdidier so as to separate the British and French, and by evening he was about five miles from his goal, but his left flank was no longer protected by the Oise. Again the retreat of the Seventh British Corps north of the Somme exposed the left flank of the Nineteenth on the south bank. On the 27th the Germans crossed the river in this interval and threatened the rear of the Nineteenth Corps, which extricated itself with difficulty. On the same day Montdidier was taken.

On the 28th the British Fifth Army was abolished and the divisions which had suffered most were sent to the rear to refit. Certain British forces between the Somme and the French left flank were now incorporated as the Fourth British Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson and the old Fourth Army Staff. The new organization included at first the improvised reserve formation under Brigadier-general Carey, some cavalry, and some divisions which had been transferred from elsewhere to this threatened area.

General Fayolle now commanded a so-called Reserve Group of Armies, consisting of the First French Army under General Debeney, on the line from Villers-Bretonneux to Montdidier, facing in a general eastward direction and the Third French Army under General Humbert between Montdidier and Noyon, facing in a general northward direction, with the Fifth Army under General Micheler between Beauvais, Méru, and Pontoise, in reserve. There were still a number of British units in the zone of the First French Army.

Just as the great German offensive was reaching its decisive stage and the safety of Amiens and the vital line of the Allies' communications was in the balance, von Ludendorff launched a subordinate attack against Arras and Vimy Ridge, hoping to destroy this important bastion and distract the resistance of the Allies in the main defensive zone.

The attacking force was Otto von Below's Army, marshalling five divisions against the Thirteenth British Corps north of the Scarpe, four divisions against the Seventeenth Corps in front of Arras, and eleven divisions on the south against the Sixth Corps.

After a short but fierce artillery preparation, to which the British replied with very effective counter-battery fire, the German infantry attacked early on March 28th and passed through the British outposts, but failed to reach the battle-zone. As the weather was fine the British artillery was largely instrumental in breaking up the advancing waves. After a second bombardment the Germans vainly attacked again late in the afternoon north of the Scarpe. At the end of the day the British counter-attacked and established a new outpost line. Von Below's effort failed and had no perceptible effect on the issue in the chief theater of attack.

In the latter region the Germans intended to direct their crowning movement against Amiens in the sector south of the Somme, but progress there was retarded for a few days

by the difficulties of communication across the wasted zone and the delay in the arrival of the heavy artillery. In the meantime they threw the chief weight of their attack against the French between Moreuil and Noyon, where communications were easier. They won several points on the ridge west of the Avre in the vicinity of Montdidier. But French reinforcements were now arriving in great numbers and the French were able to relieve the British units as far north as the Luce, a tributary of the Avre.

Finally, on April 4th von Hutier made a supreme effort to break through the Allied front in the region of the junction of the French and British and win Amiens. A terrific attack from the Somme southward was launched at 7 A. M. The left wing of the Fourth British Army was pressed back but the right wing stood firm. The French were driven from the angle between the Luce and the Avre to the west bank of the latter and the Germans reached a point within two miles of the vital Paris-Amiens railway. The Germans renewed the battle in this region on the 5th and also attacked in force north of the Somme, between Bucquoy and Dernancourt, but failed everywhere to make important gains.

Coincidentally with the great offensive in the West, the Germans had on March 23d begun the bombardment of Paris with artillery placed in the Forest of St. Gobain at a distance of seventy-three miles. The three pieces carrying on this bombardment were of 210 millimeters caliber. Their barrels were about fifty calibers long. The stupendous range of fire was made possible by the rarity of the atmosphere in the lofty regions traversed by the trajectory. The projectiles were fired at an angle of 50 degrees and rose to a maximum altitude of 23.9 miles. At an altitude of twelve miles the atmosphere is known to offer only one-tenth of the resistance near the earth's surface. The greater part of the trajectory in the present case was comprised in this rarefied upper

region. The weight of the shells was about 330 pounds and that of the bursting charge about 33 pounds. The advantage gained by this sensational performance was slight. The material damage was incommensurate with the expense involved, and the sacrifice of the lives of many civilians in the successive periods of fire added much to the burden of moral obloquy which the Germans had to bear.

Just as operations were approaching the final stage in Picardy, the Germans created a diversion by striking northwest of Lille. Although this attack in the region of the Lys was a subordinate operation, intended in part to draw Allied forces from the vital zone of Amiens, it had probably been an integral part of von Ludendorff's original plan for pinning down the British army in a helpless position along the coast of the Channel. Now when the German forces had reached a position within range of the main Paris-Amiens railway and might reasonably hope to check the flow of French reinforcements northward, von Ludendorff undertook to drive through the British front between Armentières and La Bassée, seize the important center of communications, Béthune, capture the hills north of Bailleul, and compel the Allies to evacuate the Ypres salient and all their positions northward to the sea. British morale would presumably be shaken by the menace to the Channel ports. Both British flanks would be awkwardly compressed. When the British reserves had been diverted to the north it would be time to make the final thrust at Amiens, isolate the British army, and confine it within a narrow space along the Channel.

At this time the Fourth German Army under General Sixt von Arnim extended from the sea to the Lys and the Sixth under General von Quast extended southward from the Lys, both belonging to the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. These were opposed respectively by the Second British Army under Sir Hubert Plumer and the First

British Army under Sir Henry Horne, the Lys in this case also dividing the army commands.

Three British corps held the threatened front of attack from Messines southward to Givenchy, opposite La Bassée, with seven divisions in line, including one of the Portuguese divisions. The two Portuguese divisions were at the time unfit for active service. One had just been withdrawn; the other was to have been relieved on April 10th. All but one of the British divisions had been recently transferred to this area from the region of the Somme, where they had been severely battered in the German onslaught. The two reserve divisions were also fatigued.

Nine German divisions were at first assigned to the new operation. An intense bombardment with a heavy expenditure of gas shells opened between Lens and Armentières on the evening of April 7th and continued throughout the 8th. The artillery preparation gained greater fury on the morning of the 9th.

The attack of the German infantry was launched at 7 A. M. The Second Portuguese Division quickly gave way and the assailants poured through the gap. The Fortieth British Division on the left of the Portuguese was pushed backward until its right wing touched the Lys. The Fifty-fifth on the south was rolled back, pivoting on its right flank, until it faced northward. The Fiftieth and Fifty-first strove to stop the breach, but about 3 P. M. the Germans crossed the Lys at Bac St. Maur and won a strong position north of the river. The Fifty-fifth Division still covered Béthune. The battle surged to and fro over the ruins of Givenchy, the pivotal point on the right of the Fifty-fifth Division, but the place finally rested in the hands of the British.

On the 10th von Arnim's infantry attacked north of the Lys between Frelinghien and Hill 60. By noon they had taken Messines and were nearing the crest of Wytschaete Ridge. But in the evening a South African brigade retook

Messines and cleared the ridge. On the same day the Germans occupied Armentières, captured Estaires on the Lys, and struck out northward from it. On the 11th the forces of both German armies violently renewed the attack on the whole front covered by the operations on the preceding days.

In this situation of great peril, Sir Douglas Haig addressed the following appeal to his troops in an order of the day:

"There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man; there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."

The German command continually threw fresh divisions into the conflict, giving the attack the force of a major operation. Six British divisions had now come to reinforce the threatened zone but could only be gradually brought into line. The Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first British Divisions, nearly exhausted, struggled desperately to defend the Bailleul sector, but continually lost ground. The First Australian Division detraining in their rear relieved them in the evening.

The capture of the two centers of communication, Béthune and Hazebrouck, was imminent. The Germans were approaching the summits of the range of elevations extending from Mont des Cats to Kemmel which command the plain to the north and northwest. They had almost turned the entire Allied position to the north. By the capture of the Kemmel range, Hazebrouck, and Béthune, the German command would have compelled the British to fall back on a line running from Arras northwestward along the course of the Aa to the North Sea. This would have made the bitterly contested Vimy Ridge untenable.

In such a perilous situation the Allies resisted with desperate tenacity. An attack by von Arnim with twenty-one

battalions on a front of 4,000 yards, north of Ypres was repulsed by the Belgians on the 17th. On the next day the Germans attacked on the south side of their new salient, but failed to cross the La Bassée canal. By the 21st French reinforcements had taken over the entire defensive sector covering the Kemmel range.

After a violent bombardment of the entire Allied front from Méteren to the Ypres-Comines canal, the Germans renewed the attack on the crucial Kemmel sector with five divisions on the 25th, hoping to separate the British and the French. Kemmel village and hill were in their hands by ten A. M. and the British were forced back in the region of Wytschaete, but the Allied line was not broken.

The final effort was made on April 29th. At five A. M. the Germans attacked the French and British in dense masses under cover of a thick mist. But the Allied front had been considerably strengthened, and the assailants were nearly everywhere checked or driven back with heavy losses. This was the last important episode in the Battle of the Lys. Desultory encounters followed which gradually subsided into the routine of stationary warfare.

In the region of the Lys von Ludendorff was doubtless drawn by initial success into incurring a far greater expenditure of men than he had at first intended. The German command had used thirty-five divisions, besides the nine that took part in the original attack, but gained none of their chief objectives. Toward the close of the battle it was noticeable that the German tactics were losing much of their new, more supple character and were reverting more and more to dependence on inert mass and weight of numbers.

Before the close of the offensive in the north on April 23d, the Germans renewed the contest on the Somme by an attack on the front of the Fourth British Army with four divisions. The German tanks broke through the British

lines south of Villers-Bretonneux, which was taken but recovered by the Australians the next day. At this time six small British tanks disorganized an entire German brigade. This may be regarded as the last event in the Second Battle of the Somme.

The Germans claimed to have taken 90,000 prisoners, 1,300 pieces of artillery, and 100 tanks in the course of this battle. But their casualties, perhaps about a quarter of a million, were disproportionate to the results actually achieved.

Both the major offensive in Picardy and the subordinate operation in the north had been continued long after the assailants had ceased to profit by the initial surprise, and therefore at a continually increasing expenditure for all gains acquired. The Germans had driven two formidable salients into the Allied front. They had advanced at the deepest point in the region of the Somme, a distance of about thirty-seven miles. But these salients were only useful for a continuation of the offensive. In defensive warfare they were an incumbrance, awkward to hold, needlessly increasing the length of the German front, and laying a vastly greater burden on the service of supply. The German command could not afford to tarry in such positions.

At the beginning of May the Germans were still numerically superior to their immediate adversaries on the Western front. They still possessed the great strategical advantage of interior lines of communication. They were close to vital centers of their opponents' organization. But their trained shock troops had been depleted; many of their divisions were exhausted. American forces were crossing the ocean at a constantly increasing rate.

The Germans could repeat the blows of March and April, but their reserve strength was not unlimited. They had to make the most of their advantages before their numerical superiority was surpassed. An inexorable combination of

factors drove them to fresh efforts. All was to be won or lost. Now as never before success for the Germans depended on a race with time. But there was an inevitable pause in major operations while the German divisions were reformed and preparations were made for the next great move.

During the Battle of the Somme the First American Division, under Major-general Robert L. Bullard, had been transferred to the Fifth French Army. On April 16th this division received a sector under General Débeney, and there on May 28th it carried out the first American offensive operation of the war with complete success. The objective was Cantigny, on the heights west of the Avre, northwest of Montdidier. The plan of attack was very carefully elaborated. The result of the first independent action of an American division was looked forward to as a very important indication. The maneuver was carried through with great accuracy. Cantigny was taken and a German counter-attack repulsed with an American loss of forty-five officers and 1,022 men. The French commander-in-chief and M. Clemenceau visited the divisional headquarters at Mesnil-St. Firmin to congratulate the Americans on their success.

Although the Somme front retained its intrinsic importance, von Ludendorff decided to shift the offensive to another quarter. The Heights of the Aisne, which the German command doubtless knew to be weakly guarded, were chosen for the next zone of attack. In the case of operations on this part of the front, the greatly increased prominence of the German salient in the West would seriously impede the movement of Allied reinforcements from the north. The Allies would have to travel much further around the rim. In delivering a blow southward across the Heights of the Aisne, von Ludendorff aimed primarily at cutting the Paris-Châlons railway, the important line of communications running up the valley of the Marne.

Renault.

Schneider.

*Two types of light, fast French tanks.*

German soldiers with anti-tank gun.

French tank attacking in Champagne.

The two armies which were to execute the new operation were von Boehn's Seventh German Army on the right and Fritz von Below's First on the left, both belonging to the Army Group of the Prussian Crown Prince. There were twenty-five divisions for the assault on a front of thirty miles from the Ailette to a point north of Reims. Many of the units, as, for instance, three divisions of the Prussian Guard, had taken part in the great attack of March 21st.

On the side of the Allies the Sixth French Army under General Maistre held the heights with only the Eleventh Corps of four divisions in line. On its right the Ninth British Corps, which had been brought from the Flanders front for rest, held the California plateau and Craonne, extending southeastward to Berméricourt, with three divisions in line and one in reserve. Beyond the menaced front lay the Fifth French Army in the region of Reims and the Fourth in Champagne.

With only seven divisions in line on a front of thirty miles against twenty-five German divisions, the Allies were hopelessly outnumbered. The assailants were about 250,000, the defenders scarcely 75,000.

The offensive was launched with appalling suddenness, taking the Allies entirely by surprise. The mechanism of German tactics functioned with even greater precision than in the previous attacks. A fierce bombardment opened from the Ailette to Reims at one A. M. on May 27th. The attack of the infantry followed three hours later. Von Boehn quickly swept the French from the ridge. The costly gains of the French offensives of 1917 were lost in a single forenoon. Three French divisions from the reserve vainly strove to hold the south bank of the Aisne and block the crossings. Advancing with irresistible violence, the Germans reached the line of the Vesle by nightfall, an advance of twelve miles. The French front was now pressed back from the Ailette to the Aisne at Condé and ran in a bow-shaped course to the

south of Fismes and then back northeastward almost to the Aisne. The British had stubbornly resisted von Below's attack during most of the day. The Fiftieth Division at Craonne fought heroically with its left flank uncovered by the retreat of the French, but was inevitably forced back. By evening the British had fallen back into alignment from the French right to Berméricourt.

Von Boehn advanced across the Tardenois, an elevated region forming the watershed between the Aisne and the Marne. The border of this district is indented and scalloped by numerous valleys and ravines; its interior is largely an open plateau, intersected by many good roads. The Ourcq rises in this upland region and the Vesle, flowing northwestward towards its point of union with the Aisne, cuts its northern border.

Although von Ludendorff's main primary objective was the Marne, it was important for the Germans, while pushing southward, to broaden the base of their new salient and particularly to drive the enemy from Soissons and Reims, which flanked their communication zone. Accordingly, on the 29th they won Soissons after a bombardment and fierce contest in the streets of the city. Reims remained impregnable. Everywhere else the Allies fell back pivoting on the stationary sector covering Reims.

A renewed attack on the 31st gave the Germans possession of the north bank of the Marne along a front of about six miles in the region east of Château-Thierry. They had taken 30,000 prisoners and advanced thirty-one miles in the center but were cramped on both flanks. The new position was very awkward unless it could be expanded laterally. To this the Germans devoted their efforts for several days and von Boehn gained considerable terrain on the west side of the salient, including Château-Thierry, but the situation remained unsatisfactory. The French were diligently consolidating a new front on the east side of the Villers-Cotterets

Forest, along the line of the Savières, a tributary of the Ourcq, facing the German salient on the west.

The presence of the Germans on the Marne only forty-four miles from Paris at the nearest point was a very disquieting factor for the Allies. Reinforcements were hastened to the threatened zone. Early in June the Second and Third American Divisions arrived in the neighborhood of Château-Thierry. The Third held the line of the Marne between Château-Thierry and Jaulgonne and repulsed an attempt to ford the river at the latter place. On the 10th the Second took Belleau Wood north of Château-Thierry.

Having driven back the Allied front into the two deep pockets in the region of the Somme and that of the Marne, von Ludendorff determined to shatter the intervening front so as to unite the hollows. The embarrassing position of the French on von Boehn's right flank would thus be abolished and the Germans would secure a broad front from which to launch a supreme attack on Paris. This fourth offensive opened with a bombardment at midnight, June 8th–9th, which lasted four hours. At dawn fifteen divisions attacked on the front of twenty-five miles between Montdidier and the Oise.

Von Ludendorff hoped to turn the west flank of a group of hills held by the French south of Lassigny. By the 10th the Germans had advanced six miles in the center and had captured an isolated hill at the western extremity of the group. The retirement of the French left a French salient south of Noyon near the Oise, which Foch evacuated on the night of the 10th–11th. But by this time French resistance stiffened and fighting in the region in question remained almost stationary during the remainder of the month.

Several factors concurred at this time to transfer the chief action temporarily from France to the Austro-Italian front. Chief among these was the impossibility of obtaining immediate Austro-Hungarian aid for the supreme contest in the

West. Since the reluctance of the Austro-Hungarian authorities and other difficulties prevented the despatching of Austro-Hungarian forces in large numbers to France, it was incumbent upon Austria-Hungary at this supremely critical period to keep the Italian army engaged in Italy. Von Ludendorff probably expected that the intervention of the Austro-Hungarians at this particular juncture would claim the attention of the Allies in the interval of more than a month which he needed to fit his troops for the supreme effort in the West, thus producing the cumulative effect of a continual onslaught by the Central Powers and drawing considerable reinforcements from the French to the Italian front.

Far from deterring the Italians from their heroic struggle against the enormous industrial handicap of scarcity of the most essential raw materials, the catastrophe of Caporetto spurred them to fresh exertions. Before the war Italy had imported yearly 11,000,000 tons of coal, producing only 1,500,000 tons at home. But with the interruption of traffic with Germany, the increasing scarcity of tonnage, and the decline of production in England, importation of coal into Italy fell to 5,000,000 tons in 1917, while the development of war industries greatly increased the demand for power. By drastic limitations of consumption, the meager provision of fuel was conserved for the railways and indispensable industries. The heating of habitations was almost entirely abolished. The use of gas for cooking was limited to three or four hours a day. Street lighting was in large part suspended. There was an energetic quest for new sources of energy. Exploitation of lignite and peat was extended and the process of harnessing the waterfalls for the development of electrical energy was greatly accelerated. The Ansaldo works alone obtained a supply of 200,000 horse-power from the Val d'Aosta.

Iron production in Italy rose from 603,000 to 942,000 tons. The number of auxiliary establishments for war industry

increased from 250 six months after Italy's intervention to about 1,800 just before the close of the war, with 700,000 employees. By October, 1918, the plants were turning out more pieces of artillery of all calibers (65–381 millimeters) in a day than during a whole month in 1915. Italy possessed the largest factory of explosives in Europe. The nation was working at high tension while placed on short rations and deprived of heat and light. From a total male population of 8,431,000, eighteen to sixty-five years of age, Italy mobilized a total of 5,182,000 in the course of the struggle.

There was at this time no great disparity in the numerical strength of the opposing forces on the Italian front. The Italians had the advantage of proximity to their bases of supply and better lateral communications behind the lines. The left flank of their position on the Piave was still the chief danger point, but it had been greatly strengthened since the early winter.

Tassone's Seventh Italian Army faced the Trentino salient on the west and was followed on the right by Montuori's Sixth Army. Pecori-Giraldo's First Army continued the Italian front on the eastern side of the Trentino, extending as far as the Brenta. It included the Fourteenth British and Twelfth French Corps. The Fourth Italian Army under Giardino, who had succeeded de Robilant, covered the Grappa sector between the Brenta and the Piave. The new Second Army under Pennella held the upper Piave and the Duke of Aosta's Third Army extended thence to the sea. The Fifth Army under Morone was held in reserve.

Conrad von Hoetzendorff's army group confronted the Italians on the north, with Scheuchensteuel's Army on the Asiago plateau and Krobatin's Army between the Brenta and the Piave. The army group of von Boroevitch occupied the Piave front, with the Archduke Joseph's Army on the right and Wurm's on the left.

It was proposed to begin the Austro-Hungarian offensive with a descent from the north turning the line of the Piave combined with a frontal attack from the east along the line of the Piave itself, using the new infiltration tactics. The chief weight of the assault would be concentrated on the weakest section of the Italian organization, as soon as it had been discovered, and with this in view the Seventh Army was held in reserve behind the Austro-Hungarian Piave front.

The inadequacy of the lines of communication between the Asiago and the eastern bank of the lower Piave hampered coöperation of the two parts of the Austro-Hungarian fronts. Reinforcements could not be shifted easily to and fro. There were fifty-nine Austro-Hungarian divisions in Italy and eleven others on the way thither, but the troops were far less proficient than the Germans in the new tactics. Lack of unity of aim and concentration of effort was conspicuous in the direction of the offensive operations.

From the numerous Austro-Hungarian deserters General Diaz was informed of the general plan of the enemy offensive and particularly of the hour for the commencement of the bombardment, three o'clock on the morning of June 15th. Accordingly, soon after midnight the Italian batteries opened a violent bombardment on the Asiago plateau and in the region of Monte Grappa, interfering with the assembling of the Austro-Hungarian infantry.

The assailants' artillery preparation was begun at the appointed time and continued four hours, gas shells being used for the Italian back areas.

The Austro-Hungarian infantry attacked at seven A. M., chiefly on the section of eighteen miles in the hills from Canove eastward to Monte Grappa and on the section of twenty-five miles along the Piave from Montello down to San Dona di Piave.

The attack in the hills was pressed with the greatest vigor west of the Brenta. In line on the Asiago plateau in succession from left to right stood the Twelfth Italian, Forty-eighth British, and Twenty-third British Divisions, and the left wing of the Twelfth French Corps. The blow fell with the greatest weight against the left wing of the British south of Asiago, where four Austro-Hungarian divisions attacked. The Forty-eighth British Division was pressed back but not seriously endangered.

In the zone of the Fourth Italian Army east of the Brenta the Austro-Hungarians at one moment gained a ridge on the edge of the hills, but were soon driven back. At nightfall the assailants had won no decisive points.

Montello, an isolated hill, 700 feet high and more than seven miles long, rising above the Piave where it enters the plain, was the pivotal point between the northern and northeastern sections of the Italian front. Archduke Joseph, crossing the Piave at Nervesa, seized the eastern extremity of this eminence. Bridgeheads were won at Saletto and Fagare. Wurm crossed the river on a front of about nine miles in the sector of San Dona di Piave, making a considerable advance westward. Thus the Piave position was seriously threatened on its flanks.

By the evening of the 16th the contest in the hills was over. The Forty-eighth British Division had won back the lost terrain. The only remaining chance of success for the assailants was in the plain, but physical difficulties prevented the rapid shifting of Austro-Hungarian troops from the northern sectors to the Piave zone where the offensive still prospered and they could be profitably used. On the 17th the Austro-Hungarian forces advanced on Montello, won a new bridgehead between Folina and Zenson, and constructed many temporary bridges over the Piave. By the 18th there were 100,000 Austro-Hungarians on the right bank of the

Piave and the Italians were threatened with a double flanking movement.

Then the tide turned. A sudden flood brought down a great quantity of logs from the upper reaches of the Piave which carried out most of the temporary bridges, disturbing the service of supply and eventually hindering the retreat. The Italians counter-attacked on the 18th. The Italian Third Army broke through the Austro-Hungarian center to the river bank at Saletto and Zenson and gained ground lower down in the angle between the Sile Canal and the Piave. Gradual gains were made on the next two days and on the 21st Italian soldiers and sailors made their way through the shore marshes and occupied a position on the eastern bank of the Piave Vecchio, the western branch of the Piave where it forms a delta near the sea, thus threatening the Austro-Hungarian left flank.

This move precipitated the complete collapse of the offensive. On the next day orders were given for the general retirement of the Austro-Hungarian forces behind the Piave. The Italians delivered a general attack on the 23d, but in spite of great difficulties the Austro-Hungarian retreat was accomplished in comparatively good order and with relatively small losses. By the afternoon of the 24th the entire western bank of the Piave above the Sile Canal was in possession of the Italians. On July 2d the Italians also cleared the Piave delta.

Altogether, the Austro-Hungarians lost about 20,000 prisoners and incurred about 150,000 casualties. The full significance of the great Italian success on the Piave was not at first apparent. In the light of subsequent events, it may be regarded as the prelude of the Allied march to victory. The crushing of Italy might have made the best Austro-Hungarian troops available for the Western front in the most critical operations of the whole war. With the great numerical

Mount of the large German cannon which bombarded Paris from Crêpy-en-Laonnois.

The Kaiser and the Crown Prince reviewing troops before the German offensive, June, 1918. *The original photograph of this was given to a United States signal corps photographer by a German prisoner of war at Marseilles in August, 1918. United States official photograph.*

superiority acquired through the accession of the Austro-Hungarians, von Ludendorff might have beaten down all resistance in the last great German offensive in July, 1918. General Diaz and the Italians thwarted this expectation. Wearied and underfed, and harassed by internal dissensions, the people of Austria-Hungary were now doomed to a state of abject listlessness and dejection. All the encouragement derived from Caporetto was wiped out in the collapse of the June offensive. Giving up all hope of a military victory, the Dual Monarchy henceforth subordinated every consideration to its one great yearning for peace.

In Germany, enthusiasm had mounted high in the early stages of the great spring offensive of 1918, and although the unexpected delay on the very threshold of final victory had exercised a sobering effect, the German people generally still placed complete confidence in their military leaders. Von Ludendorff still had the nation behind him when he launched a fifth great offensive operation. The German General Staff had persistently discounted American military power. Technical experts had insisted that the United States could not organize great armies or get them across the Atlantic. The German press scoffed at the reported American plans as empty bluster. In the meantime the number of American troops landing in France rose from 117,212 in April to 224,345 in May and 276,372 in June. The days of German opportunity were ebbing fast; the German High Command could scarcely regard the future without serious preoccupation.

Serenely observant amid the shocks and tempest of war, the Allied commander-in-chief had analyzed the German tactics and had elaborated his own system for counteracting his opponents' methods of attack. His system consisted chiefly in a deeper organization of the outpost zone, in a complicated use of the artillery to break up the enemy

concentrations as soon as located, and in sudden counter-attacks to halt the process of infiltration.

The German command had brought up a new army, the Ninth, under von Eben, behind the German front in the Marne salient to exploit the supreme opportunity which they expected to create by the overpowering force of their next attack.

With von Boehn's Seventh Army von Ludendorff proposed to strike southward and southeastward from the Marne salient and cut the main artery of communications between Paris and the East of France, while with the Third Army under von Einem and the First, now under von Mudra, he crushed the Allied front between Reims and the Argonne. As soon as the elevated ground south of Reims, the Montagne de Reims, had been overrun and the line of the Marne had been secured, von Boehn and von Eben would turn westward on Paris. At the same time von Hutier and von der Marwitz would break through the Montdidier sector and converge on the capital from the north. There would follow the culminating phase of operations in which the Allies would be separated, disorganized, and dispersed.

With singular inadvertence von Ludendorff gave little heed to the Allied position fronting his Marne salient on the west, which was being strengthened daily. He evidently underestimated the available reserve strength of the French.

The Tenth French Army under Mangin held the Allied front from opposite Soissons southward to Faverolles. The Sixth, under Dégoutte, extended from Faverolles to Dormans on the Marne. It contained Liggett's First American Corps which consisted of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Divisions of Regulars, the Twenty-sixth Division of the National Guard from New England and the Twenty-eighth from Pennsylvania, and some units of the marines. The Ninth Army under Berthelot stretched from Dormans

to Reims. It contained the Second Italian Corps. The Fourth Army under Gouraud extended eastward from Reims and included the Forty-second American (Rainbow) Division.

Foch planned to stand on the defensive from Château-Thierry eastward and at the crucial moment to assail with the Tenth and Sixth Armies the unguarded right flank of the enemy in the salient.

Von Ludendorff set the line of the Marne from Épernay to Châlons as the goal for the first day of the offensive. There were two distinct sectors of attack, each about twenty-seven miles in length, one from the Marne at Fossoy northeastward to Vrigny and the other from Prunay to the Main de Massiges in Champagne east of Reims. Fifteen infantry divisions were allotted to each sector for the first wave, and a large number of tanks were assigned to the eastern sector, where the terrain was more favorable for their operation.

The fifth great German offensive of 1918 was ushered in by an intense bombardment lasting from midnight until four o'clock on the morning of July 14th, the French national holiday. Foch had obtained information of the German plans and the Allied artillery replied to the enemy bombardment with considerable effect. The German infantry attack followed immediately the close of the artillery preparation.

In general the advance of von Boehn was not resisted with the utmost vigor, because it was no part of Foch's plan to prevent the Germans from engaging themselves in a position south of the Marne. Nevertheless, the brilliant defensive work of the Third American Division barred some of the river crossings near Mezy and the Twenty-eighth American Division in the vicinity of Dormans distinguished itself by its gallant conduct.

The Germans in the western sector of attack crossed the Marne at several points and made a substantial advance on

a front of twenty-two miles. The Second Italian Corps blocked the way from the northwest to Épernay.

For the moment it was more important for the Allies to stifle the German offensive east of Reims. In that sector Gouraud's counter-bombardment seriously deranged the dispositions for the German attack. Rapid counter-attacks checked the infiltration of the assailants. The Germans made slight gains but failed to reach the Allied battle-zone. On the 15th the Rainbow Division repelled seven distinct attacks between daybreak and noon. The German offensive in Champagne was clearly exhausted by the close of that day.

The Ninth French Army resisted stubbornly on the 16th. The right wing held its position on the edge of the Montagne de Reims; the center was forced back about two miles; but the left wing counter-attacked and recovered the ridge overlooking the Marne. Hard fighting on the 17th brought no appreciable change in the general situation.

There were now eight German divisions south of the Marne and their communications across the river were precarious. In fact, the Marne salient as a whole lacked solidity. By a fateful coincidence the Germans had been drawn imprudently into a position closely resembling their situation on the eve of the First Battle of the Marne and in almost the same localities. Once more the rounding German battle-front protruded to the south of the Marne. Again the exposed right flank of the Germans invited attack in the region of the Ourcq. Foch as an army commander had executed a bold and decisive maneuver at the critical moment in 1914. Now as commander-in-chief of the Allies, he was prepared to launch his forces in a supreme venture for the greatest military stake in history.

# CHAPTER XI

## Victorious Response of the Allies

**Rapid increase in the number of Germany's enemies. Disquieting condition of Germany's allies. German food and industrial situation. Political discontent among the masses. Perplexing Russian situation; the Czecho-Slovaks; intervention of the Allies. President Wilson's enunciation of the Allied aspirations, July 4, 1918. The principal strategical problems solved by Foch and his collaborators. Counter-attack launched by the Allies, July 18th; operations of the Tenth, Sixth, Fifth, and Ninth French Armies, including a number of American divisions. German Marne salient wiped out. British and French offensive in the region of the Somme started August 8th; Germans driven back over the old Somme battle-field. The First American Army and the conquest of the St. Mihiel salient. The aims of the final operations of the Allies. The destruction of the Siegfried position.**

One after another the colossal efforts of the German High Command fell short of decisive victory, while potent political and economic tendencies, abroad and at home, combined to undermine the courage of the German people.

The chauvinistic reaction in Germany, disseminated through the propaganda of the Fatherland party, nourished by the collapse of Russia, the sensational victory of Caporetto, and the failures of the Allies in the West, had borne fruit in the triumph of the German military party during the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and had reached the culmination of arrogant confidence in the early days of the great March offensive.

But the glamour of military events only partially obscured the many causes for disquietude. Far from the least of these was the recent vast extension of hostility to Germany.

At the beginning of the war the Germans had invaded Belgium without the slightest justification, because they expected to crush France thereby and win a speedy victory.

In 1917 they turned to ruthless submarine warfare in violation of the most elementary instincts of humanity, convinced that they would paralyze their enemies before the next harvest. In both instances they risked what seemed to be remote possibilities in the pursuit of advantages which promised to be certain and decisive. But both these criminal designs failed to achieve their object by a narrow margin, and the earlier outrage provoked the hostility of the British Empire, while the later enlisted many new enemies and eventually made the defeat of Germany and its allies inevitable.

Following the action of the United States, the majority of the American republics expressed their resentment at German lawlessness on the seas by breaking off relations, or even declaring war against Germany. During 1917 friendly relations with Germany were renounced by Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, San Domingo, and Uruguay. War against Germany was declared by Cuba on April 10th. Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras declared war against Germany, and Nicaragua against Germany and Austria-Hungary, in 1918.

Brazil broke off diplomatic relations with Germany on April 16th in consequence of the sinking of the Brazilian steamer *Parana* without warning. In May, after the sinking of another Brazilian vessel, the *Tijuca*, Congress authorized the president to take measures for protecting Brazilian commerce and to use the German ships interned in Brazilian waters. There were at that time forty-five German craft of 235,591 aggregate tonnage, and four Austro-Hungarian craft of 18,604 aggregate tonnage in Brazilian ports. The German ships were subsequently seized and some were used in the trade of Brazil with the United States and Europe. Finally, on receipt of news of the sinking of the Brazilian ship *Macao* off the coast of Spain, President Braz declared in a message to Congress on October 25th that Brazil was

driven to war by Germany. On the next day the legislative chambers passed unanimously a resolution declaring that a state of war existed between Brazil and Germany. The president officially proclaimed the state of war on the 27th.

In the summer of 1917 the sinking of Argentinian shipping by submarines stirred public feeling in the Argentine Republic. The question of the attitude of the Argentinian government towards Germany was made far more acute by the publication by the Secretary of State in Washington of a series of intercepted despatches sent by Count Luxburg, the German representative at Buenos Aires, to his own government through the medium of the Swedish Legation and the Swedish Foreign Office. The treacherous character and insulting tone of these messages, as well as the irregular method in which they were transmitted, constituted a serious violation of diplomatic privileges and of the hospitality of the country to which the two representatives had been accredited.

A first disclosure of some of these messages made by the Secretary of State in Washington on September 9, 1917, was rendered memorable by the suggestion of Count Luxburg to his own government that in case of destroying certain Argentinian vessels they should be sunk without leaving a trace. Other communications in the same series disclosed later urged the need of a bullying attitude towards South Americans as an inferior race.

The earlier disclosure produced great excitement in Buenos Aires in September, 1917. On the 21st the Senate voted almost unanimously to sever relations with Germany and on the 26th the lower house concurred in this resolution, but President Irigoyen withheld his approval. Count Luxburg was recalled.

In the Old World Siam declared war against Germany and Austria-Hungary on July 22, 1917. Liberia broke off relations on May 8th and declared war on August 4th.

China, after vainly protesting against Germany's ruthless submarine activity, through which a number of Chinese lives had been lost, severed friendly relations with Germany on March 14th. Towards the end of April the military governors pronounced for war and the cabinet favored this policy. President Li Yuan-hung expressed approval of war provided parliament consented. But action by parliament on a war resolution submitted to it on May 7th was interrupted by a serious political crisis and an attempt to overthrow the republic. The existing parliament was dissolved and another was not immediately convened. After the failure of the attempt to restore the Manchu dynasty, when the former vice-president Feng Kuo-chang had assumed the presidency, the government turned its attention again to the question of relations with Germany. Finally a proclamation signed by the president and the vice-president was issued on August 14th, declaring war against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Nations great and small, the primitive and backward, as well as the refined and progressive, condemned most emphatically Germany's recent outrageous conduct. The phenomenal increase in the number of Germany's enemies had little or no immediate military significance. But public opinion in Germany could not remain entirely indifferent to such a consensus of disapproval. In view of the supposed intention of the Entente to maintain a discriminatory commercial policy against Germany after the war, the hostile attitude of such vast outlying regions, great potential sources of raw materials and markets for German goods, was a cause of serious concern. Except on the eastern border of the Central Powers the course of diplomatic events throughout the world was far from reassuring for the German people.

The condition of Germany's allies was also more and more disquieting. Turkey and Bulgaria were repeatedly importuning Germany for military assistance, material, and loans.

American troops attacking before Château-Thierry.

United States artillery in front of the Palais de Justice, Château-Thierry, July 25, 1918.
*United States official photograph.*

During many months Austro-Hungarian morale had been deteriorating. After the collapse of Russia removed the compelling force of imminent peril, evidence of apathy and listlessness in the Dual Monarchy increased rapidly. The Austro-Hungarian army had lacked from the first the tradition, prestige, and common national feeling which were the pride and strength of the German army. The military authorities felt compelled to resort to the doubtful expedient of mixing nationalities in many regiments lest entire Czech or Roumanian units should go over to the enemy. This practice reduced the value of the loyal troops of German and Hungarian nationality and increased the difficulties arising from the variety of tongues within the monarchy. But no precaution availed to prevent widespread mutinies and wholesale desertions. Thousands simply abandoned the army with impunity.

The Emperor Charles seems to have been convinced from the beginning of his reign that an independent existence for Austria-Hungary was possible only with an early peace and reconciliation with the Western Powers. Striking evidence of his eagerness for peace is seen in his now-famous letter to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon, dated March 31, 1917. When Count Czernin had declared to the Vienna Municipal Council, a year later, that he accepted President Wilson's recently enunciated four essential principles of peace and that only the question of Alsace-Lorraine stood in the way of the conclusion of peace with France, Clemenceau by way of retort published the above-mentioned letter which contained the following surprising request of the Emperor Charles to his brother-in-law:

"I beg you to convey secretly and unofficially to Poincaré, President of the French Republic, that I shall support by every means, and using of my personal influence with my allies, the French just claim regarding Alsace-Lorraine."

The publication of this letter led to the resignation of Count Czernin. Subsequently, the meeting of the Emperors Charles and William at the German headquarters was regarded as an indication of the complete subservience of Austria-Hungary to its imperious ally.

The Austrian food situation, at all times trying through lack of an efficient control of distribution and consumption and Hungary's selfish policy, became extremely critical in June, 1918, after hopes of an abundant supply from the Ukraine had faded and before the domestic crop of the current season was available. In Vienna and other large towns the regular bread ration was reduced from 1,260 to 630 grams a week, while the portion of flour was only one-eighth kilogram, to which an eighth of groats, corn meal, or some other substitute was sometimes added. The weekly ration of meat was 200 grams. The potato ration had been reduced from one kilogram to a half. Butter and other fats were only obtainable in quantities of a few tenths of a kilogram weekly. Each individual obtained three-quarters of a kilogram of sugar, a small allotment of coffee substitute, and about one-half kilogram of marmalade monthly. There was only milk for children up to two years of age and expectant and nursing mothers in quantities of one-fourth to one-half liter daily. There was no certain regular opportunity for the purchase of eggs, vegetables, sausage, cheese, and other foods which had formerly been standard articles of diet.

Labor troubles, general disaffection, and the particularistic agitation of the discontented nationalities became more and more acute in Austria-Hungary, and Bolshevistic tendencies began to manifest themselves. Distracted by increasing turmoil and attacks, the Austrian government adjourned parliament on May 4, 1918. Several times the ministry, harassed by violent opposition, offered its resignation, which the emperor refused to accept.

The Austrian Parliament was reconvened on July 16th with even greater confusion. The ministry, which had largely forfeited the support of the Poles by its compliance with the allotment of Cholm, claimed as part of Poland, to the Ukraine, retired on the 22d. Baron von Hussarek, invited to become the new head of the ministry, reappointed all the former ministers except the premier.

Increasing difficulties in Hungary led on January 27, 1918, to the resignation of the members of the ministry, which was reformed by the premier, Dr. Wekerle. Later, on May 10th, the ministry was radically reorganized in consequence of the agitation for suffrage reform. There were violent anti-dynastic and anti-ministerial outbreaks in Budapest on June 22d, and the bitter attacks against the government in parliament showed an increasing and seemingly irrational antagonism to Austria.

The continual shortage of provisions in Germany, while never absolutely critical, taxed the vitality of the people and was one of the factors that drove the High Command to superhuman efforts for obtaining final victory in the field.

Before the war the German people had required an average daily importation of somewhat more than 100 grams of plant food and forty grams of animal food per head. German agricultural production, if maintained throughout the war at the level of peace times, might have sufficed, with systematic distribution and strict economy, to nourish the population without hardship under the blockade. But in reality domestic food production was vitally affected by the interruption in the importation of certain articles, particularly fodder and Chilean nitrates. Other causes added to the difficulty. The ranks of experienced agricultural labor were continually drawn upon for the army and largely replenished by the inexperienced, as by thousands of prisoners of war.

Weather conditions were on the whole rather unfavorable. A prolonged drought in 1915 curtailed the grain crop and

made the hay crop the smallest in many years. The yield of grain was fair in 1916, but potato production fell to 23,000,000 tons, as compared with an average of 53,000,000 in the period just preceding the war. The following year brought a poor grain crop and an especially poor yield of hay, although that of potatoes rose to about 40,000,000 tons.

The German food administration was conducted with a relatively high degree of efficiency, but certain mistakes were inevitable in an undertaking of such magnitude and of such an unprecedented character. These mistakes and the continual and well-known violation of the regulations by the rich and influential irritated the minds of the people. Wealthy profiteers revelled in rare luxuries and disregarded every restriction in their consumption of the rationed commodities, while the poor languished from inadequate nourishment. Clandestine trading in articles of food was so profitable that the imposition of maximum prices that were economically too low regularly drove the corresponding articles from the open market. While few people, if any, in Germany died of actual starvation during the war, the long-continued insufficency so impaired the vigor of the nation that its economic capacity was diminished and people succumbed more easily to the attacks of disease.

Germany felt no serious clothing problem before the summer of 1916. When at length the stocks of raw materials were threatened with depletion, all stores of woolens were requisitioned by the corresponding war bureau and a system of regulations was adopted to govern the distribution of the supply. Individuals were henceforth strictly limited in their purchases of wearing apparel. Old material was made over on a large scale and much ingenuity was employed in applying substances, such as paper or fiber from peat bogs, to novel use in the making of textiles.

In general, as we have seen, the technical situation distinctly favored Germany at the beginning of the war.

Germany's production (including that of Luxembourg) of nearly twenty million tons of iron equalled the output of Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Russia together. The transformation of twenty-three per cent of Germany's coal production into coke furnished an abundance of the by-products, ammonia and coal-tar, which are fundamental elements in the preparation of explosives. In consequence of the interruption of the importation of Chilean nitrate, Germany would have quickly succumbed had not inventions during the previous decade made it possible to obtain the necessary nitrogen compounds required in the manufacture of explosives by extraction from the air. Stimulated by the great emergency, the synthetic production of nitrogen in Germany increased rapidly during the war, although the ever expanding requirements of the munition works left little or no surplus for agricultural uses.

In other respects Germany's original lead was seriously threatened and eventually lost. At the outset the German military authorities could rely on only fifteen private establishments besides their own factories for the manufacture of ammunition. The accumulated supply was doomed to speedy exhaustion by the unprecedented rate of consumption. Additional munition plants had to be improvised and suitable machinery had to be procured hastily by requisition at home and in the occupied territories. Another crisis came at the close of 1916, when the Allies had gained superiority in the most important forms of material equipment and almost superhuman exertions seemed necessary to prevent the collapse of the Central Powers in the following campaign. Again large amounts of machinery were removed from factories in Germany and the occupied territories which were not in use for war production. With the decrease in the output of ore, German metallurgical industry resorted more and more to the use of scrap metal. For this purpose, machinery,

utensils, and used metal in all possible forms were levied upon, both at home and in the occupied territories. At first machinery in the less necessary industrial plants in Belgium and Northern France was broken up and transported to German foundries. In 1917 and 1918 many large works in Belgium were completely stripped to supply raw material for German war-industry. In the year from July, 1917, to July, 1918, 2,670,000 tons of scrap metal were used in German industry, of which 570,000 tons were obtained from the occupied parts of Belgium and France. Eventually raw material of all kinds was taken from the occupied regions in the west without distinction or restraint.

The German authorities claimed that their harsh measures in dealing with labor in the occupied territory were the necessary result of the Allied blockade. Many industries were closed from lack of raw material. The laborers thereby rendered idle, refusing, as it was claimed, to accept other forms of employment, had to be compelled, as an alleged social necessity, to go where there was work to be done, and to engage in agricultural labor or perform tasks for the German army. The Germans claimed that this was justified by article 43 of The Hague order for land operations.

The overbearing spirit of chauvinistic and reactionary circles in Germany, nourished by the favorable events of the autumn of 1917, the collapse of Russia, the futility of the Allied attacks, and the great victory of Caporetto, rose to even greater presumption in the early stages of the 1918 offensive. The Germans were but a few leagues from Paris; the great decision seemed finally at hand. Confident in the strength of their position, on May 2d the reactionary element in the Prussian diet substituted a complicated six-class voting system for the government's proposed suffrage reform by a vote of 235 to 183.

But the arrogance of the oligarchy stirred the smouldering fire of discontent. Popular resentment, added to the

disappointment of German hopes in the East, the troubles in the Ukraine and dissensions with Bulgaria and Turkey, the increasing food shortage, and unexpected delays in the progress of the campaign in France, dampened the warlike ardor of the people.

The German Foreign Secretary, von Kuhlmann, whose policy had been at variance with the harsh methods of the military leaders, created a sensation by a speech during the budget debate in the Reichstag on June 24th. He told his hearers that there was no prospect of a victorious decision on the battle-field; he admitted that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk needed revising; and he declared that Germany sought nothing more than its historical boundaries, sufficient overseas possessions to correspond with its greatness, and freedom to trade with all continents over a free ocean. He said that Germany was willing to consider any honest peace proposal.

Indignantly attacked for these remarks by the chauvinistic groups, von Kuhlmann tried to interpret his words in an inoffensive sense, but was forced to resign on July 10th. Admiral von Hintze succeeded him.

On July 12th, Chancellor von Hertling, replying in effect to President Wilson's Fourth of July address, accused the Allies of aggressiveness and announced that Germany had no intention of holding Belgium permanently, but retained it merely as a pawn in the subsequent dealings with the Allies.

Violence and oppression were creating a situation in the former Russian Empire which was equally perplexing for the Germans and distressing for the Allies. The ferocity of extreme Bolshevism subjected the middle and upper classes to a reign of terror. The gloomy prospect was relieved by one heroic episode of unusually romantic interest.

In recent decades a nationalistic revival among the northern Slavic races of the Dual Monarchy, the Czechs in

Bohemia and Moravia and the Slovaks in northern Hungary, intensified the traditional opposition of these peoples to the government existing under the Hapsburgs. Compelled to enter the field in the Great War against their inclination, thousands deserted to the Russian side. When Russia withdrew from the contest, these Czecho-Slovak forces demanded to be sent to France to continue the struggle. When von Linsingen's rapid advance into the Ukraine threatened to shut off the greater part of them from withdrawal eastward, they cut their way through the enveloping toils. A large number set out at once across Siberia to the Pacific coast, and accomplished the long journey in spite of the treachery of the Bolsheviki and the opposition of armed bands of released German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners.

Other Czecho-Slovak forces became involved in open hostilities with the Bolsheviki, to whom their vigorous nationalism made them suspected.

In February and March, 1918, the British made a naval landing at the terminus of the Murman Railway on the Arctic Ocean, and at Pechenga a hundred miles to the west of it. The British were followed shortly by French and American contingents. The local authorities in that region worked harmoniously with the Allies and the Soviet government was not adverse to this step at first because of Germany's support for the Finnish claim to territory astride the Murman Railway. Attacks from the Finnish border were repelled by the Allied troops aided by local levies.

Later the Bolsheviki demanded the withdrawal of the Allied forces. But the Allies had become convinced that the Bolsheviki were acting as willing or unwilling tools of Germany. Thus it appeared that the Bolsheviki were selling to the Germans great stores of war material sent to Russia by the Allies. So, instead of withdrawing, the latter decided to enlarge the scope of their military occupation.

Sunken road with German dead captured by American troops near Soissons.
*United States official photograph.*

American wounded soldiers receiving medical treatment in a shell torn church, Neuvilly.
*United States official photograph.*

Under a British commander, General Poole, Allied contingents took Archangel by surprise on August 2d. There were then about 120,000 Czecho-Slovaks in Siberia. From Archangel as base for a patriotic revival in the north of Russia, the Allies proposed to push out southeastward and join with the right wing of the Czecho-Slovaks and thus, with the coöperation of loyal bands of Russians in the south, reconstitute the Eastern front against the Germans and their dependents.

The Czecho-Slovaks then controlled most of the Trans-Siberian Railway from the Volga to Lake Baikal. A Japanese contingent under General Otani landed at Vladivostok on August 12th. The first American troops appeared there four days later. The Czecho-Slovaks were recognized as a belligerent nation by the Allies.

In the meantime, foreign interference and the presence of the Czecho-Slovaks roused the extremists in Russia to greater fury. The Bolshevist and German governments had exchanged ambassadors, but Count von Mirbach, the German Ambassador, was assassinated by Social Revolutionaries in Moscow on July 6th and von Helfferich, his successor, only ventured to pay a hurried visit to Moscow, which had become the capital of Soviet Russia. On the 16th the former Tsar and Tsarina and their children were cruelly put to death by order of the Ural regional council.

Meanwhile, the aspirations of the Allies found their noblest expression in the splendid idealism and unquestionable disinterestedness of the President of the United States.

President Wilson reaffirmed the attitude of the United States and restated the war aims of the Allies in a solemn address at Washington's Tomb, Mount Vernon, on the national holiday, July 4, 1918. The essential purposes were fourfold:

1. "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb

the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

2. "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

3. "The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

4. "The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned."

These great objects, he declared, could be summarized as "the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." These great ends could not be achieved by attempting to reconcile conflicting selfish aims of statesmen through a series of compromises, but by an unreserved determination to carry out the desire of the thinking peoples of the world for justice, social freedom, and opportunity.

"I can fancy," he continued, "that the air of this place carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority, but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people, as well as of the people of the United States; and I stand here now to speak—speak proudly and with confident hope—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself. The blinded rulers of Prussia aroused forces they knew little of—forces which once aroused can never be crushed to earth again for they have at heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph."

Before midsummer, 1918, Foch's genius, aided by the experience and study of the foremost Allied generals, had practically solved the great strategic problems of the war. The key to final success lay in the power of neutralizing the enemy's reaction against Allied offensives. With the existing conditions, merely prolonging an attack was not enough. Ludendorff's efforts had failed because he had persisted in each of his great offensives long after the original advantage of surprise had passed, after the Allies had taken effective steps to offset the hostile impact. Thus the price that the Germans had to pay for further gains was always disproportionate to the results achieved.

The way to repress or prevent the defensive reaction and recovery was to strike simultaneously, or deliver blows in rapid succession, against the greatest possible extent of enemy front, so as to make impossible the effectual reinforcing of any menaced sector. If the Germans could have attacked the British in Flanders and the French on the Heights of the Aisne at the same time that they launched the great offensive of March 21st in the direction of the Somme, it would have been impossible to stop them in front of Amiens.

Unequal to simultaneous action on such a comprehensive scale, they lacked at the same time, in spite of the advantage of interior lines, the flexibility of genius or mobility of organization for attaining similar results by a sufficiently rapid succession of attacks in different sectors.

Foch had grasped the lesson of the German offensives. The rapid increase in number of the American forces in France enabled him henceforth to use his reserves with greater boldness. German mistakes, the increasing strength and confidence of the Allies, the resourcefulness of the Allied commanders, and his own accurate judgment enabled Foch to make the Allied efforts practically continuous from July 18th onwards and to direct them in the most effective series of attacks. Attack followed attack with increasing rapidity, first at one point, then at another miles away, until almost the entire Western battle-front was ablaze at once; the German advantage of interior lines was completely neutralized, the shifting of reinforcements to and fro behind the front was thwarted, and the German army reeled and staggered under the blows like a great monster deprived of all power of organic effort.

Development in tactics and equipment was directed towards accelerating and intensifying the effect of attacks. This had been the motive for the adoption by the Germans of light, especially designed, pieces for accompanying the attacking infantry. The French had also made such use of small pieces. But the really distinctive accompanying engine of the Allies, their supremely significant technical innovation, was the small tank, the so-called "whippet" tank of the British and the "baby" Renault tank of the French, which carried two men and a machine-gun. Weighing only seven tons, very flexible in operation, as compared with the ponderous German tank or the larger British tank of the earlier type, the small tank could attain a speed of twelve miles an

hour, climb a slope of fifty degrees, crush barbed-wire, and maneuver in water not more than a foot deep. The use of these tanks to smooth the way for the advancing infantry did away very largely with the necessity for the preliminary bombardment, greatly increasing the measure of profitable gain from each local attack.

Foch was quick to perceive the opportunity offered by the situation of the German forces in the Marne salient. He was ready to exploit it with his tanks, ample stores of ammunition, and great reserve strength.

The actual plan of operations for the Allied counter-attack, destined to change the whole aspect of the campaign, was drawn up by Petain with the collaboration of Fayolle, Mangin, and Dégoutte.

Before July 18th a readjustment of forces on the French front was carried out. Dégoutte drew in his right flank as far as Vaux, a mile west of Château-Thierry, and the French Fifth Army under de Mitry, which had been in reserve, was brought into line between the Sixth and Ninth Armies.

The mission of Mangin's Tenth Army was to crush the enemy lines between the Aisne and Ourcq and push in between Soissons and Fère-en-Tardenois, while Dégoutte's Sixth Army kept pace on the right.

The First and Second American Divisions had a position of honor on Mangin's left wing opposite a critical part of the German lines. The Twenty-sixth American Division stood on Dégoutte's right at the southern extremity of the front of attack. The Third was in the position which it had valiantly defended on the preceding days south of the Marne. The Fourth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, Forty-second, and Seventy-seventh American Divisions came into the battle later.

The front of attack for July 18th extended from Fontenoy on the Aisne to Belleau, six miles northwest of Château-Thierry. Secrecy was maintained with great success in all

the preliminary movements. The Forest of Villers-Cotterets offered convenient cover for the assembling of Mangin's reinforcements.

At 4.30 on the morning of the 18th, without previous warning, the roar of artillery burst forth along Mangin's front and his infantry advanced to the attack, preceded by 321 tanks and watched over by numerous aircraft. The rolling barrage kept time in its measured progress with the movement of the infantry.

The Sixth French Army attacked after a bombardment lasting an hour and a half, a force of 147 tanks clearing the way for the infantry.

One class of aëroplanes soaring to a great altitude engaged the German pursuit planes; others flying at a height of 2,000 meters attacked the enemy observation planes; while still a third class moving low joined with their machine-gun fire in the assault on the hostile lines.

The Germans were taken completely by surprise. Their outposts fell before the defenders had recovered from bewilderment. Immediately the initiative passed from the Germans to the Allies, never to return.

The Tenth French Army was opposed by nine divisions which resisted stubbornly, but were continually forced back. Mangin's left wing was only two miles from Soissons, the crucial junction point, by 10.30 A. M. The American divisions won great distinction by their impetuous valor, advancing five miles on the first day of the offensive. Three days later the first American Division took Berzy-le-Sec and overran the highway from Soissons to Château-Thierry.

The Sixth French Army advanced in general alignment with the Tenth. The Twenty-sixth American Division took Courchamps, Torcy, and Belleau.

The objectives set for the first day were won. German plans were completely frustrated. Henceforth the sole aim of

German strategy was to parry or evade the Allied blows. The tables had been completely turned and July 18, 1918, was to stand out as a memorable date in history.

While German reinforcements were hurriedly concentrated against Mangin's attack, orders were given for the retirement of the eight divisions from the south bank of the Marne. This difficult task was mainly accomplished on the night of July 19–20 under fire of French artillery from the heights flanking the lines of retreat.

Dégoutte, de Mitry, and Berthelot were now coöperating in vigorous concentric action against the foremost sector of the German salient. The Germans resisted desperately to gain time for extricating their masses of troops and material. The Sixth French Army, containing Major-general Liggett's First American Corps (the Third, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-sixth Divisions), drove with telling effect against von Boehn's right flank. At dawn on the 21st Dégoutte's patrols entered Château-Thierry and joined the American troops who had crossed the Marne east of the town.

The Allied forces, advancing to the Marne from the south, were confronted by a serious obstacle in the steep bluffs dominating the north bank. These elevations are broken by numerous valleys descending from the Tardenois plateau into a series of buttresses forming excellent defensive positions. Further northward the plateau is traversed by many wooded ridges offering great advantage for defense. De Mitry crossed the Marne between Passy and Dormans on the 22d. The positions on the north bank were fiercely contested until the French and Americans scaled the steep slopes and the grip of the enemy was loosened by the increasing peril on his right flank.

On the 24th Generals Haig, Petain, and Pershing met in the presence of General Foch at the latter's headquarters in Melun for consideration of the future plan of operations.

The immediate success of the Allied attack, which had been launched after a four months' precarious defensive against the enemy's terrific attacks, animated the spirit of the Allied chiefs and all favored a drastic exploitation of the advantages already won.

The Allies were still inferior in the number of divisions. But they were about equal to the enemy in the number of combatants and were superior in reserve strength, in air service, and in artillery and tanks.

General Foch presented a memorandum setting forth five operations as an immediate program of action, the liberation of the railway along the valley of the Marne, the liberation of the Paris-Amiens railway, the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient so as to free the Châlons-Toul railway, the liberation of the mines in the vicinity of Lens, and the expulsion of the enemy from the vicinity of Dunkerke. These were all local operations with limited, clearly defined objectives. They were principally intended for releasing strategic lines of railway as preliminary steps to the great effort which should expel the foe from France and Belgium and win the war. But General Foch was as yet unable to forecast the final stages. The supreme offensive was not expected before 1920. As late as August 6th, General Foch, in a letter to General Diaz, alluding to the blow inflicted upon the enemy in the Marne salient, declared that this success was not such as to warrant the expectation of a final decision in 1918. But it was the business of the Entente to exploit without delay and most thoroughly the changed conditions and to do all in its power to accentuate the impairment of morale which was sure to result in the Central Empires.

By July 24th de Mitry had established firm bridgeheads on the north bank of the Marne so that his entire army could pass the stream. The Sixth Army advanced between the Ourcq and the Marne in the face of fierce resistance, wheeling

Train of United States machine-guns and supply wagons in a ruined town in the St. Mihiel salient. *United States official photograph.*

United States troops coming from the front lines after being relieved. *Red Cross and Salvation Army huts in the background distributing food. United States official photograph.*

gradually to the left as it went forward, until its front extended from Oulchy-la-ville southeastwards to the Marne at Treloup and its right flank was in close touch with de Mitry's left. On the next day the center advanced to within three miles of Fère-en-Tardenois, a vital center in the German salient.

On the 24th the Twenty-sixth American Division, after reaching the Forest of Fère, was relieved by the Forty-second. The latter advanced against sharp resistance through the forest, came into alignment with the Twenty-eighth and Thirty-second, which had been advancing on its right from the direction of Mezy and Jaulgonne, and struck for the crossings of the Ourcq.

The Germans had clung with reckless stubbornness to their positions on the north bank of the Marne. But late on the evening of the 26th, von Boehn began a comprehensive retirement, when Dégoutte, de Mitry, and Berthelot were converging against him and all the roads northward were threatened by the Allies.

The Tenth and Sixth French Armies renewed their efforts on the 27th. On the 28th the Sixth crossed the Ourcq and occupied Fère-en-Tardenois, de Mitry took Ronchères, and Mangin made gains. The Germans counter-attacked with great violence on the 29th and 30th to give von Boehn time to organize a defensive position on the watershed between the Ourcq and the Vesle. On the evening of the 29th the French Tenth, Sixth, and Fifth Armies stood before this line of elevations where they were held until August 1st. Hill 205 was the key to the right wing of von Boehn's new position.

Mangin attacked with his whole army on August 1st, bringing the greatest pressure to bear with his right. By nine o'clock in the morning he took Hill 205. The Germans counter-attacked repeatedly, but to no purpose. The action of the French Tenth Army turned von Boehn's flank between

the Ourcq and the Vesle. By the evening of August 1st Mangin's advanced guards were entering Soissons.

A general Allied attack followed the next day. The enemy were driven from Soissons and from most of the high ground between the Vesle and the Ourcq. Before the close of the 4th the Allies had almost everywhere reached the line of the Vesle and the Aisne. On the next day American troops entered Fismes and the Allied forces forced the passage of the Vesle at many points and crossed the Aisne east of Soissons.

At this point the Second Battle of the Marne may be regarded as having closed. The deep German salient formed by the terrific offensive of May 27th had been swept away. The front now ran almost straight from Soissons to Reims. It was not expedient at this time to drive von Boehn from the heights between the Vesle and the Aisne by direct attack. Hence operations subsided in this region.

Von Ludendorff had been completely thwarted. His mass of maneuver no longer equalled Foch's. He had definitely lost the initiative. Seventy-four German divisions had been engaged in the area of the Crown Prince's army group since July 15th. The Crown Prince's reserves were practically used up. A continuation of the great efforts to wrest the victory was out of the question. Nothing was left for von Ludendorff but to seek a sheltered position and, by resuming stationary warfare and husbanding his strength, to await some favorable turn or drag out the contest until from sheer weariness the Allies were willing to negotiate on terms not unfavorable to Germany.

The first of Foch's preliminary aims, the liberation of the railway up the Marne valley, had scarcely been achieved when operations for the attainment of the second were set in motion with a promptness of which the enemy probably believed the Allies incapable. This action takes us back to the region of the Somme and the Avre, where during July the

British and French had gradually improved their positions by a series of local attacks.

For the more unified execution of the coming operation, General Débeney was placed under the orders of General Haig on July 28th. The section of front chosen for the new attack, stretching across the Somme, the Luce, and the Avre, was held by the British Fourth Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson and the left wing of the First French Army under General Débeney. The respective zones of operation of the British and the French were separated by the highway from Amiens to Roye. The British sector was about twelve miles in length; the French, originally about four miles in length, was gradually extended on the right as the offensive progressed. The British had seven divisions in line, with four infantry and three cavalry divisions in reserve, on the morning of the attack. Of the eleven infantry divisions, four were Australian and four Canadian. The Allies were confronted by the left wing of von der Marwitz's Second Army and the right of von Hutier's Eighteenth, with an aggregate of seven divisions in line and comparatively weak reserves.

This was a favorable terrain for the operation of tanks, of which Haig had collected no less than 400. The Allies attacked under cover of a fog at dawn on August 8th. An intense bombardment lasting only four minutes preceded the departure of the British tanks and infantry at 4.20. The French went into action twenty minutes later.

Von Hutier was taken completely off his guard. The Germans had expected at most a local attempt to recover Montdidier. The British attack was directly successful in the center, where the Canadians and Australians advanced straight towards their objectives and the British cavalry resumed a normal function of open warfare in pursuing the retreating enemy. Much greater difficulty was encountered on the Allied flanks. North of the Somme the British failed to take

Morlancourt. The French met with serious resistance on the wooded crest above Moreuil, but after this had been won they made considerable progress between the Avre and the Luce. The British penetrated about six miles at the deepest point east of Villers-Bretonneux.

General Foch knew that he was on the direct road to final victory when General Rawlinson and General Débeney made their joint attack on August 8th. By a significant coincidence of judgment, von Ludendorff concluded from the results of the same day that a final victory for Germany was impossible. The counter-offensive of the Allies in the region of the Marne had been a signal victory. But this had been largely due to such an unusually favorable situation as could scarcely occur again, while the Allied victory on the Somme had been won with no greater initial advantages than the Allies could create for themselves on almost any sector by a skilfully concealed attack. Besides, victory was only attainable through a rapid succession of attacks. The victory of the Marne salient was not of itself proof of a capacity to carry out such a series. But the successful attack on the Somme, following immediately the Battle of the Marne, was proof of ability to shift the attack with bewildering swiftness from one region to another many miles away.

On the morning of the 9th the British north of the Somme captured Morlancourt on the Ancre and the high ground beyond it, while progress was made on the Allied center and right. The French under Débeney had outflanked Montdidier the day before, leaving its garrison in a pronounced salient. Then the Thirty-fifth French Corps attacked southeast of Montdidier so as to envelop it. The Thirty-fourth Corps next beyond followed the Thirty-fifth into action. On the afternoon of the 9th General Humbert's Army on the right of Débeney's joined in the offensive. Advancing during the following night, the French cut the line of communications

between Montdidier and Roye so that the German force in the former had to capitulate on the 10th. By evening on that day the British and French were six miles east of Montdidier.

By hurriedly concentrating reinforcements the Germans had now increased their defensive force to sixteen divisions. But German counter-attacks on the 11th failed to stem the progress of the Allies. By the 12th the latter were close to Chaulnes and Roye. In four days the Germans had been practically driven back to the stationary front of 1914–1916. They had used altogether thirty-five divisions in their efforts to resist the Allied offensive.

Von Ludendorff created a new army group under von Boehn between the groups of Prince Rupprecht and the Crown Prince, extending from Albert to Soissons. He hoped to hold the Bapaume Ridge and the line of the Somme above Péronne as an intermediate position to cover the eventual retreat to the Siegfried Line, from which the first great offensive had started in the spring.

But Foch, continuing his unbroken series of attacks on diverse sectors of the front, ordered Mangin to strike with the Tenth French Army between the Oise and the Aisne. This attack, launched on August 18th, advanced one mile along a ten-mile front on the first day. On the 19th Morsain was taken, and on the 20th the assailants approached the Ailette on a front of sixteen miles, taking 8,000 prisoners and 200 pieces of artillery. Thus the French won a firm hold on the western part of the Heights of the Aisne.

Giving the enemy no time to recover composure, General Byng on the 21st attacked with the Third British Army on a front of nine miles between Moyenneville and Beaucourt. The British command wished to turn on the north the German position running through Péronne and along the line of the Somme southward as the prelude to a general attack by the Third and Fourth British Armies.

The British attacking in the morning under cover of a fog surprised the Germans and broke through their front to a depth of two or three miles.

On the next day five divisions of the left wing of the Fourth British Army joined in the action, attacking between Albert and the Somme. Albert was recovered and an advance of about two miles was made. The British were back on the Somme battle-field of 1916.

On the next day the Third and Fourth British Armies advanced together on a front of thirty-three miles against the crucial positions of the great battle two years before, winning again a footing on Thiepval Ridge. On the 24th the crest was cleared. Débeney coöperating on the right occupied Roye on the 27th and reached the line of the upper Somme on the 28th.

Thicker and faster fell the Allied blows. On the 26th General Horne's First British Army attacked on a five-mile front astride the Scarpe in the Arras region with a view to turning the Siegfried Line. The front of attack was gradually extended and in four days the British had penetrated about six miles at the deepest point.

The British offensive was continued in the region of the Somme battle-field. The New Zealanders entered Bapaume on the 29th. The Second Australian Division crossed the Somme on the night of the 30th–31st and captured the enemy trenches east of Cléry. At daybreak they won Mont St. Quentin, the key to Péronne, which was evacuated by the Germans on September 1st.

The Germans, battered and weary, were struggling to secure a transitional position before reaching the Siegfried Line. On their left flank there was no natural defensive line between the Somme above Péronne and the Siegfried Line. On the right flank the Canal du Nord afforded cover for the defensive.

On September 2d the right wing of the First British Army, consisting of the Twenty-first Division and the First and

Fourth Canadian Divisions, and the left wing of the Third British Army, made up of the Fifty-second, Fifty-third, and Sixty-third Divisions, attacked the Drocourt-Quéant switch line on the section of nine miles between the Sensée and Quéant, which was defended by eleven German divisions. The assailants broke through this very strong position, compelling their opponents to take refuge behind the Canal du Nord.

The whole German front from Flanders to the Aisne was wavering, when Rawlinson and Débeney, continuing the calculated sequence of attacks with the same relentless rapidity, crossed the Somme south of Péronne on September 5th and advanced seven miles on the following day. Débeney retook Ham. Mangin, acting in concert, occupied the lower part of the Forest of Coucy and advanced eastward along the Heights of the Aisne. By the 10th the Germans were back on practically a straight line from the Scarpe to the Aisne. But their front was seventy miles shorter than on July 14th, so that it could be as closely held with thirty less divisions.

It had long been understood that the expulsion of the Germans from the St. Mihiel salient should be the first great independent operation of the Americans. With this in view the First American Army was organized under General Pershing's personal command on August 10th. The staff of the First American Army, installed at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre on August 22d, was removed later to Neufchâteau.

Four American army corps were now ready for active operations and fifteen artillery brigades, forming the divisional artillery complements, had left their instruction camps and were prepared to support the infantry in battle. Seven heavy artillery regiments were also available.

On August 30th General Pershing took command of the First American Army sector extending from a point east of Verdun southward, around the tip of the St. Mihiel salient, and then eastward through Apremont, Xivray, and

Pont-à-Mousson, to Port-sur-Seille, five miles east of the Moselle, a total distance of about fifty miles.

The First American Army contained fourteen American divisions, the Second French Colonial Corps, and the Seventeenth French Division. Seven of these American divisions had already been actively engaged in driving the Germans from the Marne salient. There were in all about 1,000,000 American combatants in Europe at the beginning of September.

The sharp protrusion in the German front embracing St. Mihiel and a tiny section of the Meuse was the lingering relic of the unsuccessful attempt in 1914 to pluck Verdun from the French front as with a closing pair of pincers. The retention of this salient had been favored by the configuration of the elevations which enclosed an avenue of communication leading to the most prominent part, where the German position cut the railway along the Meuse and menaced the line from Bar-le-duc to Nancy. The French had been too much engrossed in more pressing undertakings to spare forces to attack the St. Mihiel salient in overwhelming force. It remained as a sort of outer bastion for the defense of Metz and Briey and it weakened the strength of Verdun.

On September 11th the German front for a distance of about forty miles from Fresnes to Pont-à-Mousson, comprising the salient, was held by six divisions, or about 50,000 combatants, with two German divisions and an Austro-Hungarian division as local reserves. These forces were part of the army group of von Gallwitz.

The evacuation of the salient had been ordered and was under way when the American blow fell. On the American front of attack, about forty miles in length, the Fifth American Army Corps (the Twenty-sixth American and Seventeenth French Divisions), under Major-general George H. Cameron, was deployed against the western side of the

Directors of artillery fire, under gas shell fire, receiving instructions by telephone from an observer *The information received directed the fire of the battery, one of the guns of which is shown in the illustration below United States official photograph.*

Field artillery in action. Battery A of the 108th United States Field Artillery under fire of enemy gas shells at the time the photograph was taken. *United States official photograph.*

salient; the Second French Colonial Corps confronted the extremity; and the Fourth American Corps (First, Forty-second, and Eighty-ninth Divisions), under Major-general James T. Dickman, and the First American Corps (Second, Fifth, Ninetieth, and Eighty-second Divisions), under Major-general Hunter Liggett, stood opposite the southern side of the salient. The Fourth and First Corps, which were to execute the main attack, had each a division in reserve. There was an army reserve of two divisions. The French Independent Air Force and French corps and army artillery were placed at the disposal of the American army. Altogether about 2,900 pieces of artillery were available for the attack.

The mission of the Second French Colonial Corps was to engage the Germans at the extremity of the salient, while the Americans advanced against both sides on lines converging back of the Heights of the Meuse. Mr. Newton D. Baker, American Secretary of War, was present with General Pershing during the attack.

The plans were carefully drawn and accurately carried out. The enemy defensive works and back areas were subjected to a terrific bombardment from one to five o'clock on the morning of September 12th. The fire of the long-range guns reached the station of Metz. The infantry with a large number of tanks attacked at the close of the bombardment. Progress was rapid; by ten A. M. the Americans were in Thiaucourt, intercepting the railway used as line of supply by the Germans. In the following night elements of the Twenty-sixth Division, which had started in from the west, pushing rapidly forward, met at Vigneulles patrols of the First Division, which had taken part in the main attack from the south, thus closing the salient.

After three days of fighting the Allied lines ran from the old Verdun front at Bezonvaux southeastward, passing two

miles east of Fresnes, three miles east of Thiaucourt, and thence to Pont-à-Mousson. The Americans took 16,000 prisoners and 443 pieces of artillery of all calibers at a cost of 7,000 casualties.

The successful execution of an independent operation on a large scale by an American army under its own command proved the efficiency of the American organization, confirmed the confidence of officers and men, and increased the assurance of the Allies.

The Germans still held many dominating positions in the battle zone such as the hills east of Ypres, the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, the St. Gobain elevation, the main part of the Heights of the Aisne, and the elevations northeast of Reims. Their Seigfried position was still intact and was being extended southeastward in the so-called Hunding and Brynhild zones, covering the vital line of communications formed by the lateral railway through Sedan and Longuyon.

But the Allies had released their own most important connecting lines along the front. The British and French were close to the Siegfried Line. By September 24th the stage was set for a comprehensive attack, inaugurating the supreme offensive.

The general nature of the final operations was determined by the convex outline of the German front in Northern France and Belgium and the main features of the German system of communications. The rugged region of the Ardennes lying behind the middle of the arc formed by the German front separated the stream of German military traffic into two distinct channels narrowing down to practically single railway lines on the north and south sides respectively. The northern system through Liége served all parts of the military zone as far south as St. Quentin; the southern system through Luxembourg and Longuyon supplied the front from Laon to Lorraine. Liége and Longuyon were keys to

the German systems of supply. The main lateral railway line through Longuyon and Sedan was the most susceptible part of the whole German war zone.

In view of these conditions, the general offensive of the Allies was to take the form of a double enveloping movement combined with pressure on all parts of the German front. More particularly, the British and French in front of the Siegfried position would drive the German center back on the rugged region of the Ardennes, while Gouraud and Pershing fought their way to the vital line of communications running through Méžières and Sedan. While the Allies battered all parts of the German front, Haig in the center and Gouraud and Pershing on the right would strike the deadly blows.

At the close of operations in the St. Mihiel salient the greater part of the American forces were shifted to the left bank of the Meuse, and on the night of September 25–26 they quietly took the place of the French on the front from Vienne-le-Château in the Argonne eastward to the Meuse. The American battle-front was formed, in order from left to right, of the First Corps, composed of the Seventy-seventh, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-fifth Divisions in line, and the Ninety-second in reserve; the Fifth Corps, from Vauquois to Malancourt, made up of the Ninety-first, Thirty-seventh, and Seventy-ninth Divisions in line, and the Thirty-second in reserve; and the Third Corps, consisting of the Fourth, Eightieth, and Thirty-third Divisions in line, and the Third in reserve. The army reserve consisted of the Eighty-second, Twenty-ninth, and First Divisions. Sedan, the great objective point of the Americans, was thirty-four miles north of the Franco-American line in the Argonne. The Germans, who feared an attack in the direction of Metz and Briey, confronted the American sector east of the Meuse with eleven divisions, but had only five in line against the Americans west of the Meuse.

The artillery of Gouraud and Pershing commenced a furious bombardment at 2.30 A. M. on the 26th. The infantry of the two armies attacked simultaneously at 5.30 on a front of forty miles.

The Germans were taken by surprise. Gouraud's six corps quickly won the front positions of the enemy and made an average advance of about three miles on the first day over successive ridges. The Americans crossed Forges Brook, on the old Verdun battle-field, took Malancourt and Béthincourt, and penetrated the region of wooded hills beyond. By evening they were in Varennes, Montblainville, Nantillois, and Dannevoux and had advanced from four to seven miles. All the positions of the foremost defensive zone were taken by the 28th.

This great Franco-American attack between the Suippe and the Meuse was followed closely by a British blow in the region of Cambrai. There the Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal afforded additional protection for the German positions. From Vendhuile southward to Bellicourt the Scheldt Canal passes through a tunnel 6,000 yards long. The defensive works of the Siegfried position were altogether from five to seven miles in depth.

General Haig proposed to deliver the main attack with the Fourth British Army between Vendhuile and Holnon. But as the Siegfried position was strongest there, he decided to distract the enemy's attention by striking first with the First and Third Armies on the front from Vendhuile northward to the vicinity of Douai.

On the night of September 26–27 the German front and back areas were subjected to a heavy bombardment between the Sensée and St. Quentin. At 5.30 on the morning of the 27th Generals Byng and Horne advanced to the attack with the Canadian, the Seventeenth, Sixth, and Fourth Corps on a front of thirteen miles athwart the Arras-Cambrai and

Bapaume-Cambrai roads. Four divisions forced the line of the Canal du Nord in the region of Moeuvres, where it was easiest to pass, and then spread out laterally to overwhelm the defenders on the adjoining sectors. By evening the British were everywhere across the Canal du Nord and had taken 10,000 prisoners and 200 pieces of artillery. On the 28th they reached the Scheldt Canal at Marcoing and menaced Cambrai on the north and south.

On September 28th forces under command of the King of the Belgians, the Belgian army, part of the Third French Army, and the Second British Corps, attacked on a front of twenty miles from a point south of Dixmude to Ploegsteert Wood. Von Arnim could oppose only five divisions and the Allied operation met with immediate success. The Belgians, led by the king in person, took Zonnebeke and Poelcappelle and cleared Houthulst Forest. On the east and southeast the British passed the limit of their gains in the Third Battle of Ypres. On the right they gained the crest of Wytschaete Ridge. The next day they reached the Roulers-Menin road east of Ypres. General Plumer occupied the entire left bank of the Lys as far as Comines.

On the 28th Mangin and Guillaumat struck between the Ailette and Vesle. When General Haig commenced his crowning attack on the strongest part of the Siegfried position south of Vendhuile on the 29th, the entire Allied front from the sea to the Meuse was engaged in a titanic effort to crush the German front.

After pounding the German positions in a two days' bombardment, General Haig attacked between Marcoing and St. Quentin at 5.50 on the morning of the 29th. The attacking forces were the right wing of the Third British Army, the Fifth and Fourth Corps, from Marcoing to Vendhuile; Rawlinson's Fourth British Army extending twelve miles from Vendhuile to Holnon, composed of the

Third British Corps, the Second American Corps, and the Ninth British Corps; and the left wing of Débeney's First French Army from Cérizy to St. Quentin.

Débeney crossed the St. Quentin-La Fère road. On Rawlinson's right the Forty-sixth British Division passed the Scheldt Canal and carried the German defenses by storm in the vicinity of Bellenglise. The Thirtieth American Division broke through the main Siegfried position and took Bellicourt and Nauroy. The Twenty-seventh American Division took Bony. In the area of the British Third Army the Sixty-third Division crossed the Scheldt Canal and reached the southern outskirts of Cambrai while the Canadian Corps forced its way to the northwestern edge of the city. St. Quentin and Cambrai were both outflanked.

The Allies pushed on with overpowering force. On the 30th the Fourth British Army poured through the gap in the main Siegfried defenses. Renewing the attack on October 1st the French broke through the Siegfried position and entered St. Quentin, while the British were engaged in a fierce struggle on the outskirts of Cambrai.

The greatest battle in history was now raging on the 250-mile front from the sea to the Meuse. The Germans on the western front, reduced to 183 divisions, were struggling desperately to avert the threatening catastrophe. On the region west of Reims, Guillaumat had cleared the terrain between the Vesle and the Aisne. On October 2d the Second American Division with the French stormed Blanc Mont in front of Reims and drove the Germans from positions that had dominated the city for four years. The British occupied La Bassée the same day and on the 3d the Germans evacuated Lens. The Australians broke through the innermost line of the Siegfried zone between Beaurevoir and Fonsomme. By the 7th the entire front of the Siegfried position had been swept away. In the course

of these operations beginning September 26th thirty British and two American infantry divisions and one British cavalry division had engaged and defeated thirty-nine German divisions, taking 36,000 prisoners and 380 guns.

In the meantime the French and Americans were struggling ahead on the front between the Suippe and the Meuse, where the Germans had been greatly reinforced. The Americans fought their way step by step through the impenetrable thickets of the Argonne Forest where the enemy lurked in countless hidden machine-gun nests.

In these days the famous incident of the "lost battalion" showed the dauntless spirit of the American forces. Major Charles W. Whittlesey in command of 463 men from two battalions of the 308th infantry reached a given objective late in the afternoon of October 3d only to find that the American troops on both sides had failed to make the expected progress and that he was surrounded. This detachment, assailed on all sides, defended itself with the greatest steadfastness, curtly rejecting the invitation to surrender, until it was relieved on the 7th, when only 194 men were still intact.

The offensive had been renewed all along the American front on October 4th and steady gains were made against stubborn resistance. The Americans took Consenvoye and Haumont Woods east of the Meuse on the 7th and cleared the Argonne Forest on the 10th.

The Second American Army was formed on the 9th. General Pershing handed over the immediate command of the First American Army, consisting henceforth of the forces west of the Meuse, to Lieutenant-general Hunter Liggett. The Second American Army east of the Meuse was placed under Lieutenant-general Robert L. Bullard. The First Army now consisted of the First, Fifth, and Third American, and the Seventeenth and Thirtieth French Corps; the Second Army, of the Second Colonial French and Fourth

American Corps. The Sixth American Corps was subsequently added to the Second Army. The headquarters of the Second Army was at Toul.

With feverish haste the Germans had been completing their Kriemhilde position behind the front which the Americans had taken. This new position ran from Grand Pré through Landres to the Meuse, which it reached a little south of Dun-sur-Meuse. It was continued east of the Meuse by the new German line which ran along the base of the former St. Mihiel salient. The Kriemhilde position, the last defensive barrier in front of the vital German line of communications from Longuyon to Sedan, was two and one-half miles in depth.

On October 14th the Fifth American Corps penetrated the front of the Kriemhilde position in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter. Progress was necessarily slower while the German defenses were being gradually overcome. By the 23d the Third and Fifth American Corps had advanced to the line of Bantheville. The Americans were constantly gaining fortitude while the German spirit of defiance steadily waned.

General Haig launched the culminating movement against the Siegfried position on October 8th. The Allies now had a great preponderance of strength on this part of the front. General Byng on the left and General Rawlinson on the right attacked on a seventeen-mile front from Cambrai to Sequehart. General Débeney coöperating in the attack added four miles to the Allied battle-front on the south. The remainder of the Siegfried position was quickly swallowed up. The Fifty-seventh British Division forced its way into the southern part of Cambrai. The Allies advanced from three to four miles, capturing more than 10,000 prisoners and over 200 pieces of artillery on this day.

During the night the Canadians entered Cambrai from the north, joining the Fifty-seventh Division in the streets.

United States infantry charging on path made by a tank through barbed-wire entanglements near Beauquesnes, Somme, September, 1918. *United States official photograph.*

German prisoners taken in the first day of the assault on the St. Mihiel salient.
*United States official photograph.*

The general advance was continued on the 9th, the British cavalry harrying the retreating enemy. On the 10th the Germans found temporary lodgment behind the river Selle, delaying temporarily the progress of their antagonists. Meanwhile the British further north were advancing and compelled the Germans to evacuate Douai on the 17th.

The British offensive which overwhelmed the Siegfried position was regarded by the highest French authorities as a model operation, a classic example of the military art, faultless in plan and execution.

At 5.35 on the morning of October 14th King Albert directed an attack along the whole Allied front in Belgium from the North Sea to the Lys with the Belgian army on the left, the Third French Army and some Belgian elements in the center, and the British Second Army on the right. By the 16th the British had won the left bank of the Lys from Frelinghien to Harlebeke and had forced the passage of the stream at many points, the French and British had advanced eighteen miles eastward, and the Belgians had intercepted the railway between Ostend and Bruges. This compelled the Germans to evacuate Ostend which they had held just four years. Three days later the Allies held the entire Flemish coast and had reached the frontier of Holland.

Lille outflanked on both sides by the Allies was now untenable. Von Quast fell back between the Lys and the Sensée with the British Fifth Army in close pursuit and on the 17th the British entered Lille.

The Germans had begun the evacuation of the St. Gobain elevation between the Oise and the Aisne on the 11th. Two days later Mangin's vanguard entered Laon. The Germans were falling back on the Hunding position running along the Serre and the Sissonne and thence southeastward to the Aisne and prolonged to the Meuse by the Kriemhilde position, the last prepared defenses for the vital lateral railway

in the region of Hirson. By the 15th Mangin and Guillaumat were in touch with the Hunding position.

General Haig's task was now to force the German position on the Selle and intercept the railway between Valenciennes and Hirson. General Rawlinson attacked on the 17th with the Ninth British, Second American, and Thirteenth British Corps, and Débeney coöperated on the right. After resisting desperately for two days the Germans were forced back of the Sambre and Oise Canal. General Byng attacked on the British left the next day, forcing the passage of the Selle. The Germans fell back on the line of the Scheldt and the Mormal Forest. General Haig's plan was to press through the opening of ten miles between these two barriers and thus outflank them. The British renewed the attack on the 23d on a front of fifteen miles facing northeastward with their backs to the right bank of the Selle. On the 24th other troops to the right joined in the action, extending the battle-front northwestward to the Scheldt. The British advanced six miles in two days encroaching steadily upon the crucial area between the Mormal Forest and Valenciennes.

The world had been amazed at the series of terrific blows by which the German armies in the West had been so mercilessly bruised and pounded. In an unbroken series of attacks Pershing and Gouraud had crushed the Champagne-Argonne-Verdun front, Haig had broken through the main defenses before Cambrai, the British and Belgians had cleared the long-contested positions in Flanders, Mangin and Guillaumat had advanced between the Ailette and Aisne, and reached the Hunding line, the Americans were breaking through the Kriemhilde defenses, and the British and French had swept completely over the Siegfried lines.

# CHAPTER XII

## The Collapse of the Quadruple Alliance

The real significance of the breaking of the Bulgarian front. Events leading to the intervention of Greece on the side of the Entente. Allied offensive launched on Macedonian front, September 15, 1918; rapid progress of the Allies. Surrender of Bulgaria and abdication of King Ferdinand. Events in Transcaucasia. Perilous situation and surrender of Turkey. Italian offensive on the Venetian front. Collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Army. Discouragement of German High Command. President Wilson's address in New York on September 27, 1918. Resignation of Chancellor von Hertling and accession of Prince Maximilian of Baden to the Chancellorship, ostensibly to liberalize the German government. Germany's appeal for President Wilson's mediation. Correspondence between German and American governments. Shifting attitude of the military chiefs in Germany. Subversion of the Imperial régime in Germany demanded by President Wilson as the preliminary condition for peace negotiations. Significance of von Ludendorff's power and meaning of his resignation. Acceptance of President Wilson's demands by German government, October 27th. Revolution in Germany and flight of the Kaiser. Final events on the Western front. Armistice signed on November 11th; terms of the armistice. Occupation of the left bank of the Rhine by the Allies.

The contention of those who maintained that the Allies would find the key to final victory in the Near East received superficial justification in the fact that the front of the Quadruple Alliance was first completely broken in Macedonia and the surrender of Germany's vassals in the Balkans preceded that of their master. But to argue from chronological sequence alone in such a matter would be to obscure the true relation of cause and effect. For in reality, just as Bulgaria had intervened on the side of Germany from selfish motives, when the prospects of the Central Powers were brightest, so this power was the first to abandon its alliance as soon as a German victory had become clearly impossible. The Allied offensive on the Macedonian front in September, 1918, struck a vulnerable part of the enemy organization. But it

was the critical situation of the German army in the West that made the Quadruple Alliance susceptible to attack in this particular region.

The indispensable condition for a decisive offensive by the Allies in Macedonia was the elimination of Greek royalist plots and machinations in the rear. The hostility of King Constantine and his followers had been a chief cause for the failure of the Allies to support the Roumanian offensive of 1916 by an effective diversion in the south. The Greek situation was aggravated by the irresolute conduct of the Allied governments, which irritated Greek susceptibility by demands incompatible with the strict letter of Hellenic independence, but could not bring themselves to take decisive action.

M. Zaimis resigned as Greek Prime Minister in August, 1916, and was succeeded by Professor Lambros.

Exasperated by the ignoble surrender of Kavala and the Fourth Greek Army Corps, the Venizelists in Salonica repudiated the authority of King Constantine, declared their independence of the Athens government, and established a Committee of National Defense. This new government was recognized by Greek Macedonia, Crete, and most of the other islands.

Late in 1916 the Allies presented a number of demands to the Greek government, including the surrender of certain munitions supplies, the use of certain Greek railways, and the expulsion of pro-German agents from Greece. Upon the refusal of the Greek government to grant these demands, French and British marines were landed at Piraeus on December 1st and advanced into the southern quarters of Athens. A violent outbreak was thus provoked. The marines were attacked and eventually withdrew. Venizelists in Athens were made the victims of outrageous treatment by ruffians suborned by royalist agents and a large number of them were thrown into prison without any form of trial.

In consequence of these acts of violence, the Allies blockaded Greece and sent further specific demands to the Greek government. After the latter had replied twice in a temporizing spirit, the Allies presented an ultimatum on January 13, 1917, which was ostensibly accepted.

The Greek government released the Venizelists, disbanded the reservists' leagues, and transferred many units of the Greek army to the Morea, and on January 24th offered its formal excuses to the representatives of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Italy for the excesses of the preceding December 1st.

But the Allies demands were not fully complied with and German political agents still lingered in the country. On May 4th, Prime Minister Lambros resigned and was succeeded by M. Zaimis, a change in men that betokened no fundamental change in policies.

At last the Allies resolved to deal resolutely with the Greek problem. M. Jonnart, an able French administrator, arrived in Greece on June 11, 1917, as commissioner for the Entente. A conference with Prime Minister Zaimis was followed on the next day by the abdication of King Constantine in favor of his second son, Prince Alexander. The ex-king left Greece on the 13th, and on the same day the new ruler accepted the resignation of M. Zaimis and summoned M. Venizelos to form a ministry.

The determination of the Allies bore immediate fruit. The new Greek government announced its complete adhesion to the cause of the Allies and declared war on Germany and Bulgaria on July 2d. Greece ranged itself beside the protecting powers in the cause of freedom and democracy. On July 7th, the king convoked the chamber which had been elected on May 29, 1915, and had been so arbitrarily dissolved by the ex-king.

By September, 1918, uneasiness and suspicion had dampened Bulgaria's ardor for the cause of the Quadruple Alliance.

The failure of repeated German offensives in the West and later the continual German retrogression were increasingly disquieting. The question of the final disposition of the Dobrudscha was a continual source of irritation. King Ferdinand, with characteristic foresight, had altered his cabinet in a manner that might tend to propitiate the Allies in case of necessity.

General Sarrail had been recalled from the command of the Allies in Macedonia in December, 1917. He was succeeded by General Guillaumat, former commander of the Second French Army in France. French and British units had been withdrawn for the great struggle in France, but the Greek army had been greatly increased. In June, 1918, General Franchet d'Esperey succeeded Guillaumat, who returned to the Western front. The positions of the Allies on the Macedonian front were gradually improved and the Italians strengthened their forces in Albania.

With the favorable turn of events in the West, the Allies believed that the increasing embarrassment of Germany would react upon the loyalty of Germany's allies in the Near East so that a vigorous blow against Bulgaria and Turkey offered fair prospects of important results. It was now the policy of the Allies, also, to assail the enemy simultaneously on all fronts.

At the beginning of September the forces of the Quadruple Alliance on the Balkan front in their order from east to west were the Second and First Bulgarian Armies east of the Vardar; the so-called Eleventh German Army, which was really Bulgarian in composition but with German commander and staff, west of the Vardar; and an Austro-Hungarian detachment in Albania. Facing these there were, in the same order, the British and the Greeks east of the Vardar; the French and the Serbian armies between the Vardar and Monastir; an Italian detachment followed by a French detachment west

of Monastir; and an Italian army under General Ferrero in Albania. There were in all four divisions of British, nine of Greeks, eight of French, five of Serbians (including some Jugo-Slav regiments), and one and one-half of Italians in Macedonia, besides Ferrero's army in Albania.

Uskub was the crucial center of communications behind the enemy front. But an offensive movement confined to the narrow valley of the Vardar was doomed to failure. It was necessary to turn the hostile positions commanding this main thoroughfare. With this in view the Allies planned their first attack between the Tcherna and the Vardar against the heights north and northeast of Lake Ostrovo.

The Serbians and French attacked the Bulgarians along a front of seven miles on September 15th, and on the next day the front of attack was extended to sixteen miles. A Jugo-Slav regiment reached the vital position on a crest at an altitude of 6,000 feet. By the close of the 17th the Allies had penetrated the Bulgarian front to a depth of twenty miles and the front of attack was extended to a width of eighteen miles. On the 18th the Serbs crossed the Tcherna.

The British and Greeks attacked east and west of Lake Doiran on the same day. The whole Allied front was in action from the Vardar to Monastir, where the Bulgarians retreated in disorder. The Bulgarian front gave way on the 22d in the region of Lake Doiran also. The Italians pressed from the west into the bend of the Tcherna east and northeast of Monastir and on the 24th French cavalry entered Prilep.

The Bulgarian forces west of the Vardar were now in a very precarious situation. Their only suitable line of communications with the rear was the road from Prilep to Uskub, and the capture of the Babuna Pass by the Serbians divided the Bulgarian forces, which were now completely dispirited and demoralized. The entire Bulgarian defense crumbled and gave way.

On the night of the 26th a Bulgarian staff officer appeared at the British headquarters asking in the name of General Teodoroff for a suspension of hostilities for forty-eight hours pending the arrival of delegates to discuss conditions of peace. This request was referred to General Franchet d'Esperey .who refused to grant a cessation of hostilities but agreed to receive the delegates. On the evening of the 28th General Lukoff, commander of the Second Bulgarian Army, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, and M. Radeff, an ex-minister, reached the chief headquarters at Salonica and obtained an armistice the next day on condition of the immediate demobilization of the Bulgarian army, the evacuation of all Greek and Serbian territory occupied by the Bulgarians, the placing of all Bulgarian means of transportation at the Allies' disposal, the opening of Bulgarian territory to Allied operations, and the occupation of strategic points in Bulgaria by British, French, and Italian troops. The armistice was signed at Salonica on the 30th.

In the meantime the British had taken Strumnitza, gaining access to the heart of Bulgaria, and the Serbs had captured Veles on the 27th. Three days later French cavalry rode into Uskub.

On October 4th King Ferdinand, thoroughly discredited, abdicated the throne of Bulgaria in favor of the Crown Prince Boris and departed into Hungary.

Northward through Serbia the Allies advanced rapidly and almost without opposition. On the 12th the Serbs entered Nish. The Italians advancing northward along the Albanian coast in conformity with the general movement of the Allies, occupied Elbasan on October 7th and took Durazzo on the 14th. On the 19th the Allies reached the Danube and by the end of the month the Serbs were back in Belgrade and practically all the country to the line of the Save and the Danube had been cleared of the enemy.

The Caproni triplane in America. Type of aëroplane used in bombing raids. Propelled by three motors with a total of 900 horse-power, capable of travelling eighty miles per hour, and carries three guns and about 2,700 pounds of explosives.

Adjusting bombs on a bombing plane. *United States official photograph.*

After years of tedious stationary warfare and the succession of futile attacks against a seemingly impregnable barrier, the time came when the spirit of resistance perished, the hostile front collapsed, and with bewildering suddenness the whole face of the situation in the Balkans was changed. The Quadruple Alliance was broken, the Balkan peninsula was opened to the Allies, and the Turkish Empire, isolated and threatened with attack on both sides, was wavering on the verge of surrender.

The progress of the British in Mesopotamia had been long arrested by the uncertain situation created by the Bolshevist upheaval in Russia and the failure of Russian coöperation on the Armenian front.

Transcaucasia declared its independence and set up a republic in November, 1917. But the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, as we have seen, gave over Batum, Kars, and Ardahan to Turkey. Transcaucasia broke up into an Armenian, a Tatar, and a Georgian republic. The Georgians appealed to Germany against the Turks, whose greed was not restrained by the terms of the treaty. Germany, eager to use Georgia as a tool in winning control of Baku and the oil-fields, sent General Kress von Kressenstein with German troops to Transcaucasia. But in spite of German remonstrances Turkish troops advanced beyond the limits set by the treaty. In May, 1918, Russian Turkestan declared itself a Soviet republic. Turkish imperialism hoped to take advantage of a rapidly spreading wave of Pan-Islamism for the realization of far-reaching dreams of expansion based on the Tatar element in Transcaucasia and Turkestan.

The British in Mesopotamia undertook against desperate odds to interpose a barrier between the Turks and Central Asia. The route from Bagdad to the Caspian Sea was kept open in spite of raids from both sides.

A Bolshevist government in Baku was overthrown on the night of July 25–26 and the new element in power, controlling

the shipping of the Caspian Sea, sent for aid from the British against the Turks. Sir W. R. Marshall, who had succeeded Sir Stanley Maude in command of the British in Mesopotamia, sent a small force under Major-general Dunsterville, which was transported by sea from Enzeli in Persia to Baku.

The British repulsed a Turkish attack before Baku on August 26th, but soon reduced to serious straits through the unreliable character of the local levies, they found it necessary to evacuate Baku on September 14th and succeeded in returning to Enzeli. The Turks entered Baku, but their possession was of short duration.

Distracted by these events the British had made only gradual gains in the main field of Mesopotamia. But now the amazing drive of the Allies was launched on the Syrian front, in which between September 19th and the end of October the British and their associates advanced three hundred miles northward, taking more than 75,000 prisoners and great quantities of supplies, destroying the Turkish armies in Syria, cutting the Bagdad Railway, and driving the enemy back beyond the Cilician Gates.

In unison with this offensive one British column moved up the Tigris in Mesopotamia and another advanced on a route parallel with the first but further to the east. The column advancing along the river compelled a force of 7,000 Turks to surrender on October 30th, and General Marshall entered Mosul without opposition on November 3d, after Turkey had already given up the conflict.

Sultan Mahomet V, a mere puppet in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress, had died on July 3d. The surrender of Bulgaria and the swift succession of British victories in Syria staggered the Turkish government. Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha resigned on October 10th. On the next day Izzet Pasha took over the Ministry of War and Tewfik Pasha became Grand Vizier.

With invasion from the west through Bulgaria actually impending, the Turkish government appealed to President Wilson on October 14th, but he made no reply. Consequently General Townshend was released from captivity and sent to the headquarters of the admiral commanding the British naval forces in the Aegean to ask that negotiations be opened for an armistice. The armistice was signed at Mudros on October 30th and hostilities ceased the following day. The terms of the armistice provided for the opening of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea, the repatriation of Allied prisoners, the demobilization of the Turkish army, the severing of all relations between Turkey and the Central Powers, and the placing of Turkish territory at the disposition of the Allies.

In the latter part of October the Italian armies on the Venetian front joined in the great Allied drive for victory. There were fifty-one Italian, three British, two French, and one Czecho-Slovak divisions and one American regiment on the main Italian front. In consequence of the cessation of hostilities with Russia, the Austro-Hungarian forces were then numerically superior to the Italian. But the Italians possessed the great advantage of a compact position with interior lines of communication. The Sixth Italian Army, including the Forty-eighth British Division, occupied the Asiago plateau. The Fourth Army under General Giardino, including one French division, held the front from the Brenta to the Piave. The Twelfth, under General Graziani, including one French division, was stationed along the Piave as far as Montello. The Eighth, under General Caviglia, with one French division, held Montello. The Tenth, consisting of the Eleventh Italian and the Fourteenth British Corps under Lord Cavan, was posted in the sector below Montello. From the right flank of the Tenth Army down to the sea stretched the Duke of Aosta's Third Army.

The plan for the Italian offensive consisted in a diversion by the Fourth Army and a main attack by the Twelfth, Eighth, and Tenth for driving a wedge through the enemy flank, to sunder the sectors in the mountains from those in the plain.

As a preliminary measure a British force crossed the swollen channel of the Piave in the night from the front of the Tenth Army to the Grave di Papadopoli, an island about three miles long in midstream, and surprised the defenders. The possession of this island greatly facilitated the bridging of the river.

On October 24th the battle was begun on the front of the Fourth Italian Army between the Brenta and the Piave. The artillery preparation for the main operation was begun at 11.30 on the night of the 26th. On the following morning the Tenth Army attacked from the Grave di Papadopoli across the eastern channel of the river. The assailants had won a footing on the further shore by evening and bridges were hastily thrown across. At the same time the Twelfth Army was pushing up the valley of the Piave towards Feltre. The footing of the Eighth Army on the eastern bank was for some time precarious, but its situation was saved by assistance from the Tenth.

The defense collapsed on the 29th and the assailants advanced rapidly. The Eighth Army entered Conegliano. On the 30th Lord Cavan reached the Livenza. The Allies had driven the wedge completely through the enemy front and the Austro-Hungarian retreat became a rout. On the same day the Duke of Aosta's army crossed the Piave and joined in the pursuit. The Austro-Hungarian organization dissolved and thousands seized the opportunity to desert. On November 4th Lord Cavan crossed the Tagliamento. The Austro-Hungarian army was rapidly degenerating into disorganized hordes. History scarcely offers an authentic

parallel to this sudden subversion of a vast military establishment. In a few days the assailants captured 300,000 prisoners and 5,000 pieces of artillery and Austria-Hungary ceased to exist as a military power.

As late as the middle of July von Ludendorff had insisted that the German offensive would bring final victory. But the prospect changed with dramatic suddenness. As early as August 14th, six days after the British attack in the region of the Somme, von Ludendorff confessed in an Imperial war council at Spa that Germany could not win a favorable decision in the field and advised that negotiations for peace be commenced on the first favorable occasion.

Austria-Hungary, so long weary of war, urged an immediate appeal to all the belligerents, but this proposal was overruled by the German leaders, who preferred to institute negotiations through a neutral mediator, and insisted upon waiting for a favorable moment.

On September 10th von Hindenburg, while adhering to the German idea of mediation by a neutral, advocated immediate steps for negotiation.

As though impressed by the imminence of peace negotiations, President Wilson took occasion in a speech delivered in New York on the eve of the opening of the fourth American war loan, September 27th, to proclaim the following five essential conditions for a just peace:

"First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

"Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

"Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

"Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

"Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world."

A German war-council on September 29th decided that President Wilson should be invited to call a peace conference at Washington for the diseussion of terms of peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points and to secure an immediate armistice. Two days later, von Ludendorff declared: "The troops are holding to-day; but what may happen to-morrow cannot be foreseen."

The military party insisted impatiently upon the immediate formation of an ostensibly popular government that might favorably predispose the Western Powers to German overtures. On September 30th the Kaiser accepted the resignation of Imperial Chancellor von Hertling and the Foreign Secretary von Hintze and announced his desire "that the German people shall coöperate more effectively than hitherto in deciding the fate of the Fatherland."

The choice for a new Chancellor fell on Prince Maximilian of Baden, the cousin of the reigning grand-duke and at the time president of the upper house of the diet of Baden. He was fifty-one years of age, agreeable in manner and address, and had made specious profession of liberal political views. He accepted the Chancellorship and with it the distasteful duty of soliciting President Wilson's mediation, although he

deprecated the precipitation urged by the military leaders, suspecting that it would be regarded by the enemy as proof of Germany's exhaustion.

Under pressure of the High Command the German government despatched a note to President Wilson through the Swiss government on the night of October 3–4 in the following terms:

"The German Government requests the President of the United States to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all the belligerent states of this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. It accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress on January 8th and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27th, as a basis for peace negotiations. With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air."

A similar communication was sent by Austria-Hungary at the same time.

On October 5th Prince Maximilian explained to the Reichstag that his policy was based on the principles expressed in the Reichstag resolution of July 19, 1917, and in Germany's reply to the Pope's note of August 1st of the same year. He supported the idea of a League of Nations with equal rights for all, weak and strong. He advocated the restoration of Belgium and would not permit the Russian treaties to stand in the way of a general settlement.

The Imperial ministers in Berlin suspected that von Ludendorff's pessimism was the result of a nervous collapse and not warranted by facts. They were only deterred from summoning other generals for consultation by fear that von Ludendorff would resign at this proof of mistrust and thus shake the confidence of the army and of the public.

In replying, October 8th, to the German note, President Wilson asked for more explicit information as to the Chancellor's meaning. Would Germany accept the terms proposed in the President's speeches and was the purpose of discussion merely to decide the practical details for the application of these terms? The President declared that he could not propose a cessation of hostilities to the associated Powers as long as the armies of the Central Powers were on Allied soil. He asked whether Prince Maximilian merely spoke for the constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted the war.

Von Ludendorff told the German government on the 9th that the front might give way at any time. The total collapse of the Siegfried position intensified the German government's eagerness for a cessation of the struggle.

In a note of October 12th the German government reiterated its acceptance of the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8th and his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice and declared that its only object in entering into discussions was to agree upon the practical details of the application of these terms. It declared that the Central Powers were prepared to comply with the demand of the President for the evacuation of the occupied territory and asked for a mixed commission to arrange the particulars. It asserted that the German government which was now taking this step towards peace had been formed in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag and that the Chancellor spoke in the name of the government and people.

The German government accepted without any reluctance the stipulated evacuation of the occupied territory in the West, which would mean the releasing of the German army from a perilous situation unmolested. The true interests of the Allies demanded that an armistice should be granted

William II at Spa. *The former Emperor, wearing the uniform of an Austrian general, awaiting the arrival at Spa of the Emperor of Austria to attend the Imperial War Council on August 14, 1918, at which von Ludendorff admitted the Central Powers could not win a favorable decision in the*



William II in the garden at Amerongen. *The former Emperor, bearded and gray, is seen walking with General Dommes. The photographer made this while concealed on the top of a passing hay wagon about eleven months after William II left Germany.*

only on terms practically equivalent to surrender. A cessation of arms on any other terms would inevitably improve the situation of the German army. Nevertheless, the German note as a revelation of the critical state of affairs created general amazement and uneasiness throughout Germany.

The American government replied on the 14th. After noting Germany's acceptance of the Fourteen Points and the President's subsequent declarations as bases of peace, the American note defined the nature and scope of these conditions in the following well-considered language:

"It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

"The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea,—and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal

from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped not only of all they contain, but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

"It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the fourth of July last. It is as follows:

"'The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotency.'

"The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing."

On the 18th the President informed Austria-Hungary that the recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks as a *de facto* belligerent government by the United States and the aspirations of

the Jugo-Slavs compelled him to modify the tenth of his Fourteen Points which alluded to that country. For he was no longer at liberty to accept the "mere autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but had to insist that they, and not he, should judge what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian government would satisfy "their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations."

The pressure of the German High Command had impelled the German government to its hasty steps for peace. But when the German nation had been deeply affected by this revelation of the critical situation after four years' insistence on the certainty of German victory, the military leaders, actuated in part, perhaps, by the desire to shift responsibility onto the civilian chiefs and doubtless in part by a temporary slackening in the progress of the Allies, showed a tendency to draw back and disclaim the government's policy.

In a general conference of the civilian and military chiefs the former viewed the military prospect with marked skepticism, while von Ludendorff displayed a much more hopeful attitude. From the reports of the military authorities it appeared that by the following spring Germany could count on 600,000–700,000 replacement troops, while the enemy would receive 1,100,000 additional troops from the United States alone, not to mention the possibility that Italian forces might be shifted to the French front in considerable numbers. It seemed to the Chancellor that the war could only be prolonged a few months at most. While von Ludendorff sought to evade this obvious conclusion, his statements and those of the other military leaders were in part contradictory.

Germany had entered upon the great offensive in March with 205 divisions on the Western front, having a distinct numerical superiority. Since then the German divisions had declined to 191 while those of the Entente had risen to 220.

But these numbers alone do not give an adequate conception of the altered ratio of strength. For while the average strength of a battalion was now about 1,200 with the Americans, 700 with the British, and 600 with the French, it had fallen below 500 with the Germans. In twenty-eight German divisions it was between 200 and 300. Germany still had seven divisions under the Supreme Command in the East, five in the Ukraine, twelve in Roumania, and three in Serbia.

Although the submarines had signally failed to fulfill the great promises made for them, either in starving out Great Britain or preventing the transport of the American army, and the loss of the two German bases on the North Sea in Flanders would necessarily impair the effectiveness of this branch of the naval arm, the military and naval leaders were alike particularly opposed to the abandonment of submarine warfare. It appeared in the discussion of this matter that Germany was at this time launching two submarines monthly.

A discussion of the expediency of withdrawing the German troops from Roumania for service in the West brought out the statement that the war could only be continued a month and a half without the regular supply of petroleum from Roumania.

In a note to the American government on October 20th the German government agreed to leave the conditions of an armistice to the military advisers on both sides and to accept the actual relative strength on the fronts as the basis of the arrangement, trusting to the President to approve no demand that was "irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice." The German government announced that instructions had been sent to all submarine commanders ordering them to refrain in future from torpedoing passenger ships. The note continued as follows in an attempt to prove that President

Wilson's condition of the removal of every arbitrary power had already been complied with:

"A fundamental change has come about in this regard. A new government has been formed in complete accordance with the desires of a parliament which issued from equal, general, secret, and direct suffrage. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are amongst its members. In the future no government can enter upon or continue in office without possessing the confidence of a majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor towards parliament is being legally extended and safeguarded. The first act of the new government was to submit a bill to the Reichstag so amending the Constitution of the Empire that the approval of parliament is requisite for a decision on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, the vast majority of whom stand behind these reforms and demand their energetic continuance."

In the American reply of October 23d President Wilson took note of the German asseverations but repeated that the only armistice that he would feel justified in submitting to his colleagues was "one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible."

The President explained why extraordinary safeguards had to be demanded:

"It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people; but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of

Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. . . . . The President deems it his duty. . . . to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people, who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender."

The leaders in Germany could not fail to perceive that in reality this note demanded the abdication of the Kaiser and the subversion of the old order in Germany as the preliminary condition for peace negotiations.

Since December, 1916, Germany had repeatedly tried to end the war on the best possible terms by exploiting the sentiment for reconciliation among the Allies. If Germany had adhered consistently to its alleged policy for peace by agreement and had dealt fairly and candidly at Brest-Litovsk, the Western democracies might have been deprived of the will to continue fighting. But when Germany imposed terms on helpless Russia at the sword's point, the Allies were inspired with fresh determination and faced the supreme peril in 1918 with an unprecedented spirit of unanimity. The principles of liberty and democracy were reconsecrated and a common ideal of justice and right found expression in the words of Allied statesmen and of the President of the United States.

During the great offensive of 1918 the tide of assurance ran high in Germany. Final triumph seemed surely within

reach. The increasing delays and checks did not seriously impair the confidence of the public. Reverses were for a time disguised as strategic maneuvers. The long-sustained confidence of the German people was manifested in the financial support which they accorded the government. The sixth war loan in March, 1917, had brought in 12,979,000,000 marks; the seventh in September of the same year, 12,626,-000,000; the eighth in March, 1918, 14,789,000,000. As late as September, 1918, 10,434,000,000 marks were realized in a ninth war loan.

Suddenly, like a bomb dropped from the sky, the realization burst upon Berlin and the other German centers that the war was lost.

The reaction was fatal to the career of the foremost champion of war to the limit. The resignation of von Ludendorff, accepted on October 26, 1918, was the beginning of the end of the old order in Germany.

Von Ludendorff's meteoric career had hypnotized his countrymen. Von Hindenburg and von Ludendorff had been called to the positions of chief responsibility at a time when the war in the West had seemed lost. They had infused the efforts of the German nation with fresh determination and energy. Confidence was restored in the High Command. The name of von Hindenburg remained one to conjure with, but the actual control of the armies passed more and more into the hands of the younger leader. The genius of von Ludendorff was a combination of indomitable energy, far-reaching capacity, extraordinary self-infatuation, and unlimited ambition.

Assurance based on success and the confidence of the people led the military chiefs to interfere in all departments of the administration. The political center of gravity passed to the General Headquarters. It was fatal to Germany that the immature political institutions of the empire and the

divided Reichstag offered no adequate counter-weight to the military influence. The domination of the High Command became practically the dictatorship of von Ludendorff. What Bismarck always feared had come to pass. Scarcely an important economic or political decision could be made in Germany until von Ludendorff, the embodiment of military supremacy, had uttered the decisive word. The Kaiser was scarcely more than a puppet in his hands. With demoniacal audacity von Ludendorff staked everything on the vast effort in the West. His dramatic failure meant the immediate doom of the whole system which he represented.

The German government intimated a willingness to accept President Wilson's demands in the following note of October 27th:

"The German government has taken cognizance of the answer of the President of the United States. The President is aware of the far-reaching changes which have been carried out and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure, and that peace negotiations are being conducted by a people's government in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the power to make the deciding conclusions. The military powers are also subject to it. The German government now awaits proposals for an armistice which shall be the first step toward a just peace as the President described it in his proclamation."

In the meantime Count Andrassy had succeeded Baron Burian as Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and had made an ineffectual journey to Switzerland in an attempt to negotiate with the Allies. The Emperor Charles vainly strove to stem the tide of disintegration in his realms by a manifesto promising local independence to each of the different peoples. But the Czecho-Slovaks, through their provisional government set up in Paris, declared their complete independence and the spirit of revolution spread



Ich verzichte hierdurch für alle Zukunft auf die Rechte an der Krone Preussen und die damit verbundenen Rechte an der deutschen Kaiserkrone.

Zugleich entbinde ich alle Beamten des Deutschen Reiches und Preussens sowie alle Offiziere, Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften der Marine, des Preussischen Heeres und der Truppen der Bundeskontingente des Treueides, den sie Mir als ihrem Kaiser, König und Obersten Befehlshaber geleistet haben. Ich erwarte von ihnen, dass sie bis zur Neuordnung des Deutschen Reichs den Inhabern der tatsächlichen Gewalt in Deutschland helfen, das Deutsche Volk gegen die drohenden Gefahren der Anarchie, der Hungersnot und der Fremdherrschaft zu schützen.

Urkundlich unter Unserer Höchsteigenhändigen Unterschrift und beigedrucktem Kaiserlichen Insiegel.

Gegeben Amerongen, den 28. November 1918.

The Kaiser's abdication *Document signed by Emperor William at Amerongen, Holland, November 28, 1918, in which he abdicated the throne of the German Empire.*

Marshal Foch with the armistice document. *Marshal Foch and Admiral Wemyss, who signed the armistice on the part of the Allies, standing outside the car in which the German delegates signed, just before the Marshal departed for Paris with the historic document.*

rapidly throughout the lands of the Jugo-Slavs. On October 24th the Croat garrison at Fiume mutinied.

The public in Berlin was startled on October 28th by the news that Austria-Hungary had applied for a separate peace. In fact, on the 27th the Austro-Hungarian government replied to the American note of the 18th, accepting President Wilson's conditions and declared its readiness to commence negotiations for peace without awaiting the results of other negotiations.

On October 30th an Austro-Hungarian corps commander and seven other plenipotentiaries crossed the Italian lines and received the Allies' terms for an armistice from General Badoglio on November 3d. Hostilities in the Austro-Italian war zone ceased at 3 P.M. on the next day. The terms of the armistice placed all the Austro-Hungarian territories at the disposal of the Allies for military operations, thus opening the way for the invasion of Germany from the south and east.

In Germany popular ferment rapidly increased. The disillusioned multitude needed only an impulse to turn upon those who had so long deceived them. The Kaiser sought refuge at the General Headquarters at Spa on October 29th. The Social Democrats in the government clamored for his abdication. On November 4th the red flag was hoisted on the battleship *Kaiser* in the harbor at Kiel and mutiny spread to the shipyards and workshops on shore. Councils of soldiers, sailors, and workmen were formed and the mutineers took possession of the town. The movement spread to the other ports and industrial centers.

On November 8th a meeting of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council in Bavaria under Kurt Eisner voted the abolition of the Wittelsbach dynasty. Most of the Imperial ministers left Berlin for General Headquarters on the same day.

On the 9th Prince Maximilian issued a decree appointing Herr Fritz Ebert Imperial Chancellor and announcing the

Kaiser's decision to abdicate and the renunciation of the succession by the Crown Prince. Berlin was in the hands of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council. The red flag was unfurled from the balcony of the Royal Palace. Soldiers and workmen paraded the streets singing republican songs. The revolution was accomplished with amazing freedom from disorder and bloodshed. Every effort was made to preserve continuity in the administration. The rulers changed but the administrative machinery continued to operate with comparative regularity. The dynasties of the different German states vanished without resistance and almost without protest. On November 10th, when military collapse was certain, the Kaiser ended his grotesque career by an inglorious flight into Holland, finding refuge in the mansion of Count Bentinck at Amerongen. The Crown Prince also fled to Holland.

In the meantime hostilities on the Western front were being carried on more fiercely than ever. On the immense semicircle from the Scheldt to the Meuse nine Allied armies were closing in on the seven German armies receding before them. Every available resource was now thrown in for the supreme struggle. On August 21st President Poincaré had sent General Foch the insignia of Marshal of France in consideration of his inestimable services to the republic. The heart of the Allied organization was now Marshal Foch's headquarters at Senlis, where a small picked staff, grouped about the commander-in-chief and perfectly responsive to all his conceptions, toiled day and night. General Weygand, Foch's chief-of-staff, the veritable embodiment of palpitating energy, was the most valuable of the chief's collaborators. With entire confidence in the efficiency and devotion of his staff, Marshal Foch could face events with calmness and self-possession.

Valenciennes still formed a German salient delaying the advance of the British. Before dawn on November 1st the

Canadians and the Twenty-second Corps of the First British Army and the Seventeenth Corps of the Third British Army attacked on a six-mile front south of Valenciennes. The Canadians entered the town in the afternoon. The attack, progressing on the 2d and 3d, turned the line of the Scheldt northward. By the evening of the 3d the way had been cleared for the resumption of the British offensive on a grand scale.

After a violent bombardment the British attacked the next day on the front from Valenciennes to Oisy on the Somme with the fortifications of Le Quesnoy and the Mormal Forest in front of them. The task of the First Army on the left was to cross the marshes north of Valenciennes, that of the Third in the center to clear the forest, and that of the Fourth on the right to cross the Sambre south of the forest. Débeney's French Army on the right of the British cooperated in the attack, its aim being to outflank Guise, the key of the Hunding position. The plans were carried out with great success. On the first day the British took 19,000 prisoners and 450 pieces of artillery. By the 5th the French were in Guise.

Meanwhile, by the evening of the 3d the Belgians had driven von Arnim behind the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal and were close to Ghent. In the course of four days a quarter of Belgium had been redeemed. Plumer and Humbert were forcing the passage of the Scheldt. Mangin and Guillaumat had breached the Hunding position between Sissonne and Condé-les-Herpy and Gouraud had crossed the Aisne and Ardennes Canal. The Americans had resumed the offensive on the 1st. After a furious bombardment the First American Army attacked at 6 A. M. and in an hour the infantry had broken the enemy front. On the 2d the Americans advanced six miles, taking Halles, and by the 4th they were within artillery range of the Sedan-Longuyon railway.

Deprived of all their prepared positions, the Germans began a general retreat on November 5th. Gouraud and Pershing were now approaching Mézières and Sedan, while Haig was headed straight down the Sambre to intercept the chief remaining line of retreat for the Germans at Namur.

The British advanced steadily. On the 7th the Guards Division of Byng's Third British Army entered Bavai. On the 8th the British entered Tournai and, on the 9th, Maubeuge. They were to fire their last shots in the localities where they first encountered the enemy, near Mons, more than four years before. The French First Army advanced through the Forest of Nouvion in the direction of La Capelle.

On the 9th the Belgians entered Ghent. By the 10th Mézières and Charleville were both in the hands of the French. By the 11th Gouraud's front extended along the left bank of the Meuse. On the night of the 10th–11th the French and Americans penetrated into Sedan where there was fierce street fighting.

A note from Washington conveyed to the German government on November 5th the reply of the Allies to the correspondence regarding peace negotiations which had been submitted to them. They accepted the Fourteen Points as the general basis for peace, but with two provisos: they reserved liberty of judgment on the question of the freedom of the seas and they specified that they understood the restoration of invaded territories to mean "compensation by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." The German government was informed that Marshal Foch had been authorized by all the Allies to receive the representatives of the German government and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice.

At 8.15 on the evening of the 7th the German delegates, Herr Erzberger, General von Gündell, Count Oberndorff,

United States troops receiving the news that the armistice had been signed.
*United States official photograph.*

Battery C, 108th United States Field Artillery firing on Varennes during the retreat of the Germans. *United States official photograph.*

and General von Winterfeldt, presented themselves at the advanced posts of the Thirty-first Corps of the First French Army at Haudroy on the Chimay-Fourmies-La Capelle road. They were conducted to La Capelle, where four officers sent by General Débeney awaited them. At seven the following morning they arrived by special train at Rethondes, in the Forest of Compiègne, where an hour later they were received by Marshal Foch with Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, First Lord of the British Navy, and General Weygand, in the office car of the commander-in-chief's train.

The delegates received the terms of armistice, expressed surprise at their severity, and asked for time in which to communicate with Berlin. Marshal Foch refused a provisional suspension of hostilities, but gave Germany seventy-two hours in which to accept or reject the conditions. The German delegates returned to German General Headquarters at Spa and transmitted the proposed terms to Berlin. A conference of the new government in Berlin decided on the 10th to accept them. The German delegates presented themselves again to Marshal Foch and the armistice was signed at 5 A. M. on November 11th.

Marshal Foch immediately telegraphed the army commanders:

"Hostilities will cease on the whole front as from the eleventh of November at eleven o'clock. The Allied troops will not, until a further order, go beyond the line reached on that date and at that hour."

The terms of the armistice deprived Germany of the power to continue or renew the war. Germany was compelled to evacuate immediately all invaded territory, including Alsace-Lorraine, and to surrender a large amount of material of war. The Allies were to occupy the left bank of the Rhine and three bridgeheads on the right bank opposite Cologne, Coblenz, and Mainz, and a neutral zone was established all

along the right bank throughout German territory. A large amount of railway rolling stock was to be delivered immediately to the Allies. All Allied prisoners of war were to be repatriated. The German troops were to be withdrawn from Russia, Roumania, and Turkey into the German frontiers as they existed before the war. The Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were abrogated. The German troops still operating in East Africa were to evacuate the country within a month. All German submarines were to be surrendered. Certain of the units of the German fleet were to be turned over to Allied custody while the others were to be disarmed and placed under surveillance of the Allies. The existing blockade was to continue. The armistice was to be effective thirty-six days and could be extended.

The advance of the Allied armies to the Rhine began on November 17th. The northernmost zone of German territory on the left bank of the Rhine was to be occupied by the Belgians; the bridgehead of Cologne and Bonn, with the adjacent territory, fell to the custody of the British; the bridgehead of Coblenz, with the territory behind it, was assigned to the Americans; and the bridgehead of Mainz, with corresponding districts, passed under control of the French.

The Americans entered Briey and passed through Longuyon and Longwy. On November 23d they crossed the Meuse from Luxembourg into Germany. General Mangin's Tenth Army had the honor of entering Metz with Petain, now Marshal of France, riding at the head of the column. Alsace, liberated after forty-eight years of German rule, welcomed the arrival of Gouraud's Fourth Army in Strasbourg on the 25th. Petain, de Castelnau, Fayolle, and Maistre were all present with Gouraud at the supremely effective defilade of the French troops through the streets of the Alsatian capital.

# CHAPTER XIII

## Naval Lessons of the War

No change of fundamental principles. Importance of morale. Germany and morale. Morale of our men. Hardships of men on ships at "front." No type of vessel rendered obsolete. The submarine. Aëroplanes and kite balloons. Better feeling between navy and merchant marine. Bravery of personnel of merchant marine. The Convoy System and its difficulties. Its final success. The depth charge. Other enemies of the submarine. The fundamental importance of sea power. The Battle of Jutland Bank. Surface craft controled the sea and were foundation stone for victory. Submarine was dangerous only because we were unprepared for it. The navy as a national insurance policy. The public and the navy. The navy dependent on the public in time of war. Problems of a navy in war. Civilian aid. Necessity for an adequate and skilled permanent personnel. Need of civilian organization in time of peace. The time element in war. The navy invites criticism. Value and opportunities of the navy in time of peace. Importance of peace time training, skill, and spirit of personnel.

To attempt a discussion of the naval lessons of a great war so soon after its close is not only difficult but dangerous. It means the assumption of the rôle of a prophet, which is always risky and generally thankless. The great war which left untouched no activities of the countries involved demands a correspondingly great length of time before its experiences can be judged in their proper proportion. The reconstruction period has barely begun and our minds are still confused with a bewildering array of incidents and experiences. Such was the magnitude of this war that considerable time must elapse before even those engaged in the study of it can be sure that non-essentials have been eliminated. Nevertheless, it behooves us to avoid too much delay in profiting at least from our most

manifest errors and in determining the principal naval lessons which should shape our future preparedness for war. None are more desirous of preventing wars than those who have actually participated in them, and manifestly no one is more impressed with the necessity for preparedness during peace than those who know so well what war means. There were numerous naval experiences during the war from which valuable lessons were learned; many of these were strictly professional and technical, and the navy has cut out for it, for many years to come, most important and extensive professional work in digesting these experiences and reaching sound conclusions for our guidance in future training and development.

It is hardly necessary to state that the war furnishes no justification for altering in any way those fundamental principles of warfare handed down to us by the great naval leaders of the past. We have merely witnessed their repeated application on the seas as well as on the land. Modern science has developed new weapons and new methods, and these have modified tactics, but the principles themselves remain unchanged. This war has afforded a modern and monumental demonstration—if such were necessary—that the principal factor of success lies not chiefly in guns, ships, torpedoes, or even in such modern killing devices as poisonous gas, but in the spirit of the fighting men, their belief in the justice of their cause and the resulting determination to win; in other words, in their morale.

It is frequently asserted by the superficially informed that the Great War has shown that preparation for war is not a guarantee of success. Germany undoubtedly surpassed all nations in the thoroughness and extent of her preparation in time of peace. She was preëminently the best authority on war. Her naval and military forces were



British battleship attended by a dirigible.

Italian seaplane mother ship. *The seaplanes when at rest are carried on the ship and when a flight is to be made are lowered to the water.*

admirably trained and equipped, and were created to carry out her well understood policy of world power. If these are facts, and they are, why did she fail? Without entering into any discussion of the causes of the war or the moral issues involved, the answer is plain. It is simply that she badly miscalculated the number of military powers which her unholy policy would eventually bring against her and, therefore, found herself unable to maintain it. Slowly the conviction of probable defeat ahead, combined with more than doubt as to the justice of her cause, spread through her civil population and eventually through her army and navy in spite of every effort to conceal the facts. This gradually undermined the national morale and destroyed the "will to victory." When that occurred her guns, battleships, liquid fire, military training, and preparation were of no avail. Her military power was gone and with it her dream of dominating the world.

Once again, therefore, we have an impressive demonstration that morale is the greatest factor of all in attaining victory. Strangely enough, this factor is almost invariably underestimated. It is difficult to foresee what the behavior of men will be when the real test comes. The public has cause to be proud of the morale shown by the men of our navy in this war. Their courage was properly taken for granted, but we were naturally somewhat doubtful as to whether their staying powers would be equal to the continuous strain of the unprecedented exertions this extraordinary war required. Assuredly they proved more than equal to all demands made upon them. This fact is more noteworthy when it is realized that fully ninety per cent of their work was monotonous drudgery and that a large proportion of their ranks was made up of civilians to whom the experience was entirely new.

When our ships got fairly into their work in the war zone, the energy and endurance of the men exceeded our most sanguine expectations. We were warned and, in fact, had reason to expect that, as soon as the novelty of the game wore off, this unusual energy and enthusiasm would flag under the strain of continuous exertion. But it did not. On the contrary, it was not only maintained until the end, but seemed to be increasing as the war advanced.

The fact that the press generally selected only those incidents which involved excitement or thrills tended to give the false impression that the men on the ships at the "front" lead an exciting life, steaming up and down shooting at the enemy submarines like cowboys invading a western village on a holiday. Such was not the case. Take, as a single example, the duty performed by our destroyers and other anti-submarine craft in escorting troops and supplies to the scene of operations abroad. Ocean travellers, even on luxurious liners, often weary of a six or seven days' voyage. Imagine the officers and men of our destroyers, month in and month out, spending six, seven, eight, and more consecutive days under the most trying conditions, seldom seeing the enemy, and struggling ceaselessly to stand up while on duty or stay in their bunks long enough while off duty to get a little rest. The periods between such duties at sea were very brief—seldom in excess of three or four days—and even that time was crowded with the demands of repairs and overhauling of machinery and refilling with fuel and supplies. One destroyer officer described an eight days' cruise, going out to meet and escort a troop convoy into port, during which time it was a case of hanging on every minute, day and night, grabbing a bit of food now and then, and even having to be lashed into his bunk while sleeping. Imagine the slippery, steel decks of a destroyer, the motion of which,

in a seaway, is entirely unique in both its unexpectedness and violence. It was indeed a grueling experience for them in slowly and painfully becoming immune to such treatment as the destroyers gave them, particularly as few of them had ever seen the sea before. Even merchant captains and sailors who had been at sea from early boyhood often succumbed completely to seasickness when taking passage on destroyers that had rescued them at sea after being torpedoed.

As regards types of naval vessels, it is very doubtful whether the war has rendered obsolete any which were formerly considered necessary in a well-balanced fleet. For the first time in naval warfare, aircraft were used to a considerable extent—dirigibles, Zeppelins, and aëroplanes. Destroyers, particularly those of the larger type, have been of the greatest value, especially in opposing the submarine. As for the submarine itself, there is no denying that its capabilities as disclosed in the war surprised the naval profession as well as the public, both as regards its accomplishments when used in all respects quite legitimately and when used by the enemy in the unrestricted destruction of commercial vessels. Before the war, with the exception of a few enthusiastic submarine officers of vision, most naval men considered the submarine a very fragile craft, likely to be put out of action by the slightest damage. It was, therefore, with real astonishment that we found them capable of extensive cruises in all kinds of weather and of withstanding very considerable damage and still living to return to their bases. Repeatedly they were hit by gunfire or by aëroplane bombs without sinking or being forced to come up and surrender. One British submarine actually came up under a mine in the Heligoland Bight with the result that its entire forward end was practically blown off, but it nevertheless managed to reach port. The German

submarines were undoubtedly superior to those of the Allies or of the United States, in design and in the workmanship of their oil engines, but, when the necessity arose, our navies were not long in making up many, though not all, of their deficiencies. We must be prepared to see the submarine play an important rôle in future naval wars. It will be used extensively for scouting as, indeed, it was in this war, because of its ability to avoid discovery and pass under and behind the enemy's scouting line; and for a belligerent having control of the surface of the sea it will undoubtedly prove superior to any other type as a blockading vessel.

We have learned that aëroplanes can be successfully launched from and recovered by ships at sea, and that kite balloons can be towed at comparatively high speeds and in much worse weather than was supposed to be possible. These developments, together with the remarkable improvements in dirigibles, will greatly alter our scouting methods, to say nothing of the real offensive possibilities latent in these types. Future sea battles will doubtless be preceded by a contest for control of the air. The side which gains this control will have an enormous advantage, and with conditions fairly equal, it would seem to be a safe prophecy that this factor would prove decisive.

Another important result of the war from a seafaring standpoint is the increased respect and admiration which has grown up between the personnel of the navies and the merchant marines. This is bound to result in a mutual coöperation which will be beneficial to both of these institutions, the interdependence of which was so forcibly brought home to all who were concerned with the war on the seas. In the long period of peace preceding the war the merchant sailor had come to look upon the naval men as too theoretical and as lacking in sea experience. The

war could not have been won on the seas, but it could easily have been lost there, and one of the vital factors in preventing such loss was the performance of the personnel of the merchant marine. Even a partial failure of these men to stick to their calling, regardless of submarine dangers, would certainly have resulted in defeat. It was an inspiration to all seafaring men to witness the bravery displayed by these fine seamen in spite of the terrible execution by the submarines during those critical months of the unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring and summer of 1917. During that period, owing to a wholly inadequate number of naval ships, the navies were unable to afford effective protection to the merchant fleets upon which victory depended. The ships to be protected were so numerous and the sea areas so extensive that the best efforts which the destroyers and other anti-submarine craft could put forth were wholly inadequate. In spite of these conditions these brave men stuck to their posts and, even after being torpedoed and undergoing nerve-racking experiences in the water or in small boats, lost no time, once they got ashore, in seeking new billets.

An explanation of the many methods adopted to defeat the submarine campaign would require more space than is available in this article. Suffice it to say that no infallible method was discovered, though some of the best brains of the scientific world and of the navies were constantly at work on this vitally important problem. Its final solution was the result of a combination of several methods, none of which were very unusual or very scientific. The problem, briefly stated, was to make the submarine fight for every merchant ship he tried to sink. This was accomplished by the so-called Convoy System. Convoys have been used in all wars in which the maintenance of over-sea transportation of troops and their supplies was essential

to success. It is, therefore, natural that the public should find cause to wonder why the convoy system was not put into effect before the submarine campaign became so critical. The public may rest assured that such delay as occurred was not due to any lack on the part of the naval profession to understand fully its advantages and disadvantages. One of the reasons for delay arose in the merchant marine itself, in its own conception of its capabilities.

Briefly stated, the convoy system provides for the operation of merchant ships in groups of usually from twenty to thirty vessels, each group protected by a screen of destroyers. Though the advantages of such a method were clearly recognized, there were grave doubts as to whether these advantages could be realized in actual practice. Fortunately, these doubts were shown to be without foundation, as will be seen from the following explanation: Merchant captains of long sea experience maintained that attempting to maneuver a large number of ships in close proximity to each other, particularly at night and without lights, would involve as much, if not more, danger from collision than from the attacks of submarines. This required a kind of seamanship entirely outside their previous experience. They said that naval officers could successfully do this because they had practiced it for years and because men-of-war were specially designed to maneuver easily, but that it was not practicable with their relatively unhandy vessels. It was rather hard to overcome this opinion, and in fact many naval officers shared it. However, the submarines were cutting off the Allies' wholly essential supplies at a rate of nearly a million tons a month. The enemy was winning the war, and the means of preventing this were not then apparent. These rather startling statements are not matters of opinion

but of simple arithmetic. There was only a certain amount of shipping available and we were losing it at a rate which, if not checked, meant defeat within a few months. The situation was so critical that any measures had to be tested that seemed likely to prove successful. A few experimental convoys were tried and, to our great satisfaction, proved perfectly practicable. The merchant captains succeeded in handling their ships admirably even under the most difficult conditions. The first and most important part of our problem was therefore solved.

The assembling of all commercial, troop, and supply ships in protected convoys forced the submarines to expose themselves to attack whenever they attempted to sink one of the escorted vessels; and as soon as experience had convinced the enemy that such attacks were very dangerous, they were seldom made, and the losses of shipping rapidly decreased. The mission of the submarine had been to attack merchant ships exclusively and to avoid all contact with anti-submarine craft. Our primary mission was to keep open the lines of communication by protecting commerce and, incidentally, to attack the submarines. The convoy system enabled us to do both. The question is often asked why we did not attack the submarine instead of waiting for him to attack us. Why we did not intercept the submarine on the routes to and from his operating areas. The principal reason was that, with a wholly inadequate number of craft, either to hunt the submarine or to escort the convoys with entire efficiency, we should not have been justified in attempting both, because, in view of the very limited available shipping and the serious nature of the losses still being experienced, we could not afford to take the risk. Too much was at stake. If the war had lasted long enough to see completed the large number of destroyers then building

in America and England there is no doubt that hunting operations on the scale which was necessary would have been profitable. With the assistance of the scientific professions we were making rapid progress towards obtaining listening devices which would enable us to locate and follow the submarines when submerged. But, up to the time of the armistice, this progress was insufficient to warrant the diversion of any considerable number of naval craft from escorting convoys.

The next requirement to defeat the submarine, once it was encountered, was to attack it successfully after it disappeared under the water. This was accomplished by the so-called "depth charge," or "depth bomb," which was merely a can of about the size and shape of the ordinary household ash can, filled with three hundred pounds of a high explosive and fitted with a simple device which would explode the charge at any desired depth below the surface. The destroyer was the best type of vessel for using this new weapon against the U-boats, because of its superior sea-keeping qualities, compared with other small craft, combined with its facility in maneuvering, its high speed, and particularly its ability to accelerate its speed quickly. The method of attack, once the approximate location of the submarine was disclosed, was to proceed with one or more of the destroyers to the position in which the submarine was last seen, and then, turning in a circle, to bombard below the surface with depth charges an area including his possible courses of escape. This was not a simple operation. The submarine, once under the surface, disappeared as effectively as if by magic. He could turn to any course and could vary his depth at will up to two hundred feet and even more. The largest depth charge which it was practicable to carry and use in the manner described would not surely inflict mortal damage unless it

Vice-admiral William Snowden Sims, commander-in-chief of the United States Naval Forces in European waters.

was exploded within a radius of about one hundred feet of the submarine's hull. It would shake him up badly, however, at a much greater distance. We know, both from the evidence of prisoners and from the experience of our own submarines—which we attacked by mistake on more than one occasion—that a determined and energetic depth charge attack was a nerve-racking experience for officers and men, even when occurring some distance away. They were always in doubt as to where the next charge would explode. The result of such encounters was that they became very wary of attacking a convoy escorted by destroyers.

There were many other factors which assisted in defeating the submarine, but they were all secondary to the two described above. Amongst these were mines, listening devices to determine the location of submarines while under the surface, arming of merchant ships, which restricted the submarine to the use of his torpedoes, and, what was as important as any of these, the efficiency of trained lookouts, their degree of vigilance and patient devotion to duty under the most severe and exhausting conditions. The lessons to be derived from the various methods developed are principally in the field of tactics and, therefore, of interest primarily to the navy itself. They demonstrate, as stated elsewhere, that the submarine developed its own answer and failed to wrest control of the seas from surface craft.

But the all important lesson, so impressively demonstrated by the Allied fleets in this war, is the fundamental importance of sea power. We can readily imagine what the consequences would have been if Germany had found it possible to gain control of the surface of the seas—if, for example, a catastrophe had suddenly destroyed the Grand Fleet. The German battleships, cruisers, etc., would then

have been able to roam the seas at their pleasure, driving all the anti-submarine craft to the shelter of their shore fortifications, and thus leaving the submarine unopposed. Food and supplies to the Allies would have been completely cut off. The British, having food in the British Isles for but a few weeks, would have been forced to make peace—and we can imagine its terms!—and her armies and those of her Allies, being dependent upon her for many essential supplies, would have been forced to surrender unconditionally. Under these conditions we in America could have afforded no assistance whatever, even though we had had a thoroughly trained and equipped army of millions of men and plenty of ships to transport them.

There has been much discussion as to which fleet was victorious in the one great naval action of the war—the Battle of Jutland. The rôle of a navy in war is to command or control the sea. This is accomplished by destroying the enemy fleet or driving it off the seas and keeping it off—as a fleet, keeping it locked up in its fortified bases through lack of power to engage its enemy successfully. The enemy ventured out in force but once to contest the Allies' control of the sea. After a brief action, interrupted by darkness, they ran for home and were not seen at large again until that memorable 21st of November, 1918, when their flags were ignominiously hauled down by command of Admiral Sir David Beatty. Such was the result of the "German Victory" off Jutland Bank.

The public should understand, therefore, that this war has furnished conclusive evidence that the control of the seas rests with surface craft. The submarine developed its own answer and was defeated from the surface. Its importance as a naval type has been enhanced and it will play a more important rôle in the future than in the past,

but still it remains a subsidiary craft. The backbone of naval power is still the nation's battle line of capital ships.

The foundation stone upon which victory in the Great War rested was the active and latent power of the combined Allied and American Fleets. While the British Grand Fleet with its American reinforcements kept the German High Sea Fleet "contained" behind its land fortifications and mine fields, and a combined British and French Fleet kept the German naval forces out of the Mediterranean, the anti-submarine craft were thereby enabled to insure the transportation of troops, supplies, and food to all Allied countries and battle fronts.

It is quite true that the submarine, as used illegally by the enemy, came very near to forcing a decision in spite of our superiority in surface ships. The public should not lose sight of the reason for such an extraordinary condition. It was due to unpreparedness, particularly in the lack of an adequate number of anti-submarine craft of the necessary types. The Congress had always declined to provide even the number of destroyers per battleship recommended as necessary to protect our battle fleet. But even if the Congress had provided these vessels we should still have been far short of the number necessary for opposing an unrestricted submarine attack upon commerce. That these were not built by the various admiralties was not due to lack of foresight, but to the impossibility of a general belief that a civilized enemy could make war in such total disregard of international law, the laws of humanity, and the chivalry of the sea. It is true that a few naval officers expressed the opinion that the Germans would stop at almost nothing, but this was more an indication of their own temperaments than an evidence of superior astuteness. The average mind was unable to believe in such warnings, and consequently the enemy submarine campaign

against commerce proved a surprise and found our navies unprepared to meet it until they had time to build a sufficient number of surface craft and equip them with the necessary weapons. It should also be noted that, even in the German navy, the majority opinion did not anticipate such a ruthless and unprincipled use of this new type of vessel, and hence, strange as it may seem now, the number of submarines they had available and were able to build, was insufficient to accomplish their mission before our navies were able to overcome the state of unpreparedness in which they were caught.

Quite apart from the above brief outline of some of the professional naval lessons of the war, there are a few others of a more general nature which should be noted.

While these professional and technical lessons may perhaps not be of general interest, it may certainly be said that, in spite of our closeness to the events of the war, there are also some very important lessons affecting the future efficiency of a navy which are deserving of public attention. While understood to some extent, nevertheless it is believed that the public at large has not in the past fully appreciated the fact which has been clearly demonstrated by this great war, namely, that a navy is essentially a national institution. It is in fact a great public investment, and it is the public which in the end suffers if this investment does not render a good return when the test comes. Unfortunately, a navy is more of the nature of an insurance policy, the benefit of which is always in the uncertain future. It is difficult to appreciate its value in times of peace. Its major and ultimate mission is forced into the forefront of men's minds only when national interests are threatened or actually assailed.

It is much easier for the people of a nation to understand and appreciate the value of such national institutions as the

United States destroyer *Stevens*, showing type of destroyer built for the United States Navy during the war. *United States official photograph.*

United States dreadnought *Oklahoma* camouflaged. *United States official photograph.*

public schools or the post offices. The relative importance of these various national institutions requires no discussion. If the fact that a navy is an essential public institution is appreciated and accepted, an additional fact must also be accepted (for this war at least has proven it beyond all question) and that is that, in the last analysis, the efficiency and consequently the value of a navy as a public investment,—as a national institution,—is dependent upon public interest and support. A navy not only needs but it must have the interest of the public at large and of the majority of other professions. In the United States, particularly, owing to the size of the country and the fact that it is not essentially a seafaring nation, the navy has suffered sadly in the past because there have been so few men outside of its own ranks who have taken sufficient interest in it to serve both the navy and the public as constructive critics.

It is to be hoped that one of the lessons derived from the war and the rôle that navies have played will be that men of the press and of the scientific and the business worlds will hereafter find sufficient time to interest themselves more intimately in affairs of the navy with a view of ensuring its greater efficiency through public interest and support and constructive public criticism. If such lessons of the war are not understood and advantage taken of them, a navy, to a certain extent at least, cannot be blamed if its tendency is towards stagnation and narrowness. It may be agreed that a navy itself must consider such views and must encourage and invite outside interest and criticism. There is nothing gained in allowing unwarranted pride of profession to blind one to the fact that in the past all navies have been guilty of too much narrowness.

This war has, indeed, afforded a modern demonstration that a navy, as well as an army, is absolutely dependent, when it comes to putting its profession into actual practice

in a great war, upon support and active assistance from the great majority of other professions and other national activities. It has to call upon all citizens, including business men, scientific men, and even housewives, to assist it. It would be a difficult task indeed to attempt to chronicle all the assistance thus required and rendered from all walks of life at home, assistance moreover, which was necessary in order to insure victory.

When this great war came upon us, military supplies of every description—shells, guns, torpedoes, food, oil, coal, shoes, clothing, bandages, repair material, etc.—had suddenly to be obtained in much greater quantities than were ever required in time of peace. The navy had to call upon the resources of all parts of the country to ensure these essential supplies being obtained in the least possible time and with the least possible interference with the demands of the country itself as well as of the army. This material had to be assembled in ports and there apportioned in proper quantities for destinations scattered throughout Western Europe. In order that the operations of our forces should not be delayed by the loss of supply ships at sea, there had to be erected, at strategical locations abroad, storehouses and supply depots where a safe margin of supplies could be held in reserve. All ships are definitely limited in their operations by the amount of fuel and food they can carry and the physical and mental endurance of their men. Also their machinery and equipment is bound to require repairs and overhauling, and their crews must be kept in efficient condition. These demands necessitate repair shops, hospitals, barracks, recreation centers, and many other facilities located in sufficiently numerous places to support the operations at sea.

From this brief statement of some of the problems of a navy in war an idea may be gained of the tremendous

assistance which must be rendered to a navy by civilians, and the great extent to which the actual efficiency of our naval operations in the war zone depended upon essential supplies and efficient support from all parts of the country. This support was chiefly rendered. Business and technical men came in and assisted in handling supply problems, in erecting shore establishments and operating them, and in a multitude of other very essential duties, at sea as well as on shore, at home and abroad.

Let us consider some of these lessons as they apply to the rôle and problems of a navy in time of peace. There must, of course, be created and maintained the various types of naval ships and other naval equipment, and these must be quite up-to-date in all respects. This is simply because the types of ships in navies are largely dependent upon the types and equipment that possible enemies may have. It would be folly for a man to carry an air rifle if he knew that he was liable to encounter men who carried automatic revolvers and who might interfere with his welfare or interests, or the welfare and interests of those who were dependent upon him. We must also maintain an adequate and skilled permanent naval personnel of officers and men, devoting themselves exclusively to the study and development of their profession—the art of naval warfare.

All those patriotic and high-minded young men who volunteered their services to the navy of the United States in this war undoubtedly learned that there are many important naval activities which require not only special study and preparation, but which, if a navy is to be efficient, actually require exclusive and undivided attention and study. For the art of war is in many respects a special one, involving such subjects as strategy, tactics, naval gunnery, etc., which busy men engaged in peace time activities cannot be expected to master. Regardless of the excellence of design

of ships and equipment, they are useless without trained personnel to handle them to the best advantage. Even the best designed, armed, and equipped men-of-war are of little more use than the steel, iron, and brass of which they are built, unless there are highly trained men to guide and operate them. This means not only continuous study of design, but also constant experiments and practice to determine the progressive development of the design and its best actual use in war. It would be very illuminating to anyone interested in the war problems which confront a navy, and it would also be of value to a navy itself, to have interested observers outside the naval profession visit, for example, the War College at Newport, R. I., and see the extensive studies of strategy, tactics, and logistics which are there conducted. A highly skilled and thoroughly equipped regular navy is, therefore, entirely essential, no matter how great are the resources of the country which are capable of being diverted to naval use when the necessity arises.

While in many vital respects the naval profession is a highly specialized one requiring the undivided attention of naval officers, on the other hand, there are many essential activities of a navy which have their parallels in civil enterprises. They are principally concerned with the problems of supply and the design of equipment. A great part of the machinery on board men-of-war involves the same principles, if not the same designs, of machinery and apparatus required in civil pursuits.

In addition to asking the coöperation of business and technical men in the present war, the navy also called upon the scientists for assistance in solving the problems which they encountered in conducting their operations for the defeat of the enemy's naval tactics, especially the tactics of the submarines. The requirements in acoustic

United States submarines of class *AL* alongside a "mother" ship at base on the Irish coast.
*United States official photograph.*



United States destroyer, on patrol duty, in a heavy sea. *United States official photograph.*

instruments that would enable us, not only to hear, but determine the direction of, the sounds made by U-boats when running submerged, in spite of the inevitable noises of the machinery of our own ships, were explained to them, and also many other problems essential to success.

The war demonstrated in a most impressive manner the vital importance of creating in time of peace an organization through which all the national resources needed in time of war may be rendered available without delay or confusion upon the outbreak of war. The principal types of ships must not only be planned and built, but their tactical use must be studied and practiced as far as possible and their strategic use coördinated with national policies and national ideals, for the upholding of which a navy is maintained and for which the public invests its money in time of peace.

Certainly the experience of this war should have demonstrated to all men, if they did not realize it before, the importance of the time element in war. Once the decision for war is reached every other consideration should be thrown aside, every available ounce of moral, intellectual, and physical strength should be mobilized and thrown against the enemy, not only because the sooner the war is ended the sooner national interests are protected, but what is even closer to men's hearts, the less the sacrifice of precious life, not to mention the wastage of time, money, and resources of all kinds. In war, such elements as safety and expense should of necessity be thrown into the background. Nothing should be allowed to interfere with or retard the defeat of the enemy.

While the navy of the United States, of course, accepts full responsibility for its own technical efficiency, it may be

said that it also has a grave responsibility in another important matter. It is a difficult subject to explain. The great extent to which the efficiency of the other national institutions depended upon public interest and support is easily understood because the people being in daily contact with them are so much better acquainted with their functions than with a navy. Public appreciation of these lessons of the war should be greatly assisted by that large and admirable body of men who joined the navy's ranks during the war. A navy should not avoid criticism, but rather invite and encourage it. Without intelligent criticism, progress and efficiency always has been, and always will be, greatly handicapped. In time of war all the civil professions have sacrificed time, expense, and service, in a magnificent way, because it was so easy to see that service to the country was required and that all men owe service to their country as well as to their own personal fortunes.

Surely an outstanding lesson of this war, which should not be forgotten, is that in the future men should be willing, to a greater extent than in the past, to sacrifice, in time of peace as well as of war, a reasonable percentage of their personal interests to the interests and welfare of their country. There is still another naval lesson of the war worthy of public consideration. The fact is self-evident that the paramount mission of a navy in time of peace is to develop and maintain its efficiency as a war instrument. At the same time, however, in view of the expense of a naval establishment, it certainly behooves the public at large to obtain as much benefit as possible from the investment in time of peace. There are unquestionably many ways in which a navy can be of value to the community in time of peace and which need interfere very little with its preparation for war. On the

contrary, a navy's preparation for war may easily be facilitated thereby.

The best suggestions along these lines can probably be made by members of outside professions who had opportunities of becoming familiar with naval work and needs during the war. The following are a few tentative suggestions: (*a*). Experimentation in the development of radio, electric, and other appliances of various descriptions which are applicable to shore as well as ship installation. (*b*). Training of a large body of young men in various useful occupations which are found alike within and without a navy.

With a population such as that of the United States there is always a large body of capable young men who for various reasons find the expense of technical and other schools beyond their means. The navy can certainly be utilized to assist in supplying this need. Amongst the many civil occupations to be found in the navy are electricians, machinists, engineers, stenographers, accountants, to say nothing of the necessary occupations in the merchant marine field, not only on the high seas, but also on the great inland waters. Interested observers are frequently surprised at the multitude of activities which life in a navy includes. Even bakers, cooks, postal service, telegraphists, carpenters, shoemakers, blacksmiths, coppersmiths, plumbers, optical instrument experts, and many other activities are directly or indirectly represented. A navy affords opportunities for developing and testing new methods in all these activities, whereas development is frequently restricted in private enterprises by the pressure of the unavoidable laws of supply and demand. There is no reason why a navy should not do a great deal of pioneer and experimental work in the development of such subjects as scientific management

and other research problems applicable to business and civil pursuits.

Above all things the discipline which is taught and practiced in the naval service is applicable to practically all civil pursuits, in the sense that such discipline is essential to the efficiency of the coördinated effort which is primarly called "team work." The actual experience of the present war has certainly shown conclusively that a navy is capable of being made to serve as a very valuable national institution in time of peace as well as of war. As in all other government services, the resources which the navy must prepare to use in time of war, and the personnel of outside professions which it must stand by to absorb, must be selected on merit and ability alone. Means must be found absolutely to eliminate personal, business, or political influence.

There are destructive critics of naval as well as military affairs who would lead the public to believe that some leaders and other members of these national institutions have been culpably negligent or inefficient. A moment's consideration by any fair-minded man will convince him that such criticisms are very far from the truth. Few are the men who could be guilty of such charges when their work involved, not only their own personal fortunes and reputations but, what is much more important, the fortunes and reputations of their country. They may have made grievous errors, but an unbiased analysis of those errors would, in the vast majority of cases, prove that the fault has been with previous environment and training. This war has been full of lessons to show that this statement is true of all navies and armies. Such faults have always existed in military organizations, but this war has certainly accentuated and laid stress upon the necessity of heeding this lesson.

All thoughtful men whose eyes are upon the future should, therefore, take as one of the principal lessons of the war the necessity for ensuring that in the future our preparation and training shall be greatly improved in all branches of government service. One of the principal means by which such a lesson can be applied to the navy will be a more intelligent and interested public appreciation and understanding of a navy and its important function. It is doubtful if a man can be found in a navy who conscientiously gave the best of his energy and ability to serving his country's cause and who, if he is true to himself, will not acknowledge that the principal handicaps which he labored under were due to faulty previous training and preparation. Let the public, therefore, demand in the future a more thorough knowledge of that public investment called the navy.

In navies as in armies, ships, guns, and equipment, should be superior to those of the enemy, but in the last analysis the greatest factor is the skill and spirit of the men who use the material. All future wars will leave no man or national activity unemployed.

In conclusion, therefore, it is desired to reiterate and lay added stress upon the all-important demonstration afforded by this war that in navies, as well as in all human activities, the principal factor of success lies not so much in the material equipment as in the peace time training, the skill, and, above all else, the spirit of the personnel.

Napoleon estimated that in time of war the factor of morale was to that of equipment as three to one. Speaking for that part of the navy which I had the honor to command during this war, I am inclined to the belief that Napoleon's large estimate of the proportionate value of morale was too small. But, whatever the figure may be, there is one unescapable fact, and that is that the morale,

and hence the efficiency, of the fighting forces at the war front are always in direct proportion to the morale of the "Home Front."

In this war, as in all past wars, and as it will be in any future wars, the efficiency of the fighting forces was directly dependent upon the sympathy and the spirit as well as the material support of the people at home whom they represented.

# CHAPTER XIV

## The Military Lessons of the World War

On the industrial side. Training officers and men. Unity of command and the general staff. Strategy and tactics. Infantry. Artillery. Cavalry. Engineers. Signal Corps. Medical Corps. Aviation. Chemical warfare. Tanks. Supply. In conclusion.

The United States was ten years late in beginning preparation for the part it was called upon to play in the World War; ten years too late to enable it to accomplish its task in the minimum of time and with the minimum of losses. This tardiness was evidenced by the delays in the organization and training of our field troops; and in the causes for such delays, namely, the lack of sufficient trained officers to organize, instruct and lead our troops in battle; the lack of a trained General Staff; and particularly the lack of industrial preparedness to wage a modern war of the first magnitude.

We have, in truth, every reason to be proud of the American soldier and of what he accomplished in the World War. The qualities that go to make up the most efficient modern soldier—energy, adaptability, endurance, initiative and intelligence—he possesses to probably a greater degree than do the soldiers of other nations. Many deficiencies in training of our recruits were made up by their possession of these qualities, especially that of adaptability. It was scarcely fair to our men, however, that they should have been obliged to pit themselves without adequate training and in association with other men and under officers equally untrained, in combat against the most highly trained soldiers of Europe.

The World War demonstrated that the ocean no longer affords any adequate protection against the enemies who might desire to strike us in our homes. We know now that any strong hostile nations, possessing the man power and the ships, with no greater control of the seas than had the Allies in the World War, can land on our shores within three months after the declaration of war a million equipped combatant troops unless we, by possessing adequate and trained land forces, stand ready to defeat their purpose.

In modern wars, owing to improved means of communication and the careful preparations made in time of peace by far-sighted nations, events move rapidly from the moment war is declared. The loss of a few days in beginning active operations against a ready enemy may mean the loss of the war. Had we alone faced the Central European Powers in 1914, and had our navy found it impossible to hold command of the sea, we might have found ourselves beaten in the first few months after the declaration of war.

Great wars are no longer decided by the issues of armed conflicts between forces numbering only a small part of the populations of the belligerent nations. They result in a call to the colors in the nations engaged of practically all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty, and at times even beyond those limits. On the younger and older men and on the women and children fall the tasks of supplying the soldier in the field and the people at home. We had in the World War more than four million men under arms when the armistice was signed, and at that time we were planning nearly to double this force had the war continued until the summer of 1919. A similar great war in the future would justify us in planning at the beginning to call out in the shortest possible time the maximum man power of the nation available for active military duty.

Commercial life is now more directly interested in the waging of war than ever before. At the time the armistice

Girl worker in the British Ministry of Munitions
Training School.

Training men for war.
Bayonet charge practice in an officers' training camp.

was signed, the primary contracts entered into by the War Department for munitions for the army numbered 27,000 and the sub-contracts under those were probably ten times that number, involving practically every phase of industry and calling for substantially the complete output of all our great industrial plants. Three million people were employed directly or indirectly in the work of the Ordnance Department of the army alone during the summer and fall of 1918. When we add the millions employed in the production of food, the supply of clothing, the supply of ships, of material of thousands of kinds and of classes necessary for the army, it may well be claimed that the entire industrial population of the country was employed solely in the business of war. Modern war between strong nations exacts that the entire population of the combatant nations turn completely from the pursuits of peace to those of war in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion. The nation that is ready to do so smoothly and effectively, without loss of time, will—other factors being equal—win the war, with a minimum of losses in men and a minimum of cost in money.

In 1917 many of our big industrial plants had already turned their energies to at least a partial supply of war munitions for the belligerent nations. This was particularly true of the production of clothing and of food, and to some extent of ordnance material and other munitions. But even with this advantage, when we entered the war in 1917 the greater part of the big industrial plants which were found necessary to supply our needs had not come into existence. Others that later were turned from the needs of peace to those of war had not been constructed originally with a view to such alteration. Transition from a peace to a war basis of production was consequently delayed, and the cost of such transition, and of the products that finally resulted, increased many fold. It was inevitable that,

without preparation for it, the war would cost much more in money and, unfortunately, more in men. We were compelled to put forward superhuman efforts to make up for deficiencies. The surprising thing is not that mistakes were made and that some waste and extravagance resulted, but that such mistakes, waste and extravagance were kept down to a minimum. The results finally obtained did credit to those responsible, who accomplished almost the impossible in organizing and training our armies, and in developing our industries to meet military needs.

The lesson taught by the World War is that the peace-time industrial plants which in time of war will be called upon to furnish munitions, must be so organized and constructed that a transition from the needs of peace to the needs of war is smooth and rapid and does not affect adversely their productivity for peace needs. It seems clearly to our interests to establish in time of peace agencies, such as the War Industries Board, that will keep closely in touch with the industrial activities of the nation with a view to making a transfer from peace to war needs far less costly in time and in money than was the case in the World War. Our Emergency Fleet Corporation is especially important. The controlling factor with us during the trying days of 1918 was shipping. It was the lack of the ocean tonnage needed to transport our troops and munitions to France that caused many who knew the real situation and who were in responsible positions, harried days and sleepless nights. Ocean transport for men and supplies in war must be prepared in time of peace. It would be criminal to let this work remain undone until we are actually at war with an overseas power.

Modern armies are not improvised. It takes months to train the soldier, even under the constant and painstaking efforts of well-trained officers. In the late war, our officers up to the grade of field officer, and even many in that grade,

were as untrained as were the enlisted men. An old lesson of war that we had never profited by was again taught us, that the training of an officer is a matter not of days, weeks, or even months, but of years. Such training must necessarily be given in time of peace. At the time of entering the war we had approximately 4,000 officers of more than a year's experience in the Regular Army. From this small number the needs of the staff, of higher command and of the administrative and supply services had to be met. Multifarious duties in the home country kept many of the best of our regular officers from availability for service overseas. The result was that in France we had not, on an average, more than one regular officer of any worth-while experience to fifteen hundred troops, those troops themselves being without experience and training. Our task might well have been impossible but for the National Guard and the Reserve officers of the pre-war period who had so unselfishly and to the best of their opportunities given their time and energy to learning the military profession and how to serve their country in a military way in time of need. The best products of our military schools and of our training camps, fortunately inaugurated a few years before we entered the war, and the few thousand officers we got from the old soldier element of the Regular Army also proved invaluable aids to us in our work. Later on in the offensive operations in the fall of 1918 we were greatly helped out in the junior officer grades by the products of our army schools, established early in the war.

Everything that goes to make up an army in military operations must be under one command. One mind must control not only the fighting army, but also the supply necessary to such army. This control must be exercised by the commander-in-chief through his general staff, a body of officers selected to interpret his wishes and decisions and

to translate them into action. In modern war it is as necessary to have a general staff of all units from the headquarters of the entire national defense down to the lowest unit made up of all arms, the division, as it is for a watch to have a mainspring. The general staff controls and coordinates the work of the numerous arms and services that go to make up a modern army. In direct proportion to the strength of the control exercised by its general staff will be the efficiency of an army. We can no more get away from this principle than we could revert to the musket and the black powder of Civil War days and expect to win a battle against modern weapons and munitions.

Marshal Haig says the World War exhibited the same principles which had marked all other wars. This is especially true in the field of strategy and what is loosely designated as grand tactics. The changes in minor tactics and in organization are due to the introduction of new weapons and new equipment, as well as to developments in the old; to improved means of communication and to a better organization and vastly increased importance of the work of the staff and of the supply and administrative services functioning under the staff.

The World War brought out prominently the advantages that go with the possession of interior lines of operations of armies. The Central Powers found that this advantage added to their effective forces the equivalent of several combat divisions. It enabled them to hold their opponents in one theater by strongly entrenched but thinly held lines, while they concentrated their strategical mass of maneuver to crush their opponents in some other theater. This advantage would probably have won the war for them not later than the summer of 1918 but for the active intervention of the United States in the conflict.

It is doubtful if the Allies fully realized to what an extent their armies were committed to stabilized or trench warfare



Mortar on railway mount.



Sixteen-inch howitzer on railway mount.

Sixteen-caliber railway artillery capable of firing the entire circumference of the horizon, ammunition train in the rear.

French 340 M M gun manned by United States coast artillery firing at German army corps headquarters 30 kilometers away.

*United States official photographs.*

at the time we entered the war, or how impotent to secure decisive results such warfare was. They seemed to have forgotten that stabilized warfare had been adopted only through force of necessity and as a temporary expedient only; that the trenches must be given up and warfare in the open resumed before decisive results could be obtained. Hand-grenades, gas-projectors, trench-mortars and the other weapons that were the natural products of trench warfare, would serve the purpose for a while, but victory could come only through the actual body-to-body conflict of the opposing forces, when the rifle and the bayonet would decide the results. This was General Pershing's doctrine from the very beginning, a doctrine that gave aggressiveness to the American soldier, that gave us the troops that stopped the Germans at Château-Thierry, pushed them back from the Marne, and, later on, drove them from defensive line to defensive line in the St. Mihiel salient and in the Meuse-Argonne.

Probably we shall not find stabilized warfare possible in the next war in any theater in which we are likely to operate. We shall be unable to find obstacles like the North Sea and the Swiss frontier on which to rest the flanks of a stabilized defensive line that cannot be turned, unless we stretch such defensive line beyond the limit of possibility. We must be prepared to conduct war in the open and, therefore, be prepared to act aggressively from the beginning. This policy accords with the traditions and with the training of the American army.

In the field of tactics we may well go slowly in drawing from our experiences in France general conclusions applicable at all times and under all conditions of warfare. Our next war may and probably will be fought under conditions vastly different from those we faced in the last. The methods of training of our small military forces of pre-war days were along right lines as far as conditions then existing enabled us to apply them. Our Field Service Regulations and other

training manuals proved surprisingly correct as guides for the organization and instruction of our new armies.

The methods of warfare followed in the World War were not in themselves new. They were in the main adaptations and developments of old methods due to the new weapons and the changes in the old, as also to a theater of war that made possible a high expression of the defensive in warfare. The trained soldier accepted such changes and developments and readily adapted himself to them; it was to the untrained or only partially-trained soldier that they proved embarrassing.

The infantry came out of the war more than ever the dominant and important arm of battle. The introduction of new weapons, the high development of the old, the birth of new combat arms, such as aviation and the tanks, only emphasized the truth of that principle. To win a battle it is just as necessary now as it ever was to close with the enemy and actually drive him from his position. This is the task that falls to the infantry, a task rendered immeasurably greater because of the improvement in arms and in ammunition. In the accomplishment of its mission, the infantry must be prepared to suffer proportionately far greater losses than fall to the other arms. It is, therefore, vitally important that its morale be unimpaired. Close association of the work of all other arms to that of the infantry is more necessary than ever to success.

The infantry must be highly trained and disciplined, effectively equipped and efficiently led. Because of the nature of the fighting it is called upon to do, it is the most difficult arm to control in battle. To avoid paralyzing losses, it must fight in small groups or as individuals and outside of the direct control of any but the minor leaders. No two situations confronting the infantryman in battle are exactly the same. Initiative and resourcefulness are, therefore, qualities that he must possess to the highest degree. Such qualities can be developed only by thorough

training. The neglect of our infantry in pre-war days and the mistaken views then held as to the ease of infantry organization and training, cost us much in the World War.

In our future military training we must remember that it is the function of the other arms to assist, not to replace, the infantry. The rifle and the bayonet remain the principal infantry weapons. The army whose infantry knows how to use the rifle and has the courage to use the bayonet is, other things being approximately equal, the victorious army in battle. In the American Expeditionary Force the American spirit and American temper responded heartily to the injunction of the commander-in-chief that we develop in the infantryman an aggressive spirit to the point where he would consider himself an expert in the use of the rifle and a bayonet fighter invincible in battle.

Fire superiority in battle is still as necessary as ever to enable the infantry to close with the enemy. Formerly we found it possible to gain fire superiority within the range of the rifle by increasing the number of rifles on the firing line. This expedient is no longer possible because of the heavy casualties that would result from such action. We must now rely more on the fire from the artillery of all calibers and on the intensive use of all the small auxiliary weapons.

The war brought to the infantry new weapons which it was found advisable to develop without lessening the primary importance of the rifle and bayonet. The hand-grenade and the light trench-mortar had their rebirth in the necessity of stabilized warfare. We found uses for them later in open warfare. In future training we must develop an "accompanying gun" for the infantry that will replace the light mortar, the one-pounder, and the lighter artillery pieces which were found necessary in action to send forward close up to the leading infantry lines.

The machine-gun, in our studies before the war, was believed to be an emergency weapon for use in the crises of

battle. An American soldier who took part in the Meuse-Argonne campaign will never forget the annihilating power of this weapon in the "nests" of his enemy. Machine-guns and automatic rifles were wonderfully improved in mechanism and developed in their uses in all the armies engaged in the World War. Their present rôle in battle is so far in advance of our pre-war acceptance of it that we cannot now set a limit to either their ultimate development or their battle power. They remain, however, distinctively infantry weapons.

No arm had a greater development in the war than did the artillery. In the number and caliber of its guns, in the amount of ammunition expended, and, above all, in its methods of fire, that arm went beyond the dreams of its most enthusiastic advocates of but a few years ago. We could not then conceive of an operation like ours of St. Mihiel that would call for the employment of 2,600 pieces of artillery, ranging in caliber from the 75's to the 14-inch seacoast defense guns on railroad mounts. At the battle of Gettysburg, Lee's army had in use 126 guns, while the guns of Meade's army numbered approximately 170. In the French Verdun offensive of 1917, six attacking French divisions of approximately the numerical strength of Meade's army, were assisted by 2,700 guns of all calibers, the lightest of them inconceivably greater in range, rapidity of fire and execution than the most powerful gun Meade possessed. Comparing weight alone, the artillery ammunition expended by both sides in the three days' fighting at Gettysburg would not have given the French artillery at Verdun, nor ours at St. Mihiel, thirty minutes of fire. In the World War, France alone manufactured more than 36,000 pieces of artillery. Their 75's, which did such splendid work from the beginning to the end of the war, fired more than six hundred million rounds of ammunition during that period.

The figures given show one picture of the wonderful development of artillery, but only one. Control and execution of its fire, methods of support of the infantry, both in attack and in defense, and methods of ammunition supply, give other pictures of this development.

Horse-drawn artillery on the battle-field finds its losses in animals so excessive as to render it at times completely immobile. Caterpillar traction in the artillery did excellent work in the later months of the war and filled to a great extent a need that with us had become imperative because of the constant heavy depletion of an always inadequate supply of horses. The tractors were used almost continuously in all kinds of weather, over all kinds of roads. The satisfactory service they gave promises well for that method of artillery traction in the future.

The fact that cavalry was called upon to play such a comparatively small part in the war on the Western front, especially during the last three years of fighting, has led some to the hasty conclusion that the importance of cavalry in warfare has diminished. Stabilized warfare gives but little opportunity for the use of cavalry, but in France we faced conditions that are not likely to be reproduced in future wars, certainly not in our home territory. In war of movement cavalry will still have its important part to play. It is true that the World War transferred to the new arm, aviation, one of the most important old-time rôles of cavalry, that of the strategical reconnaissance of the enemy and the enemy's territory that began with the declaration of war and continued until the opposing armies were in actual contact; but more than ever before have the rôles of tactical reconnaissance and the duties of security and information become the particular province of the cavalry in open warfare. Had our armies continued on after breaking the German line in the Meuse-Argonne,

there is no doubt that the need of good aggressive cavalry would have been imperatively felt.

A modern army demands much of its engineers, both on the lines of communication and on the battle-field. The use of engineer personnel, equipment and material of all kinds is far greater now than in former wars. The operation of water supply systems for armies, both in action and at rest, the supply and operation of portable and of fixed electric lighting systems, of maps and charts of all descriptions, the operation of the light railroads now indispensable in the field, operation of searchlights, installation and operation of sound and of flash-ranging devices, as well as the employment of the new auxiliary to the combat arms known loosely as "camouflage," are some of the many duties that have been added to the work of the engineers. In the services of supply and on the line of communications we have represented all the engineers that are known to civil life. Fortunately for us we can readily recruit most of the classes required for this work when war comes. The engineers with combat units, however, call for a higher training in the work of war than ever before.

While close coöperation in battle between all parts of the combat army is more essential to success now than ever before, the old-time means of communication and of dissemination of orders on the battle-field are no longer possible. Even a company commander usually finds it impracticable to keep within sight and hearing of any but a small part of his command. Team-work on the part of every man of the unit, officer and private, must be ensured. Every part of the battle-field, usually showing no living human being to an observer, must have means of communication with every other part. The will of the commander must be made known rapidly and completely down to the individual soldiers in the most advanced positions. All modern methods of communication are made use of to

achieve this end. The telegraph and telephone, wired and wireless, runners, visual signals, light and sound bombs, pigeons, and even dogs, have their places. The best means of intercommunication must be provided before the beginning of an action and must be extended or changed, but kept workable, as the action progresses. All this is the duty of the Signal Corps, an arm that seldom receives the recognition it deserves for the work it does in actual battle, and an arm that is usually subject to as heavy losses as is any other arm of the military service except the infantry. Its work cannot be done with a personnel improvised after war comes.

In spite of the advances in civilization, war is far more cruel now than ever before in history. Its toll in dead and wounded is proportionally greater, and never before did history show destruction of material objects, of the works of man, and even of the very soil that feeds the people as did the World War. A single high-explosive shell, well placed, or a few bombs dropped from an airplane, may kill more people now than were killed in actions we dignified by the name of battles in our other wars. Nor are the victims in modern war all soldiers. Many are non-combatants, women and children. Long-range guns, bombs dropped from aircraft, and poisonous gas may claim their toll of dead and of injured indiscriminately from old and young of both sexes.

The medical and sanitary services have greatly broadened their field of activity. The actual surgery of the battlefield is not now the larger part of their work. Much of it is in the prevention of disease and in the improvement of conditions that militate against the health of the soldier or that tend to lower his morale. The army that lacks an adequate, efficient and willing medical personnel finds it impossible to attain a high battle efficiency.

Casualties in modern battle often come in large groups and in a short space of time. The skill of the surgeon that has done

such wonders in the past few years must be exerted quickly if it is to save life. The wounded must be recovered quickly and moved back to areas of comparative safety. The modern hospital train such as we used in France, with its every comfort and convenience for moving the wounded and sick over long distances, has won a permanent place in army equipment. The personnel, however, remains the most important element, as there is much in modern war that only the medical man of long training and experience in the service can know and can do efficiently.

The development of aviation as a new arm of warfare was so rapid in the World War as to cause us almost to lose sight of the lessons it taught. It did not stop with the signing of the armistice but seems to have been accelerated since that time. The field of employment of aircraft in war seems limitless. It is capable of exerting more influence in future than is any other arm of the nation's defense. Aircraft is used for observation and reconnaissance on the lines of opposing armies to practically unlimited distances; in engaging in combat with other arms, especially infantry; in the destruction of stores and centers of supply in the rear of the operating armies; in the destruction of industrial centers far removed from the actual theater of hostile contact. It is only at the beginning of its possibilities in all those directions.

We were astounded during the war at the ease with which the combatant nations bombarded enemy cities. We in America believed our cities exempt because of our geographical position. Had the war continued we would have been disillusioned in that respect. We know now that when the armistice was signed, Germany had actually completed aircraft designed to reach and bombard New York and other of our Atlantic coast cities. We know now that with enemy air bases in the territory to the north or the south of our land frontiers, there is no city of our country from the Atlantic to the Pacific that would be safe from

aërial bombardment. Furthermore, because of the progress made in aircraft and in the destructive agents carried, we must expect future air bombardments of cities to work incalculably greater damage than did the bombardments of London and Paris in 1918. We cannot even guess what will be the limit of the destructive agencies that will be carried by the military aircraft of the future nor the extent to which such aircraft will procure protection for its personnel and the machine itself by armor and by improved devices. As a nation we must keep to the front in the development of this important arm, as it is vital to the efficiency of our military defenses.

Poisonous gases as a weapon of warfare have come to stay, whether we wish it or not. This in spite of any convention between nations that might prohibit their use. That "necessity knows no law" is truer as a maxim in warfare between nations than it is in the common law. Conventions, the result of solemn covenant between Christian nations in time of peace, will be ruthlessly disregarded when victory in war is offered as the reward for their violation. We must for our own safety, keep at least abreast of other nations in the development of this weapon.

The so-called "tanks" also have come to stay in warfare and also are, apparently, only in the first stages of their development. In future wars they will be heard of much more than they were in the last. Basically the tank is the return to the principle of giving protection to the soldier by encasing him in armor. It does give protection to the men within it against small-arms fire and the fire of lighter field pieces. It clears the way for an infantry advance by beating down obstacles such as barbed-wire entanglements that are practically impassable to foot troops. It can destroy machine-gun nests of the enemy without the heavy losses in men that the same task imposes on troops in the open. The tank is a valuable aid to the infantry in the accomplishment of what has become the most difficult task that falls to troops in battle—the actual closing

with the enemy and the occupation of the enemy's position. The tank must, therefore, train with the infantry and become part of the infantry. We can set no limits to its development in size, mobility, or adaptability to terrain.

Always an important factor to an army operating against an enemy, supply is now far more so than ever before in history. This is due to the vast increase in the quantity and in the variety of munitions required by a modern army. It was a far easier matter to supply the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War than it was to supply a single American corps operating in the Meuse-Argonne. The introduction of new weapons, the almost unbelievable quantities of artillery and small-arms ammunition expended, the variety of mechanical contrivances now used in war, demand many times the supply that old-time armies found necessary to their needs. Before "jumping-off" day in our St. Mihiel operation we had placed in "dumps," or close-up supply depots, about one hundred and seventy trainloads of ammunition. This in addition to the ammunition actually with the troops engaged; and what was brought up during the progress of the battle in all probability exceeded in weight what the armies of both sides consumed during the four years of our Civil War. The soldier himself now demands more in the way of food, clothing, creature comforts, and of diversions than in the old wars it was found possible or thought necessary to supply. The "welfare agencies" won in the World War a permanent place in modern armies. The supply necessary to their activities is vast in the aggregate. When everything an army requires is totaled up in weight, it will be found that each soldier with the colors requires a ton of supply each month as a minimum.

The supply system of a modern army in war must extend without a break from the front line of battle back to the origin of supply, the farms, the factories, and the varied

munition plants. One directing head or agency must gather all the supplies needed and must control their production and fabrication and the production and procurement of the necessary raw materials. This same authority must be responsible for getting the supplies, in the quantities and in the varieties demanded, to the theater of operations. There they come under the absolute control of the leader in the field. The World War taxed all the resources and means of transport to supply the armies engaged: on water, from the canal boat to the battleship; on rails, from the animal or motor-drawn small trains of the very light railroads to the heaviest trains on the heaviest rails known to commerce; on highways, from the ox-cart and pack mule up to the heaviest type of motor-truck. Aircraft also were used for this purpose. All those agencies, some of them highly developed beyond their present-day capacity, will be used for the purpose of transportation of supplies in future wars.

Good roads, highway and rail, are an absolute necessity in the successful conduct of modern war. Poor roads can stop a highly efficient army more readily and more effectively than can the guns of its enemies. The French railroads responded splendidly to the crushing demands made upon them practically to the end of the war and especially in the crisis of August and September, 1914. Here we have never opened up highways or built railroads with a view to their military uses in time of war. We have, however, a doubtful consolation in the thought that the absence of practicable highways will be felt by our enemies as well as by ourselves in a war with a country that attempts to invade ours.

The military lessons of the World War that apply to our nation are not new. They have been emphasized by that war, that is all. We have had brought home to us directly that, if unprepared when war comes, it takes more than a year to call out, organize, equip, and train armies to meet the

trained soldier of our enemies. We know now that it takes even a longer time than that to turn the industries of our country from the work of peace to the work of war. We know that the training of the officers to organize, instruct, supply and lead our combat units in battle is a matter not of weeks or of months, but of years; that an efficient general staff is the first requisite in the organization of an efficient army; that higher leaders in war and the staff officers to whom must fall the hardest problems to solve, must be the products of a lifetime study of their profession. Armies cannot be improvised in a few days or weeks, even under the spur of dire necessity. In the World War the patriotism and loyalty of our people were more in evidence than in any other war of our history. Every call made upon them was met ungrudgingly and promptly. All was done that could be done to speed the preparation and the supply of war needs. In fact, the seemingly impossible was accomplished along those lines. But the fact remains that, in spite of all this, it was fourteen months after our entry into the war before the American army became a real factor in the struggle.

Our nation follows consistently through its history a policy of non-preparedness for war. Yet such policy seems never to have served as a deterrent from war when in the patriotic enthusiasm of our people they determined that the time had come to leave the paths of peace. We cannot keep out of war by pacifist policies alone. War once entered upon, our country, illogically but consistently with its traditions, demands immediate offensive action by its army against its enemies. The great lesson of the war for us is that, if we continue in that policy, unless our adversaries in future wars are equally with us unprepared for the struggle, or we have powerful allies to hold off our enemies until we can get ready for war, we may find ourselves defeated by a strong adversary before we have made even a fair start in our preparation.

# CHAPTER XV

## The Problems and Prospect of Peace

Increasingly difficult problems of the peace settlement. President Wilson's decision to be present at the Peace Conference in Paris. The advocates of the League of Nations. The Supreme Council. Inauguration of the Peace Conference, January 18, 1918. Decision of the Peace Conference for a League of Nations. Contrasted tendencies in the discussion of the League. First draft of the Covenant; the discussion of it in the United States. Revision and final draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations as adopted by the Peace Conference, April 28th. Difficulties in the application of the Fourteen Points. Presentation of terms to German delegation, May 7th. Attempts of Germans to modify the terms. Peace treaty signed, June 28th. The terms of the treaty. Conclusion.

In the tension of the great struggle the nations had given comparatively little thought to the final settlement. The Allies had readily adopted President Wilson's Fourteen Points with his supplementary expressions (with the provisos mentioned in the last chapter) as the basic principles of peace and their opponents finally invoked them as protection against the ignominy and losses involved in genuine defeat. But with the close of hostilities it soon became evident that the task of applying these principles was beset with enormous difficulties. There were possible contradictions in the letter or spirit of the Fourteen Points.

The meaning of the freedom of the seas had never been defined. A final settlement of the future status of the former Russian territories was impracticable with the actual chaos in Eastern Europe. In many instances national aspirations and formal treaties between the Allies clashed with the principle of the self-determination of peoples which was supposedly the basis of the Fourteen Points.

Was there human sagacity capable of determining in all cases "the historically established lines of allegiance and nationality in the Balkans?" Is it possible to establish boundary lines with any generally acceptable definition of nationality as the absolute criterion? Could the principle of self-determination be harmonized with the territorial conditions necessary for the independent existence of all the nationalities involved in the settlement? The obligation of Germany and its associates to make compensation for the material losses inflicted upon the Allies was open to a wide range of possible definition. In this connection the situation was rendered especially delicate by the popular impulses brought to bear upon the responsible statesmen. There was a loud cry that the terms should be made severe. On the occasion of the general election in the United Kingdom early in December, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George promised the voters that Germany would be made to pay to the limit of its ability.

There was a fundamental discrepancy of views as to the real nature of the circumstances in which the war had ended. In general the peoples in the West believed that they had won a complete victory, one that justified them in imposing their own terms on the enemy. But there was a widespread belief beyond the Rhine that the German armies after four years' unparalleled exertions were still undefeated and that Germany had voluntarily accepted peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points, that the settlement, in other words, was to be a negotiated peace. This view received a certain indirect support from the complaints of extremists in the West who condemned the armistice as premature, as an abandonment of operations before the attainment of complete victory. Views were influenced by partisan prejudice, especially in Germany, where popular factions maintained that the nation had been misled by the late government, while the reactionary groups insisted that the army had been betrayed by the revolution.

Neither admitted that the German army had been overcome in regular conflict by superior strength or strategy.

The certainty of conflicts between national ambitions and of embarrassing disputes about the application of the acknowledged principles of peace and the alarming growth of extremist sentiment among the Allies, combined with the unquestionable intention of the Germans to exploit any misunderstandings between their opponents, obscured the prospect of the approaching peace conference.

President Wilson had been the author of the accepted formula for peace. His words had been instrumental in consolidating the sentiment of the Allies and in compassing the resignation of the German High Command, the flight of the Kaiser, and the subversion of the Imperial German government. He was the head of a nation whose avowed purpose in the war was the most disinterested of all the greater powers. The Fourteen Points needed a champion and the peace conference needed the presence of a moderating element backed by great potential power.

Convinced of the necessity for his presence at the conference, the president did not hesitate to contravene an established precedent of American government. The purpose of his journey abroad he explained in his address to Congress on December 4th in the following terms:

"I welcome this occasion to announce to the Congress my purpose to join in Paris the representatives of the governments with which we have been associated in the war against the Central Empires for the purpose of discussing with them the main features of the treaty of peace. I realize the great inconveniences that will attend my leaving the country, particularly at this time, but the conclusion that it was my paramount duty to go has been forced upon me by considerations which I hope will seem as conclusive to you as they have seemed to me.

"The Allied Governments have accepted the bases of peace which I outlined to the Congress on the 8th of January last, as the Central Empires also have, and very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application, and it is highly desirable that I should give it in order that the sincere desire of our government to contribute without selfish purpose of any kind to settlements that will be of common benefit to all the nations concerned may be made fully manifest. The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them. The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have consciously fought for the ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country; I have sought to express those ideals; they have accepted my statements of them as the substance of their own thought and purpose, as the associated governments have accepted them; I owe it to them to see to it, so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, and no possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their life's blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which could transcend this."

Ignoring the adverse criticism of his political opponents, President Wilson sailed for Brest a few hours later with a large staff of trained experts and secretaries, besides the Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Henry White, who, with Colonel E. M. House and General Tasker H. Bliss, already in Paris, were the other American delegates to the Peace Conference.

The president landed at Brest on December 13th and was received with a great ovation on his arrival in Paris the next day. During a short visit in England two weeks later he received everywhere an enthusiastic welcome.

The Peace Congress in the Gallery of Mirrors at Versailles, June 27, 1919. *Clemenceau, President of the Congress, standing between President Wilson and Lloyd George, declaring the meeting open and inviting the German delegates to sign the treaty.*



"The Big Four." The chief representatives of the leading countries at the Peace Conference. *From right to left are President Wilson, United States; Clemenceau, France; Lloyd George, Great Britain; Sonnino, Italy. From a United States official photograph made May 27, 1919.*

In the course of an address at the University of Paris on December 21st, he alluded as follows to the proposed League of Nations:

"My conception of the League of Nations is just this—that it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world, and that whenever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them, and men everywhere will ask: 'What are the purposes that you hold in your hearts against the fortunes of the world?' Just a little exposure will settle most questions. If the Central Powers had dared to discuss the purposes of this war for a single fortnight, it never would have happened, and if, as should be, they were forced to discuss it for a year, the war would have been inconceivable."

A small group of Frenchmen was earnestly working for a league. It was led by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a senator, and the former premier, M. Léon Bourgeois. The latter advocated an effective international force to execute the decisions of the league. President Wilson conferred with these and with the leading British supporters of a league, Mr. Asquith, Lord Bryce, Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Mr. Lloyd George.

In January the president was greeted with enthusiasm during a short trip to some of the principal cities of Italy. He returned to Paris from Rome on January 7, 1919.

The first meeting of the Supreme Council was held in Paris on the 12th. This Council was a transformation of the Interallied Supreme War Council as the directing agency for the peace deliberations. It consisted generally of two representatives of each of the greater powers, including the prime ministers and foreign secretaries of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. But it was flexible in character and its membership was altered temporarily to suit the nature of the various problems under discussion by the admission of experts and specialists.

The Supreme Council convoked the Peace Conference, which consisted of representatives of all the powers of the Entente and of those associated with them, and prescribed the number of delegates from each country, five from each of the great states, and three, two, or one from each of the others according to their size or the importance of their part in the war.

The Peace Conference was formally opened in the Salle de la Paix of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, January 18th at 3 P. M. President Poincaré, as head of the nation acting as host, called the conference to order, extended his welcome to them, and withdrew. Then President Wilson rose and nominated M. Clemenceau as the presiding officer. Mr. Lloyd George seconded the nomination on behalf of Great Britain and the election was unanimous.

In spite of an elaborate ceremony of inauguration, the sessions of the Peace Conference were rather perfunctory. It ratified the decisions reached in the Supreme Council or other smaller bodies whose deliberations were secret.

Now that the unifying force of a common danger was no longer effective, all the discordant tendencies, the selfish aims of the industrial and mercantile classes, the militarism of professional soldiers appealing to national vanity or fear, the intrigues of politicians, became more and more prominent. The coöperation of all the high-minded elements was needed to combat these baneful influences.

In the second plenary session of the Peace Conference on January 25th President Wilson made a strong plea for a league of nations. Mr. Lloyd George declared that the people of the British Empire favored the movement for a league of nations. M. Léon Bourgeois advocated the league and the Italian, Polish, and Chinese delegates spoke in the same sense.

The Conference resolved that a league ought to be created "to promote international coöperation, to ensure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations, and to provide

safeguards against war," that the provisions for the league should be an integral part of the treaty, that membership in it should be open to "every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects," that it should have a permanent secretary, that it should meet periodically through its representatives, and that a committee representative of the associated governments should be appointed to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the league. On this committee President Wilson and Colonel House represented the United States; Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, the British Empire; M. Léon Bourgeois and Professor Ferdinand Larnaude, France; Prime Minister Orlando and Signor Vittorio Scialoia, Italy; and Viscount Chinda and K. Ochiai, Japan; and there were single delegates from Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia.

In the deliberations on the proposed league there was a very marked contrast from the first between the ideas advanced by the nations which would be directly exposed to the vengeance of a restored Germany and the tendency displayed by other nations which would not be immediately threatened. On the one hand were the advocates of a league with power to make laws and enforce them. The French and Czecho-Slovaks in particular stood for the establishment of a strong league with a common general staff and an international military organization capable of making the decisions of the league respected. On the other hand were those who would limit the function of the league to the maintenance of a court of international justice with no power to enforce its decisions. Great Britain and the United States, for instance, were unwilling to concur in the proposed international military force.

The draft of a covenant for the League of Nations, a compromise in many respects between the extreme views described, to which General Smuts, as well as the American delegation, had largely contributed, was presented to the

Peace Conference in plenary session on February 14th and immediately published.

On the next day President Wilson sailed for America after having sent a request to the Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives that discussion of the proposed covenant in Congress be postponed until he had been given an opportunity of discussing it with them in detail.

Unfortunately, the partisan zeal of a considerable element in Congress could not be thus restrained. Their premature denunciation of the proposed form of covenant and their appeal to nationalistic sentiment or prejudice, before the terms were clearly understood by the American people, tended to make a dispassionate consideration of the project of a League impossible.

In the course of a public address in the Metropolitan Opera House in New York, on the evening before his departure on the return to France, President Wilson alluded as follows to the opponents of the League in the United States:

"I cannot imagine how these gentlemen can live and not live in the atmosphere of the world. I cannot imagine how they can live and not be in contact with the events of their times, and I particularly cannot imagine how they can be Americans and set up a doctrine of careful selfishness, thought out to the last detail."

Ex-president Taft was present on the platform with President Wilson and spoke very forcibly in support of the League of Nations. Singularly, as it might seem, there was little objection to the draft of the covenant anywhere except in the United States. Only the richest and least assailable of the Great Powers feared that its independence might be impaired by an alliance with the other leading nations of the earth to promote the highest aims of human society.

On March 5th President Wilson set out from New York to resume his place at the Peace Conference.

The Committee on the League of Nations subjected the original draft of the covenant to a long and painstaking process of revision. At length the revised draft of the covenant, distinctly fuller and more explicit than the first one, was adopted without amendment as presented by President Wilson in the plenary session of the Peace Conference on April 28th.

The organization of the League comprised a small inner council for the transaction of international matters and a larger assembly to be composed of delegates from all the constituent states, including the different British dominions and India. International disputes were divided into justiciable, or those suitable for arbitration, and non-justiciable, or those not suitable for arbitration.

The Council of the League was to consist of representatives of the Great Powers, the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, together with representatives of four other members of the League who were to be chosen by the Assembly. Until such a selection should be made by the Assembly, the four lesser states having representation in the Council were to be Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain.

The Assembly of the League was to consist of representatives of all the members of the League. The original members of the League were to be the belligerent states associated against the Central Powers. By the terms of the covenant an invitation to join the League was also extended directly to the Argentine Republic, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela. Other states could be admitted by approval of the representatives of two-thirds of the constituent states.

The Covenant of the League of Nations could be amended by unanimous consent of the Council and the approval of two-thirds of the Assembly.

Representation in the Council was limited to a single delegate and a single vote for each member of the League possessing the right to such participation. Each state could send as many as three representatives to the Assembly but could only cast a single vote.

Any war or threat of war was declared to be "a matter of concern to the whole League" and the League was to take any action that might be considered wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

The members of the League agreed that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they would submit the question to arbitration or to enquiry by the Council, as the case might be, and that they would in no case resort to arms until three months after the arbitrators had rendered their award or the Council had made its report. The members pledged themselves to carry out in full good faith any award rendered by the court of arbitration. If, in the case of non-justiciable disputes, the report of the Council should be unanimous, (except for the representatives of the parties to the dispute), the members of the League agreed not to go to war with any party that complied with the report.

The Council might, on request of either party, refer any dispute to the Assembly of the League, provided such request were made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. The report of a majority of the Assembly with the unanimous concurrence of the Council (exclusively, in both bodies, of the representatives of the disputants) would then have the same force as a report of the Council.

If any member of the League should resort to war in violation of the covenant, he would be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the members of the League. Such an act would lead to the severance of all commercial and financial relations with the guilty state and the prevention of all

commercial, financial, or personal intercourse "between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not."

While the Council was to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments to the lowest possible point consistent with national safety and the enforcement of international obligations, it was also to recommend what effective military or naval force each state should contribute to the armed forces required for carrying out the objects of the League.

The text of Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was given special prominence by the acrimonious criticism of it in the United States, reads as follows:

"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled."

It was provided that, in the case of disputes involving a state or states not in the League, such state or states should be invited to accept the obligations of the League for the purposes of the dispute. In case any state outside the League should refuse this and make war on a member of the League, this would be regarded as an act of war against all the members of the League.

Geneva was selected as the seat of the League and provision was made for the establishment of a permanent Secretariat-general at Geneva for discharging the regular business of the League.

It was provided that every international engagement henceforth entered into by any member of the League should be registered at once with the Secretariat and published and that no agreement should be regarded as valid until it had been so registered.

Article XXI was inserted out of deference to American opinion in the following terms:

"Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace."

While work on this draft was proceeding, President Wilson had been engaged in a difficult struggle for the adoption of the essential features of his Fourteen Points. At one time, on April 6th, in seeming despair he cabled for his ship, as though about to leave the Peace Conference, which, for several weeks, appeared to be on the point of dissolution.

The territorial delimitation of Poland involved many complicated questions. Mr. Lloyd George opposed the president's intended assignment of Danzig to Poland as a violation of the principle of national self-determination and as a compromise the city was declared autonomous.

The demands of France, anxious for its future security, in case there were to be no strong military league or other form of effective defensive alliance, seemed excessive to the British and Americans. M. Clemenceau urged the establishment of a buffer state under French military protection in the German territory west of the Rhine and demanded for France the boundary of the peace of May 30, 1814, which included the Sarre valley coal-fields. This idea of a buffer state was finally relinquished and President Wilson and the moderates steadfastly opposed the transference of the Sarre region with its German population to French sovereignty as a violation of the principle of nationality. A compromise was finally agreed upon. France received the Sarre coal-fields, but the political administration of the region was left in the hands of the League of Nations, provision being made for a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years for the determination of its allegiance thereafter.

EN FOI DE QUOI, les Plenipotentiaires soussignés ont signé le présent Traité.

Fait à Versailles, le vingt-huit juin mil neuf cent dix-neuf, en un seul exemplaire qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont les expéditions authentiques seront remises à chacune des Puissances signataires.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Versailles, the twenty-eighth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French République, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the signatory Powers.



Facsimile of the original of the Treaty of Peace deposit
and British plenipotentiaries. *There were s*



the last page and signatures and seals of the United States
*from all countries, including those of Germany.*

The question as to the disposition of Fiume involved a conflict in the application of the Fourteen Points. Italy appealed to the principle of nationality in support of a claim to Fiume, where the majority of the population was Italian. But Fiume was claimed at the same time by the Jugo-Slavs as the indispensable means for their outlet to the sea specifically mentioned as the right of nations. The aim of Italy throughout was to dominate the Adriatic Sea. With this purpose in view, Italy had secured the promise of Trieste, Istria, and part of Dalmatia in its negotiations with the Allies in 1915.

The secret treaty between Italy and France, the United Kingdom, and Russia, signed April 26, 1915, embodying the agreement under which Italy intervened in the war on the side of the Allies, had been published by Trotsky from the text found in the archives of the Foreign Office in Petrograd.

This agreement had given Italy the whole of southern Tirol as far as the Brenner Pass; the county of Gorizia and Gradisca; the city of Trieste and its surroundings; the whole of Istria as far as the Quarnero, including the Istrian islands, Cherso and Lussin, and the adjacent smaller islands, and the lesser islands of Plavnik, Unia, Canidoli, Palazzuola, San Pietro Nerovio, Asinello, and Gruica; the province of Dalmatia in its actual extent, including Lissarika and Trebinje, extending as far south as a line starting from the sea near Cape Planka, with all the islands north and west of the Dalmatian coast from Premuda and Selve to Meleda, including Lissa, Lesina, Curzola, and Lagosta, but excluding Brazza and some smaller ones. It was provided that a neutral zone was to extend from Point Planka to the southern extremity of the peninsula of Sabbioncello, and also from ten kilometers south of Ragusavecchia to the Vojussa River, including the Gulf of Cattaro, and the towns of Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua, and Durazzo, except insofar as this would

be an infringement of Montenegro's rights. All the islands not allotted to Italy were included in this neutral territory.

The treaty specified that Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro should receive the coast from the Italian boundary between Volosca and Fiume to the northern boundary of the province of Dalmatia (including Fiume and Veglia and other islands), as well as the coast from Cape Planka to the river Drin (including Spalato and Ragusa) with Brazza and some of the smaller islands.

Italy received full sovereignty over Valona and the island of Sasseno, and sufficient adjacent territory for their military protection. The coast from the southern Italian boundary in Albania to Cape Stilos was to be neutralized.

Italy was given full control of the foreign relations of Albania. The same power obtained full possession of all the islands of the Dodecanese which it at that time occupied. It was provided that Italy should be granted territorial rights in Turkey commensurate with those of the other powers in case the Ottoman Empire were divided. Finally, Italy was to receive suitable compensation in the event of the extension of French and British colonial power in Africa.

Although Fiume had not been assigned to Italy by the terms of this treaty, the Italians alleged that the collapse of Austria-Hungary had created a new situation not sufficiently provided for in 1915.

The British and French premiers were unfavorable to the Italian claim to Fiume and were in sympathy with President Wilson's steadfast opposition to it, but did not feel free to take a determined stand in the matter. Signor Orlando refused to consider any compromise and insisted on full possession of Fiume.

While President Wilson was struggling against the excessive aspirations of France and Italy, another embarrassing problem presented itself.

After having driven the Germans from Kiao-chau, the Japanese claimed the right of succession to Germany's leasehold of this place together with certain important rights that would give Japan a grip on the province of Shantung with its 40,000,000 people. But the Chinese regarded the presence of the Japanese with no less dissatisfaction than that of the Germans. Japan had opposed the entrance of China into the war and consequently into the councils of the Allies. In the course of discussion it became evident that the British government had promised to support the Japanese claims to Shantung and Kiao-chau and to the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator in return for concurrence in the assignment of the German islands south of the equator to Australia, and that France, Italy, and Russia had endorsed this compact.

The Chinese delegates urged that the German concession should be restored to China, which was willing to make liberal compensation to Japan for recovering these possessions, but only the promise could be obtained from Japan that Kiao-chau and the rights in the Shantung province would be restored to China at some indefinite future date.

On April 8th it was decided that Germany should pay for all damage done, although the amount was left undetermined for the time.

The Italian question was brought to a deadlock by the refusal of Premier Orlando to accept anything less than complete possession of Fiume for Italy. President Wilson made a public statement of his attitude in respect to this question on April 23d, appealing to the good sense of the Italian people to renounce their embarrassing claim to Fiume, a place which they no longer needed as a bulwark against their ancient enemy, since the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been dissolved. The British and French premiers had approved of President Wilson's statement before it was published, although the nature of their relations with Italy

kept them from taking an emphatic stand against Italian aspirations. But public opinion in Italy was inflamed at the president's interference and the Italian delegates left the Peace Conference. They returned later at the invitation of M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George without any assurance as to the future of Fiume, which remained unsettled.

On May 7, 1919, the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the German delegation, headed by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, appeared before the Peace Conference in the hall of the Trianon Palace Hotel at Versailles to receive the terms of peace imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. Clemenceau as president of the Peace Conference handed the draft of the treaty to Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau with the following words:

"Gentlemen, plenipotentiaries of the German Empire, it is neither the time nor place for superfluous words. You have before you the accredited representatives of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our account. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present you now a book which contains our conditions. You will have every facility for examining these conditions and the time necessary for it. Everything will be done with the courtesy that is the privilege of civilized nations.

"To give you my thought completely, you will find us ready to give you any explanation you want, but we must say at the same time that this second treaty of Versailles has cost us too much not to take on our side all the necessary precautions and guarantees that the peace shall be a lasting one."

To this Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied:

"We are under no illusion as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our want of power. We know that the power of the German army is broken. We know the force of the hatred

which we encounter here and we have heard the passionate demand that the conquerors make us pay as the vanquished and punish those who are worthy of being punished. It is demanded of us that we shall confess ourselves the only ones guilty of the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie. We are far from declining any responsibility that this great war of the world has come to pass, and that it was made in any way that it was made. The attitude of the former German government at The Hague Peace Conference, its actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, have certainly contributed to the disaster. But we energetically deny that Germany and her people, who were convinced that they were making a war of defense, were alone guilty. . . .

"Public opinion in all the countries of our adversaries is resounding with the crimes which Germany is said to have committed in the war. Here, also, we are ready to confess wrong that may have been done."

The German spokesman appealed to the Fourteen Points and said that Germany expected a peace of justice and not one of violence.

The German delegation tried in vain to open a general discussion of the treaty so as to change its fundamental provisions. They declared in a note dated May 10th that the draft of the treaty contained demands which no nation could endure and that their experts held that many of them could not possibly be carried out. But M. Clemenceau replied that the Allied and Associated Powers could admit no discussion of their right to insist on the terms of the peace substantially as drafted. They could consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries might submit. Two other German notes of May 13th and 16th charged that German territories were being made "the subject of bargains between one sovereignty and another as though they were chattels and pawns in a game." In reply to this M. Clemenceau

informed the German delegation that the wishes of the population of all the territories in question would be consulted and that the procedure to be followed in such consultation had been settled with special regard to local conditions.

The great effort of the Germans was made in a series of counter-proposals submitted on May 29th. They demanded oral negotiations and immediate admission of Germany to membership in the League of Nations. The territorial changes were analyzed and the conclusion advanced that they violated the right of self-determination of peoples. A free plebiscite was demanded for Alsace-Lorraine. Germany was willing to relinquish the German colonies in return for the mandate to administer them under the League of Nations. Germany offered a fixed indemnity of 100,000,000 marks without interest to cover all claims against it for reparation, provided the other terms were accepted. The surrender of the Kaiser and of German subjects accused of violations of the laws and customs of war was refused, but Germany proposed instead an international court of neutrals to judge the facts of crime, the punishments to be determined by German courts. Germany protested bitterly against the occupation of the Rhine provinces and declared that the labor clauses of the treaty were unsatisfactory.

The final reply of the Allies on June 16th cut short all further negotiations and required Germany to make declaration of acceptance or rejection within five days. While upholding the essential principles of the draft of the treaty, the Allies permitted certain modifications in detail, including a plebiscite for Upper Silesia, frontier rectifications in West Prussia, the omission of the third zone from the Schleswig plebiscite, a temporary increase in the permitted strength of the German army from 100,000 to 200,000, and others pertaining to the financial and economic clauses, as well as the promise of early admission to membership in the League of Nations if Germany fulfills its obligations.

On June 23d, shortly before the expiration of the time for deliberation, as extended, the German government sent its consent to sign the treaty.

The final act of Germany's submission took place in the great hall of the Palace of Versailles, where the German Empire was proclaimed in 1871. Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau and his colleagues had preferred to resign rather than to be instrumental in consummating Germany's humiliation and their places as plenipotentiaries had been taken by Herr Hermann Mueller, who had become Foreign Secretary, and Herr Johannes Bell, the Secretary for the Colonies.

The two German plenipotentiaries and the representatives of the nations which had been at war with Germany assembled in the famous Hall of Mirrors at three P. M., June 28, 1919, the fifth anniversary of the fateful assassination at Sarajevo.

After M. Clemenceau had explained the proceedings of the meeting, the Germans approached the table and signed the copies of the treaty and protocol. Then the representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the smaller states signed in their turn, with the exception of the Chinese, who refused to become parties to a compact which failed to guarantee their national integrity. When all was over, with the complete silence of the seated assembly, the German delegates left the hall where the glory and the humiliation of modern Germany had alike been solemnized.

The parties to the treaty of peace as named in the document were the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay on the one side and Germany on the other. The document contained about 80,000 words and was divided into fifteen main sections.

According to the terms Germany renounced all its territorial and political rights outside Europe, surrendering thereby 1,027,820 square miles of colonial possessions, and consented to the sacrifice of a considerable part of its home territory in Europe. Germany ceded to Belgium part of Prussian Moresnet and the districts of Eupen and Malmedy on the western border, embracing 382 square miles, and restored Alsace-Lorraine to France, with the re-establishment of the boundary of 1870. The Sarre coal-basin, 738 square miles, was placed under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations for fifteen years, after which the inhabitants were to decide their future allegiance. Germany ceded to the newly-created state of Poland the greater part of Upper Silesia and most of Posen and West Prussia, 21,686 square miles of territory, subject to plebiscite in the case of Upper Silesia. The ceded portion of West Prussia formed a corridor of Polish territory reaching the Baltic Sea, and to insure Poland the full advantage of maritime communications through the unrestricted use of a suitable harbor, a district of 729 square miles including the city of Danzig, touching this corridor on the east, was permanently internationalized, that is, constituted into the "Free City of Danzig" under the guarantee of the League of Nations. A High Commissioner appointed by the League of Nations was to draw up a constitution in agreement with the duly appointed representatives of the city. Danzig was included within the customs frontiers of Poland, which had charge of its foreign relations. The question of the future allegiance of 5,788 square miles of East Prussia, where the Polish element was very strong, was left to popular vote of the inhabitants. The northeastern tip of East Prussia, forty square miles of territory, was taken from Germany and given to Lithuania to form a convenient outlet for the latter to the sea. Provision was made for plebiscites in distinct zones of northern

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Map of Europe showing the old International boundaries and the new as determined by the Treaty of Versailles. *The solid heavy red lines indicate definite changes of boundaries, the broken red lines the boundaries of new states. The red shaded portions indicate sections of which the sovereignty is yet to be decided by plebiscite. Since the signing of the treaty three plebiscites have been held. The northern portion of Schleswig was divided into two zones, the upper of which decided on February 10, 1920, to become Danish, while the lower zone decided on March 14, 1920, to remain under German rule. The southern portion of East Prussia, a large element of the population of which was Polish, also decided to remain under German rule.*

D Longitude 5° West E 0° F 5° G 10° Longitude H East 15° from J Greenwich 20° K 25° L 30° M
4 5 6
40° 35°
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNIS
FRANCE
CORSICA
(To France)
SARDINIA
BALEARIC ISLANDS
MINORCA
MAJORCA
IVIZA
FORMENTERA
ITALY
SICILY
MALTA (Br.)
GOZO
LAMPEDUSA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
TYRRHENIAN SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
IONIAN SEA
AEGEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
Strait of Gibraltar
Gulf of Lion
Gulf of Genoa
Gulf of Hammamet
Gulf of Taranto
Gulf of Venice
Gulf of Corinth
Gulf of Salonika
Gulf of Smyrna
Sea of Marmora
Strait of Constantinople
Madrid
Barcelona
Lisbon
Oporto
Seville
Cadiz
Malaga
Valencia
Cartagena
Gibraltar (Br.)
Tangier
Ceuta
Melilla
Algiers
Tunis
Bizerta
Bona
Oran
Tenes
Mostaganem
Philippeville
Bougie
Rome
Naples
Palermo
Venice
Milan
Turin
Genoa
Florence
Trieste
Marseilles
Toulon
Nice
Belgrade
Bucharest
Constantinople
Athens
Smyrna
Salonika
Crete or Candia
Rhodes
Cyprus
Montenegro
Bulgaria
Roumania
Servia
Greece
Turkey
Albania
Dalmatia
Bosnia
Herzegovina
Hungary
Austria
Switzerland
Germany
Portugal
Spain
Algeria
Morocco
Tunis
Sardinia
Corsica
Sicily
Italy
France

Schleswig embracing an aggregate area of 2,787 square miles for deciding the question of Danish or German nationality.

Germany recognized the independence of German Austria as inalienable except by consent of the League of Nations.

The German army was to be reduced ultimately to 100,000 men, including 4,000 officers. The German General Staff was abolished and conscription was forbidden in Germany. Henceforth the strength of the German army must be maintained by voluntary enlistments for terms of twelve consecutive years and the number of discharges before the completion of this term must not exceed five per cent of the total effectives in any year. Germany was forbidden to maintain fortifications or armed forces west of the Rhine or within a strip of territory fifty kilometers wide on the east bank of the river. Germany was allowed a naval force of only six small battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats, with a personnel of 15,000 men, including officers.

It was provided that the Kaiser should be tried "for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." His surrender was to be requested of Holland. Likewise, persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war were to be tried and punished by military tribunals and Germany was placed under the obligation of handing over the accused together with the required evidence.

Germany accepted on its own account and that of its allies the full responsibility for all the loss inflicted upon the Allied and Associated governments and their nationals through the war which had been imposed upon them. The total amount of this obligation was to be determined and announced to Germany not later than May 1, 1921, by an Interallied Reparation Commission, and a schedule of payments was to be adopted by which the obligation would be

discharged in thirty years. Germany was to make initial payment within two years of the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 marks in gold, goods, ships, or other specific forms. The Reparation Commission was to consist of single representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Belgium, and in certain cases of Japan and Serbia, the other Allied Powers having the right of representation in it without the power of voting whenever their claims should be considered.

The treaty established the right of the Allies to replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of the merchant shipping and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war. Germany was required to devote its economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas.

The Elbe and the Oder were placed under international control. The Rhine was placed under the Central Rhine Commission which was to be composed of four representatives of France, which should in addition select the president, four of Germany, and two each of Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.

By the terms of the treaty the members of the League of Nations agreed to establish a permanent organization to promote the international adjustment of labor conditions, consisting of an annual international labor conference and an international labor office, the latter at the seat of the League. Nine principles were adopted as an international standard of labor conditions, namely: that labor should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce; the right of association of employers and employees; a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life; the eight-hour day or forty-eight hour week; a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours; abolition of child labor and assurance of the continuation of the education and proper physical development of children; equal pay for equal work as between men and women;

equitable treatment of all workers, including foreigners; and a system of inspection in which women should take part.

Germany agreed to recognize the full validity of the treaties of peace and additional conventions which were to be concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers and the powers which had been allied with Germany.

It was provided that the treaty should become effective for the powers that had ratified it when ratified by Germany and three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

It was fitting that the achievement of victory should thus receive solemn confirmation in this historic center of France. France, which had suffered most in the war, had contributed most to the triumphant conclusion. France almost alone arrested the great invasion in September, 1914. France alone broke the tremendous attacks on Verdun. The French did their share and more throughout 1916 and 1917. Twice in the critical days of 1918 the French saved the British from destruction on the Western front. From first to last France was the main bulwark for the defense of liberty and civilization, and finally the greatest armies of all time were united for victory under the command of a French general.

Only a brief allusion can be made to the subsequent negotiations with Germany's allies. Austria, abandoned by Hungary and isolated by the establishment of Czecho-Slovakian independence, the transference of Galicia to Poland, and the union of the Southern Slavs under the Serbian crown, appeared before the Peace Conference as a suppliant, pleading for the reduction of her share of the liabilities incurred by the belligerent action of the Empire of which she had formed the nucleus, but after all only one of many parts. Austria signed a peace treaty with the Allied and Associated Powers at St. Germain on September 10, 1919, accepting the obligation to make reparation to an amount to be fixed later by the Reparation Commission of the Allies.

The peace treaty with Bulgaria was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27th of the same year. On the side of Roumania the Bulgarian frontier remained the same as before the war. Small portions of Bulgarian territory on the west were ceded to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. Bulgaria relinquished its territory along the Aegean coast, but received a small portion of Turkish territory northwest of Mustapha Pasha. Bulgaria was placed under the obligation of paying as reparation the sum of 2,250,000,000 francs in gold in a series of half-yearly instalments.

The work of settlement thus far accomplished seemed completely overshadowed by the vast problems still impending, involved in the baffling situation in Russia, the difficulty of conciliating Italian aspirations on the coasts of the Adriatic with the fundamental principles proclaimed by the Allies, and the complications which beset the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire. Minor conflicts growing out of the many uncertain situations put off indefinitely the general restoration of peace, and the laborious course of parley and negotiation seemed less the termination of a great and decisive war than the tedious period of transition to a future era, the coming of which was still far distant.

Yet the common action of the Allies was gradually merging into the union of nations forecast by the world's enlightened leaders. In spite of hostile criticism and the derision of sceptics, in spite of industrial and social turmoil, threatened revolutions and financial crises, misunderstandings and jealousies, the idea and habit of the common action of the nations was winning its place in human thought and human imagination. Slowly but inevitably, out of apparent anarchy and chaos, fashioned by the shocks and necessities of this period of storm and stress, the institutions of a future organization of humanity were taking form.

*The End*

# APPENDIX

## Summary by Gen. Pershing of U. S. Operations in France from May 26, 1917, until the Signing of the Armistice, as Made Public by Secretary of War in Annual Report

*November 20, 1918.*

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

In response to your request, I have the honor to submit this brief summary of the organization and operations of the American Expeditionary Force from May 26, 1917, until the signing of the armistice November 11, 1918. Pursuant to your instructions, immediately upon receiving my orders I selected a small staff and proceeded to Europe in order to become familiar with conditions at the earliest possible moment.

The warmth of our reception in England and France was only equalled by the readiness of the commanders in chief of the veteran armies of the allies and their staffs to place their experience at our disposal. In consultation with them the most effective means of cooperation of effort was considered. With French and British armies at their maximum strength, and all efforts to dispossess the enemy from his firmly intrenched positions in Belgium and France failed, it was necessary to plan for an American force adequate to turn the scale in favor of the allies. Taking

account of the strength of the central powers at that time, the immensity of the problem which confronted us could hardly be overestimated. The first requisite being an organization that could give intelligent direction to effort, the formation of a General Staff occupied my early attention.

### *The General Staff.*

A well organized General Staff through which the commander exercises his functions is essential to a successful modern army. However capable our division, our battalion, and our companies as such, success would be impossible without thoroughly coordinated endeavor. A General Staff broadly organized and trained for war had not hitherto existed in our Army. Under the Commander in Chief this staff must carry out the policy and direct the details of administration, supply, preparation, and operations of the Army as a whole, with all special branches and bureaus subject to its control. As models to aid us we had the veteran French General Staff and the experience of the British, who had similarly formed an organization to meet the demands of a great army. By selecting from each the features best adapted to our basic organization, and fortified by our own early experience in the war, the development of our great General Staff system was completed.

### *Divided Into Five Groups.*

The General Staff is naturally divided into five groups, each with its chief, who is an assistant of the Chief of the General Staff. G. 1 is in charge of organization and equipment of troops, replacements, tonnage, priority of overseas shipment, the auxilliary welfare association and cognate subjects; G. 2 has censorship, enemy intelligence, gathering and disseminating information, preparation of maps, and all similar subjects; G. 3 is charged with all strategic

studies and plans, movement of troops, and the supervision of combat operations; G. 4 coordinates important questions of supply, construction, transport arrangements for combat, and of the operations of the service of supply, and of hospitalization and the evacuation of the sick and wounded; G. 5 supervises the various schools and has general direction and coordination of education and training.

The first Chief of Staff was Col. (now Maj. Gen.) James G. Harbord, who was succeeded in March, 1918, by Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew. To these officers, to the Deputy Chief of Staff, and to the assistant Chiefs of Staff, who, as heads of sections, aided them, great credit is due for the results obtained not only in perfecting the General Staff organization, but in applying correct principles to the multiplicity of problems that have arisen.

*Organization and Training.*

After a thorough consideration of allied organizations it was decided that our combat division should consist of four regiments of Infantry of 3,000 men, with three battalions to regiment and four companies of 250 men each to a battalion, and of an Artillery brigade of three regiments, a machine-gun battalion, an engineer regiment, a trench-mortar battery, a signal battalion, wagon trains, and the headquarters staffs and military police. These, with medical and other units, made a total of over 28,000 men, or practically double the size of a French or German division. Each corps would normally consist of six divisions—four combat and one depot and one replacement division—and also two regiments of cavalry, and each army of from three to five corps. With four divisions fully trained, a corps could take over an American sector with two divisions in line and two in reserve, with the depot and replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps in the ranks.

Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly, the development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down, a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a complete division in war of movement.

*School System Started.*

Very early a system of schools was outlined and started, which should have the advantage of instruction by officers direct from the front. At the great school center at Langres, one of the first to be organized, was the staff school, where the principles of general staff work, as laid down in our own organization were taught to carefully selected officers. Men in the ranks, who had shown qualities of leadership, were sent to the school of candidates for commissions. A school of the line taught younger officers the principles of leadership, tactics, and the use of the different weapons. In the artillery school, at Saumur, young officers were taught the fundamental principles of modern artillery; while at Issoudun an immense plant was built for training cadets in aviation. These and other schools, with their well-considered curriculums for training in every branch of our organization, were coordinated in a manner best to develop an efficient Army out of willing and industrious young men, many of whom had not before known even the rudiments of military technique. Both Marshal Haig and Gen. Petain placed officers and men at our disposal for instructional purposes, and we are deeply indebted for the opportunities given to profit by their veteran experience.

*The American Zone.*

The eventual place the American Army should take on the western front was to a large extent influenced by the vital questions of communication and supply. The northern ports of France were crowded by the British armies' shipping and supplies while the southern ports, though otherwise at our service, had not adequate port facilities for our purposes and these we should have to build. The already overtaxed railway system behind the active front in northern France would not be available for us as lines of supply and those leading from the southern ports of northeastern France would be unequal to our needs without much new construction. Practically all warehouses, supply depots, and regulating stations must be provided by fresh constructions. While France offered us such material as she had to spare after a drain of three years, enormous quantities of material had to be brought across the Atlantic.

With such a problem any temporization or lack of definiteness in making plans might cause failure even with victory within our grasp. Moreover, broad plans commensurate with our national purpose and resources would bring conviction of our power to every soldier in the front line, to the nations associated with us in the war, and to the enemy. The tonnage for material for necessary construction for the supply of an army of three and perhaps four million men would require a mammoth program of shipbuilding at home, and miles of dock construction in France, with a corresponding large project for additional railways and for storage depots.

*Selection of Ports.*

All these considerations led to the inevitable conclusion that if we were to handle and supply the great forces deemed essential to win the war we must utilize the southern

ports of France—Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire, and Brest—and the comparatively unused railway systems leading therefrom to the northeast. Generally speaking, then, this would contemplate the use of our forces against the enemy somewhere in that direction, but the great depots of supply must be centrally located, preferably in the area included by Tours, Bourges, and Chateauroux, so that our armies could be supplied with equal facility wherever they might be serving on the western front.

*Growth of the Service of Supply.*

To build up such a system there were talented men in the Regular Army, but more experts were necessary than the Army could furnish. Thanks to the patriotic spirit of our people at home, there came from civil life men trained for every sort of work involved in building and managing the organization necessary to handle and transport such an army and keep it supplied. With such assistance the construction and general development of our plans have kept pace with the growth of the forces, and the Service of Supply is now able to discharge from ships and move 45,000 tons daily, besides transporting troops and material in the conduct of active operations.

As to organization, all the administrative and supply services, except The Adjutant General's, Inspector General's, and Judge Advocate General's Departments which remain at general headquarters, have been transferred to the headquarters of the services of supplies at Tours under a commanding general responsible to the commander in chief for supply of the armies. The Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Ordnance, Chief of Air Service, Chief of Chemical Warfare, the general purchasing agent in all that pertains to questions of procurement and supply, the Provost Marshal General in the maintenance

of order in general, the Director General of Transportation in all that affects such matters, and the Chief Engineer in all matters of administration and supply, are subordinate to the Commanding General of the Service of Supply, who, assisted by a staff especially organized for the purpose, is charged with the administrative coordination of all these services.

*Transportation Department.*

The transportation department under the Service of Supply directs the operation, maintenance, and construction of railways, the operation of terminals, the unloading of ships, and transportation of material to warehouses or to the front. Its functions make necessary the most intimate relationship between our organization and that of the French, with the practical result that our transportation department has been able to improve materially the operations of railways generally. Constantly laboring under a shortage of rolling stock, the transportation department has nevertheless been able by efficient management to meet every emergency.

The Engineer Corps is charged with all construction, including light railways and roads. It has planned and constructed the many projects required, the most important of which are the new wharves at Bordeaux and Nantes, and the immense storage depots at La Pallice, Montoir, and Gievres, besides innumerable hospitals and barracks in various ports of France. These projects have all been carried on by phases keeping pace with our needs. The Forestry Service under the Engineer Corps has cut the greater part of the timber and railway ties required.

*Coordination of Purchases.*

To meet the shortage of supplies from America, due to lack of shipping, the representatives of the different supply

departments were constantly in search of available material and supplies in Europe. In order to coordinate these purchases and to prevent competition between our departments, a general purchasing agency was created early in our experience to coordinate our purchases and, if possible, induce our allies to apply the principle among the allied armies. While there was no authority for the general use of appropriations, this was met by grouping the purchasing representatives of the different departments under one control, charged with the duty of consolidating requisitions and purchases. Our efforts to extend the principle have been signally successful, and all purchases for the allied armies are now on an equitable and cooperative basis. Indeed, it may be said that the work of this bureau has been thoroughly efficient and businesslike.

*Artillery, Airplanes, and Tanks.*

Our entry into the war found us with few of the auxiliaries necessary for its conduct in the modern sense. Among our most important deficiencies in material were artillery, aviation, and tanks. In order to meet our requirements as rapidly as possible, we accepted the offer of the French Government to provide us with the necessary artillery equipment of seventy-fives, one fifty-five millimeter howitzers, and one fifty-five G P F guns from their own factories for 30 divisions. The wisdom of this course is fully demonstrated by the fact that, although we soon began the manufacture of these classes of guns at home, there were no guns of the calibers mentioned manufactured in America on our front at the date the armistice was signed. The only guns of these types produced at home thus far received in France are 109 seventy-five millimeter guns.

In aviation we were in the same situation, and here again the French Government came to our aid until our own

aviation program should be under way. We obtained from the French the necessary planes for training our personnel, and they have provided us with a total of 2,676 pursuit, observation, and bombing planes. The first airplanes received from home arrived in May, and altogether we have received 1,379. The first American squadron completely equipped by American production, including airplanes, crossed the German lines on August 7, 1918. As to tanks, we were also compelled to rely upon the French. Here, however, we were less fortunate, for the reason that the French production could barely meet the requirements of their own armies.

It should be fully realized that the French Government has always taken a most liberal attitude and has been most anxious to give us every possible assistance in meeting our deficiencies in these as well as in other respects. Our dependence upon France for artillery, aviation, and tanks was, of course, due to the fact that our industries had not been exclusively devoted to military production. All credit is due our own manufacturers for their efforts to meet our requirements, as at the time the armistice was signed we were able to look forward to the early supply of practically all our necessities from our own factories.

The welfare of the troops touches my responsibility as commander in chief to the mothers and fathers and kindred of the men who came to France in the impressionable period of youth. They could not have the privilege accorded European soldiers during their periods of leave of visiting their families and renewing their home ties. Fully realizing that the standard of conduct that should be established for them must have a permanent influence in their lives and on the character of their future citizenship, the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian Association, Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, and the

Jewish Welfare Board, as auxiliaries in this work, were encouraged in every possible way. The fact that our soldiers, in a land of different customs and language, have borne themselves in a manner in keeping with the cause for which they fought, is due not only to the efforts in their behalf but much more to other high ideals, their discipline, and their innate sense of self-respect. It should be recorded, however, that the members of these welfare societies have been untiring in their desire to be of real service to our officers and men. The patriotic devotion of these representative men and women has given a new significance to the Golden Rule, and we owe to them a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid.

*Combat Operations.*

During our periods of training in the trenches some of our divisions had engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was Seicheprey by the 26th on April 20, in the Toul sector, but none had participated in action as a unit. The 1st Division, which had passed through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the trenches for its first period of instruction at the end of October, and by March 21, when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had four divisions with experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was such that our occupation of an American sector must be postponed.

On March 28 I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had been agreed upon as commander in chief of the allied armies, all of our forces, to be used as he might decide. At his request the 1st Division was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt

action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the allied premiers and commanders and myself on May 2 by which British shipping was to transport 10 American divisions to the British Army area, where they were to be trained and equipped, and additional British shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for use elsewhere.

*First Division in Picardy.*

On April 26 the 1st Division had gone into the line in the Montdidier salient on the Picardy battle front. Tactics had been suddenly revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the results of their training, were eager for the test. On the morning of May 28 this division attacked the commanding German position in its front, taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious counter-attacks and galling artillery fire. Although local, this brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also that the enemy's troops were not altogether invincible.

The Germans' Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had advanced rapidly toward the River Marne and Paris, and the allies faced a crisis equally as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in March. Again every available man was placed at Marshal Foch's disposal, and the 3d Division, which had just come from its preliminary training in the trenches, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized machine-gun battalion preceded the other units and successfully held the bridgehead at the Marne, opposite Chateau Thierry. The 2d Division, in reserve near Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and other available transport to check the progress of the enemy toward Paris.

The division attacked and retook the town and railroad station at Bouresches and sturdily held its ground against the enemy's best guard divisions. In the battle of Belleau Wood, which followed, our men proved their superiority and gained a strong tactical position, with far greater loss to the enemy than to ourselves. On July 1, before the 2d was relieved, it captured the village of Vaux with most splendid precision.

Meanwhile our 2d Corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Read, had been organized for the command of our divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. Five of the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area in June, three to relieve divisions in Lorraine and the Vosges and two to the Paris area to join the group of American divisions which stood between the city and any farther advance of the enemy in that direction.

### *The Chateau Thierry Fight.*

The great June-July troop movement from the States was well under way, and although these troops were to be given some preliminary training before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves. Elements of the 42d Division were in the line east of the Rheims against the German offensive of July 15th, and held their ground unflinchingly. On the right flank of this offensive four companies of the 28th Division were in position in face of the advancing waves of the German infantry. The 3d Division was holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the mouth of the Surmelin to the west of Mezy, opposite Chateau Thierry, where a large force of German infantry sought to force a passage under support of powerful artillery concentrations

and under cover of smoke screens. A single regiment of the 3d wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front while, on either flank, the Germans, who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.

*Preparing for Offensive.*

The great force of the German Chateau Thierry offensive established the deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his disadvantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every division with any sort of training was made available for use in a counter-offensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on July 18 was given to our 1st and 2d Divisions in company with chosen French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a preliminary bombardment the massed French and American Artillery, firing by the map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the Infantry began its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under these trying conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enemy brought up large numbers of reserves, and made a stubborn defense both with machine-guns and artillery, but through five days' fighting the 1st Division continued to advance until it had gained the heights above Soissons and captured the village of Berzy-le-sec. The 2d Division took Beau Repaire farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance, and reached a position in front of Tigny at the end of its second day. These two divisions captured 7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery.

The 26th Division, which, with a French division, was under command of our 1st Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons. On the 18th it took the village of Torcy while the 3d Division was crossing the Marne in pursuit of the retiring enemy. The 26th attacked again on the 21st, and the enemy withdrew past the Chateau Thierry-Soissons road. The 3d Division, continuing its progress, took the heights of Mont St. Père and the villages of Chartèves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine-gun and artillery fire.

*Machine-gun Nests Overwhelmed.*

On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and Epieds, our 42d Division, which had been brought over from the Champagne, relieved the 26th and, fighting its way through the Foret de Fere, overwhelmed the nest of machine-guns in its path. By the 27th it had reached the Ourcq, whence the 3d and 4th Divisions were already advancing, while the French divisions with which we were cooperating were moving forward at other points.

The 3d Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the 32d. The 42d and 32d undertook the task of conquering the heights beyond Cierges, the 42d capturing Sergy and the 32d capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in the pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of reducing the salient was finished. Meanwhile the 42d was relieved by the 4th at Chery-Chartreuve, and the 32d by the 28th, while the 77th Division took up a position on the Vesle. The operations of these divisions on the Vesle were under the 3d Corps, Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, commanding.

*Battle of St. Mihiel.*

With the reduction of the Marne salient we could look forward to the concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the forthcoming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the 1st Army was organized on August 10 under my personal command. While American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons, a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30 the line beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was placed under my command. The American sector was afterwards extended across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and included the 2d Colonial French, which held the point of the salient, and the 17th French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.

The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the location of hospitals, and the molding together of all of the elements of a great modern army with its own railheads, supplied directly by our own Service of Supply. The concentration for this operation, which was to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most careful attention to every detail.

*Help by the French.*

The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and army artillery, with its personnel, and we were

confident from the start of our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces, gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in one operation on the western front.

From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the Moselle River the line was roughly 40 miles long and situated on commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our 1st Corps (82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions) under command of Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on Pont-a-Mousson, with its left joining our 3d Corps (the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions), under Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, in line to Xivray, were to swing in toward Vigneulles on the pivot of the Moselle River for the initial assault. From Xivray to Mouilly the 2d Colonial French Corps was in line in the center and our 5th Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, with our 26th Division and a French division at the western base of the salient, were to attack three difficult hills—Les Eparges, Combres, and Amaramthe. Our 1st Corps had in reserve the 78th Division, our 4th Corps the 3d Division, and our 1st Army the 35th and 91st Divisions, with the 80th and 33d available. It should be understood that our corps organizations are very elastic, and that we have at no time had permanent assignments of divisions to corps.

*Advance of September 12th.*

After four hours' artillery preparation, the seven American divisions in the front line advanced at 5 A. M., on September 12, assisted by a limited number of tanks manned

partly by Americans and partly by the French. These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed wire that protected the enemy's front line and support trenches, in irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our sudden approach out of the fog.

Our 1st Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our 4th Corps curved back to the southwest through Nonsard. The 2d Colonial French Corps made the slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the 5th Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counter-attack. A rapid march brought reserve regiments of a division of the 5th Corps into Vigneulles in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our 4th Corps, closing the salient and forming a new line west of Thiaucourt to Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of only 7,000 casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American 1st Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The allies found they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with.

*Meuse-Argonne Offensive—First Phase.*

On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our Corps and Army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel, and our divisions in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area back of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the forest of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel, the

old German front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact. In the general attack all along the line, the operation assigned the American Army as the hinge of this allied offensive was directed toward the important railroad communications of the German armies through Méziéres and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines or the withdrawal of his forces with four years' accumulation of plants and material would be dangerously imperiled.

The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization and, while the mass of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions and notably its machine-gun defense were exhibiting remarkable tactical efficiency as well as courage. The German general staff was fully aware of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was planned with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.

### *Right Flank Protected.*

Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense screened by dense thickets had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of battle from right to left was the 3d Corps from the Meuse to Malancourt, with the 33d, 80th, and 4th Divisions in line, and the 3d Division as corps reserve; the 5th Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with 79th, 87th, and 91st Divisions in line, and the 32d in corps reserve; and the 1st Corps,

from Vauquois to Vienne le Chateau, with 35th, 28th, and 77th Divisions in line, and the 92d in corps reserve. The Army reserve consisted of the 1st, 29th, and 82d Divisions.

*Took Place of the French.*

On the night of September 25 our troops quietly took the place of the French who thinly held the line in this sector which had long been inactive. In the attack which began on the 26th we drove through the barbed wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across No Man's Land, mastering all the first-line defenses. Continuing on the 27th and 28th, against machine-guns and artillery of an increasing number of enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from 3 to 7 miles, and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinonville, Charpentry, Very, and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our divisions, which was with the 2d Colonial French Corps, captured Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of forcing the battle into the open, and were prepared for the enemy's reaction, which was bound to come, as he had good roads and ample railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.

In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads across spongy, shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man's Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put their shoulders to wheels and dragropes to bring their guns through the mire in support of the Infantry, now under the increasing fire of the enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but, quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counter-attacks in strong force, supported by

heavy bombardments, with large quantities of gas. From September 28 until October 4 we maintained the offensive against patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of machine-guns, and pushed forward our guns and transport, seizing strategical points in preparation for further attacks.

*Other Units with Allies.*

Other divisions attached to the allied armies were doing their part. It was the fortune of our 2d Corps, composed of the 27th and 30th Divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a place of honor in cooperation with the Australian corps on September 29 and October 1 in the assault on the Hindenburg line where the St. Quentin Canal passes through a tunnel under a ridge. The 30th Division speedily broke through the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the 27th pushed on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached Gouy. In the midst of the maze of trenches and shell craters and under cross-fire from machine-guns the other elements fought desperately against odds. In this and in later actions, from October 6 to October 19, our 2d Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over 13 miles. The spirit and aggressiveness of these divisions have been highly praised by the British Army commander, under whom they served.

On October 2-9 our 2d and 36th Divisions were sent to assist the French in an important attack against the old German positions before Rheims. The 2d conquered the complicated defense works on their front against a persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, which they captured in a second assault, sweeping over it with consummate dash and skill. This division then repulsed strong counter-attacks before the village and

cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield positions they had held since September, 1914. On October 9 the 36th Division relieved the 2d and, in its first experience under fire, withstood very severe artillery bombardment and rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now retiring behind the Aisne.

*Meuse-Argonne Offensive—Second Phase.*

The allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in this crucial contest as the German command threw in more and more first-class troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this reinforcement, it was our Army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our Infantry and Artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience. The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving beside men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which especially favored the defense, by a prodigal use of machine-guns manned by highly trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges. In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable to accomplish any progress according to previously accepted standards, but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of our troops.

On October 4 the attack was renewed all along our front. The 3d Corps tilting to the left followed the Brieulles-Cunel road; our 5th Corps took Gesnes while the 1st Corps advanced for over 2 miles along the irregular

valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of the Argonne that bordered the river, used by the enemy with all his art and weapons of defense. This sort of fighting continued against an enemy striving to hold every foot of ground and whose very strong counter-attacks challenged us at every point. On the 7th the 1st Corps captured Chatel-Chéhéry and continued along the river to Cornay. On the east of Meuse sector one of the two divisions cooperating with the French captured Consenvoye and the Haumont Woods. On the 9th the 5th Corps, in its progress up the Aire, took Fléville, and the 3d Corps which had continuous fighting against odds was working its way through Brieulles and Cunel. On the 10th we had cleared the Argonne Forest of the enemy.

*Second Army Constituted.*

It was now necessary to constitute a second army, and on October 9 the immediate command of the 1st Army was turned over to Lieut. Gen. Hunter Liggett. The command of the 2d Army, whose divisions occupied a sector in the Woevre, was given to Lieut. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, who had been commander of the 1st Division and then of the 3d Corps. Maj. Gen. Dickman was transferred to the command of the 1st Corps, while the 5th Corps was placed under Maj. Gen. Charles P. Summerall, who had recently commanded the 1st Division. Maj. Gen. John L. Hines, who had gone rapidly up from regimental to division commander, was assigned to the 3d Corps. These four officers had been in France from the early days of the expedition and had learned their lessons in the school of practical warfare.

Our constant pressure against the enemy brought day by day more prisoners, mostly survivors from machine-gun nests captured in fighting at close quarters. On October 18

there was very fierce fighting in the Caures Woods east of the Meuse and in the Ormont Woods. On the 14th the 1st Corps took St. Juvin, and the 5th Corps, in hand-to-hand encounters, entered the formidable Kriemhilde line, where the enemy had hoped to check us indefinitely. Later the 5th Corps penetrated farther the Kriemhilde line, and the 1st Corps took Champigneulles and the important town of Grandpre. Our dogged offensive was wearing down the enemy, who continued desperately to throw his best troops against us, thus weakening his line in front of our allies and making their advance less difficult.

*Divisions in Belgium.*

Meanwhile we were not only able to continue the battle, but our 37th and 91st Divisions were hastily withdrawn from our front and dispatched to help the French Army in Belgium. Detraining in the neighborhood of Ypres, these divisions advanced by rapid stages to the fighting line and were assigned to adjacent French corps. On October 31, in continuation of the Flanders offensive, they attacked and methodically broke down all enemy resistance. On November 3 the 37th had completed its mission in dividing the enemy across the Escaut River and firmly established itself along the east bank included in the division zone of action. By a clever flanking movement troops of the 91st Division captured Spitaals Bosschen, a difficult wood extending across the central part of the division sector, reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of Audenarde. These divisions received high commendation from their corps commanders for their dash and energy.

*Meuse-Argonne—Last Phase.*

On the 23d the 3d and 5th Corps pushed northward to the level of Bantheville. While we continued to press

forward and throw back the enemy's violent counter-attacks with great loss to him, a regrouping of our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidences of loss of morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and more fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and the hardships of very inclement weather.

With comparatively well-rested divisions, the final advance in the Meuse-Argonne front was begun on November 1. Our increased artillery force acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and the enemy broke before the determined infantry, which, by its persistent fighting of the past weeks and the dash of this attack, had overcome his will to resist. The 3d Corps took Aincreville, Doulcon, and Andevanne, and the 5th Corps took Landres et St. Georges and pressed through successive lines of resistance to Bayonville and Chennery. On the 2d the 1st Corps joined in the movement, which now became an impetuous onslaught that could not be stayed.

*Forward in Pursuit.*

On the 3d advance troops surged forward in pursuit, some by motor trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close behind. The 1st Corps reached Authe and Chatillon-Sur-Bar, the 5th Corps, Fosse and Nouart, and the 3d Corps, Halles, penetrating the enemy's line to a depth of 12 miles. Our large caliber guns had advanced and were skilfully brought into position to fire upon the important lines at Montmedy, Longuyon, and Conflans. Our 3d Corps crossed the Meuse on the 5th and the other corps, in the full confidence that the day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine-guns as they swept northward, maintaining complete coordination throughout. On the 6th a division of the 1st Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan, 25 miles

from our line of departure. The strategical goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications, and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete disaster.

In all 40 enemy divisions had been used against us in the Meuse-Argonne battle. Between September 26 and November 6 we took 26,059 prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32d, 33d, 35th, 37th, 42d, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 82d, 89th, 90th, and 91st. Many of our divisions remained in line for a length of time that required nerves of steel, while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. The 1st, 5th, 26th, 42d, 77th, 80th, 89th, and 90th were in the line twice. Although some of the divisions were fighting their first battle, they soon became equal to the best.

*Operations East of the Meuse.*

On the three days preceding November 10, the 3d, the 2d Colonial, and the 17th French Corps fought a difficult struggle through the Meuse Hills south of Stenay, and forced the enemy into the plain. Meanwhile, my plans for further use of the American forces contemplated an advance between the Meuse and the Moselle in the direction of Longwy by the 1st Army, while at the same time the 2d Army should assure the offensive toward the rich coal fields of Briey. These operations were to be followed by an offensive toward Chateau-Salins east of the Moselle, thus isolating Metz. Accordingly, attacks on the American front had been ordered, and that of the 2d Army was in progress on the morning of November 11, when instructions were received that hostilities should cease at 11 o'clock A.M.

At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left, began at Port-Sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandieres and through the Woevre to Bezonvaux in the foothills of the Meuse, thence along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre forests to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with the French under Sedan.

*Relations with the Allies.*

Cooperation among the allies has at all times been most cordial. A far greater effort has been put forth by the allied armies and staffs to assist us than could have been expected. The French Government and Army have always stood ready to furnish us with supplies, equipment, and transportation and to aid us in every way. In the towns and hamlets wherever our troops have been stationed or billeted the French people have everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate friends than as soldiers of a foreign army. For these things words are quite inadequate to express our gratitude. There can be no doubt that the relations growing out of our associations here assure a permanent friendship between the two peoples. Although we have not been so intimately associated with the people of Great Britain, yet their troops and ours when thrown together have always warmly fraternized. The reception of those of our forces who have passed through England and of those who have been stationed there has always been enthusiastic. Altogether it has been deeply impressed upon us that the ties of language and blood bring the British and ourselves together completely and inseparably.

*Strength in Europe.*

There are in Europe altogether, including a regiment and some sanitary units with the Italian Army and the

organizations at Murmansk, also including those en route from the States, approximately 2,053,347 men, less our losses. Of this total there are in France 1,338,169 combatant troops. Forty divisions have arrived, of which the Infantry personnel of 10 have been used as replacements, leaving 30 divisions now in France organized into 3 armies of 3 corps each.

The losses of the Americans up to November 18 are: Killed and wounded, 36,145; died of disease, 14,811; deaths unclassified, 2,204; wounded, 179,625; prisoners, 2,163; missing, 1,160. We have captured about 44,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers, and trench mortars.

*Commendation.*

The duties of the General Staff, as well as those of the Army and corps staffs, have been very ably performed. Especially is this true when we consider the new and difficult problems with which they have been confronted. This body of officers, both as individuals and as an organization, have, I believe, no superiors in professional ability, in efficiency, or in loyalty.

Nothing that we have in France better reflects the efficiency and devotion to duty of Americans in general than the service of supply whose personnel is thoroughly imbued with a patriotic desire to do its full duty. They have at all times fully appreciated their responsibility to the rest of the Army and the results produced have been most gratifying.

Our Medical Corps is especially entitled to praise for the general effectiveness of its work both in hospital and at the front. Embracing men of high professional attainments, and splendid women devoted to their calling and untiring in their efforts, this department has made a new record for medical and sanitary proficiency.

The Quartermaster Department has had difficult and various tasks, but it has more than met all demands that have been made upon it. Its management and its personnel have been exceptionally efficient and deserve every possible commendation.

As to the more technical services, the able personnel of the Ordnance Department in France has splendidly fulfilled its functions both in procurement and in forwarding the immense quantities of ordnance required. The officers and men and the young women of the Signal Corps have performed their duties with a large conception of the problem and with a devoted and patriotic spirit to which the perfection of our communications daily testify. While the Engineer Corps has been referred to in another part of this report, it should be further stated that the work has required large vision and high professional skill, and great credit is due their personnel for the high proficiency that they have constantly maintained.

*Praise for Aviators.*

Our aviators have no equals in daring or in fighting ability and have left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant page in the annals of our Army. While the Tank Corps has had limited opportunities its personnel has responded gallantly on every possible occasion and has shown courage of the highest order.

The Adjutant General's Department has been directed with a systematic thoroughness and excellence that surpassed any previous work of its kind. The Inspector General's Department has risen to the highest standards and throughout has ably assisted commanders in the enforcement of discipline. The able personnel of the Judge Advocate General's Department has solved with judgment and wisdom the multitude of difficult legal problems,

many of them involving questions of great international importance.

It would be impossible in this brief preliminary report to do justice to the personnel of all the different branches of this organization which I shall cover in detail in a later report.

The Navy in European waters has at all times most cordially aided the Army, and it is most gratifying to report that there has never been such perfect cooperation between these two branches of the service.

As to Americans in Europe not in the military services, it is the greatest pleasure to say that, both in official and in private life, they are intensely patriotic and loyal, and have been invariably sympathetic and helpful to the Army.

Finally, I pay the supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of the line. When I think of their heroism, their patience under hardships, their unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with emotion which I am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and they have earned the eternal gratitude of our country.

I am, Mr. Secretary, very respectfully,

JOHN J. PERSHING,
*General, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces.*

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

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